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AN ABRIDGMENT OF Dr. *CUDWORTH*'s TRUE *Intellectual System of the Universe.*

In which all the Arguments for and againſt ATHEISM are clearly ſtated and examined.


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In TWO VOLUMES.

LONDON:

Printed for JOHN OSWALD at the *Roſe* and *Crown* in the *Poultry* near *Stocks-Market*. M.DCC.XXXII.


LIGHT OF REASON
Confusion
Aristotle.
Plato.
Socrates.
Pythagoras.
Anaximander.
Strato.
Democritus.
Epicurus.
THEISTS
ATHEISTS
M: V. de Gucht Sculp:

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BRITISH MUSEUM

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That the antient Cabala, which deriv'd the Coſmogonia *and* Theogonia *from Chaos and Love, was not at firſt Atheiſtical.* 163.
Why the Antients thought Water to be divinely inſpir'd. ib.
Love not the Offſpring of Chaos. 163, 164.
Concluded that tho the Pagans held a Multiplicity of Gods, yet they underſtood all of them, excepting one, to have been generated. 164.
Ariſtotle, *and before him* Ocellus Lucanus, Epicharmus *and the* Chaldeans, *&c. denying a* Coſmogonia *or temporary Production of the World, did conſequently deny a* Theogonia. 164, 165.
The World, according to Plotinus *and* Proclus, *eradiated from God, as Light from the Sun.* 166.
The modern Platoniſts, *agreeably to* Ariſtotle, *but diſagreeably to* Plato, *aſſerted the World and all the inferior Gods and Souls to be eternal, yet withal deriv'd by way of Emanation from the ſupreme Deity.* 166, 167, 168, *&c.*
No Repugnancy, according to the modern Platoniſts, *between Exiſtence from Eternity and being produc'd by another.* 167,168.
Accordingly both theſe affirm'd of the inferior Gods and World. 169.
The Platonick *Aſſertors of the World's Eternity ſo far from being Atheiſts, that it was a Belief of God's emanative Fecundity and Goodneſs that led 'em into that Error.* 167.
Ditheiſts the only Aſſertors of the Self-exiſtence of Matter. 170.
How the Pagans, tho ſometimes in words they confounded, yet made a diſtinction between the ſupreme and inferior Gods. 170, 171.
Several Names of the ſupreme God in ſeveral Countrys. ib.
Why the Pagans ſometimes confounded the inferior Gods with the ſupreme. ib.
The Reaſon of thoſe Forms of Speech, ſub Jove, ſub Dio. 171.
Jupiter *ſometimes taken for a deify'd Man born in* Crete *or* Arcadia, *but moſt commonly for the ſupreme Deity.* 172.
The Pagan Theology confounded with a mixture of Phyſiology and Herology. ib.
Ζεὺς Sabazius *introduc'd among the* Greeks, *as a Name of the ſupreme God, from the* Hebrew Sebaoth. *This found fault with by* Ariſtophanes *as a new and ſtrange God.* 173.
As the Greeks *by* Ζεὺς *and* Ζεν, *ſo the* Latins *by* Jupiter *and* Jovis *denoted the ſupreme Deity.* 173.
Jupiter *or* Jovis *not rightly etymologiz'd a* Juvando *or* Juvans Pater, *but from the* Hebrew Jovah *or* Jahvoh, *&c.* ib.
Ὁ θεὸς *and* τὸ θεῖον, ὁ δαίμων *and* τὸ δαιμόνιον *us'd* ſignanter *for the ſupreme God; tho ſometimes indeed the latter words are apply'd to Dæmons and Hero's.* 174, 175.
Titles, Epithets, &c. incommunicably proper to the ſupreme God, apply'd to him by the Pagans. 175, 176.
Why the Epicureans *jeeringly term'd God a Fortune-telling old Woman.* 176.
The Pagans univerſally aſſerted one unmade God and Creator of all things. ib.

Apollonius Tyanæus *set up by the Devil to vie with Christ Jesus.* 176, 177.
He, tho a Polytheist, yet was still a Monarchist. ib.
Celsus *a profess'd Polytheist, yet still an Assertor of one supreme God and the Divine Omnipotence.* 178.
Malchus, *term'd by the* Greeks Porphyrius, *a zealous Assertor of one supreme Deity, the Creator of Matter and all the World.* 178, 179.
Hierocles, *an eminent Opposer of Christianity, whether the same with him who wrote upon the Golden Verses or not, was at once a Champion for the Gods, and yet an Assertor of one God above them all.* 179, &c.
Julian *the Emperor and greatest Oppoposer of Christianity, an undoubted Assertor of one supreme Deity.* 180, &c.
Maximus Madaurensis's *Expression of the general Sense of the Pagans, touching their Belief of one supreme God.* 181, &c.
Longimanus's *Confession of one supreme God.* 182.
That the Pagans generally disclaim'd the Opinion of many unmade self-existent Deitys, appears from Arnobius. 182.
The same is acknowledg'd touching the Pagans by Clemens Alexandrinus, Lactantius, Eusebius, *St.* Austin, *and* Paulus Orosius. 184.
The Pagans not only after, but also before Christianity asserted one supreme God. ib.
The Authority of the Sibylline *Prophecys and other Pagan Oracles deservedly suspected.* ib.
Zoroaster, *tho a Worshipper of many Gods, and among others of the Stars, and especially of the Sun, yet own'd one supreme unmade Deity, which he, as also the* Persian Magi, *term'd* Mithras *or* Oromasdes. 185, 186, &c.
The one supreme God distinguish'd by the Names of Oromasdes, Mithras *and* Arimanius, *and therefore term'd by* Zoroaster *and the* Persian Magi threefold, *as having in him a Trinity of Hypostases.* 186.
The Theology of the Greeks *term'd* Θρησκεια, *because of a* Thracian *Invention.* 187.
An Account of the Descent and Country of Orpheus, *and of the Time when he flourish'd.* 187.
The Orphick *Verses, tho suted to the Doctrine of* Orpheus, *yet perhaps were not compos'd by himself, but some other Poet.* ib.
The Orphick *Poems much older than* Herodotus, Plato *and* Aristotle, *and had in great esteem among the Pagans.* ib. &c.
Orpheus *a great Assertor, if not the first Teacher of Polytheism among the* Greeks, *and of the various Mythology and Fables of the Gods, yet acknowledg'd one supreme unmade God.* 188, 189, &c.
The Credit of some at least of the Orphick *as well as the* Sibylline *Verses to be suspected, but the Authority of some to be rely'd on.* 189, 190.
The Egyptians, *notwithstanding their multifarious Polytheism, yet asserted one supreme God, and also the Beginning and Formation of the World by God.* 191, 192.
Why the Egyptians *pictur'd* Horus *or the World, like a young Man, beardless.* ib. &c.
The Egyptians *Assertors of incorporeal Substance, as also of the Immortality, Pre-existence and Transmigration of Souls.* ib.
The Book imputed to Aristotle, de secretiore parte Divinæ Sapientiæ, *unquestionably spurious.* 193.
The Trismegistick *Books, tho they should all of 'em be granted to be spurious, as* Casaubon *thought 'em, yet would they afford no inconsiderable Argument, to prove that the* Egyptians *asserted one supreme God.* ib.

How-

However it does not appear that they were all spurious. Jamblichus's *Judgment herein oppos'd to* Casaubon's. 193, 194.

Some Trismegistick *Books forg'd purely by Christians; and others of 'em, tho not written by* Trismegistus *himself, yet contain his Opinions, and shew the* Egyptians *Belief of one supreme God.* 194, 195.

Orpheus's *asserting of one God, is an argument that the* Egyptians, *from whom he deriv'd his Doctrine, did the same; which also appears from the Testimonys not only of* Apollonius Tyanæus, *but especially of* Plutarch, Horus Apollo, Sanchuniathon, Jamblichus, Damascius, *&c.* 195, 196, 197, *&c.*

Plutarch's *and* Horus Apollo's *Reasons why the* Egyptians *made the Crocodile and the Serpent, and that sometimes with a Hawk, Symbols of the one supreme God.* 196, 197.

Jamblichus's *reason, why the* Egyptians *pictur'd God sitting upon the Lote-Tree above the watery Mud.* 198.

Jamblichus *a Person very well skill'd in the* Egyptian *Theology.* 197, 198.

That the Egyptian *Theology begins and ends with Unity, notwithstanding that it admitted Divine Hypostases.* 199.

God, as being incomprehensible, worship'd by the Egyptians *under the name of the* Unknown Darkness. 200.

The one supreme God denoted among the Egyptians *by the Name of* Amous *or* Ammous, *pronounc'd by the* Greeks Ammon *or* Hammon, *as being hidden, invisible and incorporeal; this often taken notice of in the Old Testament.* 200, 201.

Again, that the Egyptians *worship'd one supreme God appears from an Inscription in the Temple of* Sais; *by which it is also denoted, that he was held by 'em to be, unless by his Effects, invisible.* 201.

A great part of the Egyptian *Polytheism, at least among their Theologers and Priests, was really nothing else, but the worshipping of one supreme God under different Names.* 202.

That the Egyptians, *notwithstanding the Unity of the Godhead, yet held that there was in it a Trinity of Hypostases; from which* Orpheus, Pythagoras *and* Plato *very probably deriv'd their Triad.* ib. & 203.

That the Obelisk, made up of a wing'd Globe with a Serpent coming out of it, was the Egyptian *Hieroglyphick of a triform Deity.* 203.

From this, that the Egyptians *asserted one incorporeal God to be all things, and by consequence could not hold a Multitude of independent Gods, it appears, that even this was an occasion of their seeming Polytheism; they therefore worshipping the one simple Deity in the several things of Nature under several Names.* 203, 204.

Plutarch's *Account of* Osiris, *said to be mangled and cut in pieces by* Typhon. *ib.*

The Heathen Poets, tho grand Depravers of the Pagan Theology, and seeming Sticklers for Polytheism, yet in earnest asserted but only one unmade Deity. ib.

Homer *an Assertor of one eternal, unmade, self-existent Deity, distinguish'd by the Name of* Zeus, &c. *tho at once he held many created Gods, which went by the Name of* οἱ θεοὶ. 204, 205, &c.

Hesiod *an Assertor of one supreme God. His* Theogonia *or Generation of Gods to be understood only of inferior Gods.* 206.

Pindar's *many Gods not unmade or eternal; and he held one supreme God distinct from them, eternal and unmade.* 207.

Achilles *inſtructed by* Cheiron *to worſhip the one ſupreme God above all others.* ib.
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Plutarch, *tho a Ditheist, yet as on one hand he held one of his Gods to be a Principle of* Evil, *so on t'other he held the other of 'em to be the sole Principle of* Good, *whom he terms the highest* God, *&c.* 248.

Dio Chrysostomus, *tho he plainly asserted many Gods, yet acknowledg'd that the World was under a Kingly Power or Monarchy.* 248, &c.

An Account of Galen's *Religion, implying that he believ'd and worship'd one* God. 249.

Maximus Tyrius *an Assertor of one supreme* God. *ib.*

Aristides *asserted* Jupiter *to be the First and the Prince of all things.* 250.

Not only the Philosophers and the Learned, but also the vulgar and unlearned Pagans asserted one supreme God. 250, 251, *&c.*

That this Form of Prayer, Lord have Mercy upon us, *was antiently part of the Pagans Litany to the supreme* God. 253.

That the Persians *acknowledg'd an invisible Deity,* Mithras, Oromasdes *or* Jupiter, *superior to the Sun.* ib. & 254.

That the antient Germans *worship'd one supreme* God *under the name of* Thau, *term'd afterwards* Thautes *and* Theutates. 255.

That the generality of Pagans even to this day do acknowledg one supreme or greatest God, *they having many proper Names for him.* ib.

The Pagans suppos'd it for the Honour, &c. of the one supreme God *to be worship'd various ways, &c. ib. &* 256.

Livy's *Opinion, that tho from the Diversity of Religious Rites, &c. among the Pagans it might seem that they worship'd many self-existent* Gods, *yet were these no other than the supreme* God *and his Ministers under him.* ib. &c

The Egyptians *Worshippers of one supreme* God, *under the name of the* Unknown Darkness; *and him they multiply'd into the Propertys and Titles of many* Gods. 257.

The Hebrews, *who must be own'd to have had a right Notion of the Pagan Polytheism, do inform us, that the generality of the Pagans acknowledged one supreme* God, *and confess'd their other* Gods *to be Creatures.* 258.

Reasons given by the Hebrews, *why the Pagans worship'd Creatures besides the Creator.* ib.

The Scripture acquaints us, that the Pagans however Polytheists and Idolaters, yet had the Knowledg of the one true God. 259.

That the Pagans had the Knowledg, *tho not the* Agnition *of* God. *ib. &* 260.

God Almighty, according to St. Paul, *knowable from his Effects and by the Light of Reason.* ib.

That the Pagan Superstition universally consisted, not in worshipping many independent co-ordinate Gods, *but in joining the Worship of the Creature with that of the Creator.* ib.

The Meaning of the Inscription upon an Altar at Athens, To the unknown God; Lucian's *Sense of it the same with St.* Paul's, *that it was to the one supreme incomprehensible* God. 261.

The Beginning of St. Paul's *Speech in the* Areopagitick *Court expounded.* Ib.

Why the one supreme God *was sometimes term'd* ineffable *and sometimes* uncertain, *&c.* 262.

The one supreme God, *why worship'd by the Pagans under the Name of the proper and convenient* God. *ib.*

The unknown God *said to be* ignorantly worship'd *by the* Athenians, *because they had not the practical Knowledg of him.* ib.

That

That Aratus's Ζεὺς *was the one supreme* God; *prov'd by St.* Paul, *that him the* Athenians ignorantly worship'd; *the same evident from a Passage in* Antoninus. *ib.* 263.

The Sense of this Saying of St. Paul, In the Wisdom of God, the World by Wisdom knew not God. *ib.* 264.

CHAP. V.

That the Pagans besides their vulgar and political had also a more arcane and natural Theology, which was also that of their Priests and wise Men. 265.

That the fabulous Theology of the Greeks *and* Romans generated *not only the other* Gods, *but also* Jupiter *himself; this conniv'd at by Politicians for the sake of the Vulgar, who could not conceive a thing without a Beginning.* 266.

That the generality of the wiser Pagans, even such as were Poets, constantly asserted Jupiter *to be the Father both of Gods and Men.* 267.

That even the Civil Theology of the Pagans had in it an appearance of a Plurality of independent Gods. 267, *&c.*

That the Poetical Gods *of the Heathens were only so many several Names and Notions of one supreme* God, *as manifesting his several Powers and Effects in the World. Thought more solemn even by the Philosophers to worship* God *thus, than all at once.* 268.

Several proper Names given to the supreme God *in the* Egyptian *Theology from his several Powers and Effects.* ib. &c.

That other Nations looking on the Egyptian *Theology as a Pattern, did accordingly make many* Gods *of one.* 269.

That even the inferior Gods *had many proper Names given 'em by the* Greeks *and* Romans. *ib.*

That the supreme God *was more especially Polyonymous, as presiding over several Parts of the World.* ib. 282, &c.

That the several Names of one supreme God *seem'd to imply a Polytheism not only as such, but also as having peculiar Temples and Rites of Worship.* 270, &c.

Pan *an universal Deity, the Maker and Ruler of the World.* 271.

Janus *often taken for the supreme universal Deity.* ib.

Janus *and* Jupiter *were but different Names for one and the same supreme* God. 272.

That Genius *was held by the Pagans to be an universal Deity, containing the whole Nature of things.* ib. &c.

That Saturn *was no particular Deity among the Pagans, but the universal* God *of the whole World.* 273.

That Saturn *implies a hidden* God, *call'd by the* Romans Deus Latius. *ib.*

How Jupiter *could be said to be the Son of* Saturn, *and yet was held to be one and the same* God. *ib. &c.*

The Meaning of the Fable of Saturn's *devouring his Male Children.* 274.

Minerva *often taken for the supreme* God, *according to the most general Notion of him.* 275.

Apollo *sometimes taken for the supreme universal Deity.* 276.

That the Heavenly Venus *of the Pagans was another Name of* God, *as comprehending all things and the first Beauty of the World.* 276, 277, &c.

That the Antients distinguish'd two Venus's *or Loves.* ib.

Vulcan *sometimes taken for the supreme* God, *at least as a Soul of the World and artificially framing all things.* 278.

Seneca's *account why the supreme* God *was term'd by the Stoicks* Liber Pater, Hercules *and* Mercury. *ib.*

That the Dii Speciales *or particular* Gods *of the Pagans were but several Names or Notions of one Supreme;*

preme; that even Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, according to their true Theology, were so. 279.
Pluto a particular Name for one supreme God, as he manifests his Power in the whole Terrestrial Globe, or in the Regimen of Souls after Death. 279, 280.
Neptune a particular Name for one supreme God, as acting in the Seas. 280, &c.
Why a Statue of Jupiter was made with three Eyes. 281.
Juno a Name of the one supreme God, as acting in the Air. ib.
The supreme God worship'd in the Sun and Moon, under the Name of Apollo and Diana. 282.
J. G. Vossius mistaken, in that he seems to assert, that the Civil and Poetical Pagan Gods were so many substantial and eternal Minds. 283, &c.
The Ideas of the Platonists not substantial things, but only Conceptions in the Mind of God. 284.
Nothing at all amongst the Pagans without a God; however all their Gods, excepting only one Supreme, were either partial Considerations of that one, or else his inferior Ministers. 285, 286.
God suppos'd by the Pagans, particularly by the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Latins, Indians and Brachmans, to be diffus'd thro the whole World, and intimately to act all things. 287, 288.
From the many Names of one supreme God, as existing and acting in many things, some Pagans thro an indiscreet Fear have feign'd many Gods. 288.
That God was held by the Egyptians, Greeks, Latins, &c. but in different senses, to be one and all things. 289, 290.
This occasion'd their calling the inanimate things of Nature by the Names of Gods and Goddesses, as Fire was term'd Vulcan, Corn Ceres, &c. ib. &c.
Not only Substances, but also mere Accidents and Affections of things in Nature were personated and deify'd by the antient Pagans. 292.
That the Pagans Worship did not terminate in the inanimate things of Nature, but they worship'd God in them as being in all things, and in a manner all things. 293, 294.
The Pagans thought it needful, that God should be worship'd in his visible Works, because he was invisible, and therefore the Vulgar especially could frame no Idea of his spiritual Nature. 295, &c.
The things of Nature, whether Substances or Accidents, not accounted by the Pagans to be true and proper Gods, but only so many several Names or partial Considerations of one supreme God. 297, 298.
The Meaning of the Egyptian Fable of Osiris being mangl'd and cut in pieces by Typhon. 297.
An Epitomy of the Pagan Theology in the words of Prudentius and Eusebius. 297, 298.
The chief Parts of the World worship'd by those Pagans, who look'd upon God to be a mundane Animal or Soul of the World. 299.
The Pagans universally World-Worshippers in one sense or other. ib. 300.
God worship'd by the Pagans in the things of Nature, because consider'd by them concretely with the World, as pervading and diffusing himself thro all, and the Cause of all. 300, &c.
God from the Variety of his Powers call'd by many Names. 300, &c.
That the wiser Pagans had the same Notion of God with the Jews, but they were forc'd to add a Civil and Poetical Theology to the true and natural, for the sake of the Vulgar. 302.

That

That the Pagans, beſides their ſeeming Polytheiſm in the Polyonymy of one ſupreme God, *acknowledg'd alſo a real Multiplicity of Gods ſuperior to Men.* ib. &c.

That all the Gods *of the Pagans, excepting one, tho they were ſome of 'em held to be eternal, yet were in ſome ſenſe generated* Gods. 303, *&c.*

All the inferior Gods *of the Pagans, as being ſuppos'd to have ſome ſhare in the Government of the World, had accordingly a ſhare of their Worſhip.* 304.

That there are Multitudes of underſtanding Beings above Men, the Creatures and Miniſters of the one ſupreme Being, is aſſerted not only by the Pagans, but the Holy Scripture. 305.

That Worſhip or Invocation does of right belong to created Spirits or Gods, acknowledg'd by Pagans, but deny'd by Holy Scripture. ib.

The main Controverſy between Chriſtians and Pagans was whether the created Miniſters of the ſupreme God *might be call'd Gods and religiouſly worſhip'd.* ib.

Of the ſupermundane, eternal and intelligible Gods *of the Pagans, the principal of which were three Divine Hypoſtaſes, call'd by the* Platoniſts, Good, Mind *and* Soul. 306.

The Trinity of Orpheus, Pythagoras *and the* Egyptians, *&c. deriv'd from the* Hebrews, *who had it by Divine Revelation.* ib.

The whole Frame of Chriſtianity built upon the Doctrine of the Trinity, and therefore was this more fully reveal'd under that than it had been to the Hebrews, &c. 307.

That the Doctrine of a Trinity was adulterated by ſome Pagans, eſpecially the modern Platoniſts; *but that neither they nor the antient genuine Followers of* Plato *were guilty of aſſerting more than one uncreated independent* God. *ib.*

That the modern Platoniſts *ſtil'd their Trinity,* a Trinity of Gods, Cauſes, Principles and Opificers. *ib.* 308.

That only the firſt Hypoſtaſis of the Pſeudo-Platonick *Trinity was held to be independent.* 308, &c.

The Pſeudo-Platonick *Trinity no other than a Scale or Deſcent of things from the higheſt by ſteps downwards, ſo far as to the Souls of all Animals.* 309, 310.

The Pſeudo-Platonick *Pagans the greateſt Champions againſt Chriſtianity.* 310.

That the genuine Platoniſts *were not really Tritheiſts, tho they did indeed aſſert a Trinity, and that ſometimes unwarily under the name of three* Gods. *ib. &c.*

A State of the true Platonick *Triad.* 311, 312.

That the Platoniſts *held a Subordination between the Hypoſtaſes of their Trinity.* 312, &c.

A Dependence and Subordination of the Divine Hypoſtaſes, according to the Platoniſts, *does not oppoſe, but rather prove the Unity of them in one Divinity.* 314, &c.

The Divine Hypoſtaſes, according to the Platoniſts, *not greater or leſs than one another by Nature or Perfection, but only in regard to Original.* 315, &c.

That Chriſtians themſelves held the Son to be ſubordinate to the Father. 316, 317.

That, according to Chriſtians, Subordination of Perſons is not inconſiſtent with the Unity of them in the Godhead. 317.

That the genuine Platoniſts, *like as the Chriſtians, held Eſſence to differ from Hypoſtaſis, as common from proper.* ib.

Why the firſt Perſon of the Platonick *Triad was held to be ſuperior to the ſecond and third.* 318.

Direct Proof, that the Platoniſts *held the three Hypoſtaſes of their Trinity to be but one* God. 319, &c.
The Senſe of the word ὁμοούσιος *as well among* Platoniſts *as Chriſtians.* 320.
That the Platoniſts *held an Indiviſibility and mutual In-being of their three Hypoſtaſes.* 320, &c.
That the Divine Hypoſtaſes have one and the ſame Energy or Action ad extra, *tho they differ* ad intra. 321.
The Unity of the Hypoſtaſes compar'd to that of the Centre, immovable Diſtance, and movable Circumference in a Sphere. 322.
That the Divine Hypoſtaſes, according to the Platoniſts, *ſeem to be nothing elſe, but infinite Goodneſs, infinite Wiſdom, and infinite active Love and Power, tho not as mere Accidents, but ſubſtantial things.* ib.
To be preſum'd, that the Platoniſts *held the Divine Hypoſtaſes to be but one* God, *becauſe they apply'd to 'em ſuch Attributes, as are incommunicable to any but the Godhead.* 323.
That the Platoniſts *apply'd to their firſt and ſecond Hypoſtaſis the Attribute of* Eternity. 323, 324.
That the Platoniſts *held their third Hypoſtaſis to be eternal. A Doubt reſolv'd thereupon.* 325, 326.
General Teſtimonys, that the Platoniſts *held all the three Divine Hypoſtaſes to be eternal.* 326, 327.
That the Platoniſts *apply'd to their Divine Hypoſtaſes neceſſary Exiſtence; this illuſtrated by the Compariſon of the Sun, its Splendor and Effulgency.* 327, 328.
That the Platoniſts *held the Divine Hypoſtaſes to be univerſal, that is, infinite and omnipotent, and Creators of the World.* 328, 329, &c.
Concluded, that the Platoniſts *held the Divine Hypoſtaſes to be but one* God, *from their aſſerting 'em to be joint-Creators.* 330, 331, &c.
Whether the Platoniſts *held a numerical or only a ſpecifical Unity of the Divine Hypoſtaſes in the Godhead.* 332, &c.
That a ſpecifick Unity only would imply a Tritheiſm: that therefore the Platoniſts, *even according to Dr.* Cudworth, *were abhorrent from it; tho a little after he ſeems to unſay that.* 332, 333.
Granting that the Platoniſts *never expreſly declar'd themſelves touching either Unity; it may with good reaſon be concluded, that they inwardly held a numerical one of the* Godhead. 334.
A ſeeming Inconſiſtency in Dr. Cudworth's *Account of the Unity of the Hypoſtaſes, as ſubjected to the* Godhead, *according to the* Platoniſts. *This Inconſiſtency or ſeeming Contradiction reconcil'd by clearing the Ambiguity of the Terms* ſpecifical *and* numerical. 334, 335, &c.
Athanaſius *blames the* Arians *for not diſtinguiſhing between* ἀγέννητος *and* ἀγένητος. 327.
That the Divine Hypoſtaſes, tho they have their diſtinct Perſonalitys, yet are one and the ſame numerical Eſſence, *that is, one* God. 337.
The Divine Eſſence, becauſe common to three Divine Hypoſtaſes, confounded by Dr. Cudworth *with* ſpecifical. *ib.*
Probable however, that the Doctor in this caſe did not underſtand the Term ſpecifical *according to the true logical Senſe of it.* ib.
How Eſſence *differs from* Hypoſtaſis; *Dr.* Cudworth *exempted by this Diſtinction from Inconſiſtency and Self-contradiction,* &c. *ib. &c.*
That the antient Fathers meant no more by the word ſpecifical, *when apply'd to the* Godhead, *than* general *or* common, *which according to them did not exclude it from being one and the ſame numerical Eſſence.* 338.
Some Analogy indeed between the Godhead, *as predicable of the three Di-*

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vine Hypoſtaſes, and a Species as predicable of its Individuals. ib. &c.
Dr. Cudworth ſeems a little unfairly to charge ſome of the Fathers with Tritheiſm, and to be partial in exempting the Platoniſts from that Charge. 339, 340.
Concluded, that the Platoniſts, tho they ſometimes paganically term'd the Divine Hypoſtaſes three Gods, yet meant 'em to be no more than one numerical Eſſence. ib. &c.
Infer'd upon the whole, that the Pagans univerſally aſſerted one unmade ſupreme Deity. 341.
That the Platoniſts aſſerted a Trinity, tho not altogether orthodoxly, yet near the matter ſo; to the ſhame of thoſe pretended Chriſtians, who ſay it implies a Contradiction. ib. 342, 343.
Probable, that the Doctrine of the Trinity providentially found ſuch Entertainment among the Pagans, to prepare the way for Chriſtianity. 342.
A Recapitulation of what has been before prov'd touching the Idea of God; that there is nothing in it contradictious; that the Atheiſts, while they verbally deny, do implicitly confeſs it; that the Pagans univerſally had a Prolepſis of it. 343.
That Atheiſts are Anomalys of human kind. 344.

CHAP. VI.

Some further Pretences of the Atheiſts againſt the Idea of God. 345.
That the Atheiſts confound Idea with Image, and Underſtanding with Fancy. 346.
The Atheiſts pretence, that we have no Idea of any thing not ſubject to corporeal Senſe, nor conſequently of a God. ib.
That beſides that Knowledg which is by the Senſes, there is another which is by the Mind, and that even according to Democritus. 346, 347.
Many things, of which there are no ſenſible Phantaſms, and do not fall under the Imagination. 347, 348, &c.
The Evidence of particular Bodys exiſting hîc & nunc from Senſe; but the Certainty of this Evidence from Reaſon and Underſtanding, and not from Senſe: This made appear even from the Atheiſtick Atomiſts themſelves. 348, &c.
The Atheiſts argue ad hominem againſt the Idea of God, from the Theiſts holding him to be incomprehenſible. 350.
Granted that what is unconceivable is nothing, at leaſt to us. ib.
Not whatſoever is incomprehenſible is therefore, as the Atheiſts ſuppoſe, unconceivable. ib. &c.
In ſaying that God is incomprehenſible, the Theiſts mean no more, than that he is not perfectly or fully conceivable by us; and abſurd to conclude from this, that we know nothing of him. 351, &c.
That we have not a comprehenſive Knowledg of the Eſſences even of created things. ib.
Tho the Perfection of the Godhead makes it more incomprehenſible than other things, yet is it in ſome ſenſe for that very reaſon more knowable than they. 352, 353.
That Nature intimates to us the Exiſtence of a perfect Being by certain Paſſions implanted in us; and this tho conceivable, yet at once to be incomprehenſible. 353.
The modern Atheiſts argue againſt the Idea of God becauſe of Infinity, which the Theiſts ſuppoſe to pervade all his Attributes; they argue that Infinite is only an unintelligible Name or Nothing. ib. 354.
That the antient Atheiſts were of another mind, they poſitively aſſerting ſomething infinite. 355.

Something must have been infinite in Duration; *because if there had been once Nothing, there never could have been any thing.* ib. &c.

If something be infinite in Duration, it must be either senseless Matter or God; the former of these most absurd. 356.

Granted that we have no Phantasm of Infinite, *and that we do not fully comprehend it; yet infer'd from the certain Existence of this, that not whatever falls not under Sense or is incomprehensible, is therefore nothing.* ib. 357.

No actually *infinite Number, Magnitude or Time, and therefore granted that we have not so much as an intelligible Idea of either.* 357, &c.

The Non-eternity of Time no argument against, but for the Eternity and Existence of God. 358, &c.

That as there must have been something before Time, so this must needs be not of a successive, but permanent Nature. 359.

It being mathematically plain, that something must have an Infinity of Duration, and that this Infinity can belong to no successive Being; it follows, that it must belong to that Being which we term God. 360.

The antient as well as modern Atheists do principally quarrel with infinite Power. ib. 361.

Omnipotence or infinite Power misrepresented even by some Theists, as if able to do what implies a Contradiction. 361.

A fair ground might be taken from hence to prove that Des Cartes *was a personated Atheist.* ib.

That in a true sense infinite Power is only that which can do whatever is possible or conceivable, and implies not a Contradiction. 362.

That Infinity is really nothing else but Perfection. 362, 363.

That therefore nothing which is any way imperfect, as Number, Magnitude or Time, can be actually *infinite.* ib.

Argu'd that we have an Idea of perfect Being, *from the Idea we have of* Imperfection *and Degrees of Perfection.* ib. 364.

Finite *rather the Negation of* Infinite, *than* Infinite *of* Finite. 365.

God and Infinite and absolutely Perfect, but different Names for the same thing. ib.

The Atheists argue against the Idea of God, *because it is suppos'd to include in it* Incorporeity. ib. 366.

The Atheists would argue Theology to be contradictious; in that it supposes God to perceive things sensible without any Organs of Sense. A brief Answer to 'em. ib.

The Atheists pretend, that it is not good to argue about the Nature, &c. of God; but to acquiesce in what is directed by the Law of the Land, which is the Sum of Religion. ib. 367,

The genuine Attributes of God not only not contradictory, but also necessarily connected together. 367, 368.

The several Attributes of God are only so many partial Conceptions of one and the same simple perfect Being. ib.

Granted that there may be different Apprehensions concerning the Idea of God. *ib. &c.*

But it does not hence follow, that this Idea includes any Contradiction in it self. 369.

The Atheist ascribes the Universality of Religion and mens Belief of a Deity to Fear. *A Confutation of that Pretence begun from* 370.

That the Atheists pretended Courage is mere Stupidity. ib.

The Atheist is most of all troubled with Fear or Solicitude about future Events, from which the Theist is free: the reason given why he is so. 371.

The Atheist in the wrong, for supposing Mankind to apprehend God *as a Mormo or Bugbear; seeing on the contrary*

trary they conceive him to be a good and kind Being. 371, 372.
The true sense of this Saying, φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμονιὸν. ib.
Those Theists and Christians who apprehend God to delight in the Misery of his Creatures, do estimate the Deity from their own Ill-nature; the Scripture telling us quite otherwise, that God is Love. 373.
Religion indeed is often denoted in Scripture by the Fear of God; but then this is not a Fear of him, as a mere arbitrary and omnipotent or hurtful Being. ib.
The good Effect of the true Fear of God, as he is not only a Punisher of Vice, but also a Rewarder of Vertue. ib. &c.
A Description of the Original and Nature of true religious Fear, which is coupled with Love 374.
God, if he were not in being, yet would be of all things the most desirable. ib. &c.
The Notion of God only as a fearful, and therefore hateful Being, proceeds from the Ill-nature and Interest of wicked Men, who wish there were no such Punisher of their Wickedness. 375.
The Atheist pretends that there is no such thing as natural Charity; but that all this proceeds from Imbecillity and Fear, and Obnoxiousness to another's Power. 375, &c.
Accordingly God could not have any such Love, as being suppos'd to be subject to nothing. 376.
What a late Pretender says, is false, That God has no Right of reigning over Men, but by his irresistible Power. ib.
A Description of the Atheistick Scene of things, as dismal, hopeless and forlorn. ib. &c.
The Atheistick Notion of God, as a dead inconscious Nature, to be prefer'd before that, as of a mere omnipotent and malicious Being. 377.
Even Epicurus thought it better to credit the Fable of the Gods, than to hold the material Necessity of all things. ib.
His introducing Liberty of Will in Men did not much mend the matter. 378.
The Atheist in tending to be fearless by discarding the Notion of a God, plunges himself necessarily into a greater Fear. ib. &c.
Impossible for the Atheist to bring his Mind to a perfect Acquiescence in the Disbelief of a God. 379, 380.
Those who have pretended to be Atheists, have discover'd the Distrust of their Opinion, even whether they would or no. ib.
Even impossible for a Man to bring his Mind fairly to a State of Doubt, as to God's Existence; or if he could do that, yet this is still attended with Fear and Uneasiness. 381.
Again the Atheist pretends, that the general Belief of a God sprung from Ignorance of Causes. ib. &c.
It is not Ignorance, but the true Knowledg of Causes, that leads to the Belief of a God. 382, &c.
That Sense and Understanding could not be the Result of Matter, however modify'd; nor of Qualitys, however contemper'd. 383.
Atheists ignorant of the Cause of Motion in Bodys. ib. &c.
Motion not essential to all Body. 384.
The Democriticks, &c. held that one Body mov'd another from Eternity infinitely. 385.
Therefore are they condemn'd by Aristotle for assigning no Cause of Motion at all. 386.
Epicurus absurd in making Gravity the Cause of Motion, and supposing upward and downward in infinite Space. ib.
Plato rightly determin'd, that Cogitation or Self-activity is before the local Motion of Body, and the Cause of

of it. 387.
That either God is by himself the immediate Cause of Motion, or by the Instrumentality of a created Spirit, Soul or Life of Nature. 388.
Atheists ignorant of the Cause of Well and Fit in Nature. ib. &c.
The Atheists deny this Well and Fit in Nature. 389.
Some latter Theists, by supposing a mere arbitrary omnipotent Deity, &c. do give an advantage to Atheists. 390.
The Atheists alledg, that tho there be indeed many things in the World which serve for Uses, yet does it not thence follow, that they were designedly made for those Uses. ib. &c.
They urge, that things were made by Chance, and that their Uses follow'd. 391.
Prov'd on the contrary, that things were made by antecedent Counsel and Design for Uses. ib. &c.
A Democritick Dotage favour'd also by Des Cartes, That all things within the Atmosphere of the Earth proceed from material and mechanical Necessity. 392, &c.
The Atheists fancy, That it was not at one jump, but after many Essays, that the Atoms of our World settl'd in that orderly Frame they are now in. 394.
Accordingly they must acknowledg, that before this there were many monstrous Shapes of things; which they say did not continue, because they were not fitly organiz'd to propagate their Kind. 394, 395.
The Atomical Atheists suppos'd there were infinite Worlds, and that it was no wonder if one among a thousand fell into such a Regularity as this we are in. ib.
They hold that the World will gradually decay. ib.
They would account for the constant and universal Regularity of things, by saying, that at length unguided Atoms came to a kind of Methodicalness or Law. 396.
Atheists absurd, in supposing many monstrous Shapes before the Regularity of things. ib. &c.
Nor have they or others any ground to say that the World grows old: This Error confuted by Dr. Hakewill. 397.
An Infinity of Worlds impossible. Impossible that any one regular Form or System should be made, tho by ever so many fortuitous Trials and Combinations of Atoms, and without a God. 398, 399.
Most absurd, to suppose that senseless Atoms should acquire a Habit of Methodicalness. ib.
The Atheists argue further, that things were not made intentionally for Ends and Uses. 400, 401.
A Confutation of Lucretius's Argument to that purpose, that Uses follow'd things. 401.
The curious Fabrick of the Eye, as describ'd by Mr. Boyl, a notable Instance of its being form'd by a wise Contriver. 402, 403, 404.
Two Extreme Opinions, that either all things are done casually and without a God, or else immediately by God. A middle Opinion better, that things are done by an artificial methodical Nature acting under God, and by his Direction. 405, 406.
As Intention or final and mental Causality cannot be secluded from artificial things, so much less can they from natural. 406, 407, 408.
The antient Atheists would never undertake to assign necessary Causes for all the Parts of the Bodys of Animals, &c. from mere Matter and Motion. 408.
Only they have made some pitiful Attempts towards explaining some Parts mechanically. ib. &c.
Democritus so wise as not to pretend to give a mechanical account of the Formation of the Fætus, and Lucretius has not one word concerning it. 409.

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Ariſtotle *well ſaid, that the material, and eſpecially the final Cauſe, ought to be declar'd by a Philoſopher.* ib.
Some late pretended Theiſts more abſurd than Atheiſts, in ſuppoſing all things to have been by an unguided Jumble of Atoms, God only ſtanding by as an idle Spectator. 410, 411.
Againſt thoſe, who ſuppoſe the Matter of the World to have been firſt jumbl'd in a fluid Chaos, and ſo to have form'd the World, without the immediate Direction of Mind. 412.
Againſt thoſe, who ſuppoſe indeed the Matter of the World to have been firſt *turn'd round in a Vortex or Vortices by God, but that afterwards things were produc'd without his immediate Care.* ib.
The Carteſian *Theory of Vortices abſolutely falſe.* 413, &c.
Mr. Lock *acknowledges, that Mr.* Newton's *Demonſtrations in his* Principia *may be depended on as Truths well prov'd, tho they are not underſtood by all.* 413, &c.
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Instances of Prophecys beyond the Foreknowledg of Men, *under Paganism.* 484.

That Miracles prove the Being of a God. ib.

Miracles said to have been done by or in the Persons of Apollonius, Vespasian, &c. *These Facts to be question'd.* 485.

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Acknowledg'd even by Lucian, *that Christ Jesus cast out Devils, heal'd the Sick, rais'd the Dead.* 487.

Why there are no Miracles now. ib.

Those who have falsly pretended new Miracles, have, in the Judgment of some, discredited the old ones. ib. &c.

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That the Being of God appears from the Predictions of such things, as no finite Being could foretel. ib.

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The latter Prophecy of Daniel, *the Groundwork of St.* John's *Apocalypse.* ib.

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The Existence of Something *plainly shews that there was never nothing.* ib.

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That no Power whatsoever can make any thing indifferently either true or false. ib.

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Every distinct and clear Perception is an Entity or Truth. ib.

The very Essence of Truth here is this clear Perceptibility and Intelligibility. ib.

Concluded, that Omnipotence cannot make any thing which is false or is not, to be clearly perceiv'd to be. 496.

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No Derogation from God's infallible Knowledg, that some of his Creatures should know things certainly. ib. 499.

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As upon the supposition that once there was nothing, there never could have been any thing; so upon the like supposition, that once there was no Life, &c. *there never could have been any.* ib.
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CHAP. VII.

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And that human Souls were created by the Hand of God, and pre-existed our Bodys. ib.
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Only a perfect Being could exist necessarily and from all Eternity: For other Beings to exist so, would be for them to come from nothing in an impossible sense. 528, 529.
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CHAP. VIII.

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Only the Democriticks *assert such a thing as Space or* Vacuum, *which is intangibly extended.* ib.
This is the only Incorporeal which they own. ib.
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The Subterfuge of Gassendus, *that Space*

Space is a middle Nature between Substance and Accident, shewn to be vain. ib.
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The Atheist argues against an incorporeal God, because whatever is, *is extended and consequently Body.* ib.
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The human Mind, as well as God, held by Aristotle *to be unextended.* 557.
He denies that Souls are in a place or locally mov'd. ib.
Philo, Plotinus, Simplicius *and other antient Incorporealists, also the generality of antient Writers among Christians, particularly* Origen, *St.* Austin, &c. *maintain'd the Doctrine aforesaid.* 557, 558, 559, &c.
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That

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Sim.

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That the Ideas of Cogitation and Extension are quite different. 603.
Some Incorporealists do deny this Proposition, That whatever is extended is Body, they holding that there is an incorporeal Extension penetrable and indiscernible, which agrees to Spirits. 605, 606.
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That the Stoicks *were a kind of imperfect Theists; granting that all was Body, they deny'd all Body to be void of Life.* 612.
The Democritick *Atheist yet more absurd than the* Anaximandrian, *in that he denying real Qualitys, because Nothing from Nothing, yet in effect would bring Life and Understanding out of Nothing.* 613.
Concluded, that there must needs be an unmade eternal substantial Fountain of Life and Understanding. ib. &c.
The Absurdity of those Atheists, who ascribe natural Life and Understanding, tho without Consciousness, to all Matter. 614, &c.
The Atheist briefly reply'd to, when supposing that all is Matter, and that Life and Understanding are Accidents of it. 616, &c.
Tho participated Life be indeed accidental, yet the Original is substantial and immortal. 617.
That there is an original substantial unmade Life, distinct from Body, argu'd from Virgil *and Dr.* Grew. 618, &c.
This concludes a Reply to the Atheist's eighth Objection, That there can be no living Being perfectly happy and immortal, and therefore no God. 617, 623.

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The Atheist argues, That there is no first Mover, and therefore no God. He is reply'd to. 624, 625.
This Maxim of Aristotle, Whatsoever is mov'd, is mov'd by another, *is to be understood of Bodys only.* ib.
However granting him that there is nothing else but Body, yet is it impossible that one Body should move another infinitely without a first Mover. ib. &c.
From this, that no Body can move it self, it follows, that there is incorporeal Substance. 626.
That there is another Species of Action distinct from local Motion, which is Autokinesy, Self-activity, or Cogitation. 627.
The Atheist would have it, that Cogitation it self is the Action of something without it, because nothing takes its beginning from it self. ib.
Also that no understanding Being can be perfectly happy, because dependent on something without it. ib.
Granted that no Action causeth it self; but a substantial Agent does. 628.
Tho many Cogitations are occasion'd by outward

outward Objects, yet are not all of 'em. ib. 629.
The human Soul, and much more God, is a Fountain of Activity and Thought. ib. &c.
The Atheists most absurd in supposing, that Cogitation is nothing but local Motion. Des Cartes *more reasonable, when making Brutes to be Machines, he withal deny'd 'em to be cogitative Beings.* 630.
How the Atheists go about to shew, that Sensation and Cogitation are only Passions of him that perceives and thinks. 631.
The Democritick *way of doing it by corporeal* Effluvia *or exuvious Membranes streaming continually from Bodys, and lighting on the Sensorys, &c.* ib.
That of some other Atomists, by a Pressure of Bodys upon the Optick Nerve, &c, 632.
And of a Modern, that Sensation, &c. is only the Re-action of one Corpuscle against another, &c. ib.
A Reply to the first of these Accounts of Sensation, &c. ib. 633.
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As also his Account of Imagination. 634.
Some things presented to our Fancy, of which there can be no Image. ib. &c.
A Reply to the second Account of Sensation. 636.
That Sensation is not a mere Passion, but the Perception of a Passion. ib.
And what perceives this Passion can't be any thing material. ib. 637.
Further reply'd to the first and second Hypotheses conjointly with the third, that Sensation and Thought are only the Re-actions of Matter. 638, &c.
Concluded, that there is in our selves a Principle of Self-activity and Thought; and much more, that this is in the highest Perfection essential to the Deity. 640.
Had there ever been no Mind at all, there never could have been any. 641.
Prov'd that Mind is essentially distinct from Matter. ib. 642.
The Idea of Matter, that Thought is not included in it. ib.
That not Autokinesy or Self-Activity, but only a Capacity of being mov'd is essential to Matter. ib. &c.
That a late Writer's Pretences to the contrary do in effect evince no more than an Agibility or Mobility of Matter. ib.
This plain from the chief Topics he insists on, which are the Divisibility and perpetual Motion of all Matter. 643, &c.
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That all Motion is determinate, and all Determination, even according to this Writer, is from without. 645.
Most reasonable to suppose that Matter was at first put and is conserv'd in motion by God. 646.
In what sense Motion may be said to be communicated from one Portion of Matter to another. ib.
The same own'd by this Writer, tho inconsistently with himself. 647.
Even according to him there is no ground to suppose a Vis Motrix *in the Matter mov'd, distinct from the* Vis Impressa. *ib. &c.*
Tho granting that Matter as sensible is movable, yet does it not thence follow, that it is always actually mov'd, nor that Motion is essential to it. 648.
The Autokinesy of Matter asserted by few besides this Writer. 649.
A Parallel brought by him to prove, does in effect disprove this. ib. 650.
This Writer's Notion of a general Action of Matter absurd. ib.
All Motion is particular. 651.
That one Body in motion moves another. This Motion impress'd on Matter by God. ib.

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That the Ideas of Cogitation and Extension are quite different. 603.
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CHAP. X.

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That

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Still

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No wonder if we cannot solve all Querys that may be made touching Divine Providence. 770.

CHAP. XIV.

The Atheist argues, that it is the Interest of Mankind in general, that the Belief of a God, &c. *should not be entertain'd.* 771.
Wishing is no proving. ib.
How the Atheists comes to wish that there were no God. ib. &c.
It is from a wrong Notion of God, as a mere arbitrary Being, &c. *and from a sense of their own Guilt.* 772, &c.

No

No Happineſs or Eaſe without Immortality. 773.
God a moſt deſirable Being, could he be ſuppos'd not to be. ib.
That Religion is ſo far from depreſſing, that nothing more exalts mens Spirits. ib. 774.
The Atheiſt would fain ſooth temporal Princes, by telling 'em, that it is not their Intereſt that the Belief of a God, &c. ſhould be entertain'd. His Reaſons for this. ib.
Princes caution'd not to baniſh the Fear of God, leſt they ſhould ceaſe to be fear'd themſelves. ib.&c.
'Tis falſly aſſerted by the Atheiſt, That the Civil Sovereign as ſuch reigns only in Fear. 775, &c.
He takes his Specimen à peſſimo, *that is, from Tyrants,* &c. *ib. &c.*
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No juſt way of arguing from particular Individuals to the whole Species. ib.
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Not needful, in order to make Laws natural, that they ſhould be innate. ib.
The good or ill Conſequences of breaking or keeping the Laws of Nature, term'd by Dr. Cumberland *natural Rewards and Puniſhments.* 783.
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Falſe, that the Lacedemonians *thought it honorable to rob and ſteal.* ib.
However this Inſtance, if otherwiſe, would be of no weight to prove, that there is not among Men an univerſal and natural Diſtinction of Juſtice and Injuſtice. 784, 785.
That Impoſture cannot bring Men to aſſent to, or like what it pleaſes. ib.
Mens horror at ſome Things and Actions, not the Effect of Education, or Cuſtom, or Policy. ib.
That human Laws are built upon natural, &c. *ib.*
Whence 'tis granted that it follows, that all human Laws are either really or ſeemingly good. 786.
No others could ever be impos'd: whereas ſuch are readily accepted. ib.
That even ill men confeſs what is good. ib.
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But it is far from being ſo, as 'tis limited by the Atheiſt to private Perſons as ſuch, to the Body and this Life. ib. 788.
The Atheiſt miſtaken in his true Intereſt, and alſo the means of purſuing it. 788, &c.
That Force and Fraud are improper Methods for purſuing temporal Self-Intereſt. ib.
That Men, as ſociable Creatures, do ſtand in abſolute need of mutual Aſſiſtances. ib. 789.
Honeſty the beſt Policy. ib.&c.

That

That the Atheist has a wrong Notion of Profit; he is reply'd to, in that he says that there is no Right or Wrong, and no Propriety. 790, 791.

What is found to contribute to the Happiness of man, that is Man bound, as by natural Law, to pursue. 791.

That Socrates *us'd to curse those, who first divided the Notions of Honest and Profitable.* ib.

Duty however is founded upon some higher ground than that of Profit only. 791, &c.

Accordingly indeed some Maxims are obligatory, tho in particular Instances not advantageous. 792, &c.

That there is Propriety and Dominion, Mine and Thine founded in Nature. 793, &c.

How the Atheist endeavours to infer that Men are of course in a state of War. 795.

That Inference prevented, and further discover'd to be wrong. ib. 796.

That Man is by Nature peaceable and mild. 796.

Philanthrophy and Justice natural. ib. &c.

To devest Man of these, would be to deprive him of the greatest Happiness and Glory of his Nature. 797, &c.

How the old Atheists and Mr. Hobbes *do account for the Origin of Justice: That for quietness sake they gave up their Liberty, and submitted to a Head, whose Will is the Rule of Justice.* 799.

This Account baffl'd as well by what went before, as also what follows. ib. &c.

Were a man not naturally oblig'd, he would not be oblig'd to stand even to his own Act, or not to break Covenants. 800.

The Atheists argue in a circle, and contradict themselves. ib. &c.

The Atheist's Notion of Justice and Injustice, a very weak Barrier against the Force of Appetite and private Utility. 801.

Whereupon he comes about to tell us, that Force and Power must keep Men just; and that therefore the Sovereign reigns only in Fear. 802.

This gives countenance to Rebellion and Usurpation, whenever they are able to resist this Power; and then if they do it, they are not unjust. ib.

Bodys Politick not artificial or violent things, but founded in natural Justice. 803, 804.

The Civil Sovereign rules in the Right, Power and Fear of God. ib.

However not deny'd, but that he reigns partly in the Fear of his own Sword, and sometimes must use Force. ib.

Granted that the Sovereign would not be safe, were the Fear of any temporal Power greater than that of himself: but in reference to God the Case is quite otherwise. 805.

No Justice or Society without the Fear of God. Whence the Atheist himself another while pretends, that Religion is a political Figment. ib. 806, 807.

No regular Government without at least natural Religion. A Sophism of a late Writer to the contrary confuted. 807.

Granted that Politicians are not always religious, and have not an express eye to Religion in every step they take. ib.

Religion, tho it does indeed propose future Rewards, yet does also provide well for the present. ib.

The Fear of an invisible Judg the best Security of our Lives and Propertys. 808.

A Reply to the Atheist's Cavil, that Sovereignty is essentially infinite, and therefore not consistent with Religion, which would confine it. ib. &c.

That it is not Conscience or Religion, but the Atheist's own Principles, which introduce such private Judgment of Good and Evil, as is inconsistent with Civil Sovereignty. 809, 810.

That Religion and Conscience do strictly enjoin Obedience to Civil Sovereigns. ib.

The Conclusion: That there is most assuredly a God, or most perfect Being, the Cause of all others, and who is to be glorify'd above all. 811.

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THE

THE INTRODUCTION.

PLATO being about to write againſt *Atheiſm*, introduces his Diſcourſe with this Apology: * *Had not thoſe Atheiſtick Doctrines*, which he juſt before complain'd of, *been publickly divulg'd, and in a manner made known to all the World, it would not have been needful to confute 'em, nor by Reaſons to prove a Deity; but, as the Caſe ſtands, it is abſolutely needful.* And I conceive, that the ſame Neceſſity at this time will alſo juſtify my preſent Undertaking; ſince it is certain, that Atheiſtick Doctrines have been as boldly vented and publickly aſſerted in this latter Age of ours, as ever they could be in *Plato*'s. Which Doctrines moreover, as they carry in them a *Shew* of *Reaſon* and *Philoſophy*, leſt by many they ſhould be ſuſpected to prove ſome noble and generous Truths, which the bigotted Religioniſts endeavour to ſmother; 'twas on that account expedient fairly to reveal and open all the Myſterys of them: that ſo the oppoſite Light of *Theiſm* appearing in ſolemn Triumph, might at length ſhine out with greater ſplendor. And tho it be granted, that many of thoſe Atheiſtick Reaſonings, which are here ſet in view, had been long ago baffl'd by others; yet, as they have been reviv'd and put forth afreſh with Advantage and Improvement, they call'd

* Καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ καλεσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀνθρώποις, ἐλθὲν ἂν ἔδει σφᾶς ἐπαμυνέσθων λόγων ὡς εἰσὶ θεοί· νῦν δ' ἀνάγκη. Plat. in Lib. 10. de Leg. *non procul ab Initio.*

for a further Confutation: in writing which accordingly, tho I aſcribe 'em indeed to the *Antients*, as being the firſt Inventers of them; yet do I oppoſe 'em in the ſenſe of thoſe *Moderns*, who have of late taken up and eſpous'd 'em. Not, after all, that I ſuppoſe there are or ever have been any *abſolute ſpeculative Atheiſts*, or ſuch as fully anſwer that Character, being thorowly grounded and convinc'd in their Minds, *that there is no God*; and ſo not only hardily, raſhly and by fits, but deliberately, intelligently and conſtantly, as well in old Age as in Youth, as well in view of Death as in the jollity of Life, ſtand firm to that Principle, and withal can produce ſuch Reaſons for it, as are ſufficient for their Minds to acquieſce in, and with themſelves to weigh down the Scale, againſt all the other Reaſons they know to the contrary. And therefore I could wiſh that the Term *Atheiſt*, as Men are apt to underſtand it in this ſenſe, were not ſo generally us'd; becauſe from hence it is obſervable, that the ignorant, but *wickedly inclin'd*, do think to juſtify themſelves by Example: telling us that Men of Parts and Learning, as for inſtance, *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, *Epicurus*, *Lucian*, &c. have been *Atheiſts*, and therefore they alſo may ſafely be ſuch. Whereas it is certain, that thoſe and ſome others who have heretofore come under that Character, yet were not *Atheiſts* in the ſenſe bef re-mention'd, but either Oppoſers and Deriders of the *national Superſtition*, they rather chuſing to own and worſhip no Deity at all, than ſuch Gods and in ſuch a way, as the *Civil Theology* own'd and appointed: or elſe they have been ſo call'd, at leaſt in the latter of the following Senſes; in that I own that two ſorts of Men, making up alas too great a Part of the World, might in all Ages come under that Name. Firſt, ſuch as Dr. *Cudworth* diſtinguiſhes by the Appellation of *ſtupid Atheiſts*; inaſmuch as they cannot *reaſon* of the matter, but being already great Sinners, and willing to continue ſuch, they cannot away with the Thoughts of that God, from whom they can look for nothing but Vengeance, and the *Revelation of righteous Judgment*: and therefore what do they endeavour in this caſe, but to divert their Reaſon and ſtupify their Conſcience by Hurry and Intemperance; till at length

length Cuſtom getting the better, and benumming their intellectual Powers, they *have not God in all their Thoughts*, and ſo live on, as if indeed there were no God, and apparently are *without him in the World:* And theſe are properly *practical Atheiſts*, or ſuch as, in plainer *Engliſh*, might be as well term'd *ungodly* Men. Secondly, there is another ſort of *Atheiſts*, who having, like the former, a bent to Impiety, and ſo the ſame prejudice againſt a God, take upon 'em to *philoſophize* about the Point, and by Principles of *Reaſon* to diſpute his Exiſtence, or at leaſt to advance ſuch Notions of him, as imply that he is not *infinitely perfect*, and ſo in effect that he is not at all; and that eſpecially, if they have conceiv'd an Hypotheſis of *Nature*, which makes any way againſt it, and ſeems withal in other reſpects ingenious and plauſible: for then out of fondneſs to their own Invention, they the rather endeavour to explode this great Truth either *directly*, as it appears from the *Monuments of Antiquity* and *modern Obſervation*, that ſome have done, and ſo have been *profeſs'd Atheiſts*; or elſe *conſequentially*, by propounding and abetting ſuch other Doctrines as are inconſiſtent with the Being of a God; as thoſe, for inſtance, who deny the *Providence*, the *Spirituality*, or any other eſſential Attribute of God, the Abſence of which would imply *Imperfection*. And theſe in reference at once to Speculation and Practice may be term'd *mixt Atheiſts*, as being not able to convince themſelves fully that there is no God, yet venturing to live as if there were none, and that the rather, becauſe they can urge ſome little Difficultys about it. And theſe are the Men, whom I chiefly deſign to oppoſe in this Writing, and that more eſpecially, becauſe they are the great Champions and Upholders of the former, that is, of the *ſtupid Atheiſts* or *ignorant ungodly Men*; and tho but few and inconſiderable by themſelves, yet have great numbers of *implicite Believers* and *Admirers* of their Doctrine, ſuch, I mean, as being not led by ſober and unprejudic'd *Reaſon*, but inordinate *Will* and intereſted *Wiſh*, are pleas'd to ſee the Truths they dread a little puzzl'd, and ſo to take up a faint Hope, that *it may be* they are but mere Fancys. Accordingly, how do they rejoice to hear but of the Title of any looſe

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length Custom getting the better, and benumming their intellectual Powers, they *have not God in all their Thoughts*, and so live on, as if indeed there were no God, and apparently are *without him in the World:* And these are properly *practical Atheists*, or such as, in plainer *English*, might be as well term'd *ungodly* Men. Secondly, there is another sort of *Atheists*, who having, like the former, a bent to Impiety, and so the same prejudice against a God, take upon 'em to *philosophize* about the Point, and by Principles of *Reason* to dispute his Existence, or at least to advance such Notions of him, as imply that he is not *infinitely perfect*, and so in effect that he is not at all; and that especially, if they have conceiv'd an Hypothesis of *Nature*, which makes any way against it, and seems withal in other respects ingenious and plausible: for then out of fondness to their own Invention, they the rather endeavour to explode this great Truth either *directly*, as it appears from the *Monuments of Antiquity* and *modern Observation*, that some have done, and so have been *profess'd Atheists*; or else *consequentially*, by propounding and abetting such other Doctrines as are inconsistent with the Being of a God; as those, for instance, who deny the *Providence*, the *Spirituality*, or any other essential Attribute of God, the Absence of which would imply *Imperfection*. And these in reference at once to Speculation and Practice may be term'd *mixt Atheists*, as being not able to convince themselves fully that there is no God, yet venturing to live as if there were none, and that the rather, because they can urge some little Difficultys about it. And these are the Men, whom I chiefly design to oppose in this Writing, and that more especially, because they are the great Champions and Upholders of the former, that is, of the *stupid Atheists* or *ignorant ungodly Men*; and tho but few and inconsiderable by themselves, yet have great numbers of *implicite Believers* and *Admirers* of their Doctrine, such, I mean, as being not led by sober and unprejudic'd *Reason*, but inordinate *Will* and interested *Wish*, are pleas'd to see the Truths they dread a little puzzl'd, and so to take up a faint Hope, that *it may be* they are but mere Fancys. Accordingly, how do they rejoice to hear but of the Title of any loose

Book, and how do they extol the Author of it (as tho he were a Deliverer of 'em from Chains and Impriſonment) which undertakes upon *rational* Grounds to undermine the Bulwarks of Religion, and baniſh away the Fear of God? And thus from ſuch Precedents they take courage in Impiety, live on at random, and ſometimes alſo die in their Sins. By which means, tho I ſay, that the Number of Atheiſtick Reaſoners or Philoſophers be not very great, yet does their Poiſon ſpread univerſally, eſpecially among all that are *reſolutely ſinful*, and therefore would fain have it, that there is no Judg of human Actions here, and will be no Puniſher of them hereafter; I ſay, would fain have it, for neither do theſe Men, as was before hinted, bring over either themſelves or others to an abſolute and ſatisfactory Belief, *that there is no God:* but the moſt they can pretend to, is not wholly to overturn the Faith of Theiſts, and much leſs directly to prove the Reaſonableneſs of *Atheiſm*; but only to raiſe particular Doubts, bearing no proportion to the Grounds that are againſt 'em, to oppoſe ſome little Scruples touching God's Attributes and the Diſpenſations of his Providence, ſome cavilling Remarks upon the Formation and Courſe of the World. And in ſhort, whatever Objections they have againſt Theiſm, ſo far at leaſt as the *Matter* of 'em *concerns* us to be known, are as eaſily ſeen thro and anſwer'd, as they are propos'd; and they appear to be but Grounds of Temptation, which the *All-wiſe God* (upon the ſuppoſition that there is one) might very well be conceiv'd to allow, he knowing us to be endu'd with *fallible Judgments*, with a *Liberty* of *Choice*, and accordingly adapting his Diſpenſations to us: and therefore what wonder, if as 'tis in our power, we turn ſometimes, and even in this point as well as others, to the ſide of Error, and are ſollicited (for a trial of our Conſtancy) to make a wrong Choice, during our ſtate of Probation here on Earth? However it is plain that theſe imperfect Eſſays towards *Atheiſm* do effect no little miſchief, while what they want in Strength and Subſtance, the Authors of 'em endeavour to make up in *Shew* and *Outſide*; by bold Aſſertions or promiſing Titles, by Ornament of Stile, ſpecious Wit or Appearance of Learning and good Senſe,

they

they ſet off their ſmall Ware, amuſing the Minds of the Unskilful and Ignorant, and leading 'em into thoſe Doubts and Perplexitys, from which they cannot diſentangle themſelves. And thus even many Well-wiſhers to Theiſm are too often unhing'd and unſettl'd in their Principles; and eſpecially thoſe multitudes, who are prejudic'd by their Luſts in favor of Atheiſm, and Infidels aforehand in their *Wills*, are now at leaſt made Scepticks in their *Underſtandings* alſo, and are brought, with the Fool in the Pſalmiſt, to *ſay* not only *in their Hearts that there is no God*, but alſo with *Protagoras* in their Minds too, * that *touching the Deity, we have nothing at all to ſay, either that it is or is not.*

Wherefore tho, I ſay, the Philoſophical Atheiſts are but few in number, and their Objections ſo very weak, as that they deſerve not a Hearing, but rather Neglect; yet conſidering further, that they are in the Iſſue thus fatal to others, and even one or two Broachers of 'em may be thought able to infect a whole Nation, as not only ſad Experience tells us, but alſo † one of this helliſh Character did himſelf publickly own: Conſidering this, I ſay, as it is highly needful to prevent and ſtop the ill Effects of theſe contagious Waters, ſo what readier, what eaſier Method can there be for this, than to dam them up in the Fountain-head, before they flow out, or afterwards continue to multiply themſelves in far extended Streams? Not but I think it a very hard and almoſt unfaiſable thing to *convince* a *profeſs'd Atheiſt* of the Error of his Way, it being no wonder, that he is judicially given over to Blindneſs and Impenitence, and wholly forſaken by the Grace of that God, whom he has endeavour'd to cancel out of *Being:* yet may we not altogether deſpair

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* Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, οὐθ' ὡς εἰσὶν, οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ. Diog. Laert. in Vit. Prot.

† Vanini, *who, when juſtly brought to the Stake at* Toulouſe, *made this open Confeſſion; That he and twelve more went out of* Naples, *deſigning to ſpread the Seed of Atheiſm all over* Europe. *He in particular to do this more effectually, without being ſuſpected, made indeed pompous Pretenſions of proving the Exiſtence and Providence of God; but by his manner of doing this, he plainly betray'd and expos'd the Cauſe.* Hæc ſcilicet, *ſays* Spizelius, eſt Ars Artium, hoc noviſſimum τῶ μωιοτέχνῳ inventum. *In Scrutin. Atheiſmi*, p. 20.

of

of this neither, the *Goodneſs* of God being *infinite*, and ſometimes, beyond all human Expectation, reſcuing ſuch Perſons from the Jaws of Ruin. Which minds me in this place to do juſtice to the Character of * one, whom from what he once was, and what when I mention'd him I thought him ſtill to be, I have † ſomewhere term'd an *Atheiſtick Perſon*; I now very gladly retracting this Epithet, ‖ upon what I have ſeen publiſh'd under his own Hand, and heartily rejoicing at his happy Converſion. But were there no hope at all of *convincing* ſuch Atheiſts themſelves, yet is it, methinks, no little ſervice done to the Publick, at leaſt to *convict* and openly ſhew them to be in the wrong; that ſo others may plainly ſee what they themſelves will not or cannot ſee, and it may be ſaid to thoſe ſervile Imitators of them, who go only by Hear-ſay and Example, that they had no Truth on their ſide, and that however pretending to the higheſt Wiſdom, they are indeed but downright *Fools*. And how will this confirm and ſettle weak Believers, confound and bring over many that are or would be Unbelievers, in that it renders 'em utterly defenceleſs, and takes from 'em all colour of denying a God, and ſo of continuing ſecurely in Sin, upon grounds of *Authority* and *Reaſon!* Accordingly, if in this preſent Undertaking I can any way contribute to this excellent Purpoſe, to ſtifle the *dogmatical* Atheiſts in their Birth, even before they grow up and propagate their Kind, and then by their numbers are the more embolden'd to affront the Majeſty, and as it were ſcale the Throne of God: Herein, I ſay, I flatter my ſelf that I ſhall do a good Work, it being, as *Plato* tells us, *a thing of no ſmall moment to baffle thoſe Pretenders, who by their impious Arguments draw others into Impiety.*

But perhaps it will be ſaid, that in this Attempt I ſhall but only *beat the Air*, in that my Preparations are made againſt thoſe *Titans*, which have been long ſince conquer'd: or if not, yet why ſhould I dare to enter the Liſts with Men of ſuch gygantick Stature? Touching the firſt of which Particulars I ſay, that there have indeed many noble Cham-

* *Mr.* Gildon. † P. 659. *of this Treatiſe.* ‖ The Deiſts Manual.

pions,

pions, both antient and modern, appear'd in the Field of *Theiſm*: but moſt of 'em have acted rather in the *offenſive* than the *defenſive* way, rather in *proving directly* the Exiſtence of God, than in *confuting* the Arguments againſt it; or at leaſt none of 'em have gone ſo far in either ſenſe, as to make a new Work of this kind altogether needleſs: eſpecially conſidering, that Atheiſts have as it were ſprung up out of the Ruins of the Slain, and are not ſo intirely routed or quell'd, but that it is ſtill neceſſary to make head againſt 'em; and, as they ſometimes take up new Arms and deviſe new Stratagems, to countermine 'em accordingly by a yet greater Force and Policy.

But ſecondly, to the Query, Why I ſhould undertake this Province? I anſwer, that to carry on the *Glory of God*, which is at once the chief *End* and *Happineſs* of *Man*, I have as well a *Right*, nay an *Obligation*, as others of my Kind; and therefore not only may, but muſt direct my Aim at that Mark, according as I find I am prediſpos'd and providentially qualify'd for it: And now that I *fancy'd* my ſelf to be ſo in any degree by writing againſt *Atheiſm*, is in ſhort * becauſe I have ſpent great part of my time in Studys of this nature. However, leſt this ſhould be but a mere *Fancy*, I ſhall hereafter aſſign another reaſon of it. Nevertheleſs, as I depended upon it, that I had ſome little Foundation to enable me, ſo was I the rather encourag'd to ſet out in this *Cauſe*, by reaſon that I knew it to be a good one; and that on the other hand the Performance of its Adverſarys did not anſwer their Pretenſions, nor were the Efforts made againſt it near ſo ſtrong, as, before a trial of them, one would imagine them to be; nay ſo far from it, that by reading at once the *Men* Atheiſtically given and alſo their *Books*, I have taken up a meaner Opinion of both, than if I had never read them, and they themſelves have been to me their own Confuters: and thus the ſight of their *Weakneſs* has added *Strength* to me, and confirm'd me in the Principles of *Theiſm*. What won-

* Tully *thought it no Vanity in himſelf to ſay in reference to Oratory*, Quoniam in eo Studio Ætatem conſumpſi, ſi id mihi aſſumo; *that is, if I pretend to ſome skill in it*, videor id meo jure quodammodo vendicare. *In Offic. l.* 1.

der

der then is it, if after this private Experiment, an obſcure unpromiſing Youth dares openly encounter thoſe boaſting *Goliahs*, who impiouſly *defy the Armys of the living God?* And again, what wonder if they, like the numerous *Americans*, when firſt attack'd by the *Spaniards*, having either none, or at moſt but inſignificant Weapons, become an eaſy Prey to a few well-arm'd and regular Oppoſers, and who have a mighty advantage of the Ground? And this, I hope, may ſerve to excuſe an *Attempt* of this nature, and me in particular for making it, provided that herein I have happily *ſucceeded*; that is, in finiſhing what I entitle *a full Confutation of the Reaſon and Philoſophy of Atheiſm*; and of this the candid Reader muſt be the Judg.

But here I own, that at the naming of this I am in great pain, as very much fearing that however able I might *fancy* my ſelf, or I might *indeed* be, for undertaking a Work of this nature, yet by reaſon of many Diſadvantages in the carrying of it on, I have not anſwer'd what might have been expected: and if not, in vain ſhall I go to intreat the Reader, that my good Meaning may atone for my Failures, and that what is here well done (if ſome things be ſo) may make ſome amends for what is ill done; in vain ſhall I tell him, that, for Reaſons not proper to be mention'd here, I went thro the Whole in very great haſte; that, beſides many other Avocations and Rubs in my way, I have been conſtantly buſy'd in the Dutys of my Function; by which moreover being ty'd down at home, as I could have little or no converſe with, ſo neither have I had the leaſt Direction or Aſſiſtance from the Perſons, nor even from the Books or Writings of the *Learned*, unleſs it be from my own ſmall Stock of them. Of theſe however I tell him, I have made the beſt uſe that I could, in order to accompliſh this Work, ſparing no pains to ſurmount the aforeſaid Inconveniences; and withal to avoid the Imputation of Raſhneſs (albeit, as I have ſaid, * the Atheiſtick Forces be not very formidable) I have not depended on my own ſingle Strength; but, be-

* *Agreeably to that Saying of* Seneca *to* Lucilius: Rem haud difficilem facturus ſum, Cauſam Deorum ago.

ſides

ſides a full Truſt in the Divine Bleſſing, which I have all along implor'd, I have alſo, in this ſenſe, call'd in the beſt human Aid I could; and that more eſpecially of one, who, I think, may juſtly paſs for the ableſt Champion that ever appear'd in the Cauſe of *Theiſm*; I mean the very learned Dr. *Cudworth*, whom I may ſay, I have not barely call'd in to aſſiſt, but to lead me, I having engag'd my ſelf under his Banner, and follow'd him in a great part of the Conflict; and even where I have not done ſo, yet have I generally made an advantage of his Armory, which conſiſts of Weapons well-try'd and harden'd, and thoſe indeed more of ſome kinds than were needful, which therefore I have not meddled with: but as for thoſe which were, I have new furbiſh'd and whetted ſuch of 'em as wanted it, have replanted the Ordnance, which lay in confuſion, as alſo I have taken in Supplys and rais'd new Batterys, *&c.* as I ſaw occaſion: And accordingly I further entitle my Work, *in a great meaſure either an Abridgment or an Improvement of what Dr.* Cudworth *offer'd to that purpoſe in his True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*; I ſay, *in a great meaſure either an Abridgment or an Improvement*, &c. to denote, that as part of it is intirely new, ſo a good part likewiſe is owing to that Learned Man, and that either fully and directly, as being an Epitomy of his *Materials*, or elſe occaſionally and conſequentially, as here are large Additions made, eſpecially to his *Anſwers*; and I have commonly built upon his Hints, and follow'd his Scheme of *Atheiſtical Objections*.

But here, notwithſtanding my good Intention, I preconceive, it will look ſomewhat invidious, that I have ventur'd to *practiſe*, as they call it, upon ſo great a Man as Dr. *Cudworth*. As to which I ſay, that where the Glory of God and the Characters of Men are inconſiſtent, a Regard to the latter ought in no wiſe to hinder the Promotion of the former; and how much leſs ſhould it do ſo where they very well conſiſt, and while the one is effectually advanc'd, at once all poſſible juſtice is done to the other? Now this, whether or no it be the Caſe of my preſent Undertaking, I hope the Reader (and no Man, I preſume, who does not read, will have a right to cenſure me) will candidly try, before he paſs Sen-

tence. But again, perhaps it will be ſaid, and that more eſpecially by ſuch as never have or will peruſe either Dr. *Cudworth* or Me, why might not the Doctor have ſtood by himſelf, and as he was? And what occaſion was there for *abridging*, or, what I pretend, for *improving* his Work? Theſe murmuring Querys I alſo look on as the Reſults of mere *Envy*: however I ſhall make to 'em particular Anſwers, which I ſhall introduce with ſome general Obſervations touching *Abridgments*; becauſe againſt theſe, I know, there lies a common Prejudice. Some condemn all Abridgments as ſuch; and theſe are either an idle ſort of Men, who read no Books at all, but yet aſpiring at the Repute of Learning, affect to talk of nothing elſe but Originals, and accordingly * fill their Memorys with Titles and their Shelves with Authors in whole bulk, which indeed do there make a better figure than *Abridgments*, and often gain 'em the End they aim at; or elſe they are ſuch as read little elſe but *Abridgments*, yet aſpiring at the ſame Credit of being thought *Learned*, will not ingenuouſly own by whom they have profited: and from neither of theſe Men do I look for any Favour, at leaſt ſo far forth as my Treatiſe comes under this Character. Others, and thoſe the truly Learned, complain with juſt reaſon, that many *Abridgments* have not a little injur'd the *Originals*, either by rendering them *obſcure*, for want of a due Compaſs of Expreſſion, or by defalcating *material* and *neceſſary* Parts of them; and thus by conſequence, as they cannot but prejudice the Authors, ſo do they alſo cheat and impoſe upon the Readers, the Senſe being either unintelligible to 'em, or at beſt only proper to make 'em *ſuperficial*; they fancying themſelves to be abſolute Maſters of this or that Author's whole Scope, when indeed they have eſcap'd many *principal* Parts of it. And thus I alſo grant, that too many *Abridgments* have at once done injuſtice to the Merit of the *Learned*, and withal brought a diſgrace upon *Learning*, as making it to be but mere *Shew* and *Outſide*, and filling the World with Pretenders. But

* *Like thoſe whom* Lucian *cenſures in his Dialogue* πρὸς τὸν ἀπαίδευτον καὶ πολλὰ βιβλία ὠνούμενον.

ſtill

ſtill it does not hence follow that all Abridgments as ſuch are to be exploded, but only thoſe of ſuch Books as will not bear being abridg'd, they having in 'em no Superfluitys of Words or Matter to be cut off, that is, no Circumlocutions to be contracted, no Repetitions to be omitted, no Digreſſions or needleſs Appendages to be rejected: whereas on the contrary, touching thoſe which have, the moſt Learned do acknowledg, that Abridgments of 'em are not only allowable, but commendable; in that the main Deſign of 'em is hereby the better executed, and they are made more generally uſeful; as theſe are to be got with leſs Mony, to be read with leſs pains, and in all likelihood with more advantage, the ſubject matters being ſet down more cloſely but clearly, and ſo the more eaſily to be retain'd. And thus they are of excellent uſe not only to thoſe, who by the high Price or bulky Excreſcencys of ſome Originals are perfectly frighten'd from buying or peruſing them; but alſo to thoſe, who having read them, may by this means recollect the intire Subſtance of them, clear up and re-imprint the Notions in their Minds. And now to apply this to my preſent Purpoſe: No one, who has read that firſt part of the *True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, which the Author deſign'd and publiſh'd againſt *Atheiſm*, can deny but that it is the vaſteſt Magazine of *Reaſoning* and *Learning*, which ever ſingly appear'd on this occaſion; but withal he muſt own, that hardly any Writing would better admit of an Abridgment, ſo far at leaſt as I have here abridg'd it; in that it is ſwell'd with frequent Repetitions, Circumlocutions and Digreſſions, and the Series and Thred of it much interrupted by *Greek* and *Latin* Quotations, not needful (as here they are) to be inſerted at large; beſides that they make it diſagreeable, nay formidable to a mere *Engliſh* Reader, and even to thoſe who tho they know ſomething of, yet do not readily underſtand the Original Languages; for whoſe Benefit however, as being writ in *Engliſh*, it ſeems to have been chiefly deſign'd. All which being conſider'd by the moſt Learned, many of 'em have wiſh'd in my hearing, that a good part of the Doctor's *Materials* were put in leſs Compaſs, in a clear Stile and eaſy Method, and reduc'd to the Standard of a pure *Engliſh* Rea-

der: As to which I could not but be of their mind, and wonder'd that ſome one of Leiſure and Capacity did not ſet about this Work; and finding for a while that no one elſe did, at length I my ſelf, tho in a great meaſure deſtitute of the aforeſaid Advantages, was tempted thro a well-meaning Zeal to undertake it; which is the other reaſon * I promis'd to aſſign of this Attempt. Accordingly I began and continu'd to abridg the *Intellectual Syſtem*, without any conſiderable Addition or Alteration, unleſs it be ſometimes of Stile and Method, as alſo of the Titles to Chapters the firſt, fourth and fifth, the laſt of which is new, the Doctor's fourth Chapter being here cut in two, and the two former more full and expreſſive of the Senſe contain'd in 'em than before; this, I ſay, I continu'd to do quite to Page 546 of the *Intellectual Syſtem*, that is, to the End of P. 305 of this Treatiſe. And this I did, by uttering but once, what the Doctor had done either twice or oftner; by expreſſing in few, but clear Words, what he had done in more; by taking out ſeveral Digreſſions, and by ſutably turning what was emphatical and to the purpoſe in a Throng of Quotations whether *Greek* or *Latin*, &c. in Proſe or Verſe, intermingling the Verſions with the Text, and generally placing ſo much of the Original as anſwers or at leaſt points to them, at the bottom of the Page; and leaving out what was ſuperfluous in them, and *ex abundanti* or out of the way. And this Courſe at the firſt I thought to have taken throughout the whole of the *Intellectual Syſtem*, that was writ againſt *Atheiſm*: but here, as I ſhall anon give the reaſon of it, I found it to be abſolutely needful to do otherwiſe, that is, to P. 625 of the *Intel. Syſt.* and 341 of this Treatiſe. After which, as I had before done, I have went on in abridging the Doctor's Materials to P. 664 of the *Intel. Syſt.* that is, to P. 379 of this Treatiſe. Where again I finding it neceſſary to go another way to work, have not directly abridg'd any further, at leaſt not for any Continuance, till I came to P. 738 of the *Int. Syſt.* that is, the 519th of this Treatiſe. Beyond which I have proceeded, in the way before mention'd, to abridg the Doctor's third Section of his

* P. 7.

fourth

fourth Chapter, in anſwer to the ſecond Atheiſtical Argument, which makes my ſeventh Chapter; and ſo on in what is entitled the fifth Chapter of the *Int. Syſt.* extending to P. 835, that is, the 609th of this Book; after which, as before, I was again oblig'd to take another Courſe quite to the End of the *Intel. Syſt.* and of this Treatiſe. And now, after an account given of this Work, ſo far forth as I underſtand it to be an Abridgment of the Doctor's Materials, I ſuppoſe 'twill be expected, that I mention in the next place what is the Courſe I took with thoſe which I have not abridg'd: And this brings me to account for that other Particular in the Title, in that I alſo call this Book in a great meaſure an *Improvement* of them.

Now thoſe very Perſons, who, as I have intimated, wiſh'd ſome of Dr. *Cudworth*'s Materials *abridg'd*, have as much wiſh'd that others of 'em were *improv'd*, in the way I now offer at; and that in ſome places by an Addition of Method quite new, and alſo of new *Materials:* becauſe they plainly ſaw that a great part of the Doctor's rich Ore lay in confuſion, beſides its being variouſly mingl'd and blended with heterogeneous Particles; and tho in ſome places it ſuperabounded, yet in others they ſaw a Scarcity of it. Whereupon I ſay, that many truly Pious and Learned Men have juſtly complain'd, nay Dr. *Cudworth* himſelf has more than once* intimated, that the *Anſwers to Atheiſtical Arguments* are thin and ſcanty; unleſs it be that elaborate one to the firſt Objection againſt the *Naturality of the Idea of God, as eſſentially including in it Unity or Onelineſs*; which holds intire from P. 192 of the *True Intellectual Syſtem* quite to P. 632.

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* *He ſaying at P.* 632. *That he* reſerv'd a further Confutation of Atheiſm for another Volume, and that he only ſubjoin'd in the mean time a ſhort and compendious Confutation of all the Atheiſtick Arguments propos'd. *Again, having nam'd his large Account of the Pagan Polytheiſm, in anſwering the grand Objection againſt the Naturality of the Idea of God, as what had prevented that full and copious Confutation of Atheiſtick Arguments, he adds,* P. 633. *That* we may not be here quite excluded of what was principally intended, we ſhall ſubjoin a contracted and compendious Confutation, &c. *And in reference to Objections againſt Providence, he complains that* he has not room to expatiate in, *and refers the Reader to the Writings of others,* p. 880.

and

and is afterwards re-inforc'd with other Anſwers and poſitive Proofs of the contrary in the following Section of the fourth Chapter; and that to the ſecond, which is, *that there can be no creative Power, becauſe Nothing by any Power whatſoever can come out of Nothing, and therefore there is no ſuch God as Theiſts ſuppoſe.* The next Anſwer indeed to the Arguments againſt an *incorporeal* Deity, which in the Sequel makes way for a Confutation of the fifth, ſixth, ſeventh and eighth Objections, has in it abundance of excellent Materials, yet is not quite ſo full and perfect as might have been deſir'd. And as for all the remaining Heads, there are alſo upon *moſt* of them *ſome* very good Materials, but, as any one may ſee, beſides the Scantineſs of 'em, they lie in a perfect huddle; and it muſt be own'd, that they are not ſo accurately and plauſibly digeſted and expreſs'd in way of anſwer, as the Objections had been. So that here was plain Scope and Occaſion for what I term an *Improvement*, in reference at once to *Method* and *Matter*: which however neither Dr. *Cudworth* himſelf nor any other Perſon undertaking, I was again inclin'd to ſet about this too; and that eſpecially, becauſe I could no longer bear the Taunts of Libertines, That the Doctor had elaborately baffled himſelf, in that he had not made ſatisfactory Anſwers to the Objections he had ſtarted againſt a God and Providence, and that while theſe are plain and clear, thoſe are confus'd and dark: and in ſhort, I could no longer ſee *Atheiſm* ſtanding impudently at a parley, and not abſolutely quell'd and ſilenc'd by *Theiſm*. But here notwithſtanding this Plea, from a true Zeal for the Glory of God, I look to be diſdainfully upbraided by ſome: What, could *you* take upon you to improve, nay finiſh a Draught begun and ſo far carry'd on by ſo able, ſo maſterly a Hand? It was, I confeſs, a formidable Enterprize, notwithſtanding the Motive aforeſaid (which ought however to ſuperſede all others that oppoſe it) but I ſay, that I do not pretend to have any way improv'd, much leſs finiſh'd this Work in ſo compleat a manner, as either the Doctor himſelf or others *might*, tho they have not actually done: but all I pretend, is, according to my Scantling, to have ſupply'd ſome known Deficiencys in what he *has done*, and to ſet out the *Whole* in ſuch a way,

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as may ſuffice to overturn the Cauſe of *Atheiſm.* And neither in this have I taken upon me to add very much to the Doctor's great Treaſury of *Reading* and *Quotations* from the *Antients:* but beſides *Method* either in part or elſe intirely new throughout the *Whole*, the principal *Matters* I have attempted to add, are either the Reſults of my own Meditation, or taken from a Variety of modern Writers, who, it muſt be own'd, have much improv'd upon and advanc'd beyond the Antients in this kind of Philoſophy; eſpecially as having been provok'd by modern Atheiſts, who have alſo improv'd the old Objections, and ſometimes forg'd out new ones; whom therefore likewiſe and their Writings, as they came in my way, I have all along cenſur'd and confuted.

And now having thus far endeavour'd to ſtave off Prejudice at my *Undertaking*, I deſire in the next place a candid Hearing, before I am judg'd, touching what I have *perform'd* in the reſpect aforeſaid; and ſo I proceed more particularly to mention what it is I have here done, by way of *Improvement of what Dr.* Cudworth *offer'd to my purpoſe.* Now this I have attempted by an Addition of *Method* and *Matter.* Touching *Method*, this, as was before hinted in general, is either partly new, the Doctor's Materials being not only digeſted into Chapters throughout this whole Book, but alſo the Contents of thoſe Chapters, I venture to ſay, being rang'd in better order than they were (even where I have *abridg*'d them) and many of them which ſuted with each other, but lay before immethodically ſeparated, are tranſpos'd, and often brought together from very great diſtances; or elſe it is intirely new: Thus, for inſtance, when, as I ſaid, I had got in way of *Abridgment, without any conſiderable Addition or Alteration, unleſs it be ſometimes of Stile and Method*, &c. ſo far as to P. 546 of the *True Intellectual Syſtem*, that is, to the 306th of this Treatiſe, here I was oblig'd to take another courſe; foraſmuch as in this place either the Doctor's Clue was broken, or at leaſt it ſeem'd ſo to me: ſo that now not knowing one ſtep of the way (whereas before indeed I had ſome Direction) I enter'd into an infinite Maze of irregular Windings and Turnings; thro which however, by frequent Wanderings backward and forward,

I at length happily found out a Paſſage, and endeavour'd to mark out the ſame for others. I mean that in this place there being no expreſs Tranſition made, nor any plain Connection of what follows with what went before, and the Materials, tho great part of 'em well-ſuted to the Purpoſe, yet lying in great confuſion, I have endeavour'd agreeably to the Doctor's main Drift (beſides the contracting of his Matters) to rectify theſe Failures. Firſt then, I have clearly connected the enſuing with the precedent Reaſonings: the Deſign of which was to ſhew, that tho the Heathens were univerſally *Polytheiſts*, and in ſome ſenſe held *many Gods*, yet ſtill they were *Monotheiſts*, or held *one independent God over all the reſt*; agreeably to which here being mention made of the Θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμιοι or *ſupermundane Gods*, the chief of which are reckon'd to be the *Parmenidean*, *Pythagorean* or *Platonick Triad* of *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, *God* or *Monad*, *Mind* and *Soul*, I have us'd my endeavour, as far as P. 341 of this Treatiſe, to reconcile this *Trinity* with the *Unity*, and that the *numerical Unity* of the Godhead, according to the ſenſe of thoſe genuine *Platoniſts* who aſſerted it, and that chiefly to P. 332 of this Book, as this is ſet forth in the Doctor's Materials, extending to P. 625 of the *True Intellectual Syſtem*. In doing which I add, that, beſides my having caſt off many things, which were not to the purpoſe or ſuperfluous, I was forc'd to take the Doctor's Work all into pieces, to refit and ſometimes mend the Parts of it, and then to rejoin and put 'em together in quite another Form: ſo that tho the Matters lying in this Compaſs be brought into leſs room, and no way much augmented or re-inforc'd by foreign Supplys, yet is the Method intirely new; as alſo it muſt be ſuppos'd to be in all thoſe other Spaces of this Treatiſe, which, as I have noted, are not Abridgments, but come under another Title, as they are quite new, or Improvements of the Doctor's Hints, either in his Anſwers, or at leaſt the Atheiſtick Objections he has ſtated. And therefore ſecondly I ſay, that tho all along I have ſtill taken in from the *Intellectual Syſtem* what was to the purpoſe, and diſcarded what was not, yet, as before noted, not finding near enough of them, and not being able to juſtify either to God or to my ſelf, the having

ſpeciouſly

ſpecioufly urg'd Atheiſtick Arguments, unleſs I as ſpecioufly anſwer'd 'em, I have on this hand made alſo conſiderable Additions of *Matters:* and that firſt from P. 332 to 341 of this Book; where I have endeavour'd to rectify a Paſſage or two of Dr. *Cudworth*'s, and to reconcile his true Meaning therein with the main Drift of his Diſcourſe, and what elſewhere he had particularly intimated touching the *Platoniſts*, *&c.* that notwithſtanding they held three Divine *Hypoſtaſes*, yet at the ſame time they held but *one numerical Eſſence* of the Godhead, that is, one individual God. However in theſe he has dropt ſome Words to the contrary, ſaying, * *That the* Platoniſts *dreamt of no ſuch thing at all, as one and the ſame numerical Eſſence or Subſtance of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes*; and again, † *That they no where ſuppoſe the three Divine Hypoſtaſes to have no diſtinct ſingular Eſſences of their own*, &c. The literal and ſtrict ſenſe of which Expreſſions is therefore moderated, and it is ſhewn, what the Doctor, agreeably to the Tenor of his other Doctrine, muſt *really* have *meant* that the genuine *Platoniſts* held, as likewiſe here's an Eſſay occaſionally made towards vindicating ſome of the Fathers of the Church, in relation to this point. Secondly, from about P. 664 of the *Int. Syſt.* that is, to the 379 of this Book, there are frequent Additions quite to the end of what I make my ſixth Chapter, co-extending to P. 738 of the *Int. Syſt.* where among Anſwers to ſeveral Re-inforcements of the firſt Atheiſtical Objection, it being ſeaſonably propos'd to urge ſome *Phænomena*, directly proving the Exiſtence of God, in that without a ſuppoſal of this they can no way be ſolv'd, the Atheiſt is accordingly puzzl'd with ſome that are ordinary and ſome extraordinary; and Dr. *Cudworth*'s Hints and Heads of Argument, particularly touching *Final Cauſes* or *Deſigns*, and the *Well* and *Fit* (as || *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks) that are perceivable in the Univerſe; as alſo the *natural* Belief of a God, and the *Divine* Inſtitution of *Religion*; the Reality of *finite* Spirits, and *eternal Truths*, as proving the Exiſtence of God. Thirdly, from P. 836, that is, P. 609 of this Treatiſe, beſides that ſome new Topics are ſtarted, the ſame

* P. 592. *of the* True Int. Syſt. † P. 601. || Τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς.

Courſe is taken throughout the whole Works. In which Compaſs theſe Heads are particularly inſiſted or enlarg'd upon, namely, that there is in the Univerſe an *Intellectual* and *Vital* Principle, diſtinct from *Body* or *Matter*; and again, that *Matter* is no way capable even of *Senſation*, and much leſs of *Cogitation* or *Intellection*; that *Matter* is *eſſentially paſſive* and without *Motion* or *Self-activity*, in oppoſition to a late Aſſertion of the contrary; that *Mind* or *Thought*, as it is not an abſolute Quality, ſo is not the Reſult of any *Concretion* of *Matter* whatſoever: from all which ſome Corollarys are drawn, and ſome Points debated and ſettled, not only touching the Deity, but alſo the Souls of Men and Brutes; and particularly, whenas the former are concluded to be ſpiritual and immortal, what we may reaſonably conjecture of the latter, *&c.* Again it is prov'd, that beſides *Senſibles* and *Singulars* there are diſtinct *Knowables* and *Univerſals*; alſo the particular Objections againſt *Providence*, becauſe plauſibly urg'd, are here as particularly and plauſibly anſwer'd, namely thoſe from the Topic of *natural Evils*, offer'd by the *Democriticks* and *Epicureans*; to which are added thoſe of *Vanini* and others from the Topic of *moral Evils:* and it is ſhewn that each of the Particulars mention'd on theſe Heads is ſo far from diſproving, that it plainly proves a Divine Contrivance and Superintendency over the World. The like is made appear, touching the unequal Diſpenſation of temporal things to good and bad Men. Prov'd againſt the *Epicureans*, &c. that ſuch a Being, as we ſuppoſe that God is, both can and does preſide over all the Parts of the Univerſe, and this without any Derogation from his *Honour* or his *Happineſs*; nay, that by ſo doing, the one is render'd more *illuſtrious* and the other more *perfect*, than otherwiſe they would be, his *Glory* and *Beatitude* being much better diſplay'd and enjoy'd in the Rule and Conſervation of what he had once made, than they could be by a careleſs Inactivity. Again, here is Satisfaction given to theſe Querys, How God, if *Incorporeal*, could move the Matter of the World, as he muſt have done, if ſuppos'd to have form'd it? And if there be a God, How ſo great a part of Mankind, as the Infidel World includes, could be left ſo deſtitute as they are

of

of the Knowledg of him, and of the Means of attaining their eternal Happineſs? Laſtly, 'tis ſhewn at large againſt *Hobbes* and others of his way, that it is not againſt, but highly for the Intereſt of *Civil Sovereigns*, that the Fear of God and Religion ſhould be entertain'd: in doing which their State of Nature is examin'd, and the Grounds of their *Ethical* and *Political Hypotheſis* occaſionally unravel'd and exploded; and upon the whole 'tis plainly prov'd, that not *factitious*, but *natural Juſtice*, as it is enacted by the *Fear* of God and *Religion*, is the Baſis and Bond of *Civil Society*. And thus in the Concluſion, I hope, it will be found, that nothing *material* againſt the *Being* and *Providence* of God is here unanſwer'd. Indeed * *Merſennus* talks of a Perſon doubtful of God's Exiſtence, that propos'd to one *Francis Humblot* fourſcore Objections againſt it, yet let all the reſt drop, after having heard the firſt of 'em anſwer'd; which was only an impertinent Query, *Why*, if there be a God that made the World, *he did not make it ſooner?* A ſign indeed how weak and trifling all the others were, and how little they deſerv'd to be ſeriouſly examin'd. Accordingly we find that *Merſennus* neglects 'em, he naming but twenty ſix Atheiſtical Arguments; which alſo, I add, tho more in number than I have here mention'd, at leaſt as they are in words expreſs'd, yet as they don't contain Ideas altogether diſtinct, there is nothing of moment in 'em, but what is reducible to ſome or other of the Heads here offer'd. And therefore I ſay, that notwithſtanding I have nam'd fewer general Topics, yet nothing *material* to the purpoſe of *Atheiſm* is, I think, here omitted, ſo as to hinder this Diſcourſe from being, I may ſay, *a full Confutation of the Reaſon and Philoſophy of Atheiſm.*

And now having accounted for what is here advanc'd, and for what I have either abridg'd or improv'd of the Materials or Hints of the *Intellectual Syſtem*, I come next to mention what follows in the Title-page, namely, *of what Dr.* Cudworth *offer'd to that purpoſe in his*, &c. by which I would at once de-

* *In* Quæſt. Celeb. in Geneſim, *Col.* 279. *the chief Deſign of which large Work is to combat Atheiſm, and prove the Exiſtence of a God.*

note, as well that the *Whole* of the *Int. Syſt.* does not (becauſe not deſign'd to do it) directly combat *Atheiſm*; as alſo that even this *firſt Part* of it (the only one that has been publiſh'd) which was indeed deſign'd for it, yet, as we have ſeen, has in it ſome things which were not *to that purpoſe*. So that had the whole Work been extant, as the Remainder is ſaid to be in MS; yet would it have been no further uſeful to my preſent Undertaking. This I the rather choſe to mention, leſt, what ſome I know have otherwiſe ſurmis'd, it ſhould be drawn from the word *Offer'd*, that I my ſelf would thereby expreſs in the firſt place what Dr. *Cudworth* has *actually done*; and ſecondly would imply, that he *intended* to do yet more *to the purpoſe of Atheiſm*, in the two latter Parts of his Work: from which it would again be infer'd, that unleſs I had recourſe at leaſt to that * excellent Perſon, who, I'm inform'd, has the MS of them, I have new-model'd and publiſh'd but a Piece of a Treatiſe; and eſpecially that, where I pretend to have brought in an Addition of Materials, I might have been much better ſupply'd from the Fountain-head, and out of a Store, which may be ſuppos'd to be vaſtly more copious, as being collected by the Doctor's own Hand. Wherefore I ſay, that only this *firſt Part of the Intellectual Syſtem*, with which I have concern'd my ſelf, was deſign'd againſt *Atheiſm*, and accordingly look'd on by the Doctor himſelf to be in that way a *perfect Work*; he telling us at P. 836. *That he had herein copiouſly confuted all the moſt conſiderable Atheiſtick Grounds*; nay in the Concluſion, at P. 899. *That he had fully confuted all the Atheiſtick Grounds*; and accordingly again in the Preface, p. 4. *That there is no reaſon why this Volume ſhould therefore be thought imperfect and incompleat, becauſe it hath not all the three things at firſt deſign'd by us; it containing all that belongs to its own particular Title and Subject, and being in that reſpect no Piece, but a Whole. And therefore that this general Title of* True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe *might well have been here ſpar'd by us, and this Volume have been preſented to the Reader's view, not as a Part or Piece, but a whole compleat and intire thing by it ſelf*, had it not been inſcrib'd, what indeed it really is, a *Part* of that

* *The Lady* Maſham, *Dr.* Cudworth's *Daughter.*

whole

whole Work, which was deſign'd againſt three *Fataliſms*: the firſt of which is the *Democritick*, term'd by *Epicurus* the *Phyſiological*, and by Dr. *Cudworth* the *Atheiſtick Fate* or *abſolute Atheiſm*, in that it ſuppoſes *ſenſleſs Matter neceſſarily mov'd, to be the firſt Original and Principle of all things*; the ſecond is no other than immoral Theiſm or Religion without any *natural Juſtice* and *Morality*, all *Juſt* and *Unjuſt*, according to this *Hypotheſis*, being mere *thetical* and *factitious* things, made by arbitrary Will and Command only; the third is ſuch a *Theiſm*, as acknowledges not only a God or omnipotent underſtanding Being, but alſo *natural Juſtice* and *Morality* founded in him and deriv'd from him; nevertheleſs no Liberty from *Neceſſity* any where, and therefore no diſtributive or retributive Juſtice in the World. Accordingly, as it was the Deſign of only the firſt Part of the *Intel. Syſt.* to combat the former of theſe *falſe Hypotheſes*, this alone is entitled againſt *Atheiſm*, as tending to prove that *all things do not float without a Head and Governor, but that there is an omnipotent underſtanding Being preſiding over all.* And each of the other Books, as the Doctor tells us, tho coming with the former under one general Title of *True Int. Syſt.* &c. yet has beſides, its own particular Title: the one *for natural Juſtice and Morality, founded in the Deity*; the other for *Liberty from Neceſſity, and a diſtributive Juſtice of Rewards and Puniſhments in the World.* However ſtill I ſay, that as much of the two latter *Hypotheſes* as comes in, tho not *directly*, yet *conſequentially* to the purpoſe of *Atheiſm*, is touch'd at and confuted in this Treatiſe. To which I add, that tho Dr. *Cudworth* himſelf, as was before noted, hints at the Scantineſs of this very Piece, which he wrote expreſly againſt *Atheiſm*, nay and plainly ſays, That * *God affording Life, Health and Leiſure, he reſerv'd a further Confutation of Atheiſm for another Volume:* Yet from what likewiſe I have before cited it appears, that either he afterwards alter'd his Mind, ſaying that this Work was compleat in its kind; or rather, I conceive, that what he further intended was to have been an *Appendix* to the firſt Section of the fourth Chapter, particularly to his Arguments therein for *Monotheiſm* or the Belief of *one ſu-*

hence called "Int. Syſt."

* *Pag.* 632.

prema

preme God among the Heathens, notwithſtanding that they alſo held and worſhip'd a *Diverſity* of *Gods*. Accordingly this, as it is in his own Words (and I have had no other means of informing my ſelf about his Deſign but only this) was to give a yet further account of the *Pagan Polytheiſm*, * *as a Foundation of that Defence of Chriſtianity, deſign'd by us*; which, he ſays, *was defer'd to make room for a Confutation of all the Atheiſtick Arguments*: and again to the ſame purpoſe, he tells us in the † Preface, *That the Purſuit of the Remainder that is, a further account of the Pagan Idolatry and Religion, together with our Defence of Chriſtianity, would have quite excluded our principally intended Confutation of all the Atheiſtick Grounds.* Both which Paſſages do plainly ſhew that this was the Volume and the only Volume, which he intended *directly* againſt *Atheiſm*; and that conſequently what he further deſign'd in vindication of Chriſtianity, was confeſſedly not to the main Purpoſe, and therefore not wanting to compleat it; but however, as he tells us, it was expedient to be done, " ‖ Becauſe he had obſerv'd that ſome profeſs'd Oppoſers of " Atheiſm, had either incur'd a Suſpicion or at leaſt ſuffer'd " under an Imputation of being mere Theiſts and natural " Religioniſts only, and no hearty Believers of Chriſtianity, " or Friends to reveal'd Religion. With which, tho the Doctor in point of *Charity* cannot be charg'd, he more than once ſolemnly profeſſing *his unſhaken Belief and firm Aſſurance of the whole Chriſtian Doctrine*; yet ſtill it were to be wiſh'd, that he had oblig'd the learned World with that able Defence of it, which 'tis on all hands own'd that he was capable of making, and as he himſelf tells us, he would have made, had not unſutable *Contingencys* or *Circumſtances* hinder'd him.

In ſhort I then ſay, that in this Treatiſe there is the *Whole* of the *Int. Syſt.* that was written againſt *Atheiſm*; together with conſiderable Augmentations, amounting to above a fourth Part. Even where, becauſe of a Redundancy of *Matters*, there was an opportunity given to abridg them; yet ſtill

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* P. 633. *and at the end of Contents of* Ch. 4. §. 1.
† P. 6. ‖ *In* Preface, p. 5.

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the whole *Subſtance* is taken in, not one Reaſoning to the purpoſe, I venture to ſay, being omitted or obſcur'd by Brevity, or injudiciouſly miſrepreſented: but the Doctor's whole Scope being comprehended, and his Senſe intirely maſter'd, is clearly and fairly ſet forth in its full Strength and Emphaſis, and ſomething all along here and there added to explain or confirm his main Drift. And where again there ſeem'd to be a Scarcity of *Matters*, and ſo a more than ordinary occaſion given to augment 'em, here is a Supply of ſuch others made, as tho not equally valuable with the Doctor's, yet I hope will not appear to be Patches altogether heterogeneous, but fitly grafted on and interwoven with his richer Stuff, and at leaſt ſerving the better to foil and ſet it off. So that here the Reader has in leſſer Compaſs a greater Subſtance, and that to be purchas'd with leſs Mony, to be perus'd with leſs Pains, and in all likelihood with more Advantage; eſpecially conſidering in reference to the *Intel. Syſt.* that where the way is now made ſhorter, it is withal made eaſier and plainer, and the Proſpect thro it clear'd and open'd; and even where it is made longer, 'tis ſtill for the greater Convenience of the Traveller, in that whereas before it ſcarcely afforded ſufficient Accommodation, now it is ſtor'd with ſuch Entertainments, as I hope will compenſate the Labour of paſſing it. All which whoever upon a thorow Peruſal and comparing Notes finds to be true, will, I hope, if not thank, yet at leaſt pardon my Undertaking.

But ſtill in reference to what I have abridg'd of the *Intel. Syſtem*, leſt thoſe who will not be at the trouble to read both Writings, ſhould yet pretend to judg or at leaſt ſuſpect, that in contracting Dr. *Cudworth*'s *Materials*, I have done what is too often true of Abridgments, that is, ſpoilt the Original, I think fit to advertiſe, that where I have caſt off what it is granted was *to the Purpoſe*, but ſuperabounded, I have all along refer'd the Reader to it in the reſpective Pages, which anſwer to it in this Book; and even where I have caſt off what was *not to the Purpoſe*, but otherwiſe inſtructive and uſeful to be read, I have thought fit here to mention and offer to the Reader's Judgment, pointing out to him the places, where in that vaſt Field of *Matter*, which contains and hides it, it

may

may readily be found: yet part of which I can't juſtify my renewing the mention of (becauſe of great moment in point of Chriſtian Faith and Doctrine, and ſuch as upon Dr. *Cudworth*'s account has made much noiſe in the World) without ſome Obſervations upon it. Firſt then there is a Digreſſion from the main Purpoſe, concerning *Apollonius Tyanæus* and his Miracles, *&c.* at fol. 266, and ſo on, of the *True Int. Syſt.* Secondly, a Digreſſion concerning the *Sibylline Oracles*, fol. 281, *&c.* Thirdly, another concerning *Orpheus* and the *Orphick Trinity*, from fol. 294 to 308. Fourthly, ſome large but uſeful Deſcants, tho Deviations from the main Purpoſe, concerning the Antiquity and Learning of the *Egyptians*, and the Authority of the *Triſmegiſtick* Writings, beginning from fol. 308. Fifthly, an Account how the *genuine Cabala* of the *Trinity* has been adulterated and deprav'd by modern ſpurious *Platoniſts*, from fol. 548 to 557. The Abſurditys of which *Depravation* are alſo inſiſted on from fol. 560 to 570, and fol. 625, *&c.* in the former of which Spaces *Origen* by the way, as being a *Platoniſt*, comes under an Examination. Sixthly, an Orthodox Account of the Chriſtian Trinity, fol. 558, *&c.* Seventhly, a true Account of *Plato*'s *Ideas*. Eighthly, a long Digreſſion extending from fol. 601 to 625, and deſign'd to ſet forth the antient Doctrine of the Chriſtian Church, touching a *Trinity* in *Unity*; and this is one of thoſe, which I could not paſs by without ſome Obſervations upon it. The Occaſion of it was this: Dr. *Cudworth* having given a large Account of the *Triad* of the *Platoniſts* from P. 546, *&c.* and ſhewn, that tho they reckon'd the three Divine Hypoſtaſes, *Good* or *Monad*, *Mind* and *Soul*, to be the chief of their *ſupermundane Gods*, and, as they were *Pagans* and Conformiſts to the national way of ſpeaking in matters of Religion, often term'd 'em a *firſt*, a *ſecond*, and a *third God* or *Principle*; yet that ſtill in their own more curious and recondite Thoughts, and as they were *Philoſophers*, they agreeably to his Purpoſe (which was to ſhew that the Heathens univerſally held but *one unmade independent God*) acknowledg'd but one Θεῖον or *Divinity*; he having, I ſay, done this, comes at length P. 601. to declare in what ſenſe they maintain'd the *Unity* of the *Godhead* in regard to the *three Divine Hypoſtaſes*, ſaying, " That tho

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" the genuine *Platoniſts* do thus ſuppoſe the three Hypoſtaſes " to be all of them not only God, but alſo *one God* or μία θεότης, " one intire Divinity: upon which latter account the Whole " may be ſaid alſo by them to have one ſingular and nume- " rical Eſſence; yet notwithſtanding muſt it be acknow- " ledg'd that they no where ſuppoſe each of theſe three Hypo- " ſtaſes to be *numerically* the *very ſame*, or to have no *diſtinct* " *ſingular Eſſences* of their own; this being in their Appre- " henſions directly contradictious to their very Hypotheſis it " ſelf, and all one as if they ſhould affirm them indeed not " to be three Hypoſtaſes, but only one. Nevertheleſs the " Chriſtian *Platoniſt* would here alſo apologize for them " after this manner: That the antient Orthodox Fathers of " the Chriſtian Church were generally of no other Perſuaſion " than this, that that Eſſence or Subſtance of the Godhead, " which all the three Perſons or Hypoſtaſes agree in, as each " of them is God, was not one ſingular or individual, but only " one common and univerſal Eſſence or Subſtance. Touching which Aſſertion, how far it holds true of the *Platoniſts*, I have more pertinently ſhewn * elſewhere: And as to the Fathers of the Chriſtian Church, who are brought in by the way to vindicate the former (if under a miſtake) for *them*, becauſe I was unwilling to interrupt the main Body and Thred of my Diſcourſe by a needleſs Digreſſion, I have here reſerv'd a more convenient Place, begging the Reader's pardon, if now I trace the Doctor, tho ſomewhat out of his way. This I the rather think fit to be done, becauſe otherwiſe tho it was not directly to his Purpoſe, yet ſome, who do not fully comprehend his main Drift in that great Field of Matter which precedes this Digreſſion, might think I have defalcated an uſeful or conſiderable Part of the *True Intel. Syſt.* even that which has made more noiſe, it may be, than all the reſt; in that the Contents of it are often cited not only in Company, but alſo there has hardly been a Pamphlet or Book writ for ſome years about the *Bleſſed Trinity*, eſpecially in *England* and in the Heterodox way, which does not bring in Dr. *Cudworth* upon the Stage, and vouch his

* *At* P. 332, *&c. of this Treatiſe.*

Name and Quotations for its Purpoſe. While on the other hand the truly Orthodox (tho often I find thro a miſunderſtanding of his Senſe) do aim at his Doctrine as a mark of their Invectives; and others, who call themſelves alſo by that name, entertaining no little Veneration even for the very *Words* us'd by the antient Fathers, eſpecially when repeated and reviv'd by ſo Learned a Perſon as Dr. *Cudworth*, and reſolving, whatever ſhould come of it, to ſtand by them, have unhappily fallen into a kind of *Tritheiſm*. Whereupon again the *Unitarian* ſtarts up, and arguing indeed well enough *ad hominem*, tells us, that rather than believe *three Divine Hypoſtaſes*, the ſame with *Individuals*, ſubſiſting in the *Godhead* as their *ultimate Species*, which is to ſay *three Gods*, he for his part will not believe any *Trinity* at all. Now the caſe being ſo, it may perhaps be expected, or at leaſt, I hope, will be excus'd, that out of a *Zeal* not wholly *without Knowledg*, to do what honor he juſtly may to this grand Article of a *Trinity* in *Unity*, and at once to the Doctrine of the Fathers concerning it, and Dr. *Cudworth* in his Account of it, an obſcure Young man dares take up the Ballance, and in order to ſet ſome diſputed Points even, intermeddles with and weighs theſe venerable Authoritys.

Wherefore now to reſume the Charge made upon the *Fathers* by the Doctor, and which he afterwards endeavours to make good: " That they were generally of no other Perſua-
" ſion than this, that that *Eſſence* or *Subſtance* of the God-
" head which all the Perſons or Hypoſtaſes agree in, as each
" of them is God, was not one ſingular or individual, but one
" common and univerſal Eſſence or Subſtance. Theſe Words however I ſay in the firſt place, and the ſame will be ſeen more plainly hereafter, do make way for expounding and adjuſting the Senſe both of the antient Fathers and the Doctor in this Point; ſeeing he cannot here underſtand *ſingular* and *individual* in the true and proper Signification of theſe Terms, and as when oppos'd to what is *ſcholaſtically* and ſtrictly *ſpecifical*: for if ſo, he could not then by the *adverſative* and *exceptive* Particles, *But only*, ſet 'em againſt *common*, but *ſpecifical*; nothing hindering but that one and the ſame *numerical* Eſſence in it ſelf, may be at once

common

common in ſome reſpects, tho not properly *ſpecifical*. Wherefore, as I ſhall again take notice, he cannot have meant any more by the aforeſaid *Antitheſis*, than that the antient Fathers did not hold the Eſſence of the Godhead, in which the three *Hypoſtaſes* agree, to be ſo abſolutely *determinate* and *individuated*, but that it is ſtill *common*, in regard to its *Predicability* of them. Accordingly I add, that whenever in his Account he expreſly applies (as elſewhere he does) the very Term *ſpecifical* to the Godhead, it cannot even then be ſuppos'd, that he meant the Fathers to mean any more by it than *common*; and that firſt becauſe he frequently *confounds* and cites *indifferently* from them either one or t'other, as Terms ſynonymous and convertible; whereas in a ſtrict ſenſe neither they nor he could hold 'em to be ſo: not whatever is *common* being properly *ſpecifical*, tho what is *ſpecifical* be *common*. Secondly, becauſe of that great Abhorrence of *Tritheiſm*, which the Fathers muſt on all hands be allow'd to have had; yet which would unavoidably follow their aſſerting of the Divine Eſſence, in regard to its *Predicability* of the *three Hypoſtaſes*, to be in a ſtrict ſenſe *ſpecifical*. Thirdly, becauſe there are not only fair Intimations and Preſumptions, but expreſs Declarations and Teſtimonys to the contrary: thus St. *Baſil*, **What Common*, ſays he, *is to Proper, the ſame is Eſſence or Subſtance* (in the Trinity) *to the Hypoſtaſes*; I interpoſe, *in the Trinity*, for ſo this Father meant, he ſpeaking here expreſly of that Subject; not that he underſtood the word *Eſſence*, in any other Inſtance but this, to denote even *common*, and much leſs *ſpecifical*, in contradiſtinction to *particular Hypoſtaſes*: and therefore agreeably to him, *Theodoret* alſo tells us, as † Dr. *Cudworth* himſelf acknowledges, " ‖ That no ſuch diſtinction was obſerv'd by other *Greek* " Writers, betwixt theſe two words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, as " that the former of them ſhould be reſtrain'd to *Univerſals* " only, *generical* or *ſpecifical* Eſſences or Subſtances; but that " this was peculiar to the Chriſtian Fathers in their Doctrine " concerning the Trinity, they having no fitter Terms to

* Οὐ ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν. Ep. 389.

† Int. Syſt. *p.* 602. ‖ Dial. 1. adverſ. Hæreſ.

expreſs their Meaning by, ſo as to keep up the *Individuality* of the *one ſupreme God*, and at once a *real* Diſtinction of the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, which tho not *ſingular diſtinct Eſſences* or *Beings*, yet by ſome inexpreſſible Tokens *differ'd* ὅιως, ὁμοίως, ὅτως, *like* or *as* ſo many *ſingular individual Beings*; "However they in the mean while not denying, ſays the Doctor, "but that each *Hypoſtaſis*, *Proſopon* or *Perſon* in the Trinity, "might be ſaid in another ſenſe, and in way of oppoſition to "*Sabellius*, to have its own ſingular, individual or exiſtent "Eſſence alſo; that is, οὐσία may be taken for that which is *ſingular*, and be apply'd even to the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, as it ſignifies that by which a thing *is* or *is diſtinguiſh'd* from another: and the Divine Hypoſtaſes being ſo, may in ſome ſenſe be ſaid to have their own *particular Eſſences*, as they are not only *modally* or *nominally*, but *abſolutely* and *really* diſtinguiſh'd, and ſo fitly enough term'd by the *Latins Perſonæ*, as ſome will have this word to be deriv'd from the *Hetruſcan* or the *Chaldee* פְּרַשׁ, which ſignifies to diſtinguiſh, or rather as *Perſona* is *quaſi per ſe una*. So far is the word *Species*, when ſtrictly taken, from bearing an exact Analogy to *Eſſence*, in the opinion of the Fathers. But however in this particular Caſe, becauſe no fitter Term than *Eſſence* could be thought of by 'em to denote a *Community of Nature*; this implying that which is *firſt* and *neceſſarily* in a thing, without referring to any particular manner of ſubſiſting, it has been accordingly apply'd to the Godhead in general: whereas the B. Trinity, in contradiſtinction to the Unity of the Godhead, has rather been denoted by *Hypoſtaſes* or *Subſiſtences*, than by *Eſſences*; the former implying ſomething which is proper, and ſo fitly ſignifying in the preſent Caſe, tho not an *abſolute Individuation*, yet a *real Diſtinction* of *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt*, or of the *Three* that are *One*, however in common Uſage they are indeed promiſcuouſly apply'd to denote the ſame thing; as the aforeſaid *Three* are indeed all of them the ſame ὑφιστάμενον, tho not *quà* ὑφιστάμενον or *ſecundum ipſas Hypoſtaſes* τῆς θεότητος, ſcil. *Divinæ*. Accordingly, 'tis very well obſerv'd by * St. *Baſil* in oppoſition to *Marcellus Ancyranus* and ſome

* *St. Baſil in Ep. 78. See this further made out againſt* D. Petavius *by Dr.* Bull *in Defenſ. Fid. Nic. p. 114, 115. Ed. Grab.*

other

other Favourers of the *Sabellian* Hereſy, that the *Nicene* Fathers, when in their Creed they condemn'd thoſe who held the Son to be ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας, of a different Hypoſtaſis or Eſſence from the Father, did not mean ὑπόστασις and οὐσία to be ſynonymous, but to denote diverſe things. And thus again methinks 'twas prudently * order'd, for preventing miſtakes, eſpecially among thoſe of the *Latin* Church, in relation to this Subject, by the fifth Council of *Alexandria*, held in the Year 362, that the Terms οὐσία and ὑπόστασις ſhould be accurately and nicely diſtinguiſh'd. To this I ſhall only add the following Teſtimonys touching the Fathers in general: the firſt of which is this of the aforeſaid *Theodoret*, pronouncing univerſally of them, † That, according to their Doctrine, *as Common differs from that which is Proper, and Genus from the Species or the Individuum, ſo doth Eſſence or Subſtance differ from Hypoſtaſis.* In the former of which Parallels we have a downright Acknowledgment of what I have been ſaying, and in the latter, added as equivalent to it, whereas even *Genus* is mention'd as bearing a Similitude to *Eſſence*; and not only *Individuum* but *Species*, as bearing the ſame to *Hypoſtaſis*, it is plain from this that he ſubjoin'd the latter only as explanatory and declarative of the former; and as he went ſo far as to apply the word *Genus* to ſignify the Divine Eſſence, and compar'd the Divine Hypoſtaſes indifferently, either to *Individuals* or to *Species*, it is altogether unqueſtionable, that he did not mean either of theſe in the ſtrict and genuine ſenſe, but only in ſuch a latitude of 'em, as might at once denote an *Univerſality* and *Community* of the Godhead, and withal a *Diſtinction* and *Co-equality* of the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, whereof it is *predicable*, ſomewhat like thoſe between the *Species* or the *Individuals* of the ſame *Genus*: agreeably to which the *Divine Eſſence* is ſaid by ‖ St. *Hilary*, *to be one Nature, not by Unity of Perſon, but of Genus*; that is, to be not

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* Dr. Cave *in* Hiſt. Lit. *Part. alt. p.* 120.

† Καλάγει τὴν περὶ πατέρων διδασκαλίαν, ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἴδιον, ἢ ὁ γένος ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἔχει καὶ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν. Theod. ib.

‖ Natura una, non Unitate Perſonæ ſed Generis. *Hilar. de Synod.*

ſtrictly

ſtrictly *generical*, as the Word is deriv'd from *Genus* in the true logical ſenſe of it, but only *general* or common, as deriving from that word in vulgar Uſage. To this purpoſe we have another Teſtimony of the Learned *Petavius*: " * In " this one thing, ſays he, do the Judgments and Opinions of " all the *Greeks* eſpecially agree, that οὐσία Eſſence or Sub- " ſtance and Nature, which they call φύσις in the Trinity, " is ſomething general, common and undetermin'd: but " Hypoſtaſis is that which is proper, ſingular and circum- " ſcrib'd; and which is as it were compounded and made " up of that common Eſſence or Subſtance, and certain pe- " culiar Notes and Propertys or individuating Circumſtances. To which agrees this of Dr. *Cudworth* himſelf, ſaying, " † That the Orthodox Fathers did commonly diſtinguiſh " in this Controverſy of the Trinity betwixt οὐσία and Hypo- " ſtaſis, the Eſſence or Subſtance of the Godhead, and the " Hypoſtaſes or Perſons after this manner, namely, that the " Hypoſtaſis or Perſon was ſingular, but the Eſſence or Sub- " ſtance common or univerſal; that is, it is ſuch in relation to its particular Hypoſtaſes, albeit this does not hinder, but that in it ſelf, even according to him, it may ſtill be ſingular and individual.

Thus we have good ground to believe, that whenever the antient Fathers apply'd to the Godhead the Term *ſpecifical*, or call'd it a *Species*, they meant no more in it, than to denote its *Community* to and *Predicability* of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes, after the *like*, tho not the very ſame manner, that a *Species* is predicable of its Individuals: and this, I think, is all that can be made of the Aſſertions of thoſe Antients, of whom again Dr. *Cudworth* tells us, " There are not a few, " both *Greeks* and *Latins* (particularly he mentions *Gregory Nyſſen*, *Maximus* the Martyr, St. *Cyril* of *Alexandria*, *Ana-*

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* In hoc uno Græcorum præſertim omnium Judicia concordant οὐσίαν, id eſt, Eſſentiam ſive Subſtantiam aut Naturam, quam φύσιν vocant, generale eſſe aliquid & commune ac minimè definitum; ὑπόστασιν verò proprium, ſingulare & circumſcriptum, quod ex illo communi & peculiaribus quibuſdam Notis & Proprietatibus veluti componitur. *D. Pet. de l. 4. c. 7.*

† Int. Syſt. *p.* 601.

ſtaſius,

ſtaſius, and *Damaſcen*) who entertain'd this Opinion: * That "the three Hypoſtaſes or Perſons of the Trinity had not "only one general and univerſal Eſſence of the Godhead be- "longing to them all, they being all God; but were alſo "three Individuals, under the ſame ultimate Species or ſpe- "cifick Eſſence and Subſtance, juſt as three individual Men, "*Thomas*, *Peter* and *John*, under that ultimate Species of "Man, or that ſpecifick Eſſence of Humanity. In which Words indeed it ſeems as if the Doctor would have it, that the Fathers ſpoke out and open'd their Meaning plainly, here being their expreſs Words for it, that the *Divine Eſſence*, in relation to the *three Hypoſtaſes*, is not only *common*, but in way of contradiſtinction to that, truly and properly *ſpecifical*; and accordingly that the *three Hypoſtaſes* are three diſtinct *Individuals*. But as to this I ſay, that tho the Fathers aforeſaid did indeed thus apply the Term *Species* or *Specifical* to the Divine Eſſence, and that of *Individuals* to the *three Divine Hypoſtaſes*: yet does the Doctor, methinks, ſeem willing, in his Paraphraſe upon them, to make them ſay more than they really meant; namely, that the three *Divine Hypoſtaſes* are indeed three Individual Gods. For what does he conceive that thoſe Antients meant by the Term *Species*, when, as he tells us, they apply'd it to the Godhead, as regarding the *three Hypoſtaſes* which are in it? Did they underſtand it in a ſtrict logical ſenſe to be that which is *predicable* of the *Hypoſtaſes*, as differing *Numero*, that is to ſay with the Schoolmen, *Eſſentiâ*? If ſo, then I confeſs that they muſt needs mean 'em to be three diſtinct *Individual Gods*: and that they really did ſo, methinks the Doctor would inſinuate by the Parallel, which he pretends to be according to their Sentiment, between three *individual Men*, as agreeing in the ſpecifick Eſſence of *Humanity*, and the three *Divine Hypoſtaſes* as agreeing in that of the *Divinity*, ſaying, that according to them, the latter are Individuals *juſt as* the former; by which words, *juſt as*, methinks he would imply this Parallel, in the ſenſe of thoſe Fathers aforeſaid, to be exact: and accordingly at length, beſides other Abſurditys

* True Int. Syſt. *p.* 602, 603.

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he mentions of this, he expreſly charges 'em, agreeably to this Principle of theirs, with downright *Tritheiſm*, or the holding of *three co-ordinate Gods*; ſaying, I think, ſomewhat jeeringly, "* That had the *Platoniſts* comply'd with that Hy- "potheſis of St. *Cyril* and others, that the three Perſons of "the Trinity were but three independent and co-ordinate "Individuals, under the ſame ultimate Species or ſpecifick "Eſſence of the Godhead, as *Peter*, *Paul* and *John*, under "that Species or common Nature of Humanity, *&c.* "(which is to ſay plainly *three Gods*) they had been, that is, "had been held by *them*, as falling in with their own Senti- "ment, to be compleatly Orthodox. Agreeably to which again ſays he, ſpeaking of the aforeſaid Hypotheſis, "† it "ſeems plain that this *Trinity* is no other than a kind of *Tri-* "*theiſm*, and that of Gods independent and co-ordinate too. And again elſewhere, leaving this Charge upon St. *Cyril* of *Alexandria* and others of his Time, he ſeems to bring off the *Platoniſts* as not guilty of the ſame Tritheiſtick Error: "Whether, ſays he, this were a fault or no in the *Platoniſts*, "that they did not ſuppoſe their Hypoſtaſes to be three co- "equal Individuals under the ſame ultimate Species, as three "individual Men, I leave others to judg: whereby it ſeems that he did not blame them for, as being not guilty of it, but reckon'd 'em in that to be more Orthodox than the former. Touching all which Charge however, I can't but take notice in the firſt place, that the Doctor makes the Fathers ſay ſomewhat more in the Premiſes than they ever really did; and then goes on to infer the Concluſion, that their Doctrine was Tritheiſtick: for when they endeavouring to keep up a real Diſtinction of the Divine Hypoſtaſes, did indeed point out their Meaning by that of three individual Men; yet did they never ſay, that they differ'd *juſt ſo* (which would imply an exact Agreement and Proportion betwixt the Parts of the Compariſon) but only that they differ'd, as was before noted, ὅιως, ὁμοίως or ὅτως, that is, *ſomewhat like* or *as* the *Individuals* of the ſame *Species*, this being a Similitude, and that the beſt they could think of, whereby to expreſs their Mean-

* P. 603. † P. 604. P. 624.

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ing, ſo as to maintain a real *Diſtinction* and at once a *Co-equality* of the Perſons, as not *abſolutely*, yet *as it were* differing *Numero*, in that a Plurality of them as ſuch, tho not of *Eſſences*, may be *number'd*: but they never meant 'em to differ from each other in exactly the ſame manner with *Individuals*. And therefore I again add, that the Doctor could not, and accordingly did not charge 'em with *Tritheiſm* ſincerely and in earneſt, however this indeed is *ſeemingly* deducible from their own very words: I ſay *ſeemingly* deducible, becauſe albeit as they never *meant*, nor indeed ſo much as unwarily *ſaid*, that the *three Divine Hypoſtaſes* are *three individual Gods*; yet muſt it be own'd, that they call'd 'em ſimply *three Individuals*: which Term by it ſelf tho not applicable in this Caſe, if taken ſtrictly, it being certain that the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, if really at all three *Individuals*, can be no other than *individual Gods*; yet as dropping from the Pens of the Fathers with a cautious omiſſion of the word *Gods*, it admits of a more favourable Conſtruction; eſpecially as we are otherwiſe aſſur'd of their *real Meaning*, or at leaſt that it was not what this Term, when ſtrictly taken, does import. For as they utterly abominated and diſclaim'd *Tritheiſm*, and when ſpeaking of the Divine *Hypoſtaſes*, religiouſly avoided the addition of *Gods* to *individual*, it is ſo far from arguing, that when they call'd 'em three *Individuals*, they meant *individual Gods*, that to any impartial Judg it ſhews quite the contrary: that they held but one *individual God*, and by applying the ſingle Term *Individuals* to the three Hypoſtaſes of that one God, they only endeavour'd to denote a *real Diſtinction* or kind of *Individuation* between them, ſomewhat reſembling that which is between the *Individuals* of a *Species*, but not the very ſame with it. Moreover, as we find that the Doctor *juſtly* could not, ſo by conſequence, I ſay, he did not *ſincerely* and *in earneſt* charge theſe Fathers with *Tritheiſm*, we having his own Evidence elſewhere to the contrary. For tho in the Words before cited he own'd that a Trinity, underſtood according to the real Import of the Terms, as conſiſting of three *Individuals* ſubjected to the *Godhead* as their *Species*, *ſeems plainly no other than a kind of Tritheiſm, and that of Gods independent and co-ordinate*

too; yet in the ſame * Page and † elſewhere he acquits the Fathers of this Charge, they really *meaning* quite otherwiſe than might be infer'd from a ſtrict acceptation of the Terms us'd by them; in that, as he plainly intimates, they had ſo great an abhorrence of *Tritheiſm*, that they made the utmoſt ſhift to avoid it, and took up any Sentiment, tho never ſo abſurd, rather than this, that the three Divine *Hypoſtaſes* are really *three Gods*: For to this purpoſe he tells us, that *theſe Learned Fathers* (meaning more eſpecially St. *Gregory Nyſſen*, *Maximus* the Martyr, and St. *Cyril* of *Alexandria*) *endeavour'd with all their Logick*, rather than have it that the *three Divine Hypoſtaſes* are indeed *three Gods*, *to prove that even three Men are but abuſively and improperly ſo call'd three, they being really and truly but one, unleſs when they diſſent from one another, or diſagree in Will or Opinion*; and that becauſe *there is but one and the ſame ſpecifick Eſſence or Subſtance in them, and therefore they ſeriouſly perſuaded Men to lay aſide that Language.* Now this Evaſion, I ſay, tho weak and abſurd, and having no ground but merely a bigottical Prepoſſeſſion with a fondneſs for ſome Terms, which had indeed been firſt us'd to good purpoſe againſt ſome certain Hereſys, without either Foreſight or immediate Suffering from the Conſequences of them, yet does enough denote how very abhorrent theſe Fathers were, even in the Doctor's own account, from a real Tritheiſm; that they could in no wiſe admit of this *Concluſion* (and therefore neither could be ſuppos'd in good earneſt to contend for the Premiſes) that the three Divine Hypoſtaſes are properly and truly *three Individuals*, and the *Godhead* the *ultimate Species* of them.

Wherefore this in ſhort, I think, is all that can be ſaid of the matter: It muſt indeed be own'd, that ſome of the antient Fathers conceiving a kind of Analogy between the Godhead as predicable of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes, and *Species* as predicable of its *Individuals*, did indeed take up and uſe theſe latter Terms, as in ſome meaſure ſignificative of what they believ'd of the former; I ſay in ſome meaſure ſignificative, becauſe they did not think, as otherwiſe appears,

* P. 604. † P. 612.

that

that these came up to the full sense of the thing, or that in this case they denoted the very same, which they did when apply'd to *created Beings:* but that they were the fittest of any they could hit upon, whereby to declare their Meaning. And this we may the rather suppose, because, as I have before observ'd, they never once term'd the *three Divine Hypostases three individual Gods*, and must be own'd on all hands to have been very far from a real Tritheism. So that they seem to have us'd the Term *Individuals*, not *individual Gods*, merely out of caution. On one hand they would not speak out so far as to say *individual Gods*, lest they should incur the Charge of *Tritheism*, as some, I am apt to think, have since done, purely from the Authority of their misapply'd Words, not their true Meaning; and then by carrying the matter so far, as plainly to call the Divine Hypostases *three distinct Minds* or *Spirits:* On t'other hand they ventur'd so far, as to use precisely the Term *Individuals* in this Case, at once to denote against *Arius* a *Co-equality* of the Divine Hypostases, and against *Sabellius* to keep up a real Distinction of them; forasmuch as the *Individuals* of the same *Species* do bear both these Characters. Accordingly I say, that the zealous well-meaning Fathers having chiefly an eye at the then reigning Heresys in the Christian Church, presum'd to apply the Term *Species* to the *Godhead*, and that of *Individuals* to the Divine *Hypostases*, tho not, we find, according to the strict propriety of the Words, but only to signify that the Essence of the Godhead is common and equally extended to the three Hypostases; and withal that the Hypostases, tho not differing *Numero*, yet do come as near to it as may be, they having a kind of *Individuation* or unconceivable, and therefore inexpressible marks of Distinction amongst themselves, and being (in opposition to the general Essence of the Godhead) as it were particular *existent Essences*, or rather *understanding Subsistents*, which do indeed differ, tho not numerically, but do still agree in one and the same *numerical*, tho *common* Essence of the Godhead. And this methinks, as was at first hinted, may justly be infer'd from Dr. *Cudworth*'s own Words, at the head of his long Dissertation on this Subject, the like whereunto do afterwards frequently occur: name-

ly, " * That the antient Orthodox Fathers of the Christian " Church were generally of no other Persuasion than this, " that the Essence or Substance of the Godhead, which all " the three Persons or Hypostases agree in, as each of them " is God, was not one singular and individual, but only one " common and universal Essence or Substance. In which Assertion I would much rather say, that the Doctor misapplies a Term or two, and is somewhat loose in his Expression, than that his inward Sense is wrong. If he means, that according to the Fathers, *the Essence or Substance of the Godhead, in which the three Persons agree*, is not absolutely *one singular and individual Essence*, then does he indeed contradict my Purpose; but then withal the *Antithesis* he intends is not exact, and, as I said before, he misapplies the *adversative* and *exceptive* Particles, *but only*, to such things as co-incide and may very well stand together: and accordingly should he argue on this ground, that the Divine Essence is *common* and *universal*, and therefore not *singular* and *individual*, he would then be guilty of that piece of Sophistry, which is term'd by Logicians *Ignoratio Elenchi*, in that the Argument he urges would not directly oppose the *Thesis* he'd disprove; namely, That the Essence of the Godhead, in which the *Hypostases* agree, is, according to the antient Fathers, the same *singular* and *individual* one; nothing hindering but that one and the same *Essence*, tho singular and individual in it self, yet may be common and universal in some respects, and so, I say, is the *Essence* of the Godhead. But if, as afterwards he seems to mean in earnest, by his often confounding the Term *Specifical* with *Common*, he looks on this latter as synonymous to the former in the true logical Import of it, then indeed I grant that his Antithesis is exact; but then withal these Absurditys would follow, which neither will he admit as touching the Fathers: namely, that the *Godhead*, according to them, is only a *Species*, and therefore not an *absolute real Being* (since whatsoever is such is *singular*) and also that the three Divine *Hypostases*, being three *Individuals* differing *Numero*, are consequently three co ordinate *Gods*. Wherefore agreeably to what was before concluded of the *Fathers*, making

making ſome allowance for the abuſe of Words, I alſo conclude of the Doctor himſelf in his Account of 'em, that ſeeing he will in no wiſe ſuffer 'em, as indeed he juſtly could not, to lie under the Charge of *Tritheiſm*, unleſs verbally only and merely by reaſon of Terms miſapply'd, from which it might ſeem deducible, even he himſelf did not really mean, that they meant any more than this, that the Divine Eſſence, tho ſingular and individual in it ſelf, and, as he ſomewhere plainly words it agreeably to this very Hypotheſis, *the Divine Hypoſtaſes being but the very ſame thing thrice repeated* *; yet is not ſo determinate and individuate, as to be but one *Hypoſtaſis*, but that at once it is *general* and *common* in reference to the three Hypoſtaſes of which it is predicable: I ſay, not ſo *determinate* and *individuate*, as to be but one *Hypoſtaſis*; for here, as I have before hinted, lies the ground of all the Difficulty touching the Opinion of ſome at leaſt of the antient Fathers in this point, and the Account given of 'em by Dr. *Cudworth*, that both he and they made at the firſt a wrong ſtep, which occaſion'd others afterwards, touching the Senſe of the word *Hypoſtaſis*; while they affix'd to it the ſame Signification in the *Godhead*, which it has when apply'd to created things; that is, they held it, according to the Doctor, to be a *ſingular intelligent Subſtance*, or, as we find it in him all along, a *ſingular numerical Eſſence*, *this being that*, ſays † he, *which the antient Fathers meant by the word Hypoſtaſis*, they generally approving this Definition of *Hypoſtaſis* given by St. *Cyril* and *Anaſtaſius*, that it is an ‖ *Eſſence* or *Subſtance with its certain Propertys or individuating Circumſtances, differing only numerically from thoſe of the ſame Species with it.* Accordingly, as theſe Fathers look'd upon *Hypoſtaſis* to be the very ſame with *Individual* or *Singular Subſtance*, even when apply'd to the Divine Triad, they are in no wiſe allow'd by the Doctor to have held the *Godhead* to come under the latter Denomination, or to be the ſame numerical Eſſence, this being to leave no room in it for a *real Diſtinction* of

* P. 604. † P. 605. ‖ Eſſentia cum ſuis quibuſdam Proprietatibus, ab iis quæ ſunt ejuſdem Speciei numero differens.

three

three Divine Hypoſtaſes (which however they were highly zealous to maintain) and to make but only *one*; and therefore he * expreſly tells us in reference to the *Platoniſts*, with whom he afterwards brings in the Fathers as agreeing together in this Point, " That to aſſert the three Divine Hypo-" ſtaſes to be numerically the very ſame, would be directly " contradictious to their very Hypotheſis it ſelf, and all one " as if they ſhould affirm 'em indeed not to be *three Hypo-" ſtaſes*, but only *one*. Whereas, methinks, it might have been conſider'd by the Fathers here pointed at, and eſpecially by Dr. *Cudworth* himſelf, who liv'd ſince the Uſage of Terms, for preventing miſtakes about Doctrines, has been more nicely ſtated; that *Hypoſtaſis*, *Subſiſtence* or *Perſon* does not, as they ſeem to ſuppoſe, denote the very ſame thing in this Caſe, which it does when apply'd to any finite Being, nor carry this full meaning in the Chriſtian Church, ſo as to ſignify *abſolute*, *numerical* or *ſingular Eſſence* or *Subſtance*. For here, as our Mind cannot conceive, ſo neither can our Tongue expreſs the Senſe of the *Thing*; but however the aforeſaid *Greek* or *Latin* Words have been thought in the *Eaſt* and *Weſt* the moſt proper of any, to give at leaſt a diſtinguiſhing Hint and ſome Intimation of, as it were, the ſingle Branches of that *Triplicity* which the Holy Scriptures aſcribe to the *Godhead*, under the Names of *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt*; which accordingly when they are ſpoken of as ſubſiſting in the Deity, the Church has thought fit to characterize by the Terms *Hypoſtaſis*, *Subſiſtence* or *Perſon*: but neither does it hence follow, that they muſt therefore be look'd on as diſtinct *numerical Eſſences* or *Subſtances*, and not rather ſuppos'd to be all of them (however unaccountably diſtinguiſh'd among themſelves) to be but *one* and the *ſame numerical Eſſence*, that is to ſay, one God; who is not a mere *ſecond Notion*, but an *abſolute real Being*, or *individual intelligent Subſtance*, *common* indeed to *three* that are in his *Nature*, but not multiply'd like a *Genus* or *Species*. And this after all, as we have it † ſomewhere in the Doctor's own words, we find to be the Sum of what he would indeed ſay; only by the way

* P. 601. † P. 604.

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we there again diſcover his miſapplication of *Terms*: when ſpeaking of the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* as held by ſome to be after the very ſame manner in the *Species* of God that other Individuals are in their proper *Species*, he tells us, that according to this *Hypotheſis* they *differ only numerically from one another*, which numerical Difference he thus explains in the following Words; * *they being but the very ſame thing thrice repeated.* In which laſt Words (whatever he had ſaid to the contrary elſewhere) he plainly acquits thoſe Fathers, who call'd the Godhead a *Species* and the *Hypoſtaſes Individuals*, from the Charge of *Tritheiſm*: but then, I ſay, as theſe Words give us a Key to his Meaning, and ſhew that his inward Senſe is *right*, ſo do we at once diſcover by 'em, that thoſe which go before 'em are miſapply'd; he making a *numerical Difference* to be that even of the *very ſame thing*, as by being ſome way or other diverſify'd, it may be number'd or reckon'd more than one and the ſelf-ſame thing in different reſpects: whereas, if I miſtake not, a *numerical Difference* in the true philoſophical and not the vulgar ſenſe, is that of ſuch things as may not barely be number'd, as diverſify'd or differing accidentally or even eſſentially, but of ſuch as differ *Eſſentiâ*, when tho there be nothing eſſential in one, which in the ſame kind is not in the other, yet the very Eſſence of the one is not that of the other; and by conſequence ſuch things as *differ numerically* are not, nay cannot be in any ſenſe, as the Doctor ſuppoſes, *the very ſame thing*. Indeed I grant with a very † great Prelate, "That Perſonality or Diſtinction of Hypo-
"ſtaſes does ſuppoſe a Diſtinction of Subſtance; yet this is
"not from the Nature of the Perſonality, but from the Con-
"dition of the Subject wherein it is. The Perſonality in it
"ſelf is but a different Mode of Subſiſtence in the ſame
"common Nature, which is but one: but this Perſonality
"being in ſuch a Subject as Man, for example, it from thence
"follows, that each Perſon hath a peculiar Subſtance of his
"own, and not from the Nature of the Perſonality. But
"when we come to conſider a Divine Eſſence, which is moſt

* P. 604. † *Bp* Stillingfleet *in* Preface *to* Vindication of Doctrine of the Trinity, *p.* 15, 16.

"perfectly

" perfectly one, and is wholly uncapable of any ſeparate " Exiſtence or Accidents, there can be no other way of " Diſtinction conceiv'd in it, but by different Modes of Sub- " ſiſtence or relative Propertys in the ſame Divine Eſſence. " And herein we proceed, as we do in our other Concep- " tions of the Divine Nature, that is, we take away all Im- " perfection from God, and attribute only that to him, " which is agreeable to his Divine Perfections, altho the " manner of it may be above our Comprehenſion. Here then lies the difference between created *Hypoſtaſes*, and what the truly Orthodox mean by that Term, when apply'd to the *Bleſſed Trinity*: that the former are *ſingular individual Eſſences*, *multiply'd* and *numerically* differing under a Species; but theſe Terms in reference to the latter, do not denote the very ſame, yet do they ſomething indeed which is much like it, and therefore have been us'd in this Caſe too, namely to denote one and the ſame individual ſingular *Eſſence* of the Godhead, tho being withal trebly common, that is, to Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt; which *Three* as ſuch have indeed ſome peculiar Notes, and as it were individuating Marks of Diſtinction from each other, but ſtill are *one* and the *ſame numerical Eſſence* of the Godhead, which in common belongs to each of 'em; it being a peculiar Prerogative of the individual Nature and Subſtance of the Deity, founded in its infinite and therefore tranſcendent Perfection, that it is capable of a Communication, and thereupon as it were of a yet further Individuation, that is, of being in more diſtinct *Hypoſtaſes* or *Perſons* than *one*, and is accordingly communicated from the Father, who is the Fountain of the Godhead, to the Son, and from the former by this latter to the Holy Ghoſt: a Parallel to which is not to be found among the Creatures. This we *believe* upon the ſole Authority of him who cannot lie: but the thing being only aſſerted, *that it is ſo*, and not explain'd *how* it is ſo, no wonder, if as we cannot conceive, we want fit Words to expreſs it. And therefore I add, that if any one by the way be troubleſom and over-ſollicitous to have me ſay ſomething of the *Manner* of it; as I have no warrant, ſo am I not oblig'd to give him any Anſwer; or if by daring to do ſo, I find the Depth beyond

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my reach, and so am afterwards endanger'd and expos'd, I may thank my self for meddling with things, which are confessedly too high for me, and endeavouring to explain what I know to be inexplicable. However if thro my own Infirmity and the Enquirer's Importunity or Cavils touching this Object of my Faith, I am toll'd on and provok'd to do this; then will I only use those Words, which the Catholick Church (thro the opposition of Hereticks urging it to speak of and declare the Nature of what it *believ'd*) has pitch'd on as the most proper. But if when I do this, he shall think to take an advantage of my Answers, and to overturn my Belief of a *Trinity* by excepting against my *Words* touching the *Nature* of it; I can't but tell him, that he makes a disingenuous Return for my Civility, that is, for laying an Advantage in his way, when I needed not have done it: and withal that tho thro his Instigation I ventur'd to speak of and attempted to illustrate what I did not *understand*, as being confessedly above my Capacity; yet did I not think the *Terms* I utter'd to be fully expressive of the *thing*, nor consequently meant 'em according to the ordinary Usage of 'em; and therefore if instead of directing his Aim and levelling his Darts at a *Trinity* in *These*, he only cavil at it in *Hypotheſe*, only object against the *Manner* of and the very *Words* he drew from me concerning it, I'll then leave him to beat the Air and fight with a Spectre of his own raising; while I notwithstanding shall keep my ground, and hold my Faith in that mysterious Article, of which as I could have known nothing at all, had it not been reveal'd by God, so will I not pretend to know it any further than it has been reveal'd: but as on one hand the lively Oracles do in general assert *that it is*, here indeed will I believe and own the Truth of it; and so on the other, as they do not explain the Manner *how it is*, here neither will I attempt to do it, but will adore in silence the incomprehensible Secret.

But to return to Dr. *Cudworth*, What is it that all his Reasonings and Quotations from the Fathers tend to prove? Why in short, the Whole seems to me to be a mere *Logomachy*, the Upshot of all being only this, that after having first confounded *Hypostasis* or *Person*, even as referring to

the Bleſſed Trinity, with *ſingular* and *numerical Eſſence* (as he was utterly unwilling to allow the antient Fathers to have been but mere Unitarians, or at moſt but *nominal* or *modal Trinitarians*) he all along fixes his eye upon this Mark, that the *Godhead*, in which the three *Hypoſtaſes* agree, is not *one* and the *ſame numerical* or *individual Eſſence*, becauſe not one Hypoſtaſis; (however before he had allow'd, that tho they held the Divine Hypoſtaſes to *differ numerically*, yet they meant 'em to be but *the very ſame thing thrice repeated*) but that it is an Eſſence univerſal and common to three *Divine Hypoſtaſes*; which alſo, to make the way for a Diſtinction of the *Hypoſtaſes* or *Perſons* yet wider and plainer, he ſticks not very often to call indifferently (in way of oppoſition to ſuch a numerical Eſſence, as would exclude a Plurality of Hypoſtaſes) *ſpecifical* or *generical*. And on this ground, I ſay, do all his Argumentations proceed, as when he tells us, and labours to prove, "* That a Singularity of numerical Eſſence "was not aſſerted by the *Nicene* Council nor the moſt antient "Fathers, but only an Equality or Sameneſs of generical or "common Eſſence. And in the ſame Page he again infers this from their mighty Averſion at *Sabellianiſm*, "the Doc-"trine whereof, ſays he, is no other than this, that there "was but one Hypoſtaſis; or, as he there explains himſelf, "agreeably to what I ſaid before, that there is but one ſin-"gular individual Eſſence of Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt. And again, "† That ſeveral things having one and the "ſame ſingular Eſſence, that is to ſay *Hypoſtaſis*, is neither a "thing in Nature, nor falls under human Conception; that "the word *Homoouſios* does not ſignify this, nor is it indeed "likely that the *Greek* Tongue ſhould have any Name for it. "That ‖ *Athanaſius* did not by the word *Homoouſios* under-"ſtand that which hath the ſame ſingular and numerical "Eſſence with another, that is, one and the ſame Hypo-"ſtaſis, but the ſame common, or generical, or ſpecifical "Eſſence only. That ** οὐσία, according to the antient Fa-"thers, was not a ſingular exiſtent Eſſence, that is an Hypo-"ſtaſis, but the common, generical or univerſal Eſſence of

* P. 605. † Ib. ‖ P. 606. ** P. 607.

"the

" the Godhead. That the ſaid Fathers of the Chriſtian " Church, tho they interpreted the word *Homoouſian* of the " ſame Eſſence or Subſtance, yet univerſally underſtood " thereby not a Sameneſs of numerical and ſingular Eſſence, " that is, of one Hypoſtaſis, but of common or univerſal " Eſſence only, that is, the generical or ſpecifical Eſſence of " the Godhead; and that the antient Orthodox Fathers aſ- " ſerted no ſuch thing as one and the ſame ſingular or nu- " merical Eſſence of the ſeveral Perſons of the Trinity: that is, ſtill in the Doctor's ſenſe, they never aſſerted the Godhead to be but *one Hypoſtaſis* or *Perſon*, and at once to be *three Hypoſtaſes* or *Perſons*; " * This, ſays he, according to " them being not a real Trinity, but a Trinity of mere " Names, Notions and inadequate Conceptions. Now in this and much more that might be cited to this purpoſe, the Doctor, I ſay, grounds all his Reaſonings upon this fundamental Error, that *numerical*, *individual* or *ſingular Eſſence*, when apply'd to the Godhead, is the very ſame with *Hypoſtaſis*; or if he meant otherwiſe, as I think 'tis plain he did not, then, which is much worſe than a miſtake of mere Terms, he is all along guilty of an *Ignoratio Elenchi*, and thereby at once of a *Fallacia Conſequentis*, the Concluſion he infers not directly contradicting but falling in with the Premiſe he denies; ſince nothing hinders, but that the Divine Eſſence tho *common* to three (which is all he endeavours to make out) may be at once *abſolutely ſingular* and *individual*: and accordingly that the antient Fathers held it to be ſo, I make not any the leaſt queſtion, tho they did not expreſly name, or at leaſt not often diſtinguiſh it by this Character, but rather by the former, as denoting what it is *reſpectively* and in regard to its *Community*, not what it is *abſolutely* and *in it ſelf*; and that becauſe their main Buſineſs was not ſo much to aſſert the *Unity* of the Godhead (no one they had then to do with denying or oppoſing that) as to maintain the true Doctrine of a *Trinity*; to keep up an *Equality* and *Coeſſentiality* of the Perſons againſt *Arius*, and at once a *real Diſtinction* of them againſt *Sabellius*, they always had the

* P. 608, 609.

Terms *Homoousian* and *Common* in their mouths, in oppoſition to *Heteroouſian*, *Tautoouſian* and *Monoouſian*: whereas moſt certainly had they been concern'd to combat *Tritheiſm*, as they were to maintain a *Trinity*, they would then as expreſly have aſſerted the *Unity* of the Godhead, calling it what they muſt needs have underſtood it to be, unleſs they were *Tritheiſts*, one and the ſame *numerical*, *individual* or *ſingular Eſſence*; agreeably to which it appears in fact, that when ſome Hereticks would have it that *Hypoſtaſis* and *Eſſence* were of the ſame ſignification, the Catholick Doctors, as * *Theodoret* informs us, in the Council of *Sardica*, to prevent a Tritheiſm, aſſerted and urg'd againſt 'em *ad hominem*, that is, according to their Senſe of the Term, that then there was but *one Hypoſtaſis* of *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt*; ſaying, " † But we have receiv'd and learnt from our Anceſtors, and " hold this Catholick and Apoſtolick Tradition and Faith " and Profeſſion, that there is but one Hypoſtaſis, which " the Hereticks themſelves call Eſſence or Subſtance, of Fa- " ther, Son and Holy Ghoſt. Whereas they themſelves, as ‖ Dr. *Bull* obſerves, had quite another Senſe of the Word. And thus on the other hand, as Dr. *Cave* tells us, is that of *Euſebius* to be underſtood, when denying the ** Son to be one and the ſame with God, he doing this only in oppoſition to *Marcellus*, who held the Son to be one and the ſame *Hypoſtaſis* with the Father, according to the ſtrict Senſe of this Term.

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* Ἡμεῖς ὃ ταύτην παρειλήφαμεν καὶ διδάγμεθα καὶ ταύτην ἔχομεν τὴν καθολικὴν καὶ ἀποστολικὴν παράδοσιν καὶ πίστιν καὶ ὁμολογίαν, μίαν εἶναι ὑπόστασιν, ἣν αὐτοὶ οἱ αἱρετικοὶ οὐσίαν προσαγορεύουσι, τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. Theod. in Eccleſ. Hiſt. *l.* 2. *c.* 8.

† Hîc Patres diſertè monent ſe Patrem, Filium & Spiritum Sanctum μίαν ὑπόστασιν dixiſſe eo tantùm ſenſu, quo Haretici vocem ὑπόστασιν pro οὐσία acceperunt, ſignificantes nimirum ſe alium ejus Vocabuli ſenſum, apud veteres Eccleſiæ Doctores Catholicos receptum (quippe a quibus uſurpatum fuerit pro Perſonâ ſive Subſiſtentiâ) non ignorâſſe eumque lubentes amplexuros fuiſſe ac faſſuros juxta iſtam Vocis acceptionem tres eſſe in Divinitate Perſonas ſive Subſiſtentias. ‖ In Defenſ. Fid. Nic. *fol.* 116. Ed. Grab.

** Ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν τῷ Θεῷ ὄντα. In Diſſert. adverſ. Cleric. ad calcem Hiſt. Lit. *Part alt. p.* 78.

Where-

Wherefore upon the whole I find it unqueſtionable, that the antient Fathers, according to Dr. *Cudworth*'s account of 'em, deny'd the Godhead to be the *ſame ſingular* and *individual Eſſence* upon no other ground than a miſunderſtanding of thoſe Terms (if *indeed* they did miſunderſtand 'em, as the Doctor himſelf appears to have done) in that they ſuppos'd 'em to ſignify the ſame with *Hypoſtaſis*. And accordingly I ſay, that the Caſe being ſo, it can't hence be infer'd, that they really oppos'd what the Church in after Ages and to this day means by *ſingular individual Eſſence*, as predicated of the Godhead; but only what they or rather the Doctor erroneouſly meant by it, namely its being but *one ſingle Hypoſtaſis*; agreeably to which Notion of *ſingular Eſſence*, they were, I confeſs, very much in the right of it, in that they urg'd againſt *Sabellius*, that the *Divine Eſſence* was not ſingular and individual (if by that was to be meant Hypoſtaſis) but *general* or *common*; and as it were to make room for a *Diverſity* of *Hypoſtaſes*, they went ſometimes ſo far as to call it *ſpecifical* and *generical*, in oppoſition to that Senſe of *Numerical* or *Singular*, which would ſuppoſe an *Identity* or *Unity* of Hypoſtaſis; tho not, as I have ſaid, according to the genuine Senſe of thoſe Terms, they not *really* holding the *Godhead* to be a *Species*, and much leſs a *Genus*, and being as great Oppoſers of a *Trinity* of Gods, as they were Sticklers for a *Trinity* of *Hypoſtaſes*: but they underſtood theſe Terms only as paraphraſtical and ſynonymous to *common*, and thereby deſign'd to keep up a *Plurality* of *Hypoſtaſes*, and that becauſe theſe Words admitted of that Latitude, which they ſuppos'd that *numerical* or *individual* would not; ſo as that ſomewhat agreeably to the Import of 'em, the Divine *Eſſence* might be underſtood to be as it were *multiply'd* into *three*, that is, not indeed to be three diſtinct Eſſences, but, as was before ſaid, *one* and the *ſame Eſſence* trebly common to Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt. Now again, I ſay, it being thus plain, that all the difference between the antient and modern Chriſtians lies only in words; ſeeing they both maintain'd a *Trinity*, yet without a Tritheiſm, and owning a real Diſtinction of *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt* in point of *Perſonality*, aſſerted withal an *Identity* of 'em in *Eſſence*, as being but one and the ſame

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individual God; seeing moreover that if the Antients sometimes upon occasion went so far, as to apply to the Godhead the Terms *Specifical* and *Generical*, in reference to its Predicability of the three Divine Hypostases, and deny'd it to be one *numerical* and *singular Essence*, it appears that these Words were only misunderstood, or not utter'd according to the exact Import of 'em; while by *generical* or *specifical* 'tis plain that they meant no more than *general* or *common*, and by *numerical* or *singular Essence* they meant Hypostasis, and so thereby would only have it, that in the Godhead were three distinct *Hypostases* and not only *one*; which is no more in effect than the Church in all succeeding Ages has unanimously held, only with this difference in Words, that one and the same *numerical Essence* of the Godhead (this being not confounded with Hypostasis) is and has been expresly asserted to be *common* to three distinct *Hypostases* or *Persons*: The Case, I say, being thus, I wonder that so great a Man as Dr. *Cudworth* should expatiate so largely, and yet ground all his Reasonings to this purpose merely upon an Abuse of Words, the Sense whereof being open'd, and it being allow'd that the *Fathers* meant 'em one way and the *Schoolmen* another, there remains no difference as to the *thing* between the antient and modern Church, but both are reconcil'd. But because the Doctor sometimes in good earnest seems to argue for the contrary, it will not be amiss, especially considering what I have just now charg'd him with, to set in view a Detail of his Argumentations; which, having thus far clear'd the Passage, and found a Key to 'em, we shall be the less troubled to solve, it being unquestionable both from his own Confession and his opposing of *numerical* or *singular Essence* to *common*, which yet do plainly co-incide, that he meant no other by the former than Hypostasis.

First then we may observe, that the danger of *Arianism* and *Sabellianism* being pretty well over, and the calling of the Godhead a *Species* or *specifical Essence*, and the *Hypostases Individuals*, in opposition to those Heresys, being impartially look'd into and found to tend as much to destroy the *Unity* of the Godhead, as they had been innocently meant to keep up the true Doctrine of a *Trinity* of Persons; " as

" this

" this Trinity came afterwards, * he tells us, and that as he had before intimated not without good reaſon, to be " cry'd down as Tritheiſtick, in the room thereof ſtarted " there up that other Trinity of Perſons numerically the " ſame, or having all one and the ſame ſingular exiſtent Eſ- " ſence: A Doctrine, ſays he, which ſeems not to have been " own'd by any publick Authority in the Chriſtian Church, " ſave that of the *Lateran* Council only. Which Paſſage how far it may be thought to be expreſſive of the Doctor's own private Sentiment, and what he may juſtly be charg'd with from it, I ſhall more ſeaſonably mention hereafter: at preſent I ſhall only declare what may be made of it as to the Caſe in hand. Now here the Doctor plainly charges the Chriſtian Church with Novelty, with taking up a *Doctrine which ſeemeth not to have been publickly authoriz'd* but *by the* Lateran *Council only.* Touching which by the way it is firſt obſervable, that theſe words, *the* Lateran *Council*, are ſomewhat looſe, there having been eleven Councils of that Name, of which the ſeventh, eighth, tenth and eleventh were general ones, but neither of 'em reckon'd (that I know of) to be κατ' ἐξοχὴν *the Council*: However I ſuppoſe that he muſt have meant the eleventh, that is, the fourth General one, held no longer ſince than the Year 1215. in which among other things ſettled relating to the Catholick Faith, Abbot *Joachim*'s Book concerning the *Unity* of the *Trinity* againſt *P. Lombard* was condemn'd. And granting that he meant ſo, let us come on to examine his Charge; in order to which I ſhall here take the freedom to ask him one queſtion: namely, Whether by a *Trinity of Perſons numerically the ſame*, he underſtood ſuch a Trinity as really includes but *one Hypoſtaſis* or *Perſon* under *three ſeveral Names*? If ſo, then would he have it that the Church, to avoid one Inconvenience, fell into a much greater, as having by a ſeemingly neceſſary Change of a *Term*, of *Specifical* for *Numerical*, made withal a moſt enormous Change of *Doctrine*: a Charge which he can never make good, it having been the conſtant Doctrine of the

* P. 604.

Chriſtian

Chriſtian Church, that the Divine Eſſence tho *expreſly aſſerted* (as it was in former Times *ſuppos'd*) to be *numerically one* and *the ſame* in it ſelf, yet is it at once *common* to three *really* diſtinct *Hypoſtaſes*. Leſt the Term apply'd by ſome of the Fathers to the Godhead *reſpectively*, as they held it to be *common* to *three diſtinct Perſons*, ſhould be taken in ſuch a ſenſe, as to imply it not to be what they moſt certainly underſtood it to be, as conſider'd *abſolutely* and *in it ſelf*, that is, one and the ſame individual Eſſence, at length the Church in her wiſdom judg'd it very proper (whether before or after the eleventh *Lateran* Council I think it not material here to diſpute) to ſtand upon her guard in this Quarter, and to deſcribe and aſſert the *Unity* of the Godhead, and that by ſuch Terms, as tho they expreſs what God is *in himſelf*, that is, one *ſingular individual God*, yet do not exclude him as to the preſent Caſe, from being ſtill in ſome reſpect what the antient Fathers meant him to be by the Term *Generical* or *Specifical*, that is, *common* to and *predicable* of three diſtinct Divine *Hypoſtaſes*. However that the Doctor in ſaying a *Trinity of Perſons numerically the ſame*, meant that the Church in latter Ages aſſerted only a *nominal Diſtinction*, and therefore a *real Identity* of *Hypoſtaſis*, may be infer'd *ad hominem* from the very Words he all along uſes; he conſtantly taking, as I have before obſerv'd, *numerical* or *ſingular Subſtance* to be the very ſame with *Hypoſtaſis*, even in relation to the *B. Trinity*: as alſo the like may be concluded from thoſe explanatory Words which follow, namely, or *having all one and the ſame ſingular exiſtent Eſſence*, he having * elſewhere made the Terms *Singular* and *Exiſtent* the *Differentia* of his Definition of Hypoſtaſis. But after all, if the Doctor meant by a *Trinity of Perſons numerically the ſame*, their having *one* and the *ſame numerical Eſſence*, tho being ſtill different from each other *as ſuch*; this indeed I grant to be moſt true: but then withal he did not well to imply that there has been in the Church an Alteration of *Doctrine*, but methinks ſhould rather have ſaid, that the *Terms* deſign'd to expreſs the very *ſame Doctrine* have indeed been alter'd. The antient Fathers be-

* P. 602.

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liev'd and confeſs'd no other *Doctrine*, than what has been ever after aſſerted in the true Chriſtian Church, tho they did not declare it in the very ſame *Words*. Accordingly when they apply even the Term *ſpecifical* to the Godhead, they are notwithſtanding allow'd, even by Dr. *Cudworth* himſelf, to be ſtill abhorrent from *Tritheiſm*, and therefore muſt be own'd to have meant no more by it than *common*; which is the reaſon, I believe, that tho at other times he frequently uſes in this caſe the word *ſpecifical*, yet whenever it comes to be laid open, and the true Senſe of it explain'd, according to which it muſt unavoidably infer a *Tritheiſm*, then indeed * he ſeems to reject it, and cannot ſay that the Fathers underſtood it in the ſtrict Signification of it. Whence it is plain, that even according to him the Fathers muſt have held the Godhead *abſolutely* and *in it ſelf* (tho as they had no occaſion they did not often name it ſo, but rather ſaid of it what it was in *ſome reſpect*) to be one and the ſame *numerical* or *ſingular Eſſence*. For in ſhort, whatever Terms they us'd, and however they expreſs'd themſelves, either they meant a *ſpecifical* Identity of *Eſſence* or *Nature* in the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, or a *numerical*; there being no Medium between theſe *Extremes*: if a *Specifical*, then according to the Doctor they muſt have been *Tritheiſts*, becauſe, † as he tells us, *it ſeems plain that this Trinity is no other than a kind of Tritheiſm, and that of Gods independent and co-ordinate too*: But ſeeing he does not and could not expreſly charge 'em with this Conſequence, it muſt needs be own'd, that however they ſeem'd to *ſpeak* otherwiſe, yet they really *meant* the *Trinity of Perſons to be numerically the ſame Divine Eſſence*, tho diſtinguiſh'd from each other by their *reſpective Perſonalitys*. However the Doctor, we find, ſtill goes on with his firſt miſtake, that *numerical Eſſence* is the ſame with *Hypoſtaſis* or *Perſon*, and tells us again in the very ſame Paragraph, "That it might be render'd probable that no ſuch "*Thing* (he does not ſay only *Word*) was ever entertain'd "by the *Nicene* Fathers and thoſe firſt Oppoſers of *Arianiſm*, "from the free Confeſſion and Acknowledgment of *D. Peta-* "*vius*, a Perſon well acquainted with Eccleſiaſtick Antiquity.

* P. 603, 604, 612. † P. 590, 604, 624, &c.

But how does he endeavour to make this good from *Petavius*? Why from theſe following Words of his: * *The chief Force which the antient Fathers oppos'd againſt the* Arian *Hereticks was in aſſerting only the Equality of the Son with the Father, as to Nature or Eſſence, without any expreſs mention of the Singularity of the ſame,* &c. Now to keep the Doctor to his Terms, how can he hence infer, that *the* Nicene *Fathers entertain'd no ſuch thing, as that the Divine Hypoſtaſes had one and the ſame numerical or ſingular Eſſence*; that becauſe, as their main Controverſy was with the *Arians*, who aſſerted an *Inequality*, they made it their buſineſs to aſſert an *Equality* of the Perſons; and, as they then found there was no great occaſion, they did not *expreſly* aſcribe to them all a *Singularity of Eſſence*, that therefore *they entertain'd no ſuch thing* or flatly deny'd it? What indifferent Judg would not rather be apt to infer quite the contrary from this Paſſage of *Petavius*? As the *Nicene* Fathers had chiefly an occaſion, ſo did they accordingly *oppoſe their chief Force in aſſerting only an Equality of the Son with the Father as to Nature or Eſſence, but made no expreſs mention of the Singularity of the ſame.* In which words this Writer does not deny, but rather deſignedly implies them to have indeed held *a Singularity of the ſame:* however, as there was no abſolute need, they did not then concern themſelves to aſſert, contend for and expreſly name out that, which they had no reaſon at that time to think that any body queſtion'd; but only to maintain what at that juncture was eſpecially needful to be ſo, that is, a *Co-equality* of the *Son* with the *Father*. To which purpoſe it plainly follows in *Petavius*'s own Words: † *For thoſe* Nicene *Biſhops themſelves*, ſays he, *who underſtood beſt of any the Secrets of the* Arian *Faction, and which way eſpecially it ſhould be oppugn'd, aim'd at nothing elſe in their Confeſſion of Faith, but only to eſtabliſh that Equality of*

* In eo præcipuam Vim collocâſſe Patres, ut æqualem Patri Naturâ, Excellentiâque Filium eſſe defenderent, citra expreſſam Singularitatis mentionem, &c. *De Trin.* l. 4. c. 13.

† Etenim Nicæni iſti Præſules, quibus nemo meliùs Arianæ Sectæ Arcana cognovit, nemo quâ re opprimenda maximè foret, acriùs judicare potuit, nihil in Profeſſionis ſuæ Formulâ ſpectarunt aliud, niſi ut Æqualitatem illam Eſſentiæ, Dignitatis, Æternitatis aſtruerent. *Ib.*

Eſſence,

Eſſence, Dignity and Eternity between 'em. From which Paſſage, cited alſo by the Doctor, I appeal to the ingenuous Reader, whether he might not as juſtly infer (* as indeed he has done elſewhere) that *becauſe the* Nicene *Fathers employ'd their chief Force to aſcribe to the Son a Co-equality of Eſſence, Dignity and Eternity with the Father*, † and had not expreſly determin'd or aſſerted that the Holy Ghoſt was a *Divine Hypoſtaſis* or *God*, and co-equal with the Father and the Son, therefore they did not *entertain* or *acknowledg* any ſuch thing. But after all we find that the Doctor himſelf, as if he diſtruſted his own Argument, goes off from the Propoſition, which he undertook to prove, namely, *That no ſuch thing as a Trinity of Perſons numerically the ſame*, or having one ſingular Eſſence or Subſtance, was *entertain'd by the* Nicene *Fathers*: and winds up what he had to ſay of this Point in ſuch a Concluſion, as does not contradict this Propoſition; but is what his Opponent will readily grant, albeit he at once denies the former: "That thus does *Petavius* clearly confeſs that this "ſame Singularity of numerical Eſſence of the Godhead was "not aſſerted (but tho it was not expreſly aſſerted, was it therefore deny'd, or no ſuch thing entertain'd?) by the "*Nicene* Council or the moſt antient Fathers, but only an "Equality or Sameneſs of generical or common Eſſence. This, I grant, they did chiefly and expreſly aſſert touching the Godhead, as predicable of three Divine Hypoſtaſes; yet as this very well conſiſts with the *numerical Unity* of it, conſider'd in it ſelf, ſo does it no way prove, that the Antients *entertain'd no ſuch thing*, or that the three Divine Hypoſtaſes, tho really diſtinguiſh'd from each other by ſome inconceivable and therefore inexpreſſible Tokens, yet as they all agree in being God, they are not *one numerical* and *ſingular Eſſence*, in that the Deity is not multiply'd.

But further yet the Doctor tells us ||, "That the Truth "of this, namely, that the antient *Anti-Arian* Fathers did "not entertain or hold any ſuch thing, as that the three Di-"vine Hypoſtaſes had one and the ſame numerical Eſſence,

* P. 595. † *Tho the* Nicene *Fathers, as there was no Provocation given, did not openly declare in Council that the Holy Ghoſt was God, yet did they undoubtedly hold and acknowledg it. Of this ſee* D. Petav. de Trin. *lib.* 2. *c.* 13, 14, 15.

|| P. 605.

But how does he endeavour to make this good from *Petavius*? Why from these following Words of his: * *The chief Force which the antient Fathers oppos'd against the* Arian *Hereticks was in asserting only the Equality of the Son with the Father, as to Nature or Essence, without any express mention of the Singularity of the same*, &c. Now to keep the Doctor to his Terms, how can he hence infer, that *the* Nicene *Fathers entertain'd no such thing, as that the Divine Hypostases had one and the same numerical or singular Essence*; that because, as their main Controversy was with the *Arians*, who asserted an *Inequality*, they made it their business to assert an *Equality* of the Persons; and, as they then found there was no great occasion, they did not *expressly* ascribe to them all a *Singularity of Essence*, that therefore *they entertain'd no such thing* or flatly deny'd it? What indifferent Judg would not rather be apt to infer quite the contrary from this Passage of *Petavius*? As the *Nicene* Fathers had chiefly an occasion, so did they accordingly *oppose their chief Force in asserting only an Equality of the Son with the Father as to Nature or Essence, but made no express mention of the Singularity of the same.* In which words this Writer does not deny, but rather designedly implies them to have indeed held *a Singularity of the same:* however, as there was no absolute need, they did not then concern themselves to assert, contend for and expresly name out that, which they had no reason at that time to think that any body question'd; but only to maintain what at that juncture was especially needful to be so, that is, a *Co-equality* of the *Son* with the *Father.* To which purpose it plainly follows in *Petavius*'s own Words: † *For those* Nicene *Bishops themselves*, says he, *who understood best of any the Secrets of the* Arian *Faction, and which way especially it should be oppugn'd, aim'd at nothing else in their Confession of Faith, but only to establish that Equality of*

* In eo præcipuam Vim collocâsse Patres, ut æqualem Patri Naturâ, Excellentiâque Filium esse defenderent, citra expressam Singularitatis mentionem, &c. *De Trin.* l. 4. c. 13.

† Etenim Nicæni isti Præsules, quibus nemo meliùs Arianæ Sectæ Arcana cognovit, nemo quâ re opprimenda maximè foret, acriùs judicare potuit, nihil in Professionis suæ Formulâ spectarunt aliud, nisi ut Æqualitatem illam Essentiæ, Dignitatis, Æternitatis astruerent. *Ib.*

Essence,

Eſſence, Dignity and Eternity between 'em. From which Paſſage, cited alſo by the Doctor, I appeal to the ingenuous Reader, whether he might not as juſtly infer (* as indeed he has done elſewhere) that *becauſe the* Nicene *Fathers employ'd their chief Force to aſcribe to the Son a Co-equality of Eſſence, Dignity and Eternity with the Father*, † and had not expreſly determin'd or aſſerted that the Holy Ghoſt was a *Divine Hypoſtaſis* or *God*, and co-equal with the Father and the Son, therefore they did not *entertain* or *acknowledg* any ſuch thing. But after all we find that the Doctor himſelf, as if he diſtruſted his own Argument, goes off from the Propoſition, which he undertook to prove, namely, *That no ſuch thing as a Trinity of Perſons numerically the ſame*, or having one ſingular Eſſence or Subſtance, was *entertain'd by the* Nicene *Fathers*: and winds up what he had to ſay of this Point in ſuch a Concluſion, as does not contradict this Propoſition; but is what his Opponent will readily grant, albeit he at once denies the former: "That thus does *Petavius* clearly confeſs that this "ſame Singularity of numerical Eſſence of the Godhead was "not aſſerted (but tho it was not expreſly aſſerted, was it therefore deny'd, or no ſuch thing entertain'd?) by the "*Nicene* Council or the moſt antient Fathers, but only an "Equality or Sameneſs of generical or common Eſſence. This, I grant, they did chiefly and expreſly aſſert touching the Godhead, as predicable of three Divine Hypoſtaſes; yet as this very well conſiſts with the *numerical Unity* of it, conſider'd in it ſelf, ſo does it no way prove, that the Antients *entertain'd no ſuch thing*, or that the three Divine Hypoſtaſes, tho really diſtinguiſh'd from each other by ſome inconceivable and therefore inexpreſſible Tokens, yet as they all agree in being God, they are not *one numerical* and *ſingular Eſſence*, in that the Deity is not multiply'd.

But further yet the Doctor tells us ||, "That the Truth "of this, namely, that the antient *Anti-Arian* Fathers did "not entertain or hold any ſuch thing, as that the three Di-"vine Hypoſtaſes had one and the ſame numerical Eſſence,

* P. 595. † *Tho the* Nicene *Fathers, as there was no Provocation given, did not openly declare in Council that the Holy Ghoſt was God, yet did they undoubtedly hold and acknowledg it. Of this ſee* D. Petav. de Trin. *lib.* 2. *c.* 13, 14, 15.

|| P. 605.

" becauſe they all of 'em zealouſly condemn'd *Sabellianiſm*; " the Doctrine whereof was no other than this, that there " was but one *Hypoſtaſis* or ſingular individual Eſſence of the " Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt. Here have we a plain Inſtance of the Doctor's grand Miſtake, which I have before mention'd, and upon which he all along proceeds, in that he expreſly and in very Terms confounds *ſingular* and *individual Eſſence* with *Divine Hypoſtaſis*. Whereupon I muſt needs ſay, that he is guilty of an *Ignoratio Elenchi*, and ſo of a *Fallacia Conſequentis*, in that his Medium does not contradict the Propoſition I aſſert; *numerical Eſſence* being not, as he ſuppoſes, in the ſenſe of the Church or the Schools, the ſame with *Divine Hypoſtaſis*, and nothing hindering but that one and the ſame Divine Eſſence may have in it three different *Hypoſtaſes*, or, as I have before call'd 'em, *Underſtanding Subſiſtents*; and that it had ſo, was undoubtedly held by the antient Fathers, tho both they and the preſent Church (which latter more *expreſly* does ſo) are far from being juſtly chargeable with *Sabellianiſm*.

But next the Doctor lays a might ſtreſs upon the Word ὁμοούσιος, and endeavours to prove from the meaning of that Term, as apply'd to the *Hypoſtaſes* of the *Godhead*, that, according to the *Nicene* Fathers, they are not *one* and *the ſame numerical Eſſence*. His Reaſoning to this purpoſe I ſhall firſt ſet out in all its force, and then proceed to examine it. Now the Propoſition to be prov'd being this, that the *Nicene* Fathers held the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* not to have *one* and *the ſame numerical Eſſence* or *Subſtance*, the Argumentation for it out of the Doctor's own Poſitions may be thus form'd: How the *Nicene* Fathers held the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* to differ, may be gather'd from the Words by which they expreſs'd their Thoughts about the Agreement or Diſagreement of them; but that they held the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* to *differ Numero*, and ſo not to have *one* and the *ſame numerical Eſſence*, may be gather'd from the Words by which they expreſs'd their Thoughts about the Agreement or Diſagreement of them; therefore they really held the three *Divine Hypoſtaſes* not to have *one* and the *ſame numerical Eſſence* or *Subſtance*, but to differ *Numero*. The *Major* being granted, the *Minor* is

prov'd

prov'd thus: If the *Nicene* Fathers appropriated such a Term to denote the *Agreement* of the *Divine Hypostases*, as is exclusive of a *numerical Unity* of them, then may it be gather'd from the Words, by which they express'd their Thoughts about the Agreement or Disagreement of them, that they held the Divine Hypostases to differ *Numero*, and so not to have *one* and the *same numerical Essence*: but the *Nicene* Fathers appropriated such a Term, *&c.* therefore, *&c.* The *Sequel* being granted, the *Minor* is prov'd thus: The Term ὁμοούσιος is a Term that is exclusive of a *numerical Unity* of the *Divine Hypostases*; but the *Nicene* Fathers appropriated the Term ὁμοούσιος to denote the Agreement of the Divine Hypostases: therefore, *&c.* The Minor being granted, the Major seems evident; "because, says the Doctor, this Word was never "us'd in *Greek* Writers any otherwise, than to signify the "Agreement of things *numerically differing* from one ano-"ther in one common Nature or universal Essence. This *Major*, I say, *seems* evident (whether it *really* be so or not I shall anon enquire) at present let us see how he supports this Reason for it: he does not here presently do this by an Induction of Quotations out of *Greek Writers*, but first by the single Authority of *Petavius*, saying, towards the top of the Page last refer'd to, that this *was before intimated by* Petavius, when having asserted that the *Nicene* Fathers held an *Equality of Dignity and Eternity* between the Father and the Son, he adds, * *This does the Word* ὁμοούσιος *it self declare, it signifying rather Equality than Singularity of Essence.* As to which Passage and the Reason it is cited for, I say in the first place, that it appears not to me, that *Petavius* in this Passage intends to give in the full Import of the Word ὁμοούσιος amongst *Greek* Writers, but only that which had obtain'd amongst the antient Fathers, when discoursing of the *Trinity*, and particularly as touching the *Co-equality* of the Father and the Son. Secondly, flat and plain, that neither does *Petavius* there intimate the thing, which the Doctor says he does, but rather

* Testatur hoc ὁμοούσιος Vox ipsa, quæ Arx quædam fuit Catholici Dogmatis; hæc enim Æqualitatem potiùs quàm Singularitatem significat. *Petav. in Loc. prius cit.*

implies

implies the contrary. Thirdly, that however tho he fails indeed of *Petavius*'s Authority, yet granting the thing he aſſerts to be true, namely, that *the Word* ὁμοούσιος *was never us'd by* Greek *Writers*, that is, upon ordinary occaſions, *any otherwiſe than to ſignify the Agreement of things numerically differing from one another in ſome common or univerſal Eſſence*: yet ſtill, I ſay, that he can't juſtly infer from this Premiſe, that the Word was meant exactly ſo, when apply'd by the antient Fathers to the Divine *Hypoſtaſes*; and therefore can he not diſpute upon this ground.

But in order to clear up and confirm theſe Particulars, I ſhall firſt ſtate the Senſe of this Word, as us'd *amongſt Greek Writers*, and ſhall thence proceed to examine the Uſe of it amongſt the primitive Fathers of the Church; as alſo I ſhall at once review what *Petavius* affirms of it, and what Dr. *Cudworth* would draw from it to his purpoſe. Now I cannot deny but that the Term ὁμοούσιος has indeed in common Uſage been generally apply'd, both by profane and other *Greek* Writers, to things which do *differ* at leaſt *numerically*, but withal do agree in the ſame *kind* of *Eſſence* or *Subſtance*: thus * *Porphyry* tells us, that *the Souls of Animals are* Homoouſian, *or of the ſame Eſſence with ours*: † *Ariſtotle*, that *the Stars are all* Homoouſian, *or of the ſame Nature and Eſſence with each other*: Another ſpeaking of the *rational Soul*, ‖ ſays, *that it is* Homoouſian *or conſubſtantial with Angels and Dæmons*. Nay *Agapius* goes ſo far as to ſay, *it is* Homoouſian *or conſubſtantial*, that is, I ſuppoſe he meant, of the ſame *Spiritual Nature with God* **. And thus *Apollinaris* affirms, †† *that Men as they conſiſt of an irrational Body, are ſo far* Homoouſian *or*

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* Εἰγε ὁμοούσιαι αἱ τῶν ζώων ψυχαὶ ἡμετέραις. *De Abſtinent. ab Eſu Animal. l.* 1.

† Ὁμοούσια ὄ πάντα ἄστρα. As he is cited by the anonymous Author of the famous Queſtions concerning the Soul, publiſh'd with *Origen*'s *Philocalia*.

‖ Ἧς ὁμοουσίους φαμὲν τοὺς τε ἀγγέλους καὶ τοὺς δαίμονας. The anonymous Writer of the Book entitled, *Quæſtiones Græcanicæ ad Chriſtianos*, put among the Works of *Juſtin Martyr*.

** Τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμούσιον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ. Apud Phot. in Biblioth. Cod. 179.

†† Οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις ὁμόσποι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἄλογον. Apud Theodor. in Dialog. Ἀσύγχυτος.

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conſubſtantial with Brutes. The like appears from * *Plotinus* when he makes τὸ ὁμοούσιον ſynonymous to συγγένεια, ſaying of the *Soul*, that *it is full of divine Things, by reaſon of its being cognate or congenerous and* Homoouſian *with 'em.* Nay † *Athanaſius* himſelf makes it to be the ſame with συγγενὴς, ſaying, that *the Branches are* Homoouſian, that is, *congenerous with the Vine.* And thus alſo does he often promiſcuouſly confound it with ὁμογενὴς, ὁμοειδὴς and ὁμοφυὴς. The ſame was the ſenſe of the Council of *Chalcedon*, when calling ‖ *the Son* Homoouſian *or conſubſtantial with us Men, as to his Humanity.* And in ſhort, the ſame has been done by *Irenæus* and the *Gnoſticks*, and the generality of antient Writers, whether Heathen or Chriſtian **; that is, they univerſally apply'd the Term ὁμοούσιος to expreſs the *Agreement* of ſuch things as do *differ* at leaſt *numerically.*

But now in the next place what ſhall we infer from this Conceſſion? Shall we, that the Word ſignifying thus in common uſage and when apply'd to created things, therefore it muſt ſignify, and accordingly the *Nicene* Fathers meant it to ſignify the very ſame, when they apply'd it to the *Bleſſed* and *Eternal Trinity?* No, far from it: as there was no Parallel in Nature to this ſupernatural Truth, and no Thought could ſound this unfathomable Depth, ſo thoſe holy Men, tho ſometimes indeed they attempted to illuſtrate and to open themſelves about it, yet did not imagine that any Figure could *perfectly* reſemble, or Words fully expreſs it. However, when upon occaſion they gave ſome Hints at it, they took up ſuch *Similitudes* and Terms for this purpoſe, as do in common uſage bear ſome ſmall analogy to what they in general believ'd of this myſterious Object; and thus, as I have ſaid, the Godhead, tho *one* and the *ſame numerical Eſſence*, yet being at once common to and predicable of *three Hypoſtaſes*, has been ſometimes expreſs'd by a *Species* or *common Nature*, that is predicable of more *Individuals*, which

* Θείων μεσὴ διὰ συγγένειαν ἡ τὸ ὁμοούσιον. En. 4. l. 7. c. 10.
† Τὰ κλήματα εἶναι ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου. In Ep. de Sent. Dion.
‖ Ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα.
** *See more about the Word* ὁμοούσιος *in* Petav. de Trin. *l.* 4. *c.* 5.

are

are under it: however ſtill it is moſt certain, that the Godhead was not held by thoſe who did ſo, to be *multiply'd*, but abſolutely *undivided*. So that the *three Divine Perſons* were not thought, *juſt as* Individuals, to *differ Numero*, as if the *Eſſence* of the one were not the very *Eſſence* of the other, it being univerſally acknowledg'd by them, that there was but *one individual God*. Notwithſtanding to juſtify the *Similitude* (I do not ſay the *Parallel*) 'tis granted that this *one numerical Eſſence* of the Godhead, as it is trebly *common*, and branch'd out as it were into *hanc vel illam Perſonam*, is in this ſenſe capable of a ſort of *numerical Diverſity*, in that the Eſſence of one *Hypoſtaſis* or *Perſon* as ſuch is not the Eſſence of another, that is, not *quà* Hypoſtaſis or Perſon, tho it be ſo abſolutely as they are all of them *God*. And thus indeed do they *differ* as it were *Numero*, and come as near to it as is poſſible, and therefore have not altogether improperly been liken'd to ſuch things as do really ſo *differ*, that is, to *created Individuals*. In like manner I ſay, that the Word ὁμοούσιος, according to the uſual Import of it, bearing the ſame Analogy to the Identity of the Divine *Hypoſtaſes*, has alſo accordingly been apply'd to 'em in the ſame proportion by the antient Fathers; that is, not in the very ſame ſenſe which it commonly bears, ſo as to infer the *Hypoſtaſes to differ numerically juſt as three Individuals*; yet however to denote, that *differing* ſomewhat like 'em, ſtill they have this unparallel'd Prerogative beyond all other things, that they are *one* and *the ſame numerical Eſſence*. To this I add, that the Term ὁμοούσιος has indeed been commonly us'd as an Epithet, to ſignify either a *generical* or *ſpecifical Identity*: yet is it plain, that in the Caſe now before us, it was apply'd by the *Nicene* Fathers to denote a *numerical Identity* or *Unity of Eſſence* in the Divine Hypoſtaſes, tho at once it was ſuppos'd to admit of, nay imply a *Community* of *Eſſence* in the *Godhead*, as contain'd in and predicable of them; and that firſt becauſe 'tis unqueſtionable that they unanimouſly held but *one individual God*: whence we may undoubtedly infer what their real Meaning was; and that whatever the Terms might *vulgarly* imply, which they took up as the moſt proper they could find, whereby to denote the

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Diverſity or Agreement of the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, they notwithſtanding underſtood them, tho diſtinguiſh'd amongſt themſelves, yet not to *differ numerically*, that is, as the Learned expound this Phraſe, not to have *three ſeveral Eſſences*, but to be the *ſame numerical Eſſence* of the *one undivided God*. Secondly, this alſo may plainly be infer'd to have been the ſenſe of the Fathers; becauſe had they meant the word ὁμοούσιος to ſignify no more than a *ſpecifical Identity*, the Word συνούσιος might have done as well, in that it ſufficiently expreſſes a *Community* of *Nature* or *Subſtance*: but whereas this was rejected by them as improper, it is well obſerv'd by * *Epiphanius*, and atteſted by Archbiſhop *Uſher*, that they took up the former Term rather than the latter, at once to denote an *Identity* or *Unity* as well as a *Community* of *Nature*; and in particular, a *numerical Identity* of the *Godhead*, in which the *three Hypoſtaſes* both do and muſt agree, if they do agree at all, and are not *three individual Gods*. Accordingly I add, that the Word has been cautiouſly render'd into *Latin*, not always by *conſubſtantialis*, which anſwers directly to συνούσιος, and implies ſuch a Latitude, as will not very well admit a *numerical Identity* of things ſo denominated; but often by *unius* or *ejuſdem Subſtantiæ vel Eſſentiæ*. Thus † *Lucifer Caralitanus* tells us, *What the* Grecians *call* ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, *we* Romans *call* unius Subſtantiæ cum Patre, *of one Subſtance with the Father*. And *Victor Epiſcopus* ſpeaking at once of the *Sabellian* and the *Arian* Hereſys, ſays, *That to refel and utterly aboliſh the one and the other, this* Greek *Word* ὁμοούσιον *was us'd, the Senſe of which is in* Latin, unius Subſtantiæ vel Eſſentiæ, *and ſignifies the Son to be of no other Subſtance, but that of the Father only*. Which *una* or *eadem Subſtantia vel Eſſentia* muſt in this caſe needs point at a numerical Identity or Unity, and

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* Ampliùs enim quid quàm συνούσιον (ut rectè in Anchorato ab Epiphanio eſt obſervatum) quod propriè conſubſtantiale eſt, vox iſta, *i.e.* ὁμοούσιον denotat, atque unius & ejuſdem individuæ Subſtantiæ Patrem & Filium eſſe ita plenè ſignificat, ut ſolo τὸ ὁμοούσιον φρονέντων vel ἐφευρόντων Titulo ab Arianis Orthodoxi ſecernerentur. *J. Armachan. de Rom. Eccleſ. Symbol. Apoſt. Vet.* p. 29. 4° *Lond.*

† *Cited by* Petav. de Trinit. *p.* 209. *col.* 2. *where is more to this purpoſe.*

is therefore alſo us'd by * *Tertullian* and † other undoubted *Monotheiſts*, tho *real Trinitarians*, to expreſs the ὁμοούσιον. And this Verſion, we are again told by a ‖ competent Judg here at home, directly anſwers to the *Greek* Original, as meant by the Fathers: and accordingly from the large *Nicene* Creed we render into *Engliſh* this Clauſe apply'd to the *Son* at the inſtance of *Conſtantine*, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, *of one Subſtance with the Father*; by which the Church muſt needs have meant *one* and the *ſame numerical Subſtance*, unleſs the Godhead be divided or multiply'd, which moſt certainly it never ſuppos'd. Indeed the *Son* is confeſs'd in the ſame Creed and held by all the Orthodox to have been *begotten* by the *Father*, and the *Holy Ghoſt* to have *proceeded* from the Father and the Son; yet was not this in a natural way, ſo as to imply a *Multiplication* of the Godhead, as Effects uſe to do among finite and created things; but only an Equality of Nature and Perfection: and ſo far indeed the Simile holds, as taken from the Production of natural things; and the *Son*, as ſaid to be eternally *generated*, is *God of God*, as much as a human Son is *Man of Man*; and the ſame is true of the Holy Spirit, as proceeding, tho with this difference in the preſent caſe, from finite Beings and ſuch as are generated or produc'd in a natural way, that they are *one undivided Eſſence*, the *ſame* infinite and eternal God. For by the way, in this and the like Caſes, whenever *Similes* or Terms are taken from created things and apply'd to give ſome hints or intimations of this myſterious Doctrine, it is very well obſerv'd by *Petavius*, "That we ought with *Baſil* of *Ancyra*, St. *Hilary* and *Epi-*
"*phanius*, to abſtract in our Mind from the Words thus
"us'd whatever is involv'd in the Notions of them among
"created things, and only ſelect and apply to the Divinity

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* *In* Init. Lib. adverſus Praxeam.

† *St.* Auſtin *in* Lib. cont. Maxim. *c.* 13. *St.* Hilary *de Trin.* l. 6. *Touching which latter 'tis obſerv'd by Bp* Pearſon, *that* Petavius *without reaſon would have it, that he render'd* ὁμοούσιον *in* Latin, id quod partem Subſtantiæ habet ex toto reſectam: *for, ſays this Prelate, St.* Hilary *clearly tranſlates* ὁμοούσιον, unius Subſtantiæ. *In* Expoſition of the Creed, *p.* 135. *in* Margent.

‖ *Dr.* Bull *in* Defenſ. Fid. Nic. *p.* 28. *col.* 2. Ed. Grab.

"that

" that which includes ſomewhat of Perfection, *&c* *. Agreeably to what I ſaid before, *Euſebius* of *Cæſarea* thus argues in reference to the *Son*: †*That which is born of the Fleſh is Fleſh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit; now God is a Spirit, and therefore muſt we conceive that what is born of God is God.* And to this purpoſe *Photius* having ſaid, *that it is univerſally and of courſe own'd that a Son is of the ſame Subſtance or Nature with the Father*; hereupon the Learned Dr. *Cave* thus comments: ‖ *And if it be ſo in human things, how much more is it ſo in divine, where there is a moſt perfect and altogether unſearchable Generation?* And acordingly he tells us again, that the *Arians*, who deny'd the Divinity of Chriſt, ** *did equally oppoſe his Communication from the Father.* Which minds me further, that the ſenſe in which the antient Fathers meant the Word ὁμοούσιος, may be gather'd from that in which the *Arians* oppos'd it; the former having call'd the Son *Homoouſian* in direct contradiction to the Blaſphemys of the latter, ſo as to imply, that he was not of any created or mutable Eſſence, but of the ſame divine and immutable Eſſence and Subſtance with the Father, that is, one and the ſame eternal God. Now the *Arians* not ſuppoſing the Orthodox Fathers to be given to Polytheiſm, and granting that what was born of God (if any thing were ſo) was *God*, not *another God*, made their chief effort againſt the Word ὁμοούσιος, as implying the *Son* to be of the ſame Subſtance with the *Father*, and not another inferior God or Creature, but one and the ſame ſupreme God and Creator. Accordingly *Euſebius* of

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* Rectè illi declarant quemadmodum, cùm aut Creator inferiorum rerum Deus appellatur aut unigeniti Filii Pater, ab iis vocabulis intelligendo ſecernere oporteat omnia, quæ in infimis & creatis rebus cum eorum Notionibus implicata cernuntur: ut ea tantummodo ſeligantur, quæ Perfectionis aliquid continent, &c. *Pet. de Trin.* p. 208. col. 1. *Ed. Antw.*

† Τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς, σάρξ ἐστι; καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος, πνεῦμα ἐστι. πνεῦμα δὲ ὁ θεὸς, διὸ ἔπεσθαι νοεῖν, ὡς τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, Θεὸς ἐστι. Cited by Dr. *Cave* in *Diſſert. adverſ. Cler. ad calcem Hiſt. Lit.* p. 72.

‖ Et ſi ita in humanis ſit, quanto magis in divinis, ubi perfectiſſima & planè imperſcrutabilis datur Generatio? *In* Diſſ. adv. Cleric. *p.* 75.

** Et Naturam in Chriſto Divinam & ejus a Patre Communicationem ex æquo negabant Ariani. *p.* 71.

Nicomedia, * *than whom we are told that no one better knew the mind of* Arius, delivers their ſenſe in this manner: *If*, ſays he, *we own Chriſt to be the true Son of God and uncreated, then do we begin to confeſs him to be* Homoouſian, *or of the ſame Subſtance with the Father*; which, as † *Petavius* notes, they look'd on to be abſurd, yet withal to be a neceſſary Conſequence of their holding him to be the true Son of God and uncreated. Accordingly St. *Ambroſe* tells us, that the ſaid *Euſebius*'s Letter containing theſe Words being read in the *Nicene* Council, gave the Fathers a handle whereby to oppoſe the *Arian* Faction, they hereupon putting in their Creed the Term ὁμοούσιον, ‖ *becauſe they ſaw it was a terror to their Adverſarys*; *that the Head of their curſed Hereſy might be as it were cut off by that very Sword, which they themſelves had drawn.* Nay ſo far were the *Arians* from oppoſing ὁμοούσιον as implying any other than a *numerical Unity* of Eſſence in the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, that, as ** Dr. *Bull* tells us, they ſometimes found fault with it, as favouring *Sabellianiſm*, that is, as implying an Unity even of *Hypoſtaſis*, and much leſs as denoting a ſpecifical Unity of the three Hypoſtaſes, or of the Father and the Son.

Further I ſay, that methinks this Conſtruction of τὸ ὁμοούσιον is alſo favour'd by its very Etymology; whether it come from ὁμὸς which ſignifies *the ſame*, or from ὁμοῦ or ὅμως (as 'tis in *Vulcanius*'s Edition of *Iſidore*) which ſignifies *at once* or *together*, in the *Latin*, *unà* or *æque*; foraſmuch as †† nothing is properly ſaid to be the ſame with it ſelf, but with ſomething elſe; and ſo the former Term *implies*, as either of the latter plainly *expreſſes* a Connotation of *more Things* or *Perſons* to whom it belongs, together with an emphatical Hint at the

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* Quo nemo Arii mentem intimiùs novit. *Dr.* Cave *ubi ſup.* p. 75.

† De Trin. *p.* 205. *col.* 1. Ed. Antw.

‖ Hæc cùm lecta eſſet Epiſtola in Concilio Nicæno, hoc verbum in tractatu Fidei poſuerunt Patres, quòd id viderunt Adverſariis eſſe formidini; ut tanquam evaginato ab ipſis Gladio, ipſorum nefandæ caput Hæreſis amputarent. *L.* 3. *de Fid. c.* 7.

** Cauſabatur impia illa & inquieta hominum Factio τὸ ὁμοούσιον nunc Sabellianiſmo patrocinari, &c. *Def. Fid. Nic.* p. 25. col. 2. *Ed. Grab.*

†† Ὁμοούσιον enim aliud alii, non ipſum eſt ſibi. *Ambroſ. l.* 3. *de Fid. c.* 7.

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Co-Equality of them; and eſpecially as join'd with the word οὐσία, and apply'd to the Godhead (which is in it ſelf but *one* and *undivided*, tho reſpectively *common*) at the Unity of them in *Nature* and *Eſſence*, however otherwiſe diſtinguiſh'd amongſt themſelves. * *Well therefore*, ſays St. *Ambroſe*, *do we call the Son* Homoouſian *with the Father, becauſe by that Word the Diſtinction of Perſons* (againſt *Sabellius*) *and at once the Unity of Nature* (againſt *Arius*) *is ſignify'd.* To which agrees this of *Epiphanius*; † *That by the word* ὁμοούσιον *are ſignify'd two perfect things, which yet have a real Unity*, τὴν ἑνότητα, *i. e.* a *numerical Unity.* And this of *T. Aquinas* taken from S. *Auſtin*; ‖ *That the word* Homoouſion, *which was eſtabliſh'd in the* Nicene *Council againſt the* Arians, *imports thus much, that the three Perſons are of one and the ſame*, that is, one and the ſame *numerical Eſſence.* In ſhort, the *Nicene* Fathers do ſufficiently declare what they mean by τὸ ὁμοούσιον, when they anathematize thoſe, who hold ** *the Son to be from a different Hypoſtaſis or Eſſence* from the Father, that is, as †† Dr. *Bull* explains theſe Words in oppoſition to ‖‖ *D. Petavius*, to be no way from the *Perſon* as ſuch, nor from the *Subſtance* of the Father, *but created*, or *convertible* or *alterable.* And again we have their Senſe directly in theſe Words of *Athanaſius*: " (*a*) That herein lies " the Force of the word ὁμοούσιον, that the Son is not a Crea-

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* Rectè ergo ὁμοούσιον Patri Filium dicimus, quia verbo eo & Perſonarum Diſtinctio & Naturæ Unitas ſignificatur. *Ib.*

† Τὸ δὲ ὁμοῦ οὐκ ἕνα πάλιν σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμοουσίου δύο σημαίνει τέλεια, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀλλοῖα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἀλλότρια τῆς αὐτῆς ἑνότητος. Epiphan. Har. 69. n. 70.

‖ Auguſt. dicit in L. 3. c. 14. contra Maximinum, quòd hoc nomen *Homoouſion*, quod in Concilio Nicæno adverſus Arianos firmatum eſt, idem ſignificat, quòd tres Perſonas eſſe unius Eſſentiæ. *In ſum. Theol.* 1a *Q.* 39. *A.* 2.

** Ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι, ἢ κτιστὸν, ἢ τρεπτὸν, ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

†† In Def. Fid. Nic. *p.* 114, 115.

‖‖ D. Pet. de Trin. *p.* 185, &c. Ed. Antw. *Where he oppoſes St.* Baſil *for having aſſerted, that the* Nicene *Fathers did not here mean* ὑπόστασις *and* οὐσία *as Terms ſynonymous or of a parallel Signification.*

(*a*) Καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁμοουσίου δύναμις γινώσκεται, ἐν τῷ μὴ κτίσμα ἢ ποίημα τὸν υἱὸν, &c. In Epiſt. ad Afric. Epiſcop.

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" ture or a Thing made, as being of one Subſtance with the " Father; which whoſoever holds him to be, holds him to be " the true and genuine Son of God: and in a word, he who " does this, rightly underſtands this Scripture-Saying, *I and* " *my Father are one*, not μία ὑπόστασις, *one Hypoſtaſis* or *Per-* " *ſon*, but ἕν, *one Thing*, *Eſſence* or *Subſtance*. This again * St. *Hilary* gives as the Senſe of thoſe Fathers, when putting this Queſtion in reference to the *Nicene* Creed: " Does the " word *Homoouſion* here import any other, than that there is " one Nature of the Father and of the Son that is generated " by him; becauſe the Eſſence of the Son is not from any " other thing, and it being not ſo, both the Father and the " Son are rightly believ'd to be of one Eſſence, becauſe the " Son ows his original Subſtance to the Father? And † *Ba-* *ſil* the Great repreſents their Meaning, that is, the true Theological, not the ordinary Meaning of the ὁμοούσιον thus: " Not thoſe things, which are cognate or akin, are *Homo-* " *ouſian* to each other, as ſome have thought; but when the " Cauſe and the Thing caus'd are in all reſpects of the ſame " nature, then are they *Homoouſian:* I ſay, *are of*, from the word ὑπάρχῃ, rather than *partake of*, as ſome render it, be-cauſe ſo the word ſignifies, and then does not imply the Deity to be *partible*. Many other Teſtimonys might be cited to this purpoſe, but for this I refer the Reader to that Part of Dr. *Bull*'s *Defence of the* Nicene *Faith*, which is *de Filii τῷ* ὁμοσίῳ; from the whole drift of whoſe Quotations, and par-ticularly that Summary of the Senſe couch'd in 'em at *Fol.* 36. *Col.* 2. it may plainly be infer'd, that by the Son's being *Homoouſian* with the Father, they meant his being of *one* and the *ſame individual Eſſence* and *Subſtance* of the Godhead; they here and all along intimating the neareſt *Unity* that can be conceiv'd, yet ſo withal as more eſpecially to maintain a *Diſtinction* and *Co-equality* of Perſons, which it was their direct Concernment to do. So that the ὁμοούσιον, as it may

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* Aut aliud hic teſtatur Homoouſion quàm ut una duum ſit ſecundum Naturæ propaginem Eſſentia, &c. *In Lib. de Synod.*

† Οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἀδελφὰ ἀλλήλοις ὁμοούσια ἀλλήλοις λέγεσθαι, &c. *In Epiſt.* 300.

with

with equal reaſon be alſo apply'd to the Holy Ghoſt in reference to the *Father* and the *Son*, ſuppoſes the Godhead, according to *them*, to be what *Maximus* emphatically terms it, * *at once indeed the ſame Monad and a Trinity*; and again, † *the ſame whole Monad diſtinguiſh'd by Hypoſtaſes*; and what *Dionyſius* the *Areopagite*, ‖ *a tri-ſubſiſtent Monad*; and what *Gregory Nazianzen*, ** ἕν, *one individual thing in Eſſence or Subſtance, and three in Hypoſtaſes.*

To which I add, that the Fathers rather pitch'd on for this purpoſe the word ὁμοούσιον, than μονοούσιον or ταυτοούσιον, as on t'other hand I have ſaid, than συνούσιον; becauſe tho it does indeed admit of, nay imply (as ſpoken of the Godhead) a numerical Identity of *Eſſence*, yet does it not ſo plainly expreſs it, as to exclude, but at once more eſpecially to imply a *Community* of Nature, which μονοούσιον or ταυτοούσιον would ſeem to exclude, in that the firſt part of theſe Compounds referring to the Perſons, yet has not in it any Connotation of a *Community*, and ſo would be thought to admit of no *Diſtinction* of them, but to make the Godhead in effect, what the *Noetians* and *Sabellians* held, μονοπρόσωπον, but *one Hypoſtaſis* or *Perſon*. Agreeably to this St. *Baſil* tells us very well, †† *That the word* ὁμοούσιον *corrects the Impiety of* Sabellius: *for it takes away an Identity of Hypoſtaſis, and induces a perfect Notion of the Perſons: foraſmuch as one and the ſame thing is not Homoouſian to it ſelf, but one thing to another.* And let not Dr. *Cudworth* here think (|||| as we find he would do) to draw in St. *Baſil* to his ſide, he thus gloſſing on theſe Words (as was before noted) *the Sameneſs of Hypoſtaſis*, that is, ſays he, *of ſingular numerical Eſſence*; *this being*, he adds, *that which the antient Fathers meant by the word* Hypoſtaſis: for, with ſubmiſſion,

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* Τὴν αὐτὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς μονάδα καὶ τριάδα.

† Ὅλην μονάδα τὴν αὐτὴν μεμερισμένην ταῖς ὑποστάσεσιν. Apud Euthym. in Panop. ‖ Μονάδα τεισυπόστατον. De Eccleſ. Hier. c. 2.

** Ἓν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὰ δὲ τρία ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι. In Orat. 32.

†† Αὕτη δὲ ἡ φωνὴ καὶ τὸ τῦ Σαβελλίυ κακὸν ἐπανορθοῦται· ἀναιρεῖ γὰρ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως, καὶ εἰσάγει τελείαν τῦ προσώπου τὴν ἔννοιαν. οὐ γὰρ αὐτό πἐστιν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. In Epiſt. 300.

|||| Int. Syſt. *p.* 605, *at bottom*, &c.

this

this Notion of *Hypoſtaſis*, as referring to the Godhead, and denoting a *Divine Subſiſtent*, and accordingly as us'd by the antient Fathers in this caſe (however it ſignifies in common uſage) I aver to be wrong; and particularly as to *Baſil*'s meaning here, this I leave to the candid Reader's Judgment, whether or no it does not appear from the following words to be quite other than the Doctor interprets: * *Wherefore*, ſays he, *this Term was very rightly and religiouſly us'd, in that it diſtinguiſhes the Propriety of the Hypoſtaſes, and at once expreſſes a Communion of Nature without any Diverſity*; without ſo much as a *numerical Diverſity*, which is what the Doctor ſuppoſes between the *D. Hypoſtaſes*: yet neither does this, in the ſenſe of St. *Baſil*, infer an *Identity* of *D. Hypoſtaſis*; for tho indeed, as follows in his words, the *ſame thing be not*, and conſequently the *ſame D. Eſſence* as ſuch be not *homoouſian*, *co-eſſential* or *conſubſtantial with it ſelf*; yet nothing hinders but that *three Divine Hypoſtaſes*, which do conſiſt of this *Eſſence* in common and of ſomething beſides which is proper, and by which they are diſtinguiſh'd, may as ſuch be Homoouſian, as one thing is with another. Again, as touching the word μονοούσιος St. *Athanaſius* writes thus: † *We do not think the Son*, as ſuch, *to be really one and the ſame with the Father, as the* Sabellians *do, and to be Monoouſios and not Homoouſios; they thereby deſtroying the very Being of the Son.* And of the word ταυτοούσιος *Epiphanius* thus: ‖ *We affirm not the Son to be Tautoouſian, leſt this ſhould be taken in way of compliance with* Sabellius; *nevertheleſs do we aſſert him to be the ſame in Goodneſs, and in Eſſence, and in Power.* Wherefore I ſay, that the Fathers rather us'd the word ὁμοούσιον as denoting in the Godhead a *Community* of *Nature*, and conſequent to that a *Plurality* of Perſons, and at once a *Singularity* of *Nature* and *Eſſence*; I ſay, *in the Godhead*, for ſo the word muſt denote in

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* Ὥστε καλῶς ἔχει καὶ εὐσεβῶς, ἅμα τε ὑποστάσεων τὴν ἰδιότητα διοριζόσα καὶ τῆς φύσεως τὸ ἀπαραλλακτον παιςοῦσα. Ib.

† Οὔτε ὁμοπατέρα φρονοῦμεν, ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι, Μονούσιον καὶ οὐκ Ὁμούσιον, &c. *Cited by* Dr. Cudw. Int. Syſt. *p.* 611.

‖ Καὶ ὃ λέγομεν ταυτοούσιον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ λέξις πᾶσι λεγομένη, Σαβελλίῳ ἀπεικαθῇ. ταυτὸν δὲ λέγομεν τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. Hæreſ. 76. N. 7. prout cit. ib.

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this caſe: but withal I grant that they had chiefly an eye at the former ſenſe of it, their main Concern and Drift being this; not ſo much to aſſert the *Unity* of the Godhead, as the *Coequality* of the *Perſons* in *Nature* and *Perfection:* and therefore as the word ὁμοούσιον in ordinary uſage denoted a *Conſubſtantiality* or *Co eſſentiality* of things agreeing in one *Genus* or *Species*; * ſo much more, thought they, might it expreſs a *Co-eſſentiality* and conſequent to that a *Co-equality* of *Perſons* agreeing in the ſame *one God.* Accordingly in the place before-cited *Petavius* well intimates, that ὁμοούσιος in the ſenſe of the *Nicene* Fathers, *ſignifies rather Equality than Singularity*; I ſay, in the ſenſe of the *Nicene* Fathers, as uttering their mind in relation to the Trinity. And again, tho I grant that in common uſage *Equality* would indeed ſuppoſe at leaſt a *numerical Diverſity*, yet in this caſe it does not, but only ſomething like it, as *Petavius* himſelf does plainly imply, in ſaying that it *ſignifies Equality rather than Singularity:* it does not directly exclude *Singularity*, tho chiefly indeed it denote *Equality*; which at once gives us to underſtand, that he meant this Signification of it only in reference to the Myſtery of the Trinity, and according to the ſenſe which it bore among the Fathers, and not what it had among *Greek* Writers in ordinary caſes. As was before obſerv'd, they put out their whole Force againſt *Arius*, who aſſerted the Son to be a *Creature*, and therefore not ὁμοούσιον or of *one Subſtance* and *equal with the Father* †, to aſſert the *Equality*, tho, as *Petavius* intimates, without expreſs mention of the Singularity of Eſſence; which however is a tacit Confeſſion, that they ſtill held this *Singularity:* and accordingly they choſe a fit Term for this, which might rather ſignify *Equality* than *Singularity*, yet ſo as not to exclude *Singularity.*

In ſhort, the word ὁμοούσιος does indeed properly ſignify *conſubſtantial* and *co-eſſential:* and becauſe the things which ordinarily come under this Character are *coequal*; and the Fathers were not concern'd expreſly to prove the Hypoſtaſes to be

* *See* Petavius de Trin. l. 4. c. 13. p. 247. col. 2.

† Ἵνα μὴ γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν καὶ μὴ Ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ. Athan. in Ep. de Dionyſ.

one God, but to be *God* and of the ſame immutable Eſſence: therefore they chiefly affix'd to this Term the ſenſe of *Equality*, eſpecially becauſe as this was plainly imply'd by it, ſo I ſay the *Arians* had likewiſe as it were put it into their Heads and Mouths, in that they aſſerted the Son to be only ὁμοιούσιον, ἑτεροούσιον, that is, Godlike indeed, but really inferior in Nature and Eſſence to God. But to ſay, that becauſe *Petavius* intimated this (granting his Intimation to be well grounded) therefore they diſown'd a *Singularity*, and held the Divine Hypoſtaſes to have Eſſences or Subſtances *numerically differing*, is as abſurd, as to conclude, that becauſe he aſſerted the word *Trinity* to have been us'd by them, and this ſignifies rather *Plurality* than *Unity*, therefore they did not hold the *Unity*: and as well might it be argu'd that the word *Hypoſtaſes* or *Perſons* being ordinarily us'd by all Writers to ſignify things *numerically differing*, therefore they do ſo when apply'd to the Bleſſed Trinity; or that this laſt Term ſignifying the *Number Three*, therefore the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* do in a true logical ſenſe differ *numero*, or have *diſtinct numerical Eſſences*; yet this, if there be any thing at all in the Doctor's Argument, is, I believe, the Subſtance of it. But I add, ſo far is the Doctor from having *Petavius* on his ſide, that, as we have ſeen, he does not even imply and much leſs plainly intimate what the Doctor would have him; nay (which makes me wonder at the Doctor and others I might name, who vouch his Authority upon this occaſion) it is his main Drift to prove quite the contrary, and to lay down this as his own proper Sentiment. This is plainly to be ſeen in his fourth Book of *Dogmata Theologica de Trinitate*, Chapter the 13th, quoted by the Doctor; where he has elaborately and copiouſly ſhewn that the *Greek* Fathers, notwithſtanding they aſſerted a real Trinity of Hypoſtaſes, yet held withal *one individual* and *numerical Eſſence* of the Godhead, in which they all ſubſiſted; St. *Athanaſius*, St. *Baſil*, St. *Cyril*, and others the greateſt of 'em expreſſing it emphatically by μονὰς ἀδιαίρετος and ἀκριβὴς, an indiviſible and exact Monad; by ἑνὰς, ἑνότης, and the like Terms implying an abſolute Unity without any Connotation of Plurality; and that *propter* μίαν θεότητα, and ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως ἢ οὐσίας, becauſe of the *one Divinity* of the

the three Perſons and the *Identity* of *Nature* and *Eſſence*: and the ſame is done by him in Chapter the 14th from the *Latin* Fathers, as alſo again in the 15th and 16th from both the *Greek* and *Latin* promiſcuouſly. Out of the firſt of which copious Fields of Matter and Chapter the 5th of the ſame Book, which treats expreſly of the word ὁμοούσιον, and has much more to this purpoſe (to ſhew that I have not miſconſtru'd his Senſe) let it ſuffice that I quote the following Paſſages; the * firſt of which methinks could not but look the Doctor full in the face, as immediately following his own Quotation: " † It " was argument enough, ſays he, againſt thoſe Hereticks " (meaning the *Arians*) that the *Word* is *equal* and ὁμοούσιον " or conſubſtantial with the Father; that they are both as " much to be look'd on to have *one Nature*, as among created " things the Begetter and the Offspring, the Father and the " Son are found to be. But, ſays he, a certain greater and " ſtraiter Conjunction of Nature, than this which is proper " to a Species, is concluded to be in God from many places " of the Antients, ſome of which I ſhall here extract out of " 'em; which do ſignify the *individual* and *ſingular Subſtance* " of the *three Perſons*, and by conſequence that the Trinity it " ſelf is one God with that kind of Unity, which agrees to " Individuals; only allowing that a Diſcrimination of Per- " ſons and Hypoſtaſes conſiſts with that very Singularity. To which agrees what he had ſaid before at the end of the fifth Chapter, where having mention'd that ὁμοούσιον expreſly denotes a *Community* of Nature, and that *Plotinus* apply'd it to things at leaſt *numerically differing*, he goes on thus: " || But when this Word is rais'd from things created to God, " to ſignify his proper Subſtance and the Communion of that

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* P. 248. col. 1. † Igitur ſatis in eo ipſo contra Hæreticos iſtos argumentum fuit, æquale & ὁμούσιον eſſe Deo Patri verbum, &c. verum major quædam & arctior in Deo Naturæ conjunctio, quàm hæc Speciei propria pleriſque Veterum ex locis concluditur, &c.

|| Verùm cùm ad Deum ejuſque propriam Subſtantiam & Subſtantiæ Communionem ſignificandam, a creatis rebus ea vox attollitur, majorem quandam & arctiorem Unitatem exprimit; ut non Specie ſolum, ſed etiam Numero eadem in utriſque Natura ſit, &c.

" Subſtance, then does it expreſs a certain greater and " ſtraiter Unity; ſo as that the Nature is one and the ſame " not only *Specie*, but *Numero* in both. For the Divine " Eſſence cannot be multiply'd, ſo as to be more Natures; " becauſe there can't be more Gods, one of which is firſt, " another ſecond. But if it be communicated to a kind of " Individual and Perſon, it is all of it communicated, the " *ſame in Number* and ſingular with all its Attributes; and " conſequently with Eternity it ſelf. So that it follows with an equal Neceſſity, that he muſt be eternal who is born of that which is eternal, as that he ſhould be God who is born of God; he making it alſo elſewhere a peculiar Prerogative of the Divine Nature, that tho it be individual, yet it does not exclude a Communion, as that of created things does. The moſt he ſays to this purpoſe is, that the Divine *Hypoſtaſes* have ſomething *proper*, by which they are diſtinguiſh'd; and ſomething *common*, in which they agree. And having ſpoken of the *Modus exiſtendi* or *ſubſiſtendi* proper to an Hypoſtaſis, he adds, " * This Mode indeed excludes a Commu- " nion even of individual Subſtance in created Subſtances, " but in the Divine only of Perſon. So that in this particular Caſe, albeit in no other, there is a *numerical Homoouſiotes*, *Individuality* conſiſts with *Community*; and herein lies the *Myſtery*. This Latitude indeed *Petavius* allows in the Divine Nature; but was far from meaning and from ever calling it *ſpecifical*, in reference to the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, and by conſequence from intimating theſe latter to be *three diſtinct numerical Eſſences*. On the other hand he plainly ſays, " † If we " would ſpeak in an exact philoſophical way, the three Per- " ſons are not in ſuch a ſenſe ὁμοούσιοι or of the *ſame Sub-* " *ſtance*, as *Peter*, *Paul* and *John*; which Simile notwith- " ſtanding is us'd by the Antients in almoſt every Diſpute of " theirs againſt the *Arians*. Touching this however they " are not to be blam'd or cenſur'd as Perſons groſly ignorant, " and as if they knew nothing of a *numerical Unity* of the

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* Qui quidem Modus in creatis Subſtantiis Communionem excludit etiam individuæ Subſtantiæ, in Divinâ verò non niſi Perſonæ. *De Trin. l.* 4. *c.* 8. *p.* 223. † Ib. p. 247. col. 2.

" *Divine*

" *Divine Eſſence*, and own'd no other but what is like it in " the human Nature. For they at once underſtood that " former (as I ſhall anon ſhew) yet prudently brought in " this latter, which is proper to a *Species*, as an Example. " For they conſider'd, that it were beſt for 'em to oppoſe the " *Arians* in ſuch a way, as ſtill to remember that the *Sabellian* " Plague was alſo to be ſhun'd, into which, while they fled " from the *Arian*, it were very eaſy for 'em to fall. Where- " fore they thought it adviſable to utter themſelves in ſuch " a way, as to bring in that higheſt Conjunction, that ἀκριβῆ " μονάδα, that *exact Monad*, as *Gregory Nyſſen* ſpeaks, ſome- " what ſparingly; leſt they ſhould ſeem to admit the *Sabel-* " *lian* Solitude or Singularity; and rather to apply that Con- " junction or Unity, which is proper to a Species: and this was " at once enough to repel the *Arian* Fury, and to remove 'em " from the Suſpicion and Scandal of *Sabellianiſm*. But after all to make ſome allowance for Dr. *Cudworth*'s miſtaking of *Petavius*, on account of what he was *willing* to believe of the Fathers; yet how ſhall we bring him off in reference to theſe latter? Was he either ignorant of, or did he induſtriouſly miſrepreſent their Meaning? No, I will not ſay either of theſe: but that being reſolv'd (as indeed he had reaſon) to ſet thoſe Antients far enough off from *Sabellianiſm* and *Aria-* *niſm*, and therefore to deſcribe 'em as *real Trinitarians* and Aſſerters of an *Equality* of the Divine Hypoſtaſes, he would have them, agreeably to what I ſaid before, to have miſtaken with himſelf the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* for *Eſſences numerically differing*; and that ſo ὁμοούσιος denoted much the ſame, as when apply'd to created Individuals. And thus we find, as was before ſaid, that this whole Diſpute is only about Words, which it would have been enough barely to have ſaid, were it not that many have ſince laid hold of and us'd theſe very Words, as coming from ſo great an Author, to the diſad- vantage of the Catholick Doctrine. But of this, and the outragious Expreſſions, which follow this firſt miſtake of the Doctor's, I ſhall ſay more anon. I purſue him now in the courſe we are in, as next (to paſs by St. *Baſil*, whom I have already occaſionally nam'd) he goes on to abet this firſt and grand Miſtake, that the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* were look'd on by

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the Fathers to be *Eſſences numerically differing.* * Next then he would draw this from the uſage of the Term ὁμοούσιος among *Greek* Writers, ſome of whom now he particularly cites, as applying it to things *ſpecifically* or *numerically differing*, and only agreeing in a *Genus* or *Species:* namely *Plotinus*, the Council of *Chalcedon*, and *Athanaſius* himſelf. *Anſw.* Who denies this? This was before granted, and more particularly ſhewn, as not making againſt, but rather for my purpoſe. And what can the Doctor infer from it? Not that the Fathers, when applying this Term to the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, would thereby denote 'em to be *Eſſences numerically differing*; but only that, agreeably to the common uſage of it, they look'd on it as the propereſt Word they knew of to repreſent in this extraordinary Caſe, as it were that *Difference*; that *Difference*, I ſay, which albeit not truly *numerical*, yet comes as near to it as is poſſible. But, ſays the Doctor, the Council of *Chalcedon* affirms, that our Saviour Chriſt was † ὁμοούσιος, *co-eſſential or conſubſtantial with the Father as to his Divinity, but co-eſſential or conſubſtantial with us Men as to his Humanity.* Where, he tells us, it can't reaſonably be ſuſpected, that one and the ſame Word ſhould be taken in two different ſenſes in the ſame Sentence, ſo as in the firſt place to ſignify a *numerical Identity*, but in the ſecond a *generical* or *ſpecifical* only. *Anſw.* I do not and never have ſaid that this Term expreſly and directly ſignifies or was intended by Chriſtian Writers to ſignify *numerical Identity*, but more eſpecially an *Agreement* or *Equality* of the Divine Hypoſtaſes in the *common* Nature of the *Godhead*, ſomewhat like that of individual Men in the *Species* of *Manhood*; and ſo this latter was deſign'd by that Council indeed to illuſtrate, but not to parallel the former: the *Community*, or what is there denoted by ὁμοούσιος, not excluding, tho not ſo plainly ſignifying *numerical Identity*. And this, I affirm, is all that can be drawn from the following Words of *Athanaſius* and *Dionyſius*, which he urges to the ſame purpoſe.

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* Int. Syſt. *p.* 606. † Ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα.

And

And this, I add, is what a * late eminent Writer muſt needs have meant, when having intimated that the word Ὁμοούσιος, in the ſenſe of the Fathers, *ſignify'd the three Perſons in the Godhead to have the ſame Nature*, he next offers at explaining what kind of *Sameneſs* it was they underſtood, that it was not a *numerical* but *ſpecifical*; which he tells us, *that* Petavius, *and after him Dr.* Cudworth, *have abundantly prov'd.* But how have they prov'd it? The † former has never once allow'd the Term *Specifical* or *Species* as exactly applicable in this caſe, and on t'other hand has expreſly contended for a *numerical*, tho *common Eſſence* of the Divine Hypoſtaſes, as held by the antient Fathers, and imply'd by Ὁμοούσιος: And as to the latter, tho he does indeed aſſert the Term, yet does he not the thing meant by it, when ſtrictly and properly taken, but in a looſe ſenſe, as it implies the ſame with *common*; and accordingly ſo does this Author mean, as appears from his enſuing Words, in which he paraphraſeth the *Sameneſs* aforeſaid by *the Agreement of things numerically differing from one another in the ſame common Nature.* In which words the only Failure ſeems to be this (which yet will occaſionally give us a further inſight into this Author's meaning) that in 'em he ſuppoſes the Divine Perſons to be *things numerically differing*; and if ſo, then in the ſenſe of the Schools, they muſt have *three Eſſences*, and by conſequence can't be *one numerical Eſſence* or *individual God*: which yet he undoubtedly holds, and accordingly elſewhere ſpeaks out his mind to this purpoſe, ſaying, ‖ That the *Fathers never dreamt of a collective or ſpecifick Unity of the Godhead, but aſſerted a real ſubſiſting numerical Unity of Eſſence*; ** that they proceeded *to ſhow how this* Ὁμοούσιον *or Sameneſs of Nature in all three Perſons of the Ever-Bleſſed Trinity proves a*

* *Dr.* Sherlock *in* Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever-bleſſed Trinity, *p.* 106.

† Nunc vero ſpeciatim de hâc ſolâ (ſcilicet Naturâ Divinâ) demonſtrandum idem illud eſt; Naturam Divinam, quæ in Perſonis ineſt tribus, non ratione cogitationeve ſolâ, quemadmodum quæ univerſalia dicimus, unum quidpiam eſſe, ſed per ſe abſolutéque unam & ſingularem atque individuam eſſe rem triplici Proprietate ſubſiſtentem. *Petav. de Trin.* p. 246. col. 2. Ed. Antwerp. ‖ P. 109. ** P. 114.

true

true numerical and essential Unity of the Godhead; * that *tho they attempt several ways of explaining it, they all agree in the thing, that Father, Son and Holy Ghost, three distinct Divine Persons, are united in one numerical Nature and Essence.* Whence I conclude his meaning to have been the same with *Damascen*'s: † That *things, which any way differ, may be number'd, and that none else can be number'd; but that such are number'd according to that by which they differ.* And thus methinks he declares his sense in the Page before cited, saying, "That "tho all the Fathers assert the Singularity of the Godhead, "or the numerical Unity of the Divine Essence, yet they "do not assert such a numerical Unity, as there is where there "is but one Person as well as one Essence; but such a numerical "Unity as there is between three who are ὁμοούσιοι, of the "very same Nature, but are not merely united by a specifick Unity, but by an essential Union; I suppose he rather means an ‖ *Unity* of *singular Essence*, and therefore are *Three* and *One*, three in *Hypostasis* and one in *Essence.*

What the Doctor next offers by way of Argument, does not in effect oppose what I assert; but only there's a little disagreement in words, which is easily reconcil'd. The *Nicene* Fathers, says he, in way of opposition to this Doctrine of *Arius*, that the *Son* or *Word* was not ἑτεροούσιος nor ἀλλοτριοούσιος but ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ, *co-essential* or *consubstantial with the Father*; that is, not a *Creature* but *God*, or agreeing with the Father in that *common Nature* or *Essence* of the Godhead. So that this is that οὐσία, *Essence* or *Substance* of the antient Fathers, which is said to be the same in all the *three Hypostases* of the *Trinity*, as they are call'd *God*; not a *singular existent Essence* (by which 'tis plain he means *Hypostasis*, and so I agree with him) but the *common, general* or *universal Essence* of the Godhead, or of the *uncreated* Nature, call'd

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* P. 121. † Ἰσέον δὲ, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν διαφερόντων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἀριθμεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ μηδὲν διαφέροντα· καθ' ὃ δὲ διαφέρουσι, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀριθμεῖσθαι. Dam. l. 3. c. 8.

‖ *The Word* Union *implying a Composition, and that of pre-existent Parts, and therefore not so proper in this case as* Unity: *accordingly is it observ'd by* Petavius, *that the* Greek *Fathers rather chose to express themselves by* ἑνότης *than* ἕνωσις.

by

by St. *Hilary*, * *one Nature not by Unity of Perſon, but of Kind*; which Unity, ſays he, of the *common* or *general* Eſſence of the Godhead, is the ſame thing alſo with that *Equality* which ſome antient Fathers ſo much inſiſt upon againſt *Arius*, namely an *Equality* of Nature, as the Son and Father are both of 'em alike God; that Eſſence of the Godhead, which is *common* to all the *three Perſons*, being, as all other Eſſences, ſuppos'd to be *indiviſible*. From which Equality it ſelf, again ſays he, alſo does it appear, that they acknowledg'd no *Identity* of *ſingular Eſſence* (that is, he means again of *Hypoſtaſis*, and ſo again we are agreed) it being abſurd to ſay that one and the ſelf-ſame thing is equal to it ſelf. I grant it is ſo; and therefore don't maintain that *one Eſſence* as ſuch, but *one Divine Hypoſtaſis* as ſuch, tho having *one* and the *ſame common* Eſſence, is *equal* to another. In the † Concluſion of this Head he ſtill ſeems right as to the *thing*, tho he fail in Terms; while he would have it, that the Fathers oppos'd *numerical Sameneſs* to *common*, as Terms inconſiſtent or incompoſſible; (by which former however he meant Hypoſtaſis, and ſo his inward Senſe was right.) And again, having ſaid *common Eſſence*, he paraphraſes on it, as uſually, by *generical* and *ſpecifical*; which Terms, as I have noted, are too wide and looſe, and ſuch as the Fathers never us'd in this caſe according to the true logical ſenſe of 'em.

But for this again the Doctor goes on ſtill to argue from the ‖ words of *Athanaſius* cited at large, but the Subſtance whereof lies in theſe that follow: " He who affirmeth that " the Son is not ſo of God, as a Man is of a Man, accor- " ding to Eſſence or Subſtance; but that he is like him only " as a Statue is like a Man, or as a Man may be like to God; " it is manifeſt that ſuch a one, tho he uſe the word *Homo-* " *ouſios*, yet doth not really mean it. Where, ſays the Doc- " tor, we ſee plainly that tho the word *Homoouſios* be inter-

* Natura una, non Unitate Perſonæ, ſed Generis. *De Synod.*

† Intel. Syſt. *p.* 608.

‖ Εἰ ὃ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ ὐσίαν, ὁμοιώματι γοῦν πατρὸς ἀνδρείας ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὡς ἄνθρωπος Θεῷ, δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁμοούσιον μὲν λέγων, ὁμοούσιον δὲ οὐ φρονῶν. In Fragm. contra Hypocriſ. Miletii. Int. Syſt. *p.* 609, &c.

" preted that which hath *one and the ſame Eſſence* or *Sub-*
" *ſtance*, yet is this underſtood of the ſame common Nature,
" and as one Man is of the ſame Eſſence or Subſtance with
" another. *Anſw.* All this I grant; and what follows from it? Not that the Divine Eſſence is a *ſpecifical Nature*, nor conſequently that the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* are *Eſſences numerically differing* from each other. However I allow this *Similitude* ſo far, as St. *Athanaſius* and the other Fathers ever meant it; that is, to denote a *real Diſtinction*, and at once the Divinity of the *three Hypoſtaſes*; which in theſe reſpects, almoſt as Individuals, are diſtinct from each other, and co-equal in Nature and Perfection. But beyond this, ſo far were the Fathers from endeavouring by this Inſtance to make a yet wider Interval between the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, that rather, agreeably to what I ſaid before, they deſign'd it ſecondarily, as an Argument drawn *a minore ad majus*, at once to ſhew that they were *one numerical ſingular Nature*. For thus they ſuppos'd it; " If ſeveral *individual Men* could not properly
" be ſaid to have more than one Nature, much leſs could this
" be ſaid of the three Divine Perſons; which are merely
" diſtinguiſh'd from one another and no more, and therefore
" muſt have a greater Unity of Nature than ſuch as are not
" only diſtinguiſh'd, but alſo divided from one another by a
" ſeparate Exiſtence: and what is this greater Unity, but what we term a numerical? And therefore, ſays * *Petavius*, *the Fathers did not hereby intend to aſſert the very ſame Unity in the Divine Perſons, which is in human Individuals; but by the compariſon of this, to point at a much ſurer and ſtraiter Unity in them.*

But further, ſays the Doctor, we might here alſo add to this the concurrent Teſtimonys of the other orthodox Fathers, but to avoid Tediouſneſs we ſhall omit them, and only inſert ſome Paſſages out of St. *Auſtin* to the ſame purpoſe.

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* Hæc Ratio ad ſimilitudinem tantummodo valet, non ad proprietatem: quâ uſos eſſe ſcimus Hilarium, Auguſtinum & alios Patres; non ut ejuſmodi in Divinis Perſonis Unitatem aſtruerent: ſed ut comparatione hujus, quæ tam diverſis in Individuis cernitur, multò in illis certiorem & arctiorem monſtrarent. *De Trin. l.* 4. *c.* 9. *p.* 226. *col.* 2.

Anſw.

Anſw. He might, I think, as well have let this alone too, all that he alledges proving juſt nothing to the purpoſe he drives at, namely, that the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* are *three diſtinct numerical Eſſences*; only, as I ſaid, it upholds what it was intended to do, a *real Diſtinction* and an *Equality* between 'em; which in this caſe do not exclude a Singularity of 'em in *Eſſence*, tho this be common; nay what he laſt quotes from St. *Auſtin* (unleſs he ſuppoſes him to have held more than one God) methinks very plainly declares it: " * If the Son be not a " Creature, then is he of the ſame Subſtance with the Fa- " ther; for whatever Subſtance is not God is Creature, and " whatever is not Creature is God. And therefore if the Son " be not of the ſame Subſtance with the Father, he muſt needs " be a made and created Subſtance, and not truly God. What the Doctor adds † of the Fathers rejecting ταυτοούσιον and μονοούσιον, has been before anſwer'd: this was done, leſt either of theſe Terms ſhould ſeem to imply an *Identity* of *Hypoſtaſis*, which here again he expreſly confounds with *ſingular individual Eſſence*, and thence infers, that to aſſert this would be downright *Sabellianiſm:* with which however the preſent Church would think it very hard to be charg'd, or with holding any thing really contradictory to what the orthodox Fathers held, notwithſtanding that they aſſerted the former; they ſtill maintaining the ὁμοούσιον and a *Community* of Nature in the *Hypoſtaſes*, agreeably to what *Athanaſius* ſays of the antient Catholick Church: " || That it neither " believ'd leſs than this Homoouſian Trinity, leſt it ſhould " comply with *Judaiſm* or ſink into *Sabellianiſm*; nor yet " more than this, leſt on the other hand it ſhould tumble down " into *Arianiſm*, which is the ſame with Pagan Polytheiſm " and Idolatry: it introducing in like manner the Worſhip " of Creatures together with the Creator. Next whereas the Doctor aſſerts, " ** That tho this *Homoouſiotes* or *Co-*

* Si Filius Creatura non eſt, ejuſdem cum Patre Subſtantiæ eſt: Omnis enim Subſtantia, quæ Deus non eſt, Creatura eſt, &c. *De Trin. l.* 1. Cud. Int. Syſt. *p.* 610, 611. † P. 611.

|| Οὔτε ἔλαττόν τι φρονεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὸς παλαι καιάφαν Ιυδαίυς καὶ εἰς Σαβέλλιον ὀλισθήσῃ, &c. Ad Serap. Ep. ** P. 612.

" *eſſentiality* of the *three Perſons* in the *Trinity* does imply " them to be all *God*, yet does it not follow from thence of " neceſſity, that they are therefore *one God*. *Anſw.* What then, is the Godhead a *Species*, a mere *ſecond Notion?* The truth of that Aſſertion I flatly deny: if the Perſons are *Homoouſious* in the Godhead, they are neceſſarily *one God*, becauſe God is but *one*. If he ask me *how* they are *one God*, I am not bound to anſwer him. Whoever attempts to *explain* this, having no Scripture Light to guide him, cannot but expoſe himſelf. And * what he quotes from St. *Athanaſius* as endeavouring to do it, is only urg'd by that Father a little to illuſtrate, not explain the *Unity* of the *Trinity*; and in way of Argument runs, I ſay again, only *a minore ad majus*. It muſt be conſider'd that this great Man, when having appear'd as a *real Trinitarian*, was provok'd by Hereticks to clear himſelf from *Tritheiſm*; accordingly in his Book concerning the *common Eſſence of the three Perſons*, he entitles one Chapter, † *that there are not three Gods*. And this ſhews enough for my purpoſe, however his *Words* are repreſented, that he *believ'd* one numerical Eſſence of the Godhead, he calling it alſo ‖ *the Holy Monad*, and ſaying, ** that *the Son and the Father are one thing in the Propriety of Nature, and in the Sameneſs of one Godhead.* Neither from which words (with Dr. *Cudworth*'s good leave) nor yet from the Context can it be drawn, that *Athanaſius* here expreſly meant a *Sameneſs* of *common*, or, as the †† Doctor will word it, of *generick* or *ſpecifick Eſſence*, but of *ſingular* and *numerical*; tho indeed I grant, that he at once held this ſame Eſſence to be *common* in reference to the *Divine Hypoſtaſes*. In ſhort, he tells us again in his *Expoſition of Faith*: " ‖‖ Neither do we acknowledg three Hypoſta- " ſes divided or ſeparate by themſelves, as is to be ſeen cor- " poreally in Men, that we may not comply with the Pagan

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* P. 613, &c. † Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ τρεῖς θεοί.

‖ Τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα. In Ep. ad Serap.

** Ἓν εἰσὶν ὁμοῦ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τῇ ἰδιότητι καὶ οἰκειότητι τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος. In Orat. quartâ. †† P. 615.

‖‖ Οὔτε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις μεμερισμένας καθ' ἑαυτὰς, ὥσπερ σωματικῶς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ λογίσασθαι, ἵνα μὴ πλυθείαν, ὡς τὰ ἔθνη φρονήσωμεν.

" Poly-

" Polytheiſm. But according to him, *the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghoſt is God, and yet they are not three Gods, but one God*; which yet they could not be, were they not one numerical Eſſence or Subſtance, however diſtinguiſh'd between themſelves. And all that * Dr. *Cudworth* advances further *ſeemingly* to the contrary, only proves that *Athanaſius* was neither a *Sabellian* nor *Arian*, as unqueſtionably holding a *common Nature* of the Godhead in three diſtinct Hypoſtaſes. I only add, touching what he would draw from † *Similys* us'd by this Father to denote the *Unity* of the *Trinity*, as namely when he compares the *Father* and the *Son* to *Water* and the *Vapor* ariſing from it, to the original *Light* or *Sun* and its ſecondary *Splendor*, to the *Prototype* and the *Image*, the *Fountain* and the *Stream*, the *Root* and the *Stock* and *Branches* of a Tree, *&c.* Touching theſe, I ſay, that they, like other *Similitudes*, *do not walk on four-feet*, that is, they are lame and ought to be underſtood looſely and only in ſome reſpect; and thus however 'tis own'd, they do indeed give ſome intimation of what they were deſign'd to do, that is, of an *Equality* in Nature and Perfection, and at once of the Father's being *Fons Deitatis*, the *Spring* as it were of the *Godhead*, and ſo *Auctoritate* or *quoad Principium greater* than the *Son* and *Holy Ghoſt*. But beyond this they are not to be ſtrain'd, as if deſign'd in all other reſpects for exact Parallels; and therefore beſides what has been before hinted to this purpoſe, I can't with || Dr. *Bull* but think all thoſe in the wrong, who look on 'em as any more than Illuſtrations or Hints of that myſterious and inexplicable Doctrine; and particularly in the preſent caſe, who argue the *numerical* Diverſity of *Eſſence* between the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* from what is between created things, which tho in other reſpects they have been offer'd by the Antients in way of compariſon, yet were not intended by 'em for that purpoſe, or to denote any more than a *Community* of Nature; which yet they never

* P. 614, 615. † P. 616, 617, 618, *&c.*

|| Verum iniqui prorſus mihi ſemper viſi ſunt, qui Similia ad illuſtrandum utcunque Divinæ Generationis inenarrabile Myſterium, a veteribus adhibita, ita ad vivum reſecant. *In Def. Fid. Nic. p.* 170. *col.* 2. Ed. Grab.

meant

meant *in the Godhead*, as exclusive of a *numerical Unity*. However I own, that both they, and especially Dr. *Cudworth* in his Account of 'em, have us'd some loose Terms, *specifical* and sometimes *generical* instead of *common*, and *numerical Essence* instead of *Hypostasis*; and in this sense 'twas the Scope of this latter to shew, that the antient Fathers were not *nominal* or *modal* Trinitarians, but held *three real Essences*, not one *Essence* or *Hypostasis* in the Godhead: but making an allowance for this mistake of Words (supposing the Fathers to have mistaken 'em so far and so often as the Doctor has done for 'em) I do not find but that their inward Sense was right and orthodox, and indeed no other than what the present Church, tho taught by the Experience of this and former Ages to be more cautious in words, does to this day believe and confess: namely, that these three, *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* are God; and yet withal that there is but one *singular individual God*; by consequence that there is a real *Trinity* in *Unity*, and that at once a *numerical Unity* of *Nature* and *Essence*, and so without a *Tritheism*. In short then I say of the antient Fathers, or rather of Dr. *Cudworth* as giving an account of 'em, what *Gregory Nyssen* has said of *Eunomius*, when terming the three Divine *Persons* three *Essences*: * *If*, says he, *he so understand a Distinction of Essences as to exclude the Impiety of* Sabellius, *who accommodated only three Names to one Subject*; *then would he himself and all other pious Men readily agree and shake hands with him*; *tho in Words and Expression he seems to be out, as using Essence instead of Hypostasis.*

And now having thus far examin'd, and, as I hope, in some measure rectify'd and clear'd the Doctor's Account of the antient Fathers, as touching their Doctrine of a *Trinity* in *Unity*, I come next to say something of the Doctor in Person, as I'm apt to believe he has suffer'd very much on this occasion, from some who have not or would not understand

* Εἰ μὲν ὄν ὅπω λέγει τὴν τῶν ὑπῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας διαφορὰν, ὡς μὴ δοκεῖν τῇ ἀσεβείᾳ τῦ Σαβελλίυ συμφέρεσθαι, ἑνὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τρεῖς ἐφαρμόζοντος προσηγορίας, καὶ ἡμεῖς συνησόμεθα καὶ ὑδεὶς τῶν εὐσεβούντων ἀντιλέγει τῷ δόγματι, &c. P. 67. B.

him;

him; while in giving an account of the *Platonick*, and thereupon of the *Chriſtian Triad*, he appears indeed overfond of ſome improper Terms, and then plauſibly ſets off and argues for ſome Points, which are ſeemingly erroneous; and has thence been concluded himſelf to be Heterodox in *Judgment*. Of this (to omit what is daily toſs'd about in Converſation) I ſhall produce ſome Inſtances from what has undergone the Preſs, and enquire a little into the Juſtice of them. And for this the way is in a great meaſure already prepar'd, we having before ſeen, that the Doctor's chief Failure has been in the miſapplication of Words; and now to make this yet plainer, I think fit to premiſe theſe Obſervations: Firſt, that the Doctor's main Deſign in all his large Diſcourſe from *p.* I may ſay 192 to *p.* 632 of the *Intellectual Syſtem* (whatever elſe is included in that ſpace coming in only by way of Digreſſion) was to prove that the Heathens, notwithſtanding they were *Polytheiſts* and Worſhippers of *many Gods*, yet were at once univerſally *Monotheiſts* or Worſhippers of *one ſupreme God*; and among the reſt, particularly that the genuine *Platoniſts* (from *p.* 546 to 601) who held a Triad of Divine Hypoſtaſes, were likewiſe ſuch, and held but *one Divinity*. Whence I conclude, that as in general he allow'd of no ſuch thing as a Belief of more co-ordinate Gods, ſo likewiſe in particular he could not * mean the Divine *Hypoſtaſes* (aſſerted by the *Platoniſts*) to have only a *ſpecifical Unity* of Eſſence, according as the Term *ſpecifical* imports, when apply'd to other things. Secondly, by conſequence that 'twas not his Intention to declare his own Sentiment, but firſt that of the *Platoniſts* as touching a *Trinity* in *Unity*, and next that of the *Nicene* Fathers, as therein agreeing with 'em: and ſo it is by accident only if he drop any thing as from himſelf, or by which one may gueſs at his own Opinion; unleſs as it may be preſum'd in general, that his Faith was the ſame with that of the antient orthodox Fathers, and that accordingly it ſquar'd with the Account he has given us of that. Otherwiſe I find him very ſparing in uttering expreſly his own private Sentiment: and this, I believe, can hardly

* *And ſo indeed he expreſly ſays* p. 590. *at the top.*

be

be drawn from much that he has in Perſon declar'd; but muſt chiefly be infer'd from the advantageous Deſcription of and the plauſible Turn he gives to this or that Notion of others, from his collateral Apologys and Illuſtrations of it, and his having a fling now and then at the contrary, or at leaſt from his not finding fault with and condemning it, when 'tis ſuch as appears to be heterodox and falſe. Wherefore the Caſe being ſo, 'twill in the next place be eaſy to ſee what Judgment may reaſonably and equitably be made either for or againſt him.

Now the Doctor being indeed a profeſs'd and reſolute *Trinitarian*, has, from his manner of Expreſſion, been taken by many for a *Tritheiſt*; under which Character, as he may be liable to be cenſur'd by the Orthodox, ſo for the ſame reaſon may he be alſo applauded by the Heterodox, as tending to expoſe and undermine the true Faith, and propagate the Error of the *Antitrinitarians*. Accordingly in fact has he been more than ſuſpected by ſome of the former, tho I'm perſuaded, if rightly underſtood, his inward Senſe and theirs would not at all differ; and the latter, thro a like miſtake of his own private Opinion, for what he only delivers as that of others, or rather from ſome improper Terms, by which he would utter their Meaning and ſometimes his own, * do gladly embrace the *Learned* Dr. *Cudworth*, that *great Philoſopher and Divine*, as they very pleaſingly and feelingly ſtile him, at leaſt as an accidental, tho not a deſign'd and real Friend; while from the Account which he gives of a *Trinity*, as held by the *Platoniſts* and Fathers of the Church, they conclude both them and himſelf by the way, as appearing to abet and favour their Sentiment, to be indeed *Tritheiſts*, and in no other ſenſe *Trinitarians*: and that ſo in effect, as † *Curcellæus* before him had *expreſly* done, he ſerves their purpoſe; they readily inferring, that if the *Nicene* Fathers eſpecially, and ſo great a Doctor, or at leaſt *they* by themſelves, accor-

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* *As may be ſeen in* Conſiderations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity, *and among others, of* Dr. Cudworth's, *beginning at* p. 13.

† Curcel. de Vocib. Trin. §. 70. *See his Arguments confuted by Bp* Stillingfleet *in* Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 77, *&c.*

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ding to *him*, instead of *Trinitarians* were real *Tritheists*, there is just ground from *Reason* and *Scripture*, tho in opposition to so great human Testimonys, to reject such a *Trinity*, and barely to hold the *Unity* of the Godhead. Wherefore I say, that having already given satisfaction touching the Fathers and the Doctor's Account of 'em, it now remains that I justify and clear, so far as may be, the Doctor himself from the Imputation of *Tritheism*.

1. He is charg'd from various Quarters with asserting or holding * the *Father*, *Son* and *Holy Ghost* to be *three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits*, and by consequence *three Gods*. *Answ.* But from what can this be drawn? From what, I say, that he represented this even as the Opinion of others; and from what especially, that he declar'd it as his own? In short, if he any where said or meant this, it was *besides*, nay *contrary* to his main Design and Drift, which was to assert the *Unity* of the Godhead, as held by the *Platonists* and Fathers, notwithstanding their *Triad* of Divine *Hypostases*; with which I can't but own, that the Doctrine of *three infinite Spirits* in the *Godhead* can no way consist: and surely 'twould have been a most unhappy Blunder, if the Doctor intending to vindicate Mankind, and particularly the Heathen *Polytheists* and *Trinitarians* from the Charge of *Tritheism* or holding a *Plurality of Gods*, he himself by the way fix'd the very same upon the best of Men and Christians, and such as were undoubted Monotheists; as unhappy, as if while designing to confute, he unwittingly (as † another expressly charges him, of whom more anon) gave a handle to *Atheism*. But moreover, as he could not *design*, so neither by *accident* has he once said this, whether in his own or the Person of others; nor in short, did he ever mean it. Whence I can't but particularly wonder at one Writer's Confidence, who, as will be

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* *In* Judgment of a disinterested Person concerning the Controversy about the Blessed Trinity, depending between Dr. *S—th* and Dr. *Sherlock*, p. 7. *In* Discourse concerning the Nominal and real Trinitarians, *p.* 27. *col.* 2. Nye *in* Institutions concerning the Holy Trinity, *p.* 17, &c. *and in* Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, *p.* 186, &c. *And in other Writers.*

† *Monsieur* Bayle.

ſeen more hereafter, firſt makes the Doctor ſpeak what he pleaſes, and then falls a laſhing him for Error and Heterodoxy: As for inſtance, "* That Dr. *Cudworth* in oppoſition "to that Council, that is the *Lateran* held in the Year "1215, deſcribes the Divine Perſons to be Νόες *Minds*, and "Πνεύματα *Spirits*. Whereas I affirm in the firſt place, that the Doctor never uſes theſe *Words* either in his own Perſon or upon this occaſion, nor, as I have ſaid, even *means*, and much leſs openly *deſcribes* the *Perſons* of the Godhead, to be what is denoted by the Import of them. And ſecondly I ſay, that neither in the Perſon of others does he at all uſe the latter *Greek* or *Engliſh* Word, and the former of 'em but in one only Paſſage (tho this indeed be cited or hinted by † him thrice) at leaſt upon this occaſion, he telling us that *Amelius*, a Contemporary with *Plotinus*, and who is ſaid to have taken notice of what St. *John* the Evangeliſt had written concerning the *Logos*, as agreeing with the *Platonick* and *Pythagorick* Hypotheſis; that he, I ſay, *making a threefold Demiurgus or Opifex of the World, call'd 'em three Minds and three Kings*, &c. Upon which words *Proclus* (whom however neither did the Doctor look on to be a genuine *Platoniſt*) thus commenteth: ‖ Amelius *therefore ſuppoſeth theſe three Minds and Demiurgick Principles of his to be both the ſame with* Plato's *three Kings, and* Orpheus's *Trinity of* Phanes, Uranus *and* Chronus, *&c.* But this Language after all, tho ſomewhat excuſable in a Heathen, yet is ſuch as I'm ſure, and it will hereafter appear, that Dr. *Cudworth* did, and all true Believers can't but abominate. Not but I own, that in the Perſon of others and on other occaſions the Doctor does indeed ‖‖ frequently uſe the word Νόες or *Minds*, I ſay, in the Perſon of others, that is, of *Platoniſts*, yet whom he did not look on as genuine neither; as namely, not to *deſcribe* their Divine Hypoſtaſes, but to denote a ſort of Θεοὶ νοεροὶ or νοητοὶ, *intellectual* or *intelligible Gods*,

* Nye *in* Inſtitutions concerning the Holy Trinity, *p.* 17.

† Ἀμέλιος δὲ τρίτον ποιεῖ τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ νῦς τρεῖς, βασιλεῖς τρεῖς, &c. P. 305. *The ſame again mention'd at* p. 547, and 583.

‖ Τέτυς ὖν τὰς τρεῖς νόας καὶ δημιεργὰς ὑποτίθεται καὶ τὰς ὑφ' τῷ Πλάτωνι ἱερὰς βασιλέας καὶ τὰς παρ' Ορφεῖ ἱερὰς, Φανῆτα καὶ Ὠυρανον καὶ Κρόνον. Int. Syſt. p. 306. ‖‖ *As at* p. 555, 556, *&c.* 564, 568, *&c.*

otherwiſe

otherwiſe term'd αὐλοσοφίαι, which he looks on as the *Figments* of ſome ſpurious modern *Platoniſts*, as being fancy'd by them (diſagreeably to *Plato*'s true Doctrine) to be in great numbers either in or about their firſt *Mind* or ſecond Hypoſtaſis, and to be participated and created *Minds*, but yet ſuperior to the univerſal *Mind*; as alſo infinite *Henades* or *Agathotetes* were thus ſuppos'd by them to belong to the firſt *Monad* or *Good*: both which Fictions Dr. *Cudworth* does upon many accounts find fault with and explode. However upon this firſt Arreſt, the aforeſaid Writer goes on to proſecute the Doctor yet further, telling us poſitively, * That *he among others as much meant three Gods, as any Pagan ever did*; and will allow him no better Society or Rank among *Chriſtians*, than that of *Philoponus*, who, as *Nicephorus* tells us, of old *divided the indiviſible Nature of God into three Individuals, as among Men*, and ſo held no other than a *collective* or *ſpecifical Unity* of the Godhead; and of *Abbot Joachim*, who in the middle Ages did much the ſame; and of *Valentinus Gentilis* and *Genebrard*, who alſo in late times have held ſomething like it; the former aſſerting the Divine *Hypoſtaſes* to be *three Spirits of different Order, Degree and Subſtance*; the latter, tho not denying them to be *equal*, yet maintaining them alſo to be *three diſtinct Individuals, eternal Spirits or Minds*. All which, in reference to Dr. *Cudworth*, I affirm to be mere Buffoonry, and what this Accuſer can never prove: not that I'm inclin'd or think my ſelf bound to plead for the Doctor, where he is truly blamable; as I can't indeed deny but that he is in this, while in accounting for the Doctrine of the *Platoniſts* and *Fathers*, he takes much pains, which I'm perſuaded he might have better ſpar'd, to ſhew how the latter eſpecially, upon ſome occaſions extraordinary, expreſs'd their ſenſe of a *Trinity* in *Unity*; and ſo indeed reviv'd ſome Terms, which tho well-meant by them at the firſt, yet are not altogether proper, and very probably occaſion'd the Errors of the Perſons laſt nam'd; which therefore the Church long ago (as the Fathers themſelves would undoubtedly have done, had they foreſeen or liv'd to ſee the ill conſe-

* Nye *in* Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, *p.* 189.

quence of them) thought fit to alter, for prevention of the like for the future.

2 *Object.* But ſtill it is ſaid, that whatever the Doctor's *words* were, ſurely his *meaning* was *Tritheiſtick*, ſeeing * he aſſerts *three diſtinct Subſtances* in the *Godhead*, by which as they muſt be *ſpiritual*, *'tis unqueſtionable that he underſtood three Spirits and three Minds, and* by conſequence *three Gods. Anſw.* Again I ſay, 'tis falſe that Dr. *Cudworth* ever aſſerted *three diſtinct Subſtances* in the Godhead, at leaſt in his own name; and even where he ſeems to do it in that of others, as ſomewhere indeed (tho rarely) he does, yet muſt this be underſtood in a qualify'd ſenſe, according as he and they may be in reaſon ſuppos'd to have meant, and agreeably to the Tenor of their Doctrine elſewhere: as for inſtance when he tells us, "† That "the three *Platonick* Hypoſtaſes ſeem to be nothing elſe but "infinite *Goodneſs*, infinite *Wiſdom*, and infinite active *Love* "and *Power*, not as mere *Qualitys* or *Accidents*, but as *ſub-* "*ſtantial* things, *&c.* all concurring together to make up "one Θεῖον or Divinity. Here 'tis obſervable, that he does not ſay out *Subſtances*, but only *ſubſtantial things*, which he very well might in oppoſition to *Modes* or *Accidents*; and thereby only implies, that, according to the *Platoniſts*, they were three diſtinct *Subſiſtences*, making however but *one Divine Subſtance* or God; τὸ Θεῖον, according to them, ſignifying, as was before noted, the *one ſupreme God.* And what again if he tells us || elſewhere plainly, that *from three Divine Attributes, infinite Goodneſs, infinite Wiſdom, and infinite active Power, the* Pythagoreans *and* Platoniſts *ſeem to have fram'd their Trinity of Archical Hypoſtaſes, ſuch as have the nature of Principles in the Univerſe, and which they apprehend as ſeveral diſtinct Subſtances*, &c? Here in like manner muſt we take the word *Subſtances* according to the ſenſe in which he and they here certainly meant it, rather than that in which it is commonly taken by others. Now methinks the Doctor in

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* Judgment of a diſintereſted Perſon, *&c. in the place before cited*; *and frequently in* Conſiderations on Dr. *Cudworth*'s Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, *&c.* † P. 591, *and to the ſame purpoſe* p. 600, 601.

|| P. 206. *toward the bottom.*

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the firſt place terming the Hypoſtaſes three Divine *Attributes*, agreeably to the mind of thoſe Philoſophers, implies 'em not to be three abſolute diſtinct *Subſtances*, according to the ordinary Import of this word, and upon the ſuppoſition that the Godhead is impartible; which again is more plain from what follows (eſpecially conſidering that it is otherwiſe moſt certain that they held but one individual, independent and uncreated God) that notwithſtanding this, *they extend the* τὸ θεῖον *ſo far, as to comprehend them all within it*, that is, to be *one Divine Subſtance* or God; ſtill they meant 'em, as before, to be indeed *ſubſtantial things*, but which are not ſo properly term'd *Subſtances* as *Subſiſtences*: and therefore the Doctor elſewhere granting this to be their inward meaning (and this at leaſt ſhews enough for my purpoſe what his own meaning was) * often corrects their Language, and calls 'em more agreeably to Chriſtian Ears, *Hypoſtaſes*, *Subſiſtences* or *Perſons*.

3 *Object.* But ſtill, you'll ſay, all this is but trifling about Words; the Doctor himſelf moſt certainly meant the *thing*, whether he ſpoke out *three Subſtances* or not, and that's enough: this plainly follows from his † ſaying to this purpoſe, that the Divine Hypoſtaſes were not held by the antient Fathers to have *one numerical Eſſence* or *Subſtance*; by conſequence they were held to have more, that is to ſay three ſeveral *Subſtances*. *Anſw.* This is the Doctor's meaning, that the three Divine Hypoſtaſes were not held by them to be indeed but one Hypoſtaſis, he conſtantly making, as I obſerv'd, numerical or ſingular Eſſence ſynonymous to Hypoſtaſis; but to have a common Eſſence or Subſtance, which yet is not excluſive of ſingular Subſtance. And here again it is very remarkable, that the Doctor all along very cautiouſly avoids the naming out of this Conſequence, and omits the word *Subſtances* in the Plural (tho ‖ he ſays indeed that *Subſtance* in the ſingular, and in reference to the Godhead, *was us'd by the Fathers as ſynonymous with Eſſence*) from which we may reaſonably preſume, that therefore he did not mean them.

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* P. 550, 559, 579, 592, 594, *&c.* † P. 601, *&c.* ‖ Ib.

4 *Object.*

4 *Object.* Mean them, you'll ſay; and what elſe could he mean by *three Eſſences* in the Godhead, which he all along aſſerts, but three diſtinct Subſtances? *Anſw.* He does indeed expreſly aſſert *three Eſſences* in the Godhead, and ſeems too fond of the Epithets *individual*, *ſingular* and *numerical*, as added to them; I ſay, too fond of theſe Epithets, becauſe improper in this Caſe, and not agreeable even to his own inward Senſe: he really meaning, I ſay, as was before abundantly ſhewn, his three numerical, ſingular or individual Eſſences of the Godhead to be no other than what he terms *exiſtent Eſſences*, which is his own Definition of *Hypoſtaſes*, and ſo intending to imply no more than three real *Subſiſtences*, not *Subſtances* (which would indeed ſeem more emphatically to intimate three Individuals) in the Godhead; and in that ſenſe underſtanding that neither did the Fathers hold the Bleſſed Trinity to have but *one numerical Subſtance*, that is to ſay *Hypoſtaſis*, but *three*.

5 *Object.* What then you'll ſay, that allowing a real Diverſity of Hypoſtaſes, the Doctor ſtill aſſerted *one and the ſame numerical Eſſence* and *Subſtance* of the Godhead, in which they all agree and are united? *Anſw.* No, I do not ſay that he directly aſſerted, yet however that undoubtedly he muſt have meant this.

6 *Object.* Why then, you'll ſay, did he ſo frequently call the *Eſſence* of the Godhead, in which the *Hypoſtaſes* agree, *ſpecifical*, nay *generical*? *Anſw.* Theſe Terms were not ſo much intended to expreſs the *Unity* or what the Godhead was in it ſelf, as rather they were apply'd, and that too ſomewhat looſly by the Fathers and the Doctor, to denote the *Community* of it to *Three*, as alſo at once the real Diſtinction, yet Equality of theſe three; and this is all that can be made of thoſe Terms as us'd by the one or the other. Accordingly, as we have ſeen, whenever they come to be open'd in their true meaning, or as when apply'd in other Caſes, then the Doctor no longer ſtands to 'em, they plainly inferring, as he more than once owns, a downright *Tritheiſm*, from which as well the *Platoniſts* and Fathers, as alſo himſelf, were highly abhorrent.

7 *Object.* How then could he ſay, that the D. Hypoſtaſes are

as

as * *diverſe and diſtinct as three Angels or three Men, and as* Peter, James *and* John? *Anſw.* He never has once ſaid or meant this, and it is only ſaid for him by others. Indeed he brings in ſome of the Fathers, as uſing that Compariſon; but then he thinks that St. *Cyril* and others (of whom more anon) do carry it too far in point of Diſtinction, there being in this Inſtance a real Separation; and approves of it no further (and indeed it was intended no further) than as it barely gives an Intimation, that the Divine Hypoſtaſes are really diſtinguiſh'd, tho not ſever'd, and are co-equal in Nature and Perfections, even as three Men.

8 *Object.* What then you'll have it that the Doctor held an *Equality* of the Divine Hypoſtaſes? *Anſw.* Yes, I will ſo: that is, tho not in this ſenſe, as they are Hypoſtaſes, and as ſuch ſtand diſtinguiſh'd from each other, yet however as to their *Materia ſubſtrata* (if I may ſo ſpeak) they being equally God, or rather one and the ſame Subſtance of the Deity.

9 *Object.* But no, you'll ſay, " † He plainly reviv'd the Er-
" rors of *Valentinus Gentilis* concerning the Trinity, and
" wholly agreeing with him, will have only the Father to be
" truly and properly God: || That the Doctor was *mollis*
" *Arianus* a moderate *Arian*, in that again he deſires to
" diſtinguiſh his Explication from all others of the Moderns
" by this Mark, that it alloweth not the three Perſons to be
" in any reſpect, but Duration, co-equal; nay, tho he
" ſaith, that the Son and Spirit are alſo eternal, yet he can-
" not deny but that there muſt be ſome Priority of the Fa-
" ther, as the Fountain, Principle and Cauſe, before the Son
" and Spirit as Effects: That he particularly inſtanceth the

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* Conſiderations on Explications, *&c.* p. 14. col. 1. Diſcourſe of Nom. and Real Trinitarians, *p.* 27. *col.* 2.

† Nye *in* Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, *p.* 19. *and in* Inſtitutions concerning the Holy Trinity, *p.* 15. *In* Judgment of a diſintereſted Perſon concerning the Controverſy about the B. Trinity depending, *&c.* p. 7.

|| Conſiderations on Explications, *&c.* p. 18. col. 2. p. 14. col. 1. p. 19. col. 1. *and* Diſcourſe of Nominal and Real Trinitar. *p.* 27. *col.* 2. *tho the Author of this latter juſt after contradicts himſelf, as reckoning* Dr. Cudworth *among thoſe who ſay, that Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt are three* infinite *Spirits, three omniſcient Minds.*

" Infe-

" * Inferiority of the Son and Spirit to the firſt Perſon or " the Father in Dignity, and in Authority, and in Power, " and ſays that only the Father is Almighty *ad intra* or really " Almighty, and ſo the Son and Spirit are impotent: That " theſe are God, Omnipotent and the other Divine Attri- " butes, but only by the Father's Concurrence with them, " and their Subordination and Subjection to him; they are " not omnipotent *ad intra* or of themſelves, but only by " means of the Father's Concurrence; in which ſenſe there " is no Creature, but what may be ſaid to be Omnipotent " and God: nay that the Doctor is very ſharp upon ſome of " the Fathers, as teaching an implicit Tritheiſm, becauſe " they ſaid three Divine Perſons are equal in Power " and all other Divine Perfections; it follows, ſaith Dr. " *Cudworth*, that they are three Gods: The true Doctrine " is, that the Father only is omnipotent *ad intra*, and hath ſo " much the ſole Authority, that the other two Divine Perſons " are wholly dependent on him; and thereby tho the Son is " a God and the Holy Spirit a God, yet only the Father is " God κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or God by way of Excellence: And adds " expreſly †, that if the Perſons were co-ordinate, that is, " equal in Authority, Dignity or Power, they ſhould not be " one, but three Gods. *Anſw.* I am ſo amaz'd at the extra-vagant Injuſtice of theſe Imputations, that I can hardly with Patience make any reply to 'em! What a huddle of ſpurious ungenuine Stuff (and much more might be cited from our *London-Unitarians* and their Journymen Scriblers) is here laid at Dr. *Cudworth*'s door, which, were he now alive, he would utterly diſown and kick away! How inſolently is he affirm'd for the moſt part to have *expreſly ſaid*, what he never once ſaid either in his own or even in the Perſon of others, whether *Platoniſts* or Fathers, and was very far from ever meaning! It would not be unjuſt (tho perhaps it might be thought ill manners) to return all this in its proper coin, and to make ſhort work with it by giving it the lye. How-

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* Conſiderat. on Explicat. *p.* 17. *col.* 2. Judgment of a diſintereſted Perſon, *&c.* p. 7, 8. Nye's Doctrine of the Trinity, *p.* 186.

† Conſiderat. *p* 14. *col.* 2.

ever,

ever, becauſe we are enter'd into a diſpute, I will not turn my back in a paſſion, leſt in that, tho nothing elſe, I ſhould ſeem to give my Opponents an advantage. But as the Doctor has indeed here and there dropt ſome apparent Hints to the purpoſes aforeſaid; that I may ſilence ſuch Cavils for the future, and reſcue his Name from the hands of thoſe Invaders, who cite his Authority for Heterodoxy and Error, I'll ſoberly examine what has been ſaid, culling out and diſtinguiſhing what ſeems any way material in the rude Lump, which and whatever elſe may come in by the by being once anſwer'd, the reſt will of it ſelf fall.

Firſt then, whereas Dr. *Cudworth* is charg'd with *reviving the Errors of Valentinus Gentilis*, and for the like reaſon of being, as they term him, *mollis Arianus* or a *moderate Arian*, as *allowing only the Son to be truly and properly God*; and holding the *Son* and *Spirit* to be *eſſentially* and *ſubſtantially different* from and *inferior* to the *Father*: I not only affirm, that he never ſaid or meant this or any thing like it, either in his own Perſon or even the Perſons of thoſe whoſe ſenſe he undertook to repreſent; but alſo that the only ſeeming Hint given towards it, or from which it may any way be drawn that he meant it, was deliver'd by him not as his own, but as the Doctrine of the *Platonicks*. And well by the way perhaps you'll take me up ſhort, Did not * Dr. *Cudworth in accounting for the Doctrine of the Trinity, profeſs to follow the* Platonick *Philoſophers?* No, I ſay, he did not; this Allegation is as falſe and unjuſt, as is the whole Account of Dr. *Cudworth*'s Doctrine, given by one who ſays he did. It was not expreſly his Deſign to account for the Chriſtian Trinity at all, but only for the *Platonick*, as this latter fell in with his principal Scope: and accordingly, if in doing ſo he be ſaid to have purſu'd the *Platonick Philoſophers*, that is, to have follow'd after and ſearch'd into, but not eſpous'd their Doctrines; then indeed I grant what is ſaid: but what is it then to the purpoſe? Nay moreover, if in his Account of the *Platoniſts* Belief of a *Trinity* in *Unity*, he ſeem any way particularly to favor or incline to 'em, this can be only by his Endeavour

* *It is affirm'd that he did, in* Conſiderat. on Explicat. *&c.* p. 13.

to do them all poſſible juſtice, and to ſhew how near their Doctrine comes to that of the Chriſtian Church; which he the rather did, to the end he might ſhame all thoſe, who even in the Sunſhine of Chriſtianity will not *ſee*, and pretend that this Article is *nonſenſe*, and implies a Repugnancy to *Reaſon*; which yet *Plato* and his genuine Followers, who are granted on all hands to have been great Maſters of *Reaſon*, aſſented to and held as one of their capital Doctrines, albeit they had no other Guide or Motive to it, unleſs at the moſt a faint *Tradition*. But ſtill tho the Doctor thought it no Prejudice, but rather Advantage to the Chriſtian Faith, thus to give ſome colour to the Reaſonableneſs of it from the concurrent Suffrage of Heathens; yet has he not once ventur'd to ſet forth their Doctrine as a juſt Parallel, but only as a bare Illuſtration or Reſemblance of the Chriſtian; he often * ſaying and endeavouring to ſhew that it came near to, tho not equal'd, and much leſs exceeded it, ſo as to be worthier than that to be made the Object and Rule of his Faith; unleſs it be in the private ſenſe of ſome few Doctors, whom however, as I have noted, † he ſeems to look on as miſrepreſenting the Chriſtian Doctrine, in that they ſet it forth as a kind of Tritheiſm. But as the Chriſtian Triad ſtands in its true and genuine Senſe, and as ſet forth in Holy Writ, he always diſtinguiſhes between *it* and the *Platonick*, and no further yields his Aſſent to this latter, than it ſquares and agrees with the former. To ſhew that he ſuppos'd the *Platonick* Doctrine of a Triad to be imperfect, ‖ he tells us, that this was abſolutely a matter of *Divine Revelation*, and as ſuch was but *ſparingly imparted to the Hebrews* themſelves, from whom either mediately or immediately the *Platoniſts* receiv'd it: but that *afterwards it was more fully* manifeſted *under Chriſtianity*; and by conſequence what the *Platoniſts* taught of this Point could not come up to the Doctrine of the

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* *As at* p. 557, 570, 591, 592, 596.

† *Saying, that therefore ſome would think that the antient and genuine* Platonick *Trinity, taken with all its faults, is to be prefer'd before this Trinity of St.* Cyril *and St.* Gregory Nyſſen, *&c.* p. 604. *and to the ſame purpoſe at* p. 624.

‖ P. 548.

Goſpel.

Goſpel. However, he * *wonders that living ſo long before Chriſtianity, they made ſo near an Approach to the Chriſtian Truth afterwards reveal'd*; wherein he ſtill ſuppoſes, that they *fell ſhort of the Accuracy of it.* And in a word, the greateſt Commendation he gives of the *Platoniſts* in this point, is, that † he prefers their Doctrine of a Trinity before *Arianiſm*, ſaying, "That as *Arianiſm* is commonly ſuppos'd to approach "nearer to the Truth of Chriſtianity than *Photinianiſm*, ſo "is *Platoniſm* undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than "*Arianiſm*; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that "and *Sabellianiſm*, which in general was the Mark that the "*Nicene* Council alſo aim'd at. And on the other hand, beſides that he never once intimated or ſuppos'd, that the *Platoniſts* Belief of a Trinity came up to the full height and meaſure of *Chriſtian Faith*, ‖ he often, as I have hinted, mentions and finds fault with their Expreſſions about it; in that notwithſtanding they really held the Divine Hypoſtaſes to be but one θεῖον or Divinity, yet they often term'd 'em *three Principles*, or a *firſt*, a *ſecond*, and a *third God.* ** Nay beſides that they *utter'd* themſelves *unadviſedly and inconſiſtently with their own Principles*, he alſo grants, that they err'd in ſome meaſure as to the thing, and *plainly wander'd out of the right path*; and particularly in one reſpect, touching this point, †† he cenſures the *Platoniſts*, calling a certain Notion of theirs a *high-flown Conceit of* Plotinus, *and perhaps of* Plato *himſelf too*, &c. And in a word, he tells us ‖‖ elſewhere, that it *cannot be deny'd, but the beſt of* Plato's *Followers were ſometimes extravagant in their Doctrine of a Trinity*: and accordingly is he often put to't to apologize for them. And however friendly he may for this reaſon be thought to the *Platoniſts*, yet after all 'tis obſervable, that he makes this ſolemn Aſſeveration (which from a Man of his known Piety and Vertue, had I no other reaſon, I would much rather credit as ſincere and true, than the bare word of (*a*) any that accuſe him of Fraudulence and Falſhood) "That after

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* P. 595. † P. 592. ‖ *As at* p. 548, 550, *&c.* 572, 588, *&c.*
** P. 595, & 596. *at the top.* †† P. 558. ‖‖ P. 593. *at the top.*
(*a*) *As among others*, Nye *in his* Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, *p.* 189.

" having endeavour'd in the Perſon of the *Platonick* Chriſ-
" tian, partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine *Pla-*
" *tonick* Trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the Doc-
" trine of the antient Church; nevertheleſs, ſays he, we
" ſhall here declare, that whereſoever this moſt genuine
" *Platonick* Trinity may be found to differ, not only from
" the Scripture it ſelf (which yet notwithſtanding is the ſole
" Rule of Faith) but alſo from the Form of the *Nicene* and
" *Conſtantinopolitan* Councils; and further, from the Doc-
" trine of *Athanaſius* too, in his genuine Writings (whether
" it be in their Inequality of the *Divine Hypoſtaſes* or in any
" thing elſe) is there utterly rejected by us. So far was Dr. *Cudworth* from being in his Judgment a profeſs'd and abſolute Follower of *Platoniſm* as ſuch, or any further than it ſuted with the *Chriſtian Doctrine*. Wherefore now to return to the points in hand: The Doctor, agreeably to his main drift, having not purpoſely deliver'd his own, but the Sentiments of others, what they have thought erroneouſly (if ſome things they have) cannot with juſtice be charg'd upon him; and accordingly might I now very well drop the aforeſaid Accuſations, without any further particular Defences. But however, becauſe I know 'twill be ſuſpected, that albeit the Doctor did not at all ſpeak out his own Senſe, yet at leaſt he meant as the *Platoniſts* did, I ſhall proceed to conſider what may reaſonably be made of their Intimations as deliver'd by the Doctor (the Truth of which it's not my buſineſs here to diſpute) to the purpoſes aforeſaid; the principal Ground and Sum whereof I take to be this: " * That
" the genuine *Platoniſts* and *Pythagoreans* aſſerted an eſſential
" Dependence of the ſecond Hypoſtaſis upon the firſt, and
" alſo of the third both upon the firſt and ſecond, together
" with a gradual Subordination in them. But how did they underſtand this *Dependence* and *Subordination?* Not in reference to the *abſolute Being* or *Operation* any more of one *Hypoſtaſis* than another: foraſmuch as the Firſt, tho it be indeed look'd on as the *Fountain* of the *Godhead*, yet in all other reſpects is no more *independent* than the ſecond and third; foraſ-

* P. 580.

much

much as it can no more *be* or *act* without *them*, than they without it, their *Eſſence* and therefore their *Action*, according to the *Platoniſts*, being altogether one and the ſame. And therefore by the way how looſly and wrongfully is it ſuggeſted in the Objection, that according to the Doctor, the *Son* and *Holy Spirit*, as *abſolutely* differing things, *are* or come under the Character of *God*, *omnipotent and the like, only by means of the Father's Concurrence with them, and their Subordination and Subjection to him*; *in which ſenſe there is not a Creature, but may be ſaid to be Omnipotent and God!* As if becauſe in ſome reſpect (of which more anon) the ſecond and third Hypoſtaſes are ſaid to be *dependent* and *ſubordinate*, therefore they were held to be *univerſally* and *abſolutely* ſo. Whereas neither Dr. *Cudworth*, nor yet the *Platoniſts*, whoſe Senſe he delivers, conceiv'd in this particular Inſtance, that the ſecond and third Divine Hypoſtaſes were ſo *dependent* on the firſt, as one altogether different thing may be on another: but only that they might be ſaid to *depend* on, becauſe they cannot be without that Divine *Eſſence* or *Subſtance*, of which both the firſt and they alſo do jointly or rather *indiviſibly* conſiſt; which ſuppoſes indeed a *relative Subordination* of ſome of the Hypoſtaſes as ſuch, to that which is firſt in order, as one or other of them muſt needs be: but does not at all infer an abſolute *Inequality* of them. Inequality, you'll ſay? Is not this plainly imply'd by the very Term *Subordination?* No, I ſay, it is not (as all my Opponents ſeem to imagine) in the ſenſe here aim'd at, that is, not an *Inequality* of *Nature*, *Eſſence* or *Subſtance*; but in reference to this, ſtill there is a *Co-equality* of the Hypoſtaſes, tho not a *Co-ordination*. But no, no, you'll reply, this Doctrine of the *Platoniſts* is plainly *Arian*, which you can't deny to have expreſly aſſerted an *Inequality* of *Subſtance* in the Hypoſtaſes; and for this you'll vouch no leſs topping Authoritys than thoſe of a famous Emperor, an antient Father, and a late great Theologer, that is, of *Conſtantine*, St. *Cyril*, and *D. Petavius*: the firſt of theſe, *according to Dr. *Cudworth* himſelf, upon the report of *Socrates*, therefore calling the *Arians*

* P. 594.

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Porphyrianiſts, that is to ſay, *Platoniſts*, *Porphyrius* having been a zealous Follower and Imitator of *Plato* and *Plotinus*; the ſecond telling us, * *That* Plato *did not perceive the whole Truth of the Trinity, but in like manner with thoſe who follow* Arius, *divided the Deity or made a Gradation in it, and introduc'd ſubordinate Hypoſtaſes:* The third of 'em, after having rightly ſtated the *Doctrine* of *Arius*, adding, That † *from the Profeſſion of this, it is moſt undeniably manifeſt (what was before affirm'd) that* Arius *was a german or genuine Diſciple of* Plato. *Anſw.* Were Truth on the ſide of theſe Authoritys, and Dr. *Cudwosth* againſt it, I own I would not ſcruple to deſert him and cleave to that; but being well aſſur'd, that Truth at the bottom lies in common among theſe great Men, and that they are not in the reſpect aforeſaid at real variance about it, far be it from me to raiſe or foment a needleſs difference between 'em. Dr. *Cudworth* will here anſwer for himſelf, and reconcile the ſeeming Diſagreement. Not that I think what he ſomewhere intimates will do it neither: namely, "‖ That "the true reaſon, why ſome late Writers as well as antient, "and among theſe St. *Cyril*, have affirm'd *Platoniſm* to ſym- "bolize with *Arianiſm*, and the latter to have been indeed "nothing elſe but the Spawn of the former, is merely be- "cauſe the *Platoniſts* did not acknowledg one and the ſame "numerical *Eſſence* or *Subſtance* of all their three *Hypoſtaſes*, "*&c.* that is, as the Doctor underſtands the Terms, not really *three Hypoſtaſes*, but *one*; which he wrongly ſuppoſes to be the *now receiv'd Doctrine* of the Church: whereas the preſent Church, agreeably to the antient, holding indeed a real Diſtinction of *Hypoſtaſes*, *Subſiſtences* or *Perſons*, aſſerts notwithſtanding one and the ſame numerical *Eſſence* or *Subſtance* of them, as alſo a Dependence and Subordination of the ſecond and the third; which likewiſe St. *Cyril* did not deny,

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* Τεθεώρηκε μέν ἦν ὃκ ὑγιῶς εἰσάπαν, ἀλλὰ λοῖς τὰ Ἀρείᾳ πεφρονηκόσιν ἐν ἴσῳ διαιρεῖ, κὴ ὑφίςησιν, ὑποκαθεμένας τε ἀλλήλαις τὰς ὑποςάσεις εἰσφέρει. S. Cyril cont. Jul. *l.* 1.

† In eâ verò Profeſſione, quod ſupra memoravi, planiſſimè conſtat, germanum Platonicum Arium extitiſſe. *Pet. de Trin. l.* 1. *c.* 8. *ſect.* 2.

‖ Int. Syſt. *p.* 592.

as

as this excludes a *Co-ordination*, and yet does not infer an *Inequality* of *Eſſence*. But the Doctor's beſt and moſt healing Anſwer, is what he ſignifies * elſewhere, and particularly applies to *Petavius*. He diſtinguiſhes two ſorts of *Platoniſts*, one of which were not taken notice of by the Perſons aforeſaid, but all of that name were reckon'd by 'em in the number of the ſecond: namely genuine, or thoſe who faithfully expounded, improv'd and follow'd *Plato*'s true Senſe; and ſpurious, or ſuch as tho call'd from his Name, yet deviated from, deprav'd and miſrepreſented it. The former, he tells us, tho aſſerting indeed a Subordination in the Divine Hypoſtaſes as ſuch, yet ſtill held 'em to be ὁμοούσιοι, *co-eſſential*, or of the ſame *Subſtance*, and not *Creatures*, as *Arius* ſuppos'd the Son to be, but God and Creator; and accordingly he affirms and makes it out, "† That the antient and genuine *Platonick* Trinity "was doubtleſs *Anti-Arian*, or elſe the *Arian* Trinity *Anti-*"*Platonick*, &c. And therefore brings in *Socrates* the Eccleſiaſtick Hiſtorian, as juſtly wondering how thoſe two Preſbyters, *Georgius* and *Timotheus*, ſhould adhere to the *Arian* Faction, ſince they were accounted ſuch great Readers of *Plato* and *Origen*; becauſe‖ Plato *no where affirms his firſt and ſecond Cauſe (as he was wont to call them) to have had any beginning of their Exiſtence*; *and* Origen *every where confeſſeth the Son to be co-eternal with the Father*. Nay, ſo far were the *Platoniſts* from falling in with *Arius*, that again the Doctor ſays, ſome of them went ſo far, ** as to call their *Nous* or *ſecond Hypoſtaſis* αὐλοπάτως and αὐτόγονος, its *own Parent* and its *own Offſpring*, as that which was *ſelf-begotten:* which Language (however he tells us, it was underſtood by them in *a certain myſtical ſenſe, they otherwiſe not denying it alſo to have proceeded from the firſt Good*) tho no more juſtifiable in them, than that of αὐτόθεος in ſome late Divines, yet does ſufficiently ſhew for my purpoſe how widely diſtant their Sentiment run from that of *Arius*. Whence I conclude, that the aforeſaid Impu-

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* P. 576. † P. 621.

‖ Οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ δεύτερον καὶ τὸ τρίτον αἴτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζειν εἰώθει, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως, εἰληφέναι φησί. καὶ Ὠριγένης συναίδιον πανταχοῦ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί. Eccleſ. Hiſt. l. 7. c. 6. ** P. 574, 575.

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tations can't with any colour of Juſtice be affix'd to theſe genuine *Platoniſts*, with whom however and none elſe we are here concern'd; nor by conſequence to *Platoniſts* in general, and as ſuch: but only to the latter ſort or the ſpurious, who have indeed brought a diſgrace upon *Plato*, and thoſe more juſtly denominated from him; and are therefore often cenſur'd, and particularly * upon the preſent Account, by Dr. *Cudworth*, they making *a vaſt and diſproportionate Diſtance between the Hypoſtaſes*; and their *Subordination* to be as it were *a tumbling down from the former to the latter*, and ſo in effect ungodding two of them, as making them unequal to, that is, of a different Subſtance or Eſſence from the firſt, and conſequently Creatures. Accordingly, I ſay, he complains of the *Inconvenience of theſe kind of* βαθμοὶ, *Storys, Stairs and Gradations of theirs in the Deity*, telling us that Proclus *and ſome others of the* Platoniſts *plainly underſtood their Trinity no otherwiſe than as a certain Scale or Ladder of Beings in the Univerſe, or a gradual Deſcent of things from the firſt or higheſt by ſteps downward lower and lower, ſo far as to the Souls of all Animals.* Which Doctrine he reckons is alſo liable *to be further abus'd to Creature-worſhip and Idolatry, when the Diſtances are made ſo wide, and the Deity it ſelf ſuppos'd ſo to ſink, as that the loweſt of it differs but gradually only from the higheſt of created Beings.* But you'll ſay, that the Doctor himſelf, as from the *genuine Platoniſts*, aſſerts † an *Inequality* not barely of Order and Dignity, but of *Authority* between the *Hypoſtaſes*. *Anſw.* He does not, that I remember, ſay this, tho I grant indeed, that he muſt have ſuppos'd it: but what then would he mean by *Authority?* Not what the *unſcholaſtical* Objector means, when making it, as he appears to do, ſynonymous with *Power*: but in this caſe it would only betoken, according to the Doctor, a Priority of Original, as the firſt Hypoſtaſis is the Author or Auctor of the ſecond, and the firſt and ſecond of the third; and in a word, as the ſecond and third Hypoſtaſes are from the firſt, and not it

* *This and more to this purpoſe to be ſeen at* p. 551, 556, 557, 560, 568, 570, 593, 594, *&c.*

† Conſiderat. on Explicat. *&c.* p. 13. col. 1.

from

from them. O very well, you'll ſay, now I think I have you faſt, you granting juſt what I would be at, that is, what *Arius* contended for in reference to the Son, ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦσαν, two of the Hypoſtaſes, according to Dr. *Cudworth* and the *Platoniſts*, had a beginning, and *once were not*, the firſt having been very plainly *before them, as the Fountain, Principle and Cauſe. Anſw.* You ſeem to allow no other *Priority*, but that of *Time* only, nor any other efficient Cauſe but *active*, or which does not produce its Effect immediately, but by a mediate Cauſality or Action, and ſo ſuppoſes ſome Interſtice or Space between it ſelf and the thing caus'd: whereas it is certain, that even among created things there is a *Priority* of *Nature* in contradiſtinction to that of Time, as alſo there are *emanative efficient Cauſes*, which, as Logicians interpret this Phraſe, are ſaid to be *before* their Effects, notwithſtanding that theſe latter do *co-exiſt* with 'em; as for inſtance, the Sun and its Light, Subjects and their Propertys *quarto modo* and the like. And thus the firſt Perſon in the Godhead is indeed before the ſecond and third as an *emanative efficient Cauſe* of them; and accordingly he being eternal, by conſequence they are ſo too. So that *Priority* in this caſe does not ſuppoſe an Interval of Time between the Cauſe and the Effects, but a *Co-exiſtence*, and therefore a Coeternity of them. And this is expreſly aſſerted over and over by Dr. *Cudworth*, ſaying, * that *none of the three Hypoſtaſes are Creatures, but all eternal*, &c. † that *the ſecond and third Hypoſtaſes were not from an antecedent Non-exiſtence brought forth into being; nor can it be ſaid of either of them*, erat quando non erat, *that once it was not, but their going forth was from Eternity, and they were both coeve and coeternal with the Father:* and the ſame is methodically prov'd out of the Doctor's Materials to have been the Opinion of the genuine *Platoniſts*, from *p.* 323 to 327 of this Treatiſe. Well then, you'll ſay, granting that according to the Doctor the ſecond and third Divine Hypoſtaſes are *co-eternal* with the firſt, yet are they *in no other reſpect, but only Duration, held by him to be coequal with it*; *inſo-*

* Int. Syſt. *p.* 592, &c. † P. 559. *and much to the ſame purpoſe at p.* 596, 597, 623, *and elſewhere.*

much that he desires to distinguish his Explication from all others by this Mark. *Answ.* I wonder with what Front this can be said! since he never once expres'd or hinted this, nor can it be any way concluded that he meant so. However, it may be this Suspicion is occasion'd by what he * says of *Plato*, that *he* made *Eternity* the distinctive Character of God, and consequently of the Divine Hypostases, from the Creatures. But does this exclude either *Hypostasis*, or especially any one of them rather than the other, from being infinitely and therefore equally and transcendently perfect in all other respects? Nay on the other hand, according to the Doctrine of *Plato* himself, does it not plainly infer 'em to be so? Since he at once teaches, that whatever is *eternal* is *uncreated*, and what is *uncreated* is God, in whose *indivisible* Nature there can be no *Inequality*. And agreeably to this, † Dr. *Cudworth* expresly asserts quite another thing from what is objected; that the Divine Hypostases are not only *eternal*, but also *necessarily existent* and *universal*, that is, *infinite*, *omnipotent*, the *Creator*, or (in the Pagan Language, not his own) joint *Creators*, *Principles*, *Containers* or *Comprehenders* of all other things; *immutable*, *independent*, *perfectly intellectual*, and the like. Which again is prov'd to have been the Opinion of the antient *Platonists* from *p.* 327 to 330 of this Treatise. And in short, his affirming them to be *absolutely perfect* and *God*, and that one and the same God too, abundantly shews that he could not hold them to differ essentially in any respect. Now both these he emphatically does in these Words: ‖ *There is nothing truly infinite, either in Knowledg, or in Power, or in Duration*, but only one *absolutely perfect Being, or the Holy Trinity*: Also that they are *God* and *one God*, as it would have oppos'd his main Drift to have done otherwise, he is very frequent and copious in asserting it. Thus he tells us, "** That all these three Hypostases, *Tagathon*, *Nous* and "*Psyche*, are said by the *Platonists* to be essentially one Θεῖον or "Divinity, *&c.* †† That the three Hypostases in the *Platonick* Trinity are ὁμοούσιοι, co-essential, both as being each

* P. 571, 572, 596. † P. 570, 577, 578, 579, 589, 592, 596, 597, 621, 622, 627. ‖ P. 648. *at the top.* ** P. 591. †† P. 589.

"of

" of them God, and as being all one God ; (which latter Expreſſion by the way plainly ſhews, that he thereby meant a numerical Unity of Eſſence in them) " and that becauſe, " as * St. *Cyril* himſelf acknowledges, the *Platoniſts* ſuppo- " ſing *three Hypoſtaſes*, which have the Nature of Principles " in the Univerſe, do extend the Eſſence of God to all theſe " three Hypoſtaſes. And after having ſaid, † That neither " *Plato* nor any intelligent *Platoniſt* would ſcruple to ſubſcribe " that Form of the *Nicene* Council it ſelf, that the Son was " therefore co-eſſential or conſubſtantial with the Father, as " being God, and not a Creature, he adds, that the genuine " *Platoniſts* would doubtleſs acknowledg alſo all the three " Hypoſtaſes of their Trinity to be homoouſian, co-eſſential or " conſubſtantial yet in a further ſenſe than this, namely as " being all of them one Θεῖον or *Divinity*, and really but one " God : nay, ‖ That they are *phyſically* one (than which what can be more expreſſive of a numerical Identity ?) and argues for the Reaſonableneſs of it ; and accordingly ** elſewhere makes *God* and *Holy Trinity* convertible Terms. Again, " †† That the World having but *one Creation*, and yet be- " ing created, *according to the* Platoniſts, by thoſe three Di- " vine Hypoſtaſes, it follows, that they are all three really but " one Creator and one God ; and in a word, that their very " Will, Energy and Action are eſſentially one and the ſame. And this alſo is clearly prov'd to have been the Doctrine of the genuine *Platoniſts*, from *p.* 312. and more expreſly from *p.* 319 to 341 of this Treatiſe. Wherefore now to add no more on this head, the *abſolute Perfection* and *eſſential Unity* of the Divine Hypoſtaſes, as ſet forth and aſſerted by Dr. *Cudworth* in the Perſon of the *Platoniſts*, plainly infers them to have been no way *unequal*, at leaſt in *Nature* and *Subſtance*. But hold there, you'll ſay ; whatever the Doctor might drop to the Purpoſes aforeſaid, yet is it plain that his Meaning was otherwiſe, that ſtill he held the Divine Hypoſtaſes to be *eſſen-*

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* Τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ὑποτιθέμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἐκτείνοντες. *As he is cited* ib. *and* p. 596.

† P. 559, 570, 597, 598, 626, *&c.* ‖ P. 559. *toward the bottom.*

** P. 565. †† P. 589. *at the top.*

tially unequal, in that he denies the Son and Holy Spirit to be *omnipotent*; for, says he, *only the Father is Almighty* ad intra, *or really and of himself Almighty, and so the Son and Spirit are impotent. Answ.* It is not Dr. *Cudworth*, but only you your self that say this, as you have something else before in reference to this Point. Somewhat indeed, I grant, of the Doctor's Words may be cited as the Text, yet is the Comment wholly your own, and utterly repugnant to his Sense. He * says indeed in the Person of the *Platonick* Christian, that the *second and third Persons are not omnipotent* ad intra, *inwards or within the Deity it self:* But how does he understand this? Not as you expound it, as if they were not *really* or *of themselves* and *absolutely omnipotent*; but only in regard to what was before nam'd, the Origination or Derivation of the second from the first, and of the third from the first and second, and consequent to that, their Subordination and Inferiority or Inequality of Order; *the Son*, as he tells us, *being not able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter absolutely the Cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account*, says he, *was that first of these three Hypostases, who is the original Fountain of all, stil'd by* Macrobius, Omnipotentissimus Deus, *the most omnipotent God*; he therein implying the second and third Hypostases, *Nous* and *Psyche*, to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect Equality with him, as within the Deity they are compar'd together; *however* ad extra, *or outwardly to us*, and in all other respects, they being all one, are equally omnipotent: that is, they are indeed Almighty, and can do all things but what implies a Contradiction, as what is here instanc'd in would have done. For according to the *Platonists* and the Doctor, there being but one Θεῖον or Θεότης, μία Φύσις, μία οὐσία and ἕς Θεὸς, *one Divinity* and *one Nature*, *one Essence* and *one God*; and yet they holding withal that the *Essence of the Godhead*, as † *Porphyrius* speaks, *proceeded to three Hypostases*, and by consequence that these *three* are *one Essence* and *one God*; as in this Case there must be suppos'd a *common Fountain* of the Godhead, so can this Fountain be but *one*, that is, there can be but

* P. 598. † Ἀχειτειῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θείᾳ προελθεῖν οὐσίαν.

one

one of these Hypostases originally of himself subsisting in that infinite Being, because a Plurality of Hypostases or Persons so subsisting would necessarily infer a Multiplicity of Gods *. So that only one of these is *originally* God, and the other two, tho they have indeed the same common eternal and uncreated Nature, yet is it communicated to them from that †: I say, the *same common, eternal* and *uncreated* Nature, so that here neither is there a Partition, but an intire Communication of one and the same whole or rather undivided Essence; still all the *Three* are *God*, and one God according to the Doctor, and not, as is perversly suggested as his Sense, each of 'em a *God, but the second and third essentially inferior to the first.* However, that of them which is thus first in order, is properly call'd *the Father*, and by the *Greeks*, agreeably to the Character aforesaid, αὐτόθεος, μόνος ἀγέννητος, μόνος πηγὴ, ἀρχὴ τῆς θεότητος, &c. And thus are we told by ‖ Dr. *Bull*, agreeably to Dr. *Cudworth*'s sense of *Macrobius*'s *Omnipotentissimus Deus*, that the *Nicene* Writers were wont to stile the *Father* διακριτικῶς, in way of distinction or discrimination, absolutely *God*, the *one only God* and *Father of all*, according to these Texts of Holy Scripture, 1 *Cor.* 8. 4. *Eph.* 4. 6. and *John* 17. 3. And in no other sense than this did Dr. *Cudworth* understand the *Father* to be, what one of my Opponents has also intimated, God κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or as indeed we have it in his ** own words, giving the sense of *Dionysius* and *Origen*, that is, that the *second* and *third Person* were *inferior* to him in *Power* and *Glory*; they being both of them equally God, tho the one be indeed *begotten* by the Father, and the other proceed from the Father and the Son: because for them as such to be thus *begotten* or *born*, and to *proceed*, is no other than what St. *Hilary* says in

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* *The Words of Bp* Pearson *in* Expos. of the Creed, *p.* 134. *the Sense of which is agreed to by Dr.* Cudworth *in* Int. Syst. *p.* 590, 596.

† *Agreeably to what Dr.* Bull *asserts particularly in reference to the Son; That he was held both by the* Ante *and* Post-Nicene *Fathers to have* eandem quidem Naturam Divinam cum Patre communem, sed a Patre communicatam. *In* Def. Fid. Nic. *p.* 251. Ed. Grab.

‖ *In* Defens. Fid. Nic. *p.* 252. *col.* 1.

** *About the middle of* p. 600.

refe-

reference to the former, that is, * *to be in that Nature by which they are God*; this being, as Dr. *Cudworth* † says, in way of perfect Generation or natural Emanation, whereby the whole Divine Eſſence is deriv'd downward. And thus far even the ‖ *Jews* rightly enough took our Bleſſed Saviour, when calling God his *Father* or *Begetter*, they concluding, as he indeed meant it, that this was to *make himſelf equal with*, that is, to be abſolutely *God*. But no, you'll ſay, Dr. *Cudworth* not barely as a *Platonick*, but alſo as a Chriſtian and in his own name, goes in a yet higher Strain, and argues the *Inequality* of the Divine Hypoſtaſes from theſe words of our Saviour himſelf, ** *The Father is greater than I:* telling us moreover, "†† That to underſtand this of his *Humanity* only, ſeemeth "to be leſs reaſonable, becauſe this was no news at all, that "the eternal God, the Creator of the whole World, ſhould "be greater than a mortal Man born of a Woman. And "thus, ſays he, do divers of the Orthodox Fathers, as *Atha-*"*naſius* himſelf, St. *Baſil*, St. *Gregory Nazianzen* and St. *Chry-*"*ſoſtom*, with ſeveral others of the *Latins*; and (he might have added) of the *Greeks* too, with ‖‖ *D. Petavius* (tho this latter indeed ſeems not to be hearty enough in the point, he repreſenting ſome Fathers as contradicting others, or as fluctuating and inconſiſtent with themſelves) as namely all theſe Writers, whether of one or t'other Character, *Alexander* Bp of *Alexandria*, the whole Council of *Sardica*, St. *Cyril* of *Alexandria*, St. *Hilary*, *Epiphanius*, *Iſidore* of *Peluſium*, *Damaſcen*, *Marius Victorinus Afer*, *Sæbadius Agiunenſis*, the Author of the Queſtions put at the end of the fourth Tome of St. *Auſtin*'s Works, St. *Auſtin* himſelf, *Fauſtinus* otherwiſe call'd *Gregorius Bæticus*, *Cæſarius*, *&c.* "That all theſe, I ſay, do interpret the ſame to have "been ſpoken, not of the *Humanity*, but the *Divinity* of our "Saviour Chriſt: and by conſequence he could not hold 'em to be one *Divinity* or one God, but one greater and another leſſer, or in the ſenſe of *Arius*, one the *Creator* and another

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* Deum naſci non eſt aliud quàm in eâ Naturâ eſſe, quâ Deus eſt, &c. *In* L. 11. de Synod. *ſub Init.* † Int. Syſt. *p.* 587.

‖ John 5. 17, 18. ** John 14. 28. †† Int. Syſt. *p.* 599.

‖‖ Pet. de Trin. *l.* 2. *c.* 2. *which is expreſly writ upon this Subject.*

a *Creature*. *Answ.* This in like manner must be *interpreted* agreeably to the true Sense of the Writers aforesaid, and of Dr. *Cudworth*, as frequently elsewhere it has been before observ'd, that he delivers himself, and in this very place falls in with this Passage of *Petavius*: * *That the Father is in a right catholick sense affirm'd by most of the Antients to be greater than the Son, and he is commonly said also without Reprehension to be before him*; But how? *in respect of Original*. Agreeably to which, I cannot deny, but that they and the Doctor understood the *Minority* of the *Son*, with reference indeed to his *Divinity*; tho not to his *Divinity* as such and in it self, but as *deriv'd* from that of the Father. In which sense, tho the *Son* be eternal and the same God, yet as being derivative from the *Father*, he is inferior to and less than him, from whom he is deriv'd. Accordingly again he says with *Petavius*, "That no Person of the Trinity is *greater* or *less* than "another, in respect of the Essence of the Godhead, com-"mon to them all, † because the true Godhead can be no "where *greater* or *less*; but that notwithstanding there may "be some *Inequality* in the Persons as such. ‖ The very "Terms, *Son* and *Generation*, which the Fathers of the Church "very commonly use, do at first blush plainly denote to "us a *Subordination* of the *Son* to the *Father* as *generating*. And so the meaning of the Antients aforesaid, and consequently of Dr. *Cudworth* himself in this point, amounts to no more than this of ** *Cæsarius*, That *the Father as Father is greater than the Son*; of *Sæbadius Agiunensis*, That the Father is rightly term'd *greater*, because he alone is *Auctor sine Auctore*, is a *Principle*, but has none himself; and of †† *Petavius*, *That the very Filiety is in some sort less than the Paternity*;

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* Pater major Filio ritè & catholicè pronunciatus est a plerisque Veterum, & Origine prior sine Reprehensione dici solet.

† Quia vera Deitas in nullo esse aut minor aut major potest, *&c.*

‖ Quòd Voces ipsæ Filii & Generationis, quibus iidem (sc. Doctores Ecclesiæ) utuntur passim, primo suo Conceptu manifestè innuant Subordinationem Filii ad Patrem generantem. *Dr.* Bull *now Bishop of* St. Davids, *in* Defens. Fid. Nic. *p.* 252. *col.* 1.

** *Both cited by* Petavius de Trin. *p.* 71, 73. †† Ib. *p.* 74. *col.* 2.

not

* *not but ſtill*, according to him, *there is an Equality*; *for*, ſays † he again, *one Perſon is not ſaid to be greater than another, in reference to that by which they are one in number*; (which by the way is a further Inſtance that *Petavius* contended for a *numerical Unity* of Eſſence in the Divine Hypoſtaſes) to which agrees this of *Gregory Nazianzen*, that the || *word Greater refers to the Cauſe, that of Equal to the Nature.* Accordingly, ſays ** *Athanaſius*, 'tis obſervable, that *Chriſt did not affirm, that the Father was better than himſelf, leſt he ſhould be thought to be of a differing Nature:* nor, ſays †† *Fauſtinus*, that GOD is greater, but that the FATHER is greater than himſelf. " ||| *All things whatſoever the Father hath are mine*, ſaith Chriſt; " (*a*) becauſe in him is the ſame Fulneſs of the Godhead, and " more than that the Father cannot have: but yet in " that perfect and abſolute Equality, there is notwithſtand- " ing this Diſparity, that the Godhead is not from the Son " nor any other, whereas the Son hath it from the Father. And thus when (*b*) Dr. *Bull* aſſerts the Father to be greater than the Son, according to all the *Ante* and *Poſt-Nicene* Fathers, *etiam quoad Divinitatem, even in reference to the Divinity*, it is only in this ſenſe that he does ſo, *becauſe the Son is from the Father, and not the Father from the Son*; not but ſtill, as Dr. *Cave* (*c*) writes, *the Son is equal to the Father by the Divine Nature, but the Father greater by Communication.* In ſhort, we have the Senſe of the Church in this point, touching the whole Trinity, in theſe words of St. *Auſtin: We are given to*

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* Tam Origine priorem, quàm majorem ratione Principii Patrem appellari poſſe ſine ullo Æqualitatis diſpendio. *Pet. de Trin.* p. 75. *col.* 1.

† Non enim major minorve una Perſona alterâ dicitur in eo, in quo unum ſunt numero. *P.* 7. *col.* 2.

|| Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον μὲν ἐϛι τῆς αἰτίας, τὸ δὲ ἴσον τῆς φύσεως. In Ora. 24.

** Οὐκ εἰρηκεν, πατὴρ μοῦ κρείττων ἐϛίν, &c. In Orat. 2.

†† *In* Lib. de Trin. & Fid. ||| Joh. 16. 15.

(*a*) *Biſhop* Pearſon *in* Expoſition of the Creed, *p.* 134.

(*b*) Greater, *he ſays*, non Naturâ quidem, aut Perfectione aliquâ eſſentiali, quæ in Patre ſit & non in Filio; ſed Auctoritate ſolâ, hoc eſt Origine; quoniam a Patre eſt Filius, non a Filio Pater. *In* Def. Fid. Nic. *p.* 258.

(*c*) Filius eſt Patri æqualis Naturâ Divinâ: major Pater Communicatione. *In* Diſſertat. tertia ad calcem Hiſt. Lit. *p.* 64.

under-

underſtand in the Father Auctority, in the Son Nativity, and in the Holy Ghoſt a Community of the Father and the Son, and in all three an Equality *. And now after all, agreeably to this, I think 'twill not offend any even Orthodox Ears, to hear Dr. *Cudworth* thus ſpeaking for himſelf: "† What, ſays he, is "originally of it ſelf and underiv'd from any other, muſt "needs have ſome Superiority and Pre-eminence over that, "which derives its whole Being and Godſhip from it, as the "ſecond Hypoſtaſis doth from the firſt alone, and the third "from the firſt with the ſecond. But then, he tells us, this "is only *ad intra*, within the Deity it ſelf, in their Relation "to one another, and as compar'd amongſt themſelves; but "*ad extra*, outwardly and to us, that is, *in all other reſpects* "they are one and the ſame God, concurring in all the ſame "Actions: not that this *Concurrence*, as is falſly inſinuated, does, according to the Doctor, make the Son and Holy Spirit to be God; but becauſe they are abſolutely *God* and *one God*, their Actions are ſo too. And he adds, "In that reſpect "are they without any Inequality, becauſe in Identity there "can be no Inequality. However, here again you'll make no queſtion, but be at leaſt even with me, from what the Doctor himſelf ſays otherwiſe of the matter elſewhere: "|| It is true indeed, that many of thoſe antient Fathers do "reſtrain and limit this Inequality only to the relation of the "Perſons one to another, as the Father's begetting and the "Son's being begotten by the Father, and the Holy Ghoſt "proceeding from both; they ſeeming to affirm, that there "is otherwiſe a perfect Equality amongſt them. Neverthe-"leſs ſeveral of them do extend this difference further "alſo, *&c.* *Anſw.* Here indeed I own, there appears an Inconſiſtency in the Doctor's words, yet ſtill I do not find, but that his Senſe is the ſame with what went before. How does he make it out, that thoſe Fathers *carry'd the Difference further?* What in particular he cites from St. *Hilary*, as de-

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* Inſinuatur nobis in Patre Auctoritas, in Filio Nativitas, in Spiritu Sancto Patris Filiique Communitas, in tribus Æqualitas. *Cited by Dr.* Bull *in* Def. Fid. Nic. *p.* 254. *col.* 1.

† *In* Int. Syſt. *p.* 598. || *About the middle of* p. 599.

noting Chriſt's Obedience to the Father in the Creation, and his Subjection to him, amounts to no more than his *Inferiority* to him as *Father* *. And again, that this was his real meaning, I have his own word for it elſewhere, he ſaying that the Son, agreeably to what goes before, † *is ſubject to the Father*; But how? *ut Auctori*, as to his Auctor or Principle. And I cannot conceive in what reſpect the Fathers could carry the Difference further, unleſs ſo as to favour *Arianiſm*; which yet at the ſame time the Doctor expreſly denies, and after all, the Similitudes he cites from *Athanaſius* and *Dionyſius*, and in the upſhot his own Concluſion from them, do amount to no more than was before mention'd; namely, "That the ſecond "Hypoſtaſis of the Trinity, ſince it muſt derive its whole "Being from the firſt, muſt alſo of neceſſity have an eſſential "Dependence on the ſame, and conſequently a gradual Sub-"ordination to it; that is, as it is ‖ *hæc Perſona*, *this Perſon*, albeit in Eſſence it is *equal* to it, becauſe truly and properly *God*, or *one* and the *ſame God* with the *Father*, and not a *Creature*. Well but, you'll ſay, were the Doctor thus perſuaded in his own Judgment (which is what we now propoſe to examine) "how comes he then to be ſo ſharp upon ſome "of the Fathers as teaching an implicit *Tritheiſm*? Becauſe "they ſaid the three Divine Perſons are equal in Power and "all other Divine Perfections, it follows, ſaith Dr. *Cudworth*, "that they are three Gods. *Anſw.* Here I perceive that your ſtock of true and lawful Coin is very low, becauſe you again take up the old trade of Forgery and Counterfeiting. The ** Doctor does indeed blame ſome of the Fathers both *Greeks* and *Latins*, particularly *Gregory Nyſſen*, *Cyril* of *Alexandria*, *Maximus* the Martyr, and *Damaſcen*, for ſeeming to aſſert an implicit *Tritheiſm*: yet does he not do this for the reaſon here aſſign'd, it being abſolutely falſe, that he ever once ſaid or meant this or any thing like it, that *Tritheiſm*

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* Si quis unum dicens Deum, Chriſtum autem Deum ante ſecula Filium Dei, obſecutum Patri in Creatione omnium non confitetur, Anathema ſit. *And again*, Non exæquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri, ſed ſubjectum intelligimus. † *Of this ſee Dr.* Bull *in* Def. Fid. Nic. *p.* 254. *col.* 1.

‖ *Thus* p. 600. ** P. 603.

would

would follow from a *Co-equality of the Divine Perſons in Power and all other Divine Perfections.* Nay, as we have already and ſhall hereafter ſee, he plainly aſſerts quite the contrary. But he charges thoſe Antients with Tritheiſm upon another account, namely becauſe, as he ſuppos'd, they aſſerted not only a *Co-equality* of *Nature* and *Subſtance* in the Divine Hypoſtaſes, but alſo of *Dignity* and *Place*, and therefore at once a Co-ordination and Independence of them on each other, which, it is certain, would infer *Tritheiſm.* But here however to ſay ſomething more for thoſe Fathers by the way, I muſt needs grant that the Doctor (under favor) was quite miſtaken in his Suppoſition, neither does *Petavius* help him out at all, who, he tells us, has ſet down their words at large: for however he has ſet down, yet does he not alledg their words as making for this purpoſe, he all along aſſerting 'em to have held an *Equality* of *Eſſence* in the Divine Hypoſtaſes, albeit they held an *Inequality* of Order between them; which, to name no more, ſufficiently appears from * this ſummary Confeſſion of his, when having mention'd the aforeſaid *Inequality* in reſpect of *Origination*, but the abſolute *Equality* of the Perſons in the *Godhead*, he adds, "That upon this Suppoſition "it is an eaſy matter to reconcile thoſe antient Fathers, who "ſeem to contradict either themſelves or others, they being all "agreed in this. In ſhort, he is as much miſtaken in the Doctrine of St. *Cyril*, &c. as, according to him, St. *Cyril* was in that of the genuine *Platoniſts*; this Father, *&c.* no more aſſerting ſuch an *abſolute Co-equality* of the Hypoſtaſes, as would imply neither of 'em to be any way *ſubordinate*, than the genuine *Platonicks*, according as the Doctor repreſents 'em, held 'em to be in ſuch a ſenſe *ſubordinate*, as to have moreover both a *Diverſity* and alſo an *Inequality* of *Subſtance:* that is to ſay, the former no more aſſerted *three infinite independent Gods*, than the latter aſſerted *one only infi-*

* Filius qua Filius Patre, ut Pater eſt, minor dicitur; quoniam Origine eſt poſterior: non autem ut Deus, hoc eſt ratione Divinitatis, &c. *To which he adds:* Hoc ſi ante oculos habemus, facilè veteres illos Patres in Concordiam vocabimus, qui vel ſecum ipſi, vel cum aliis conflictari videntur. *De Trin. p.* 74. *col.* 2.

nite, and two other *finite* and *dependent Gods*: but ſtill St. *Cyril*, &c. tho holding indeed a *Co-equality* of *Nature* and *Subſtance* in the Divine Hypoſtaſes, yet maintain'd a Subordination or a real Diſtinction of Order between them; inſomuch that had St. *Cyril* underſtood the *Platonicks*, and the Doctor *him*, no material Diſagreement as to the thing would have been found between one and t'other. But methinks the Doctor ſtrains and miſconſtrues the words he cites from * St. *Cyril* in particular, when in explaining his Senſe of the *Homoouſiotes* of the Divine Perſons, which he intimates was the only thing wanting in the *Platonicks* to make them compleatly orthodox, he ſays, *there muſt be underſtood to be one Nature of the Godhead in them all, and conſequently no ſuch Gradation between them, as would infer a natural Diverſity*: for this the Doctor interprets of a *ſpecifical Unity*, and ſo not excluſive of a numerical Diverſity of the Divine Hypoſtaſes, but of ſpecifick only; and by conſequence that they differ'd, according to this Father, juſt as three co-ordinate, independent and *abſolutely* co-equal Individuals in the *ſpecifick Nature* of *Humanity*. Whereas beſides that the words which he alledges do not imply this, moreover to prove that this was not his meaning, he elſewhere declares quite the contrary, ſaying, That † *tho the Son is equal to the Father as to his Subſtance, and altogether like him, yet he terms him greater, as having no Principle; whereas in this reſpect he himſelf has a Principle, in that he is from the Father*: and again, ſays || he, *the Father is term'd greater, as being the Principle of the co-eternal Generation*. And indeed the ground of the Doctor's miſtaking the Senſe both of him and the reſt appears to have been this, that they having ſometimes made a compariſon between the Divine Hypoſtaſes and three *individual Men*, the Doctor carries this

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* Ἵνα ϗ μία νοοῖτο τῆς θεότητος φύσις, τὸ τείχδες ὐκ ἔχουσα πρὸς ἑτερότητα φυσικὴν, ϗ τὸ γε δὴ δεῖν ἀλλήλων ἐν μείοσιν ὁρᾶσθαι ὑποτάσσει. Int. Syſt. *p.* 603.

† Ἴσος τοιγαροῦν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ὐσίας λόγον ὑπάρχων ὁ υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ ϗ ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα μείζονα αὐτὸν φησίν, ὡς ἄναρχον, &c. *Cited by* Pet. de Trin. *p.* 71. *col.* 2.

|| Λέγεσθαι δὲ μείζων, ὡς ἀρχὴ τῆ συναϊδίῳ γεννήματος. Cit. ib.

further

further than they meant it: while they attending only to what the Divine Hypoſtaſes agreed in, and not to that in which they differ'd, made the compariſon, firſt in oppoſition to *Sabellius*, that as Individuals are indeed *diverſe*, ſo are the Hypoſtaſes *really* diſtinguiſh'd ſomewhat like 'em; and ſecondly againſt *Arius*, that as *three individual Men* are equally *Man*, ſo the three Divine Hypoſtaſes are equally and alike God, and that one individual God, becauſe the Godhead is but one. But beyond this they did not go, ſo as to make a *Diverſity* of *Subſtance*, or a Co-ordination and Independence of the Divine Hypoſtaſes, as there is between three individual Men. Well but you'll ſay, whatever the antient Fathers thought, ſtill it is enough for my purpoſe, that is, to prove the Doctor himſelf to be a Favorer of *Arianiſm*, that he denying the Perſons to be *co-ordinate*, and withal making *co-equal* ſynonymous to *co-ordinate*, muſt therefore needs have held 'em to be unequal, which is the point you debate. *Anſw.* It is you, and not Dr. *Cudworth*, that confound *equal* in *ſome ſenſe* or as referring only to the *Subſtance*, with *co-ordinate*, he making only that which is *abſolutely* and in *all ſenſes equal*, to be ſo, as this excludes all manner of *Inequality*, and even that of *Order*: which latter however it is certain that the Doctor aſſerts in reference to the Divine Hypoſtaſes, tho ſtill withal a *Co-equality* of Eſſence in them; for, ſays he, "This Eſſence of "the Godhead that belongeth alike to all the three Hypoſta- "ſes, being as all other Eſſences perfectly indiviſible, it "might well be affirm'd, according to *Platonick* grounds, "that all the three Divine Hypoſtaſes (tho having ſome Sub- "ordination in them) yet in this ſenſe are co-equal, they "being all truly and alike *God* or *uncreated* *. Nay, ſo far is this diſtinction of Order between the Divine Hypoſtaſes as ſuch, by reaſon of the Auctority of one and the Origination of the others, from making a *Diviſion* or *Inequality* of Nature in them, that according to the † Doctor and the *Platoniſts* alſo, without it there could be no *Trinity*, which were not

* Int. Syſt. *p.* 597. *toward the top.*

† P. 590. *at bottom*, &c. 596. *toward the top.*

a *Tritheiſm*, and otherwiſe *three Divine Perſons* muſt needs be *three co-ordinate Gods*. Whereas allowing a Diverſity of *Order*, but not of *Duration* and *Eſſence*, the Doctor ſtill falls in with the Creed of *Athanaſius*, " That in this Trinity none is " afore or after other, none is greater or leſs than another, but " the whole three Perſons are *co-eternal* together and *co-equal*. But no, you'll ſay, 'tis plain from the Doctor's own mouth, that he denies that Co-equality of the Divine Perſons, which is aſſerted in the Creed aſcrib'd to *Athanaſius*; and therefore ſeems to reject the ſaid Creed as ſpurious and novel, if not as heterodox; when having mention'd that *Inequality* of Perſons, which he before aſſerted, he does not ſuppoſe that Creed (as appears from the Connection) to ſquare with this Doctrine, as neither indeed, according as ſome at leaſt underſtand it, with the *genuine Writings* of *Athanaſius* himſelf, he telling us to this purpoſe, " * For as for that Creed commonly " call'd *Athanaſian*, *this* was written a long time after by " ſome other hand. *Anſw.* In the firſt place I grant, that he does indeed look on the aforeſaid Creed as ſpurious and novel; and this is no more than other Learned Men have done, whom yet we have no ground to ſuſpect, as willing to betray or any way to weaken the Catholick Faith. Thus for inſtance it is plac'd by † one as a modern Writing, no higher than the eighth Century; agreeably to what ‖ Dr. *Cave* has written of it, he reckoning it among the ſpurious Writings of *Athanaſius*, and giving theſe Reaſons for it: " Becauſe " neither *Athanaſius* himſelf nor any other Writer of the " following Ages before *Theodulphus Aurelianenſis* in his Book " *de Spiritu Sancto*, p. 72. makes any mention of it; nor did " it prevail in the Chriſtian Churches till the Year 1000, nor " was univerſally noted, before it was cited in way of Teſti- " mony or inartificial Proof, under the name of *Athanaſius*, " by the Legats of *Gregory* the Ninth, about the Year 1233.

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* Int. Syſt. *p.* 620. † *The Author of the* Animadverſions upon Dr. *Sherlock*'s Book, entitled, A Vindication of the Holy and Everbleſſed Trinity, *&c.* p. 257.

‖ *In* Eccleſ. Scriptor. Hiſt. Lit. *p.* 146. *to which purpoſe more may be ſeen in his Life of* Athanaſius, *ſect.* 6. *n.* 10.

" in

" in a Diſputation held at *Conſtantinople.* And further he " tells us, 'tis probable that it was compil'd by *Vigilius Tap-* " *ſenſis*, was turn'd at length into *Greek*, and lay hid a great " while in the Archives of the Churches. Which Conjec- " ture is ſtrengthen'd and more likely to be true, becauſe, " ſays he, *Theodulphus Aurelianenſis* cites this Creed out of " thoſe very Books once aſcrib'd to *Athanaſius*, which are " now moſt certainly known to be thoſe of *Vigilius Tapſenſis*; " and which therefore have been antiently join'd in one Vo- " lume with *Vigilius*'s Books againſt *Neſtorius* and *Eutyches.* But neither after all does Dr. *Cudworth* plainly reject this Creed as heterodox, tho novel, unleſs it be (as indeed by the Connection he ſeems to inſinuate) according to the private Senſe of ſome, who ſuppoſe the Co-equality of the Perſons there mention'd to be *abſolute* and in all reſpects ſuch, ſo as to exclude even a *Subordination* of the ſecond and the third. As to which I ſay, that if there be any (tho I know not that there are, at leaſt among thoſe who are juſtly reputed Orthodox) that do this, he deſervedly finds fault with and diſſents from their *Miſconſtruction* of that Creed: but as for the *Creed* it ſelf, when rightly conſtru'd, that is, agreeably to the genuine Writings of *Athanaſius*, whom he ſtiles * *the very Rule of Orthodoxality in this point*, he utters nothing diſreſpectfully of it, or which reflects on the uſage of it in the Church; but rather the contrary, he not denying it in this ſenſe to be at leaſt *Athanaſian*, and to favor of the Doctrine, tho it was not expreſly written by the Hand of *Athanaſius* himſelf; he † telling us, " That it at firſt deriv'd its Authority either " from his Name, or was look'd on as an Epitome and A- " bridgment of his Doctrine, and thence concluding, that " it ought to be interpreted according to the Tenor of that " Doctrine, contain'd in the genuine Writings of *Athanaſius*: " and thus by conſequence muſt it needs ſhare in the Doctor's " Approbation of *him*; of whom, ſays he, we can think " no otherwiſe, than as a Perſon highly inſtrumental and " ſerviceable to the Divine Providence for the preſerving of " the Chriſtian Church, from lapſing by *Arianiſm* into a kind

* P. 599. † Int. Syſt. *p.* 620.

" of

" of paganick and idolatrous Chriſtianity, in religiouſly wor-
" ſhipping thoſe which themſelves concluded to be Creatures,
" and by means of whom eſpecially the Doctrine of the Tri-
" nity, which before fluctuated in ſome looſe Uncertainty,
" came to be more punctually ſtated and ſettled.

Thus I have got thro the crouded Huddle of the ninth Objection, and what by the way was incidental to it, and ſeen how very unjuſtly Dr. *Cudworth* is charg'd with any thing like *Arianiſm*, of which beſides he conſtantly declares the utmoſt Abhorrence and Deteſtation. And upon the whole, I make no queſtion but that the antient and modern Church, and in particular Dr. *Cudworth*, are agreed in this point, that the three Perſons of the Godhead are co-eternal together and co-equal, notwithſtanding that there is a kind of *Priority* and *Poſteriority*, or a diſtinction of Order between them; the Doctor, agreeably to the Catholick Doctrine, thus gloſſing on thoſe words of the aforeſaid Creed with *D. Petavius*,

" * That no Perſon of the Trinity is greater or leſs than
" other in reſpect of the Eſſence of the Godhead, becauſe
" the true Godhead, as was before obſerv'd, can be no where
" greater or leſs, but that notwithſtanding there may be
" ſome *Inequality* in them, as they are this or that Perſon.

10 *Object.* What then, you'll have it, that *the Trinity of the Schools*, that is, of the preſent Church, is the ſame with that of the Fathers and of Dr. *Cudworth*, who plainly eſpouſes the latter? And if ſo, you make no doubt but you have caught me now; foraſmuch as the *Doctor has largely and clearly prov'd the contrary* †. *Anſw.* The Doctor is ſo far from having done this *clearly*, that indeed all his Arguments (as we have before ſeen) do not *really* at all, but only *ſeemingly* prove it, he uſing ſome ambiguous Terms apparently making for that purpoſe, tho not in earneſt meant ſo by him, as we find, when the true Senſe of 'em comes to be unfolded.

11 *Object. In earneſt*, you'll ſay? do you pretend to have a ſurer Key to his Meaning than his own Words? *Anſw.* The Doctor, I ſay, it muſt needs be own'd, is ſomewhat unwary and inconſiſtent in his Words; and therefore I do not ſo much

* P. 599. † Conſiderat. on Explicat. *&c.* p. 10. col. 1.

much gueſs at his Meaning from ſome particular Expreſſions dropt here and there, and ſeemingly tending this or that way, as from what appears to be his main Drift, and agrees with the Tenour of his Doctrine elſewhere; and not from ours or other Mens, but from what upon the whole may be reaſonably infer'd to have been his own ſenſe of thoſe Expreſſions; which, if we candidly and thorowly examine 'em, do not prove any real diſagreement in Doctrine, as to the point in hand, between the antient and modern Church in general, or between one or t'other and himſelf in particular.

12 *Object.* Well but, you'll ſay, we are now ſpeaking more eſpecially of the Doctor, and therefore 'tis enough for the purpoſe, that *he* at leaſt thought otherwiſe, he openly declaring a Diſagreement between the antient and modern Church, and withal profeſſedly ſiding with the antient, muſt be concluded to differ in his Judgment from the modern: thus, not to inſiſt upon Concluſions deducible from Terms that are equivocal or doubtful, he tells us plainly, " * That " there is a manifeſt diſagreement betwixt the *Platonick* Tri- " nity as declar'd (which he avers to be agreeable to that of the firſt Chriſtians, and accordingly expreſſes his Approbation of it) " and the now-receiv'd Doctrine of the Chriſtian " Church; ſays †, " That this is a thing ſo unqueſtionably " evident, as that it can by no means be diſſembled, pallia- " ted or *excus'd*: by which laſt word he at once implies the " modern Church to be juſtly blamable herein; and accordingly yet further goes on to cenſure its Doctrine as *novel* and *contradictory*, ſaying, " || That as this Trinity, that is, the Doctrine taught by ſome of the Fathers touching the three Divine Hypoſtaſes as agreeing in one *ſpecifical* Eſſence of the God- " head, came afterwards to be decry'd for Tritheiſtick; in the " room thereof ſtarted there up that other Trinity of Per- " ſons *numerically* the ſame, or having all one and the ſame " ſingular exiſtent Eſſence; a Doctrine, ſays he, which ſeem- " eth not to have been own'd by any publick Authority in " the Chriſtian Church, ſave that of the *Lateran* Council " only. And having ** intimated, that the word *Homo-*

* P. 592. † Ib. *at bottom.* || P. 604. ** P. 605.

ouſios was never apply'd by *Greek* Writers to denote any other than things at leaſt numerically differing, he adds, " nor " indeed is it likely, that the *Greek* Tongue ſhould have any " Name for that, which neither is a thing in Nature nor falls " under human Conception, that is, according to his Senſe of theſe Expreſſions, implies a Contradiction, and therefore is not ſo much as poſſible; meaning herein the Trinity of the Schools and preſent Church, or the Doctrine of three Hypoſtaſes agreeing in *one numerical Eſſence*; and thence inferring, that the antient Fathers muſt have apply'd that Term to the Divine Hypoſtaſes in another ſenſe, ſo as to exclude 'em from being one and the ſame numerical Subſtance. *Anſw.* Here in the firſt place I muſt indeed make ſome allowance, as to what you ſay of the Doctor's own Sentiment, and grant that he believ'd a real diſagreement between the antient and modern Church, and accordingly himſelf inclin'd rather to the one than the other. However I engage to keep my hold faſt, and, whatever the Doctor *believ'd* or *thought* of the antient and modern Church, ſtill to maintain, as in the long run you'll find me do, what I before advanc'd, namely, that the Belief of both theſe, and alſo of himſelf as touching a *Trinity in Unity*, was at the bottom the very ſame; and the only reaſon why he thought otherwiſe, was purely thro a Miſconſtruction or want of reconciling ſome logical Terms and Phraſes made uſe of in this caſe by one and t'other. For how is it he goes about to make any difference betwixt 'em appear? Why becauſe the modern Church aſſerts and holds one thing, that is, * *one and the ſame numerical Eſſence or Subſtance of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes*, which he tells us the antient deny'd; and denies another, that is, a *gradual Subordination* in them, which the antient held and aſſerted. But this, under favour, is only ſaid, and more I preſume than the Doctor can prove. As to the firſt Particular, granting that the Antients did not *expreſly aſſert*, yet does it not thence follow that they deny'd *one* and the ſame numerical Eſſence of the Divine Hypoſtaſes; nay, that they really held and believ'd it, is, I think, as undeniable as that they held *one God*. This has † appear'd as touching

* P. 592. † P. 332, &c.

the

the *Platonicks* in the Body of this Treatiſe, and as touching the Fathers of the Church in a foregoing Part of this Introduction; and with them the Doctor himſelf, as generally he appears to do, muſt needs agree in this point, unleſs he held, as moſt certainly he did not, a *Trinity of Gods*. And as to the ſecond Particular, I deny it to be the *now-receiv'd Doctrine* of the truly Chriſtian Church, that there is ſuch an *abſolute Co-equality* of the Divine Perſons, as excludes all manner of Subordination between them; and in this, to name no more, I appeal to thoſe Learned Divines before-cited, who, I ſuppoſe, may be juſtly look'd on as faithful Mouths not only of the antient, but the modern Church, ſuch are Biſhop *Pearſon*, Biſhop *Bull*, Dr. *Cave*, &c. And how Dr. *Cudworth* came to think otherwiſe, ſeems to be from this: That being a zealous Aſſertor of a *real Trinity*, and withal having confounded (as was before obſerv'd) *numerical Eſſence* with *Divine Hypoſtaſis*, he conceiv'd that to aſſert but *one numerical Eſſence*, was in effect to aſſert but *one Hypoſtaſis* in the Godhead; and that in this ſenſe a *Trinity of Perſons having all one and the ſame ſingular exiſtent Eſſence*, were, according to his Conſtruction of theſe Terms, but one and the ſame *Perſon*; or that otherwiſe ſtill to aſſert three really differing Hypoſtaſes, when they are indeed one, would be to aſſert a Contradiction and utter Impoſſibility. But this, whether or no it be the Doctrine of the preſent Church, let the Orthodox determine; who diſtinguiſhing *numerical Eſſence*, at leaſt in this particular Caſe, from *Hypoſtaſis*, do aſſert *three real Hypoſtaſes* united in *one numerical Eſſence* of the Godhead, and herein do they place the *Myſtery* of it. However I add, that this firſt and capital Miſtake of the Doctor made him alſo deny that the preſent Church held any Subordination of Perſons, there being no room at all for this, where there is in reality but one only Perſon. Upon this Prejudice he goes on further to expreſs his diſlike of a Trinity in this ſenſe as *novel* and *upſtart*, or rather as *Sabellianiſm* reviv'd or *contradictory*. But by the way methinks the Doctor ſhould have given more heed, than he appears to do, to the ſolemn Decree of a General Council, granting, as before, the eleventh *Lateran* (tho one

very * Learned Perſon denies it) to have been ſuch; and conſider'd that this did not broach or hand down to Poſterity any new Doctrine, but only ſome Words expreſſing the Doctrine which was before aſſerted; and that to prevent the like Hereſy for the future with that of *Abbot Joachim*'s, it cautiouſly took up and fix'd ſuch Terms, as before were not ſo uſual, and inſtead of *Generical*, *Specifical* or *Collective*, aſſerted a *numerical Unity* of Eſſence or Subſtance in the Divine Hypoſtaſes, which yet does not exclude a real Diſtinction of them; but ſtill tho *One*, they are truly *Three*; not *one Hypoſtaſis*, but *one Eſſence* and *three Hypoſtaſes*: which *Unity in Trinity*, I add, ſuppoſing a Diverſity of *Reſpects*, does therefore not imply a Contradiction, or an abſolute Repugnancy to Apprehenſion or Conception that the thing *is*, tho indeed the manner *how* it is be incomprehenſible. *The Monad*, † ſays one, *being extended even to the Triad, yet ſtill remains a Monad; and the Triad collected even to the Monad, ſtill remains a Triad; which is a Paradox and very admirable: Nay*, ‖ ſays *Petavius*, *it even exceeds all Admirability, nor can there be found any Parallel to it or what is truly like it.* However as this, albeit *unſpeakable* and *incomprehenſible*, yet is a thing in it ſelf not impoſſible, but *may be*, ſo are we aſſur'd upon the Divine Teſtimony that it *really is*; and after all I find, that it is not this Trinity in the right ſenſe of it, that the Doctor aſſerts to be not a *Thing in Nature*, and that *falls not under human Conception*, but only a Miſconſtruction of it, as if it ſuppos'd that *ſeveral things*, that is, *Hypoſtaſes*, were all of them in the ſame reſpect *one thing* or *one Hypoſtaſis*. But neither, I add, even upon this Suppoſition, does he treat the preſent Church ſo diſreſpectfully, or ſpeak ſo immodeſtly of this its pretended abſurd Doctrine, as a certain ** Writer has more than once

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* *Bp* Stillingfleet *in* Vindicat. of the Doctrine of Trin. *p.* 37, 38. *of Pref.*

† Ἡ μονὰς μέχει τειάδος παρ' αὐτοῖς κινεμένη μένει μονάς. καὶ ἡ τειὰς μέχει μονάδος συναγομένη μένει τειὰς. ὃ παράδοξον. Thalaſſius *the Monk in* Hecatontade, *cited by* Petavius de Trin. *p.* 250. *col.* 1. Ed. Antw.

‖ Quod omnem Admirabilitatem ſuperat, nec ei quod ſimile ſit in ullo rerum genere inveſtigari poteſt. *De Trin.* p. 247. col. 1.

** Nye *in* Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, *p.* 29. *and again in* Inſtitutions concerning the Holy Trinity, *p.* 15.

publickly told us that he does, saying, " That he comple-
" ments *us* (reckoning himself *now*, I conceive, among the
" Orthodox) in a very extraordinary manner on *our* Expli-
" cation of that Article; he saith, the Scholastick Trinity
" is a pure Jargonry, the Philosophy of *Gotham*, and a fan-
" tastick Trinity, *&c.* *Answ.* When I first read this Charge, I could not persuade my self, that Dr. *Cudworth*, so very disagreeably to his wonted Ingenuity, us'd these paultry foul Expressions; and upon enquiry I found, that he did not, and that they no where occur in his whole Writings. Where-upon I could not but be very much surpris'd at his Opponent's Assurance, and that so much the more, because upon a fur-ther Enquiry I perceiv'd, that these very words, which he imputes to the Doctor, * were, I venture to say, at first coin'd by himself, albeit then without a Name; and how at length he came to father 'em on Dr. *Cudworth*, I conceive it might thus happen: there was, you must know, a † pretty long Interval between the Appearance of the *Considerations on the Explications of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, and what this Writer has since produc'd to the present purpose; during which time, I suppose that he might frequently dream of what he fancy'd at the first, that his account of what Dr. *Cudworth* had said of the *Trinity* was an exact and *clear* Com-pendium not only of his Sense, but also of his very Words (tho it was as far from being one as the other) coming at length, after I know not what new Revolution of Principles, to cite the Doctor upon the occasion now before us, he thought he needed go no further than his own Abstract; and thus very probably it came to pass, that having first set up a *Mercury* with his own hands, he then, like sportful Boys, fell a throw-ing stones at it, tho intending to hit, at least *in effigie*, the Learned Doctor. Strange, that he should charge him with those very Words, which he never once utter'd! nay words of his own Invention! and afterwards make those very

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* *In* Consideration of Dr. *Cudworth*'s Explication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, *p.* 15. *col.* 2, *&c.*

† *The* Considerations *being publish'd in* 1693. *the* Doctrine of the Holy Tri-nity *in* 1701. *and the* Institutions *concerning the same in* 1703.

Words,

Words, becauſe immodeſt and outrageous, a frequent ground of Cavil at him! And which is more again, the very *Thing* which he cenſures and condemns in Dr. *Cudworth*, he himſelf before * had emphatically, and with a far worſe Meaning utter'd in the very ſame words!

13 *Object.* But here the Unitarian nicks the opportunity, and ſtarting up with Joy as if he had got ſome precious Booty, and no leſs Friend than Dr. *Cudworth* on his ſide, tells us, that if a Man of his Parts and Learning could not get clear of the Briars, as touching the Doctrine either of the Antients or Moderns, he looking on the former as ſetting forth a *Trinity of Gods*, and the latter a Trinity only of *Names* or *Modes* or *inadequate Conceptions* of *one God*; it may be, that as he ſaw no juſt ground for, he indeed believ'd no Trinity at all, that is, no *real Three* in *One*. *Anſw.* No, hold there; the moſt that can be concluded from this is, that it may be he ſuppos'd both Fathers and Schoolmen to have ventur'd too far towards an Explication of what is confeſſedly inexplicable; and ſo with St. *Athanaſius*, to thoſe that wonder and would fain know *how Three* can be *One*, and *One Three*, he would make this Reply: † *O Fools, and without Underſtanding, why do you not ceaſe from your Curioſity, enquiring no further after a Trinity, and only believing that there is a Trinity?* This perhaps he reckon'd was all that the Scripture declar'd of this Article, of which without this Declaration we could have known nothing at all; and that conſequently, they who venture beyond the Verge of this Light, muſt needs be in the dark, at once bewilder'd in their Conceptions, and deſtitute of Words to expreſs themſelves. To which purpoſe may this of St. *Auſtin* be apply'd, ‖ *If Jeſus Chriſt has kept ſome things cloſe, who of us ſhall ſay, that they are this or that? or if he*

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* To ſay that the Perſons are or ſubſiſt in one ſelf-ſame Eſſence or Subſtance in Number, is *Jargonry* in Philoſophy. *And again he tells us*, That no Philoſophy, but that of *Gotham*, will allow, that one intelligent Subſtance can be more than one Perſon. *In* Conſiderat. on Dr. *Cudworth*'s Explicat. of the Doct. of the Trin. *p.* 15. *col.* 2. &c.

† Ὦ ἀνόητοι διὰ τὶ μὴ μᾶλλον ὅπ τῆς ἁγίας τειάδος παύεσθε πειεργαζόμενοι ϗ μόνον πιςεύοντες ὅτι ἐςιν. Athanaſ. ad Serapionem.

‖ In Epiſt. ad Januar.

does

does say it, yet how will he prove it? This, I suppose, might be the Doctor's reason for uttering himself so inconsistently and waveringly, whether for or against either this or that Hypothesis concerning the *Manner* of a Trinity in Unity: but however that he held the thing, and still believ'd a Trinity *in These*, may, I think, be infer'd from his daring, for its sake, to oppose what he look'd on as the now-receiv'd Doctrine of the Christian Church; touching which, tho he was indeed mistaken and so far blamable, yet methinks his Zeal for the Truth of the Article is herein remarkable and to be commended: and this may suffice to turn the Scale against the Unitarian, and to shew that the Doctor really believ'd a *Trinity in Unity*; but now moreover to weigh it down quite on this side, and bring off the Doctor in Peace and Concord with the universal Church, I add, that he directly express'd himself to this purpose, and that in such a way and words as, I say, come up to the Doctrine taught both by the antient and modern Church; and particularly having taken up the very Forms made use of by the latter, these, whatever he may seem to drop otherwise elsewhere, he often approves and stiffly adheres to as the most proper. In general * he declares *his unshaken Belief and firm Assurance of the Truth of the whole Christian Doctrine*; and † *his devout Veneration for all the Scripture Mysterys*; and in particular for the Article of the Trinity, as appears from the Tenor of his Doctrine about it: insomuch that he goes so far as to say, that ‖ *if we will be Christians, we must needs believe a Trinity*, and ** *that the whole Frame of Christianity is built thereupon*; and further he declares in what sense he believ'd it: First, " †† That it was not a Trinity of mere Names or " Words, nor of partial Notions and inadequate Concep- " tions of one and the same thing, which was plainly con- " demn'd by the Christian Church in *Sabellius* and others; but " a Trinity of *Hypostases*, *Subsistences* or *Persons*. Secondly, " that tho in the Christian Trinity the second *Hypostasis* or " *Person* be begotten from the first, and the third proceed " both from the first and the second, yet are neither this se-

* *In* Preface *p.* 5. *and often elsewhere.* † P. 585, *&c.* ‖ P. 560.
** P. 548. †† P. 558, 559, 560, *&c.*

" cond

" cond nor third *Creatures.* Thirdly, that theſe three *Hypo-*
" *ſtaſes* or *Perſons* are truly and really *one God.* On one hand he tells us againſt *Sabellius*, * That *the Indiviſibility of the Trinity is not ſo to be underſtood, as if three were not three in it*; neither † *muſt it be thought that the whole Trinity is one after the very ſame manner that each ſingle Perſon thereof is in it ſelf one, for then would there be a Trinity alſo in each Perſon*; *nor again, that it is ſo call'd undivided, as if three were not three in it (which were to make the Myſtery contemptible) but becauſe all the three Hypoſtaſes or Perſons are indiviſibly and inſeparably united to each other, as the Sun and the Splendor, and are really but one God*; foraſmuch as *the Eſſence of the Godhead*, ſays || he, *being abſolute Perfection, can admit of no Diviſion or Degrees:* which latter Expreſſion, beſides what we have before ſeen of the matter, ſhews on the other hand his great abhorrence of Tritheiſm and Arianiſm, of either *three co-ordinate Gods* or of *one only* properly ſo call'd, and two others inferior to him in *Nature*; and therefore reckoning it a fault in the Pagans, that they term'd their *Hypoſtaſes*, *Principles* or *Gods*, he adds, that this is yet leſs *allowable in Chriſtians, notwithſtanding that when we ſpeak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghoſt ſeverally, we confeſs each of them to be God* **. Accordingly, as I ſaid, 'tis obſervable, that he never once expreſly calls 'em three diſtinct *Subſtances*, but with the Schools †† *three Hypoſtaſes, Subſiſtences or Perſons.* And further how a *Trinity* in this ſenſe (which is that of the preſent Church) may conſiſt with the *Unity*, he very well argues, ſaying, " |||| We grant in-
" deed that there can be no inſtance of the like Unity or
" Oneneſs found in any created Beings; nevertheleſs we
" certainly know from our very ſelves, that it is not impoſ-
" ſible for *two diſtinct Subſtances*, that are of a very different
" kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other
" corporeal, to be ſo cloſely united together, as to become
" one *Animal* and *Perſon*; much leſs therefore ſhould it be
" thought impoſſible for theſe *three Divine Hypoſtaſes* to be
" *one God.* Agreeably to which, I think, 'twill not be de-

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* P. 617. † P. 598. || P. 596. ** P. 550. *at the bottom.*
†† P. 592. *at the top.* |||| P. 559. *at bottom.*

ny'd,

ny'd, that the Doctor believ'd a Trinity, and that in such a ſenſe to be *three* and *one*, as the Church heretofore and ſtill indeed believes; and whoſe Belief therefore if at any time he ſeem to diſapprove of, it is in words only, thro (I venture to ſay) a Miſconſtruction of it, he taking, as we have ſeen, the Trinity of the Schools and the modern Church to be either *Sabellianiſm*, in that the Perſons of it are *monoouſian*, and make in effect no Trinity at all, or, if ſtill pretended to be a real Trinity, it is an Impoſſibility and Contradiction; that is, according to his meaning, for one *numerical Eſſence* by which he underſtands *Hypoſtaſis*, to be *three real Hypoſtaſes*. However this, I ſay, was not the true, but only the miſtaken Doctrine of the Church and the Schools; the real Doctrine is, That *in one and the ſame Divine Eſſence there are three truly diſtinct Hypoſtaſes*, and to this Dr. *Cudworth* will heartily aſſent. Accordingly we find him cenſuring thoſe who hold it to be Nonſenſe and Contradiction, he ſubjoining this to the place laſt quoted: "* We ſhall conclude here with confidence, that "the Chriſtian Trinity, tho there be much of Myſtery "in it, yet is there nothing at all of plain Contradiction to "the undoubted Principles of Human Reaſon, that is, of "Impoſſibility to be found therein, as the Atheiſts would "pretend, who cry down all for Nonſenſe and abſolute Im-"poſſibility, which their dull Stupidity cannot reach to, or "their infatuated Minds eaſily comprehend, and therefore "even the Deity it ſelf. Nay he juſtly endeavours to ſhame all thoſe, who tho having the Light of Revelation before 'em, yet disbelieve or ſlight this Article in the true ſenſe of it, by the Example of ſuch as having no other Guide but Natural Reaſon, yet providentially, as he thinks, aſſented to it; ſaying, "† That whereas bold and conceited Wits, precipi-"tantly condemning the Doctrine of the Trinity for *Non-"ſenſe*, abſolute Repugnancy to human Facultys and Impoſ-"ſibility, have thereupon ſome of them quite ſhaken off "Chriſtianity and all reveal'd Religion, profeſſing only "Theiſm; others have fruſtrated the Deſign thereof by pa-"ganizing it into Creature-Worſhip or Idolatry: this igno-

* P. 560. *at the top.* † P. 627.

" rant and conceited Confidence of both may be retunded " and confuted from hence, becauſe the moſt ingenious and " acute of all the Pagan Philoſophers, the *Platoniſts* and " *Pythagoreans*, who had no biaſs at all upon their Faculty's, " but follow'd the free Sentiments and Dictates of their own " minds, did notwithſtanding not only entertain this Tri- " nity of Divine Hypoſtaſes, eternal and uncreated, but " were alſo fond of the Hypotheſis, and made it a main Fun- " damental of their Theology. And again he * reckons, " That to conclude, that whatſoever any man's ſhallow Un- " derſtanding cannot eaſily conceive and fully comprehend, " is therefore to be expung'd out of the Catalogue of Be- " ings, is the Reaſon or rather Infidelity of the Anti- " Trinitarians.

14 *Object.* Well but after all, you'll ſay that the Doctor relates and does not diſapprove of a *Platonick* Notion, " † That the three Divine Hypoſtaſes are only three Attri- " butes, infinite Goodneſs, infinite Wiſdom, and infinite " Power and Love; as they are obvious in the Deity, and " firſt come under our inadequate Conception. *Anſw.* I remember indeed, that an injudicious Collector cites this (tho he || miſtook the Page of the *Intellectual Syſtem*) as from Dr. *Cudworth:* but granting that agreeably to this he did not diſapprove, yet does it not thence follow, that he approv'd of it; or if he did, how came he then after the *Platonicks* ſtill to term them *Hypoſtaſes* or *Subſiſtences* of one Divine Eſſence? Theſe very words imply them not to be barely inadequate Conceptions or Qualitys of the Godhead. Why this, you'll ſay, " ** He did agreeably to *Plato*, who " himſelf was forc'd to do ſo, that he might pleaſe a " ſuperſtitious Mob, that is, to make as many Hypo-

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* *The middle of* p. 638.

† Les trois Hypoſtaſes des Platoniciens, dit il, ne ſemblent effectivement être autre choſe qu' une infinie Bonté, une infinie Sageſſe, & une infinie Puiſſance & Amour. *In* Le Platoniſme devoilé, *p.* 65. *Engliſh Edition, call'd* Platoniſm unveil'd, *p.* 23. *col.* 1.

|| *Cites* 590. *inſtead of* 591. *in both Editions.*

** Pour plaire a la Populace ſuperſtitieuſe il fut obligé de faire autant d'Hypoſtaſes & des Dieux, qu'il avoit trouvé de Perfections dans le Createur du Monde, *&c.* Le Plat. dev. *p.* 63.

" ſtaſes

" ſtaſes and Gods, as he had diſcover'd Perfections in the " World's Creator; in ſhort, that he might ſafely philoſo- " phize about the Origin of the World, he found it needful " ingeniouſly and cunningly to feign a Genealogy of Gods, a " Father, a Son begotten, and a third proceeding from theſe " two, and ſo to turn the whole Coſmogony into a mere Theo- " gony. But this, I believe, is more than you can prove: what you urge from *Proclus* is not of force to do it; or if it were, (granting his Teſtimony of *Plato* to be good) yet this will not be granted; foraſmuch as he according to the Doctor, was far from being a genuine *Platoniſt*, and therefore will not his word ſuffice to warrant that this or that Doctrine was *Plato's*. And much leſs, as you ſuppoſe, does the Doctor himſelf here fall in with you, or ſet forth what you ſay as *Plato's* Sentiment. You pretend that the Trinity of the Philoſophers was the mere reſult of Contemplation or Conſideration of the Origin of the World, and thus came to be conceiv'd by thoſe deep Thinkers the *Platonicks*, " * Who held the World not " to be eternal and unbegotten, but that the ſupreme Father, " inclin'd by a diſpoſition of *Goodneſs*, had begotten it by his " *Wiſdom*, and fill'd it with his *Power*. As to which I ſay, that the *Platoniſts*, according to Dr. *Cudworth*, held *one ſupreme God*, and at once *three* ſeveral *Hypoſtaſes* in this *one God*, to which they apply'd the diſtinctive Characters of *infinite Goodneſs*, *infinite Wiſdom*, and *infinite Power*; like as Chriſtians have thoſe of *creating*, *redeeming*, and *ſanctifying*, to Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt, reſpectively as ſuch: and had he not ſeriouſly aſſerted theſe Divine Hypoſtaſes as things properly ſo call'd, yet not as three Gods, how came he then to make only a *Trinity* of them, ſince many other capital Perfections were plainly conceivable in the Deity? or if he meant that they ſhould paſs for Gods, that ſo he might ſooth the People, why needed he to feign this ſet number of 'em, ſince he had ſufficiently done the former, by aſſerting in good earneſt, as the † Doctor has ſhewn, many other inferior Gods; nor needed he, as is inſinuated, to put on this mask, leſt he ſhould incur the Fate of *Socrates*, ſince this Philoſopher, as ‖ he has

* Le Plat. devoilé, *p.* 60, 61. † P. 402, *&c.* ‖ P. 400, 401.

likewiſe ſhewn, was not taken off, as 'tis commonly thought, for aſſerting but *one*, and denying a *Plurality* of *Gods*, but for ſome other thing. And however *paganically* and unwarily he ſometimes call'd his Divine *Hypoſtaſes* Gods, Principles, *&c.* yet ſtill as he held 'em to be but one God, by this he only meant that as ſuch, they were at once really diſtinct from each other, and that not as inadequate Conceptions or Qualitys, but true Hypoſtaſes or Subſiſtences. This is the Doctor's Senſe of the matter, touching which you your ſelf do alſo make this Conceſſion, that * *he ſaw the End and Scope of this Myſtery:* but then I add, that you have not ſeen his End or Scope in ſetting it forth; or rather, to make it ſquare with your own Hypotheſis, you have deſignedly miſrepreſented it. For whereas the Doctor does indeed more than once ſay, "That the three *Platonick* Hypoſtaſes ſeem to be really no-"thing elſe but *infinite Goodneſs*, *infinite Wiſdom*, and *infinite* "*active Love* and *Power*; he adds moreover, what you have curtail'd and chopt off for your purpoſe, that *they underſtood 'em not as mere Qualitys or Accidents, but as ſubſtantial Things*; by which I have ſhewn, agreeably to his Doctrine elſewhere, that he meant Hypoſtaſes or Subſiſtences as ſuch, in way of contradiſtinction to the *Eſſence* or *Subſtance* of the Godhead: ſo far was the Doctor himſelf, or even the *Platonicks*, according to him, from favouring that looſe Principle of yours, that the Trinity is only *three Attributes* or *inadequate Conceptions* of the Deity.

And now, I think, I may venture to pronounce, that whatever the Doctor's words were, or however he miſconſtru'd the Words of others, he really believ'd a Trinity, and this in the ſenſe of the univerſal Church from the earlieſt Times even to this day; and that not the † very *Platoniſts*,

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* Le Dr. *Cudworth* a vu le fin de ce Myſtere. *Le Plat. dev.* p. 65.

† *And touching this Point, even Monſieur* Le Clerc *will take his and my part thus far: That upon the ſuppoſition of the Truth of what the Doctor aſſerts, that* Pythagoras *and* Plato *deriv'd their Doctrine of the Trinity from the Writings of the* Hebrews, *they muſt have held one numerical Subſtance of the Divine Perſons; becauſe the* Hebrews, *he tells us, were* Unitatis numericæ Numinis vehementes ſemper Propugnatores. *Ars Critic. vol.* 3. *p.* 238, 239.

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according to him, and much leſs he himſelf was a Tritheiſt: but abſolutely denying three Gods, whether co-ordinate and co-equal, or ſubordinate and unequal, he went with the antient Fathers in a middle way between *Sabellianiſm* and *Arianiſm*; that is, he aſſerted three really diſtinct *Hypoſtaſes* in the Godhead, yet ſtill withal *one God*, and ſo fell in both with the antient and modern Church. And thus after all, his only ſeeming Failure was purely in words: however what he ſays one while may render him ſuſpected of *Tritheiſm*, yet as we have ſeen, what he ſays another while exempts him from that charge, and gives ground for quite the contrary ſuſpicion: not that I think his very Faith was verſatile and really fluctuating, but his apparent turning to this way or that, and after all his ſeeming diſlike of either Doctrine of the Trinity, whether that of the Antients or Moderns, proceeds purely from words made uſe of by them or put in their mouths by himſelf, or from his miſconſtruction of them; and not from any real diſagreement about the thing it ſelf. Wherefore making allowance for ſome capital Miſtakes of Terms; as the confounding of *generical* and *ſpecifical* with *common Eſſence*, of *Divine Hypoſtaſis* with *individual* or *numerical Eſſence*, of *numerical Difference* with that of ſuch things as may barely be *number'd* in ſome reſpect, tho their *Eſſence* be *one* and the *ſame*, &c. allowing this, I ſay, I do not find but the antient Fathers, the modern Church and Dr. *Cudworth* agreed in Senſe and believ'd the ſame thing, that is, were *real Trinitarians*, yet ſo as neither to be *Tritheiſts* nor *Arians*.

Having thus far done what Juſtice I could to Dr. *Cudworth*'s Doctrine and Belief of a Trinity in Unity, I proceed now to mention another of his *Digreſſions*, which likewiſe I muſt not paſs by without ſome Reflections. Now this alſo is about an important Article of Chriſtian Faith, namely the Reſurrection of the Body, from *p.* 794 to 799 of the *True Intellectual Syſtem*. It ſeems to have been occaſion'd by the Doctor's great Indulgence of himſelf in *Platonick* Notions; according to the way of which Philoſophy, having endeavour'd to ſhew from Reaſons and Authoritys, both Chriſtian and Pagan, that the Soul, tho confeſſedly ſpiritual in it ſelf, yet never exiſts without ſome *Vehicle* or *Body*, at leaſt an ethereal or fiery

fiery one, he thence takes an opportunity to mention a further Correſpondence and Agreement between *Chriſtianity* and the old *Philoſophick Cabala*, in that the former likewiſe ſuppoſes, that the higheſt Perfection of our human Souls does not conſiſt in being eternally conjoin'd with ſuch *groſs Bodys*, as we have, *unchang'd* and *unalter'd*. And this in general, as 'tis here expreſs'd, we can't controvert with him: but the particular Account, which he afterwards gives of the Reſurrection-Bodys, ſeems to be exceptionable. According to which it does not appear that he ſuppoſes what the Term *Reſurrection* implies, that is, a Riſing up again of that *ſame Body*, which fell down by Death, but of *another*; in that firſt he takes the Compariſon, made by St. *Paul*, of the *dead Body* to *Corn* that is ſow'd in the ground, and afterwards, in the ordinary courſe of Nature, produces quite *another Body*, that is, as he himſelf expreſſes it, *a Stalk and an Ear having many Grains with Huſks in it; and therefore neither in* Quantity *nor* Quality *the ſame with that, which was ſow'd under ground*; I ſay, he takes this * Compariſon to go, as they ſay in the *Schools*, *upon four feet*, that is, to hold every way parallel, and not to be lame in ſome reſpect: and accordingly, that the *preſent Body of ours is to be look'd upon but as a kind of Seed of the Reſurrection-Body, which therefore is in ſome ſenſe the ſame, and in ſome ſenſe not the ſame.* Secondly, The Doctor thinks the *particular Oppoſitions, which the Scripture makes betwixt the preſent and future Body, to be very agreeable to thoſe of the old Philoſophick Cabala.* And if ſo, 'tis plain, according to his own Account of the ſaid *Cabala*, that there will not hereafter be a Re-union of the *ſame Body* to the *Soul*, which is now united to it, but an acceſſion of a Body, either intirely *new* and *different* from what it had in this Life, or at leaſt not a *human Body* or one conſiſting of *Fleſh*, but an ethereal and ſubtle one: and this indeed he afterwards *expreſly* acknowledges, ſaying, *that the future Body of the Righteous, according to the*

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* *See the true Senſe of this Compariſon; That it is to be taken ſomewhat looſly, ſo as not to exclude the* Identity *of the* Riſing *with the* dead *Body; and that the latter is not properly a Seed of the former, in* Dr. Hody's Reſurrection of the *ſame Body* aſſerted, *p.* 111, 112, 119, 120, 190, 191, &c.

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Scripture alſo, as well as the Philoſophick Cabala, will be a *glorious, ſplendid, luciform and ſtar-like Body*; which he ſeems to underſtand in a literal ſenſe, and therefore thinks it probable, that this future glorious *Reſurrection-Body* is that † *Inheritance of the Saints in Light*, which the Scripture ſpeaks of. Thirdly, From which Term *Inheritance*, if he underſtand it, as he ſeems to do, according to the true Propriety of it, he may again be preſum'd to mean not the *ſame Body* repoſſeſs'd, but one new-poſſeſs'd or occupy'd, and which we had not before. Fourthly, He ſuppoſes the *Reſurrection-Body*, becauſe term'd *Iſangelical*, to be equal in its *Nature* and *Condition* to that of Angels; which tho he concludes upon a wrong ground, yet ſufficiently ſhews what his meaning is, namely that it will not be a Body of *Fleſh*, but an ethereal and ſubtle one, ſuch as he ſuppoſes that the Angels are cloth'd with: I ſay, tho he concludes this upon a wrong ground, in that it is ſaid, that they *who ſhall be counted worthy to obtain that Life and the Reſurrection from the Dead*, &c. will be ἰσάγγελοι, *as the Angels of God in Heaven*; which our Saviour did not mean in reference to the *Nature* and *Subſtance* of their Bodys, but in regard to Marriage, which was the Subject of the Queſtion. "Had he, ſays ‖ one, intended the Nature and Subſtance "of their Bodys, or if he had diſlik'd the common and re-"ceiv'd Opinion touching the Humaneneſs, if I may ſo ſpeak, "of the riſing Body, he would not have us'd thoſe words, "but ſuch as theſe: for in the Reſurrection they neither "*marry* nor have human Bodys, as your Queſtion ſuppoſes, "but are, &c. Fifthly, He takes theſe words of the Apoſtle in a downright literal ſenſe, that *Fleſh and Blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God*, ſaying, that this Place is undoubtedly not to be allegoriz'd; by conſequence 'tis plain, that he did not hold the Reſurrection of the *ſame Body*, becauſe the *Body* we now have does really conſiſt of *Fleſh* and *Blood*: and therefore tho the Church indeed expounds theſe words in a qualify'd ſenſe; yet does it not do it only ſo, as the Doctor ſuppoſes, as if it would thence follow, that the

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* Σῶμα ἀιδέιον, φωσεινὸν, ἀυγοειδὲς, ἀστροειδὲς. † Col. 1. 12.
‖ Body *of* Reſurrection, &c. p. 116.

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happy *Reſurrection-Body* ſhall be *this foul and groſs Body of ours, only varniſh'd and gilded over on the outſide, it remaining ſtill naſty and ſluttiſh within*, &c. but ſuch as is to be call'd *ſpiritual*, tho indeed conſiſting of *Fleſh* and *Blood*; in that it being freed from all inordinate Luſts and Paſſions, will, as he himſelf words it elſewhere, *bear a fit Proportion and Correſpondency to Souls renew'd in the Spirit of their Mind, or in whom the Divine Spirit dwelleth and acteth.* Sixthly, He ſuppoſes the *Reſurrection* thus often mention'd, that is, the Reſurrection in a true and proper ſenſe, to anſwer to the ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν ſpoken of in *Luke* 20. 35. which does not imply a riſing again of the *Fleſh* or of the very *ſame Body*, but only a *Reſubſiſtence* or *ſecondary State* of Men after Death; our Bleſſed Saviour not arguing in this place particularly for the *Reſurrection* of the *Body*, but in general for a future Exiſtence or Immortality after this Life: yet this however again he expreſly owns to be equivalent to the *Chriſtian Reſurrection*, ſaying, " That it is of this Reſurrection only, that St. *Paul* " treateth in that fifteenth Chapter of his to the *Corinthians*, " and that it is the veſting or ſettling (he does not ſay the re- " inveſting or reſettling) of the Souls of good Men; nor again, in the *ſame*, but ſimply *in their glorious, ſpiritual, heavenly and immortal Bodys*; he allowing it to be requiſite to the Happineſs of Men, that, according to this of the Poet, *there ſhould be a ſound Mind in a ſound Body.* Seventhly, By which *Body* it is further plain, that he does not mean that ſame which we now have, becauſe he takes theſe words of Scripture in an abſolute ſenſe, that *our Souls are not at home here, but Strangers and Pilgrims in this terreſtrial Body and earthly Manſions* as ſuch, in contradiſtinction to quite different *celeſtial Bodys*, and not to theſe preſent ones, as they are deprav'd, polluted and corruptible, and tending to a State of greater Perfection; which makes our * *Souls groan within us* now, *waiting for the Adoption, to wit, the Redemption of our Bodys*, that is, the Deliverance of them from Corruption, that *this Mortal* may put on *Immortality*, or *be cloth'd with its Houſe from Heaven*, and that *Mortality may be ſwallow'd up*

* Rom. 8. 23.

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of Life. Eighthly, He ſuppoſes that the *Reſurrection-Bodys* will anſwer to thoſe, for which *our Souls were at firſt intended:* now, ſays he, *our Souls were at firſt intended and deſign'd by God Almighty, the Maker of them, for other Bodys,* &c. that is, than thoſe we now have; and by conſequence, according to him, our future ones will be ſuch too, that is, Bodys of another kind and frame, and not made up of *Fleſh* and *Blood,* &c. All which, I think, is contrary to the general Belief of a Reſurrection of *the Fleſh,* or, as ſome Antients have expreſs'd it, *this Fleſh*; I do not mean *this Fleſh* with its irregular Appetites and Paſſions, but as by a new-modelling and Alteration of it, tho ſtill remaining the very *ſame Matter* or *Subſtance,* it will become regular and ſubject to the Empire of the Soul, will be freed from all inordinate Paſſions and Reſtiveneſs, from all Pollutions and Deformitys, and made pure and lively as that of *Adam* was, when it firſt came forth from the hands of its Creator; and in this ſtate "its Spring will al-
"ways have the ſame bent, its Motions will all be equally
"regular, the ſame continual Round of the ſame pure vi-
"gorous Spirits, and the ſame Blood moving for ever in a
"brisk but even Circulation. And this is all that is meant by thoſe lofty Epithets and Similitudes, that the Body will be *powerful* and *ſpiritual,* and *celeſtial* and *glorious*; and that in it *the Righteous ſhall ſhine as the Brightneſs of the Firmament, as the Sun and as the Stars for ever and ever*; and all that the Scripture ſays of our Transformation into the *Divine Likeneſs,* I take to ſignify no more than the aforeſaid *even* and *pure,* and *diſpaſſionate* and *incorruptible* State of the Body, with a perfect Refinement of all our Facultys. But however the Fleſh, which will be thus purify'd and reſtor'd, will ſtill be real *Fleſh,* and our exalted Bodys true *human Bodys:* "For,
"ſays a * great Divine of our Church, whatſoever Altera-
"tion ſhall be made, ſhall not be of their *Nature,* but of
"their *Condition*; not of their *Subſtance,* but of their *Qua-*

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* *Bp* Pearſon *in* Expoſition of the Creed, *who has elaborately prov'd the ſame,* p. 381, *&c. of which alſo ſee Dr.* Hody *in his* Reſurrection of the ſame Body aſſerted, *from* p. 108. uſque ad finem; *and Dr.* Nicols *in his Anſwer to the* Naked Goſpel, *p.* 69, &c.

" *litys.* Which Explication, he tells us, is moſt agreeable to " the Language of the Scriptures, to the Principles of Re- " ligion, to the conſtant Profeſſion of the Church, againſt " the *Origeniſts* of old and the *Socinians* of late. Thus far then I think I may venture to ſay, that the Doctor appears to have taken a wrong path by treading in the * ſteps of *Origen*, whoſe Doctrine was, " That the riſing Body will not " conſiſt of the ſame Subſtance that was bury'd; and that it " will not be a Body of Fleſh, but an ethereal one.

But however after all, to do him what Juſtice I can, I ſay that he ſeems not to be guilty of an Error in ſettled Judgment and Reſolution, but only of a Self-inconſiſtency, as the ſame *Origen* alſo was; he † as plainly aſſerting the Reſurrection of the *ſame numerical Body* and *Fleſh* in ſome places of his Works, as in others he denies it. For thus in like manner the Doctor at length comes up to a pitch of Orthodoxy, when ſeeming to reject the Opinion of thoſe, who, becauſe St. *Paul* calls the *happy* Reſurrection-Body, || *that Houſe of ours which is from Heaven*, are apt to infer from this, *that therefore it will not be taken out of Graves and Charnel-houſes*; and that there will not be a Reſurrection of the *ſame Body*, but in ſome ſenſe a Reſtitution of the ſame Perſons, " They conceiving, " ſays he, that the Individuation and Sameneſs of mens Per- " ſons does not neceſſarily depend upon the numerical Iden- " tity of all the Parts of Matter; becauſe we never conti- " nue thus the ſame, our Bodys always flowing like a River, " and paſſing away by inſenſible Tranſpiration; ſo that we " have not all the ſame numerical Matter, and neither more " nor leſs, both in Infancy and in old Age, tho we be for all " that the ſelf-ſame *Perſons*: he ſeeming, I ſay, to reject this Doctrine, adds ** in the next place, " That according to the " beſt Philoſophy, which acknowledges no eſſential or ſpe- cifical Difference of *Matter*, " the fouleſt and groſſeſt Body, " that is, merely by Motion may not only be chryſtalliz'd, " but alſo brought into the Purity and Tenuity of the fineſt

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* *See* Dr. Hody *of the* Reſurrection, *p.* 169.

† *See* Dr. Hody *of the* Reſurrection, *from* p. 152 *to* 170.

|| Οἰκετήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. ** P. 799.

" Ether.

" Ether. And undoubtedly that ſame numerical Body of " our Saviour Chriſt, which lay in the Sepulcher, was after " its Reſurrection thus transform'd into a ſpiritual and hea- " venly Body; the Subtilty and Tenuity whereof appear'd " from his entering in when the doors were ſhut, and his " vaniſhing out of ſight: however its Glory were for a time " ſuſpended, partly for the better convincing his Diſciples " of the Truth of his Reſurrection, and partly becauſe they " were not then able to bear the Splendor of it. We con- " clude therefore, that the Chriſtian Myſtery of the Reſur- " rection of Life conſiſteth not in the Souls being re-united " to theſe vile Rags of Mortality, theſe groſs Bodys of ours, " ſuch as they now are, but in the having them chang'd into " the Likeneſs of Chriſt's glorious Body, and in this Mortal's " putting on Immortality. Agreeably to which he ſays alſo *elſewhere, " That tho, as the Doctrine of the Church in- " ſtructeth us, our Bodys ſhall be both ſpecifically and nume- " rically the ſame with what they were here; yet notwith- " ſtanding the Scripture tells us, they ſhall be ſo chang'd and " alter'd in reſpect of their Qualitys and Conditions, that in " that ſenſe they ſhall not be the ſame. Than which Decla- rations what can be more orthodox? Wherefore I ſay, that the Doctor cannot be juſtly condemn'd as reſolutely and fixed- ly heterodox, but can only be charg'd with Self-inconſiſteney, which I would much rather impute to Inadvertency than De- ſign. Some however may perhaps think it no ſmall fault to be off and on, and apparently not well ſettled in a Point of ſo great importance; and therefore once for all, in reference to this and other places I muſt needs own, as others, I'm cer- tain, that have read over and thorowly weigh'd the *True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, cannot but do, that whenever the Doctor ſpeaks of any thing bordering upon Heterodoxy, he either does it by a *Proſopopœia* and as the Senſe of others; or, if he ſpeak in his own Perſon, he introduces what he ſays with an *it ſeems*, and then backs it with the ſtrongeſt Reaſons he has; tho in the cloſe he commonly tacks about, and ſays on the other ſide, *it ſeems* or *ſome would think*: ſo that it is hard to gueſs his

* *In Sermon upon* 1 Cor. 15. 57. *p.* 88. *at the end of the* Intellect. Syſtem.

own meaning, or at leaſt he can't be warrantably charg'd with this or that wrong Sentiment, becauſe he does not expreſly or in Perſon aſſert either one or t'other: And if any one ask me, why he does not? this, if I could gueſs, is more than I would dare to utter of ſo Great and Learned a Man; but leſs than this I could not ſay, becauſe, as was before noted in reference to the Trinity, many falſe Teachers would fain get ſhelter under his Umbrage, and urge his pretended Authority and Reaſons in defence of their abſurd and heterodox Notions.

Thus I have accounted for and pointed out here even what was not to Dr. *Cudworth*'s purpoſe, and therefore in abridging his Materials, has been excluded from the Body of this Treatiſe: withal I have made ſome needful Obſervations upon thoſe of his Digreſſions, of which, I ſaid, I could not otherwiſe juſtify my renewing the mention; and that becauſe I thought they interfer'd either ſeemingly or really with ſound Divinity; and for this I hope my well-meaning Zeal will be excus'd. But further, touching ſome other matters purely *human*, whether *hiſtorical* or *philoſophical*, that here and there occur in the *Intellectual Syſtem*; and being indeed to the purpoſe, yet, if not abſolutely falſe, are at leaſt diſputable: theſe, I ſay, I have laid hold of and digeſted in this Book without alteration, as thinking, where I had no religious Obligation, it would not become me to oppoſe or reject what had been advanc'd by the Learned Doctor; but rather barely to repeat and let it ſtand as it was upon his Authority and Reaſons. However in this place, ſuppoſing that the Reader may be curious to know what theſe matters are, and to interpoſe his Judgment about 'em, I think it not improper to give him a taſt of 'em, but ſhall leave him to determine on which ſide he pleaſes.

Firſt then, whereas * Dr. *Cudworth* ſeems to fall in with Mr. *Selden* and *Arcerius*, that *Moſchus* or *Mochus* the *Phœnician*, ſaid by *Poſidonius* to have been the firſt Inventor of the Atomical Phyſiology, was no other than the celebrated *Moſes* of

* P. 12, 13.

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the *Jews*; ſome * Criticks would here put in and ſay, that tho it was indeed uſual with the *Greeks* to confound the *Phœnicians* with the *Jews*, and there be alſo a great reſemblance between *Moſchus* and *Moſcheh* (as the *Jews* write *Moſes*) and they were both of 'em very antient Names; yet one would not think this *Moſchus* or *Mochus* to be really *Moſes*, when one conſiders that in the Writings of *Moſes* and his Succeſſors the Prophets, there are not only no Footſteps or Signs of the Atomical Hypotheſis, nor even of any part whatſoever of the ſpeculative Phyſicks, which ſearches into the Reaſons of natural Effects. Again, the *Egyptians* and *Phœnicians* were rich and flouriſhing a long while before the *Moſaick* Republick was eſtabliſh'd; and it is more probable, that ſuch kind of Sciences were invented by *them* than by the *Jews*, who make no mention of nor any the leaſt alluſion to 'em in their Writings. And again, this *Mochus* the *Phœnician* was an Hiſtorian known in the time of *Joſephus*, who does not confound him with *Moſes*: For after having ſpoken in his † *Jewiſh Antiquitys* about the long Lives of the Patriarchs before the Flood and thoſe who came a little after 'em, to confirm his Hiſtory drawn from *Moſes*, he cites *Manetho*, who had written a Hiſtory of *Egypt*, *Beroſus* who had written one of the *Chaldeans*, and after that *Mochus*, *Heſtiæus*, and *Jerom* the *Egyptian*, who had alſo compil'd one of the *Phœnicians*; which ſhews that the *Mochus* of *Joſephus* and *Athenæus* was not, according to the *Jewiſh* Hiſtorian, the ſame with *Moſes*. And this yet further appears from a Paſſage of *Tatian* the *Syrian*, in his Oration to the *Greeks*, where, after he had mention'd the *Phœnicians*, he ſpeaks in this manner: "‖There were "three men among 'em, *Theodotus*, *Hypſicrates*, and *Mochus*, "whoſe Writings *Letus*, who carefully wrote the Lives of "the Philoſophers, has tranſlated into *Greek*. Whence it is concluded, that probably there has been an antient *Tyrian* Philoſopher call'd *Moſchus*, and it may be an Hiſtorian too call'd *Mochus*, quite different from the *Moſes* of the *Jews*.

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* *Thus Monſieur* Le Clerc, *in* Bibliotheque Choiſie, *tom.* 1. *p.* 75, &c.
† Lib. 1. c. 3. ‖ §. 58. *Ed. Oxon.*

Secondly,

Secondly, Whereas * Dr. *Cudworth* endeavours to prove a *Plaſtick Nature*, and ſo to baffle the *Carteſians*, who aſcribe the Production of all things to the mechanical Motion of Matter; it may be return'd to him in the firſt place, that few of the *Carteſians* now-a-days do hold, that organiz'd Bodys are the Productions of a mechanical Motion. The Author of *the Search of Truth* is of opinion, that the Bodys of all Animals have been form'd in the Ovarys of the firſt Females, and that they are only ſpread out and augmented in proceſs of time; and the ſame does he think of Plants, which the firſt Grains contain'd all in little. And thus, according to him, God himſelf *immediately* created all organiz'd Bodys. 2. It may be ſaid, that the ſame Author and ſeveral other *Carteſians* hold, that God is the immediate Author not only of the firſt Motion impreſs'd on Matter, but alſo of all the particular Motions, which he continually produces, according to the Laws which he has eſtabliſh'd. And ſo, in their Opinion, God is the Soul as it were of the corporeal World, ſeeing he immediately works all the Changes that happen in it. 3. That the Scruple which ſome may have, that for the Providence of God to concern it ſelf immediately with all things would be too perplexing and troubleſom, will preſently vaniſh, if we conſider God as an infinite Being, to whom nothing can be painful or laborious, and who is no more turmoil'd or embarraſs'd with an Infinity of Actions even at the ſame time, than if he were intirely at reſt. We ſhould not meaſure God by our ſelves, whoſe Capacitys are limited, and to whom therefore a multitude of Buſineſs is troubleſom. Nor ought we to look on him as a King, who ſeems to be credited by a variety of Miniſters; but who indeed makes uſe of 'em for no other reaſon, but purely becauſe he himſelf can't attend both to great and ſmall matters, nor be at the ſame time in all places: inſomuch that what ſeems on one hand to magnify his Power, is on the other a ſenſible Token of his Weakneſs. A King would undoubtedly be more reſpected and even rever'd by his Subjects as a kind of Divinity, could he be without all ſorts of Miniſters and Ser-

* P. 146, &c.

vants,

vants, and do every thing himſelf without trouble and pains. And we ought not to think it any worthier of God to form himſelf the Body of an Elephant than that of a Fly or Hand-worm. The Greatneſs of the Body adds nothing to the Excellence of the Work, and as much Wiſdom and Power are diſplay'd in making a little as a great *Automaton*. However I ſay, that the very ſame * Critick who urges theſe Doubts, tho indeed he does not anſwer 'em, yet neither does he think 'em ſufficient to overturn Dr. *Cudworth*'s Hypotheſis of a *Plaſtick Nature*; and therefore the rather does he himſelf afterwards urge ſome other Reaſons in favour of it, which he ſeems to think may ſerve to out-ballance the Objections againſt it.

Thirdly, Whereas † Dr. *Cudworth* contends that Men have a *natural Idea of one God*; ſome || would think to vouch Mr. *Lock*'s Authority and Reaſons to the contrary. But with him the Doctor would not, it may be, diſagree; he not expreſly ſaying that the Idea of God is *innate*, nor in any other ſenſe *natural*, than as it riſes up and appears upon the *uſe* of the *natural Faculty* of *Reaſon*.

Fourthly, Whereas the ** Doctor ſays of *Chalcidius*, that he is unqueſtionably concluded to have been a Chriſtian; the †† very Learned Dr. *Cave* has made theſe Exceptions againſt it, tho not indeed dogmatically, but with ſome kind of heſitation; ſaying "That were he, as ſome think, not only a Chriſtian, "but alſo a Deacon or Archdeacon of *Carthage*, the Title "of *Viri Clariſſimi* in the Front of his Book, would have "been improper; that in his Epiſtle to *Oſius* he never calls "him Biſhop, nay nor gives the leaſt intimation that he was "a Chriſtian, and much leſs an Eccleſiaſtical Perſon: and tho

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* *Monſieur* Le Clerc *in* Biblioth. Choiſ. *tom.* 2. *p.* 86, 87, 88, 89, 90. & *tom.* 5. *p.* 81, 82.

† *In his large Anſwer to the firſt Atheiſtical Objection.*

|| *As Monſieur* Le Clerc *has done in* Bib. Choiſ. *tom.* 3. *p.* 32. ** P. 624.

†† Me certè ἐπέχειν fateor, neque enim ſatis conſtat Philoſophus ſolum Platonicus fueritne an etiam Chriſtianus. Viri Clariſſimi titulus, qui in fronte reperitur, Diacono haud ſatis convenit, &c. *In* Script. Eccleſ. Hiſt. Lit. *p.* 149. *vol.* 1.

"he

" he more than once mentions the *Moſaick* Theology con-
" cerning the Creation, and quotes *Solomon*, the *Septuagint*,
" *Aquila*, *Symmachus* and *Origen*, and takes notice of the
" Star ſpoken of in the Goſpel, which appear'd ſoon after
" Chriſt's Nativity, *&c.* yet does not his Stile or way of
" writing ſavour at all of that of a Chriſtian, and much leſs
" of an Eccleſiaſtick. However the * Learned *Fabricius* tells us, " That after having read *Chalcidius*'s Work, and care-
" fully weigh'd Dr. *Cave*'s Objections, he is rather inclin'd
" (tho he does not aſſign his Reaſons for it) to think that
" *Chalcidius* was at leaſt a Chriſtian, but whether or no
" an Eccleſiaſtick he is in doubt. And with him *Huetius* and *Voſſius* are thus far agreed.

Fifthly, Whereas † Dr. *Cudworth* having occaſionally men-tion'd *Vectius Valens*, ſays, that he was *an Augur in the time of* Romulus; a late || Critick has hereupon made theſe Re-flections, that having conſulted the place of *Varro* from which the Doctor takes his hint, and which is to be ſeen among the *Varronian* Fragments of the eighteenth Book, *of the Antiqui-tys of human things*, he found that the Augur there meant was call'd *Vettius*; whom he thinks that Dr. *Cudworth* thro a miſtake has confounded with *Veſtius Valens* an Augur of *An-tioch*, who foretold to *Conſtantine* the Fate of *New Rome* or *Conſtantinople*. And again he found in *Varro*, that this *Vettius* liv'd in *Varro*'s own time, and not in that of *Romulus* **. However he ſays, that tho the Doctor was out in his Chrono-logy, yet his Reaſoning touching this *Vettius* holds good; that from this Inſtance it might be made probable, that a-

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* Lecto Chalcidii Opere, iiſque quæ a Doctiſſimo Caveo objiciuntur dili-gentèr expenſis, potiùs inclino in eam ſententiam, Chalcidium fuiſſe Chriſti-anum. Quòd verò Diaconus fuerit, non æquè auſim aſſerere, &c. *In* Bib-liothec. Latin. *p.* 145.

† P. 713. || *Monſieur* Le Clerc *in* Biblioth. Choiſ. *tom.* 5. *p.* 117, &c.

** *As appears from theſe Words of his:* Fuiſſe Vettium Romæ in Augurio non ignobilem, ingenio magno, cuivis docto in diſceptando parem; eum ſe audiſſe dicentem; ſi ita eſſet, ut traderent Hiſtorici de Romuli urbis con-dendæ Auguriis ac duodecem Vulturiis; quoniam centum & viginti annos (poſt Romulum) incolumis præteriiſſet Populus Romanus, ad mille & du-centos perventurum.

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mong the Heathens there have been Prophets in the Weſt, as well as a *Balaam* in the Eaſt; becauſe from the time of *Varro*, who liv'd in the Year of *Rome* 700, it was about 500 years to the fulfilling of what was foretold, that *Rome* would laſt twelve hundred years.

Sixthly, Some other Scruples might be urg'd touching *Heſiod*, *Homer*, and * *Heraclitus*, whether or no they were pure Materialiſts? As to which it may be ſaid, that the Doctor does not deny that theſe, nor indeed is it at all diſagreeable to his main Hypotheſis to own, that others alſo of the Pagans were mere Materialiſts; accordingly does he expreſly ſay this of † *Heraclitus*, in that *he acknowledg'd no other Subſtance but Body:* But however ſtill he held him and the reſt to maintain that there was one ſupreme unmade God over all the other Gods, and I think 'twill not be eaſy to overturn what he alledges to ſupport this Opinion. No, ſays a || Critick? How ſtrangely is he miſtaken, particularly touching *Heraclitus!* For how could he hold *one ſupreme God*, ſeeing he believ'd him to be Fire, and by conſequence that his Eſſence conſiſts of ſeparate and only contiguous Atoms? And the ** like he urges touching the *Egyptians*, *Pythagoras*, *Xenocrates*, *Parmenides*, &c. To which it may be anſwer'd, that tho Dr. *Cudworth* held that theſe and other Heathens aſſerted *one* ſupreme God, yet did he not mean, that they had an exact and clear Conception of him; nor in particular that *Heraclitus*, &c. had, as he ſuppoſes the Doctor to mean, an *orthodox* Notion of his *Unity* or *Oneneſs*. This, I grant, they could not have had, unleſs they conceiv'd him to be *ſpiritual* and *ſimple:* however 'tis enough for the Doctor's purpoſe, that they had ſome, tho not a diſtinct Apprehenſion of a ſupreme God, whom in ſome ſenſe they held to be *one*, as likewiſe *Scotus* undoubtedly did, notwithſtanding that, according

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* *As is done by Mr.* Le Clerc *in* Bib. Choiſ. *tom.* 2. *p.* 46. *tom.* 3. *p.* 77. *And Mr.* Bayle *in* Continuation des Penſées diverſes ecrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne a l' occaſion de la Comete qui parut au Mois de Decembre 1680. *p.* 495. *tom.* 2. † Int. Syſt. *p.* 378.

|| *Monſieur* Bayle, *ib.* ** Continuation, *&c. tom.* 1. p. 332, 333, 334, &c.

to this * Writer, he aſſerted the Divine Attributes to be *things really diſtinct* from each other. Other little Doubts might alſo be ſtarted, as † whether or no *Arius* were a *Platonick?* And again, ‖ touching what the Doctor has ſaid of *Infinity*; alſo whether finite Spirits do never exiſt but in corporeal Vehicles, or ſome tenuious Veſtments of *Matter*, &c? But in a word, I ſay of theſe and ſome other Scruples, which might be offer'd, that I am the leſs concern'd to ſolve 'em; becauſe which way ſoever they are decided, the main Doctrines advanc'd in the *Intellectual Syſtem*, and from it in this Book, will ſtand unſhaken. However one Critick lately pointed at ſtands ſo very full in my way, that before I paſs on and compaſs my Stage, I can't but change a few words with him; and that becauſe I find that in reference to one of the matters aforeſaid he is more ſevere than all others, and infers that from it to Dr. *Cudworth*'s diſadvantage, from which I think my ſelf bound to clear him; as alſo to put in ſomething by the way in Dr. *Grew*'s favor, and that becauſe ** I have largely confirm'd the Hint given by the former, from that Doctrine of his for my purpoſe elſewhere, by reaſon of which he is jointly cenſur'd with Dr. *Cudworth*; and that in ſuch a manner too, as tends to depretiate and pervert both their and my Attempt; inaſmuch as one great Method of carrying it on is repreſented not only as fruſtraneous, but alſo as occaſionally producing a quite oppoſite effect from what it was firſt deſign'd to do. While in general 'tis ſaid of both theſe Doctors, that they among other unlucky Blunderers inſtead of ſubduing have ſtrengthen'd Atheiſm, *and beſide their Intention, have arm'd the Enemy they were to oppoſe* ††. This,

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* *In* Continuation des Penſées diverſes, *&c. tom.* 1. *p.* 533.

† *As is done by* Petavius *in* Dogmat. Theolog. *tom.* 2. *l.* 1. *c.* 1. *and by Mr.* Le Clerc *in* Bib. Choiſ. *tom.* 3. *p.* 92, &c.

‖ *As the Author laſt refer'd to has done in* Bib. Choiſ. *tom.* 5. *p.* 50, 56, 59.

** P. 617, 618, *&c. of this Treatiſe.*

†† Nous voions tous les Jours, que ceux qui combatent le plus vivement l'Atheiſme, lui donnent des Armes ſans y penſer. Mr. *Cudworth* & Mr. *Grew*, tres-grand Philoſophes en ſont un Exemple. *Mr.* Bayle *in* Continuation, *&c. tom.* 1. *p.* 90. *And to the ſame purpoſe in* tom. 1. p. 530.

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as * I have before hinted, would have been a moſt unhappy and fatal Miſcarriage, had it been really ſo, as is ſaid! But how does he go about to make good his Charge? Why he tells us, " † That they diſdaining to confirm and " illuſtrate the *Carteſian* Hypotheſis, according to which the " Spirituality of God may beſt be maintain'd, thought it " more for their Credit to fortify the reeling and almoſt " ruin'd Sect of the *Peripateticks*, that is, to ſet out in a " clearer Light and under a new guiſe the Doctrine of *ſub-* " *ſtantial Forms*; the one by illuſtrating the Syſtem of the " *Plaſtick Faculty*, and the other by ſuppoſing a *Vital World* " diſtinct from the material. By which means it can't be " imagin'd how they injure a good Cauſe, tho at the ſame " time they no way intended it. Nothing, ſays he, does " more puzzle the Atheiſts, than when they find them- " ſelves reduc'd to aſcribe the Formation of Animals to a " Cauſe, which has no Idea or Knowledg of what it does, " and which regularly executes a Plan, without under- " ſtanding the Rules which it practiſes. Yet this is the " Caſe of Dr. *Cudworth*'s *Plaſtick Form* and of Dr. *Grew*'s " *Vital Principle*; and ſo do they take from this Objection " againſt Atheiſts all its Force. For if God could impart " to Matter this Plaſtick Power, *&c.* then is this a plain " ſign, that it is not repugnant to the nature of things, that " there ſhould be ſuch Agents; and from this 'twill be in- " fer'd, that 'tis poſſible for 'em to exiſt of themſelves, *&c.* *Anſw.* Touching this, I ſay in the firſt place, that on one hand both thoſe Doctors are far from declaring expreſly againſt *Carteſianiſm* as ſuch, and accordingly do they not

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* *At* p. 81. *of this Introduction.*

† Ils n'ont pas trouve, qu'il fût digne d'eux de fortifier & d'eclarcir l' Hypotheſe Carteſienne, qui eſt dans le fond la plus capable de ſoutenir la Spiritualité de Dieu: ils ont trouvé plus de Gloire à fortifier la ſecte chancellante & preſqu' aterrée des Peripateticiens, je veux dire, a metre dans un plus beau Jour & ſous une nouvelle face la Doctrine des Formes ſubſtantialles, l'un en illuſtrant le Syſteme de la Faculté Plaſtique, l' autre en ſuppoſant un Monde Vital diſtinct du Monde Materiel, *&c.* *In* Continuation des Penſées diverſes, &c. *tom.* 1. *p.* 90, 91.

make it their concern to oppoſe it any further than as they find it againſt the Truth. And again on the other hand, much leſs do they eſpouſe the Sentiments of *Ariſtotle*, or take upon them to revive the Doctrine of *Subſtantial Forms*, but rather quite the contrary; Dr. *Cudworth* in particular, of whom I'm here chiefly concern'd to ſpeak, very often finding fault with and exploding it: and it may be truly ſaid of him, that if he was any way bigotted or partial, it was in matters of Theology to the *Platonicks*, and of Phyſiology to the Atomicks; which latter again by the way is an Argument, that he could not be utterly averſe to *Des Cartes*, he being alſo a *Corpuſcularian*, and one of thoſe who deal in Atoms. But ſecondly, how then comes our Author to aſſert quite the contrary, and that Dr. *Cudworth* and alſo Dr. *Grew* abetted the Sentiment of *Ariſtotle?* Why it is, as we find in his words, becauſe the one held a *Plaſtick Nature*, the other a *Vital Principle* in the World. But what Connection, pray, is there between theſe Premiſes and the Inference drawn from them? Or do either of theſe Principles fall in with the Notion of *Subſtantial Forms?* Neither the *Plaſtick Nature* nor *Vital Principle* is, according to theſe Doctors, a Faculty or Power of *Body* exiſting in it as in its Subject, as *Subſtantial Forms* are ſaid to do in *Matter*; nor is either of 'em included in the Idea of *Matter*, as being at leaſt dependent on it, and therefore term'd *material:* but one and t'other are look'd on as *Incorporeal Subſtance*, wholly diſtinct from *Body* or *Matter*, which in particular Compounds alſo is not a conſtituent part of the Eſſence; and tho it be indeed immediately concern'd in the firſt Formation, the Conſervation and Motion of the Organs, yet does it not properly belong to 'em, it ſelf being ingenerable and incorruptible, and not at firſt educ'd out of the Power of Matter, nor again periſhing with the Diſſolution of this or that particular Syſtem of it, as the *Subſtantial Forms* of *Ariſtotle* do. But thirdly I ſay, allowing theſe Doctors to be Favourers not of *Des Cartes* but *Ariſtotle*, and ſo to be Aſſertors of *Subſtantial Forms*; yet do I not ſee, but that under this Character they might ſtill very well defend

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the *Spirituality of God*; nor do I find, that any who have taken up the Doctrines of the latter, have in this reſpect done any the leaſt prejudice to thoſe of the former. And laſtly, whereas this Writer ſeems to ſuppoſe, that, according to the Doctors aforeſaid, God has given ſuch Powers to Matter, as tho blind, yet can model and act it in thoſe various ways which are viſible in Nature; and this, it is infer'd, would make way for the Atheiſt's Surmiſe, That if God (as according to theſe Theiſts) has given ſuch Powers to *Matter*, this proves them to be in themſelves not repugnant to or incompatible with Matter; Whereupon the Atheiſt makes bold to take a ſtep further, and ſay, that having paſs'd this rub, that it is poſſible for Matter to move it ſelf, and that in a methodical orderly way, it is yet eaſier to ſuppoſe that Matter has been eternal; from which the conſequence is, that it may be the Things of Nature have exiſted and been form'd without a ſuper-intending Cauſe or God: In anſwer to this I ſay in the firſt place, that whatever Liberty the Atheiſt may raſhly take, yet no wiſe Man would venture to argue, eſpecially touching Points of this importance, that becauſe a thing *may be*, therefore it *is*; or at leaſt that becauſe a thing is *poſſible* to be done by a *Divine Power*, therefore it may be ſo *of it ſelf*. However ſecondly I deny the Suppoſition here made, the Doctors aforeſaid not holding that God has at all given ſuch Powers to Matter, by which it can move and model it ſelf, nor this eſpecially in way of Propertys or Accidents, or Things that any way belong to it as their Subject; but they aſſert 'em to be intirely diſtinct from Matter, and thoſe alſo Subſtances of another Order. Which immaterial Subſtances, however I grant, if they were held to move by themſelves in the Formation of Things, without having their Actions over-rul'd by God, would indeed give ſome ground to the *Stratonick* Atheiſts to object, that the Regularity of the World in general and of its Parts does not directly prove that there is a God. But thirdly I ſay, that this is not what our Philoſophers aſſert; they do not hold theſe *Natures* to act by themſelves, but only as Inſtruments

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in the hand of God, whoſe Exiſtence and Providence they further evince from the Order and Beauty of natural things. And he, they reckon, has in his all-comprehending Mind a Plan of his Deſigns, and the Laws by which Matter is mov'd and acted: but as for the *Plaſtick* and *Vital Natures*, theſe they regard as only ſubaltern or inſtrumental Cauſes, and therefore judg it not neceſſary that they ſhould know the Ends of the principal Cauſe; neither yet can it be any more argu'd from this, that the World was form'd without a moſt wiſe Contrivance and Deſign, "than that a "Building was made without Art, becauſe not only the "Hammers, the Rules, the Squares, the Compaſſes, the "Axes, the Saws, but alſo the Hands of the Men that us'd "'em are things without Knowledg of what they did. It "ſuffices that the Mind of the Architect directed all theſe, "and employ'd 'em for compaſſing his Ends. Accordingly after all I found the Charge made upon Dr. *Cudworth* and Dr. *Grew* to be ſo very unjuſt and groundleſs, that it put me hard to it to gueſs, how it ſhould ever enter into the mind of a Perſon of Monſieur *Bayle*'s Ingenuity and Learning; and at length upon enquiry I perceiv'd, that if under a miſtake he ſeems to lay the blame upon Monſieur *Le Clerc*, in that * he tells us, that he had notice of the Doctrines he cenſures, only from his *Bibliotheque Choiſie*: whereupon I immediately conſulted that Work, and after having done ſo, could not but do ſo much Juſtice in this to the Author of it, as to acknowledg, that what he has abſtracted as well of others as of the Points aforeſaid is faithfully enough done, and the Original not miſrepreſented, in the way that Monſieur *Bayle* has been pleas'd to cenſure; but † of this I leave Mr. *Le Clerc* to ſpeak for himſelf. However that Critick, e'en as if he were thus far in the right, ſeems to acquieſce in what he has advanc'd, and proceeds to ‖ threaten Dr. *Cudworth* yet further, That *if he underſtood* Engliſh, *he would perhaps make a long Digreſſion to examine the Doctor's Proofs, that the Pagans*

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* Continuation, *&c.* p. 332. tom. 1, *&c.*

† *In* Bib. Choiſ. *tom.* 5. *article* 4. *beginning at* p. 283.

‖ *In* Continuation, *&c. tom.* 1. ibid.

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universally believ'd one supreme God: But, I think, he would do much better to keep his way, and, unless he level his Darts with an exacter aim than he did before, to let that Work alone.

Thus out of Zeal for the *Glory* of God, I have dar'd to intermeddle with various Subjects, and the differing Sentiments of Men, even in Points of the highest importance: Whereupon if any one, who thinks not as I think, be mov'd to find fault with me upon a just ground, I'll modestly retract my Error; but if upon an unjust, thro the help of Him, whose Cause I undertook to fight for, I'll stand my ground, and still endeavour to maintain the Truth.

The End of the Introduction.

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THE REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM CONFUTED.

CHAP. I.

An Account of the Atomical Phyſiology; *of its Nature and Original: Of its true and genuine Tendency on one hand, as it leads to the Notion of Incorporeal Subſtance, of God, of finite Spirits, Souls,* &c. *and on t'other, as it has been perverted, and unjuſtly made a Ground of the* Democritick *Fate, or the material Neceſſity and abſolute Mechaniſm of all things, that is, of downright Atheiſm.*

FAtaliſts, or thoſe who hold the *Neceſſity* of Human Actions and Events, may be reduc'd to three Heads: Firſt, ſuch as aſſerting the Deity, ſuppoſe it irreſpectively to decree and determine all Things, and thereby make all Actions *neceſſary* to us; and in this Rank have been indeed ſome of

the *Philoſophers*, but chiefly ſome modern Heterodox *Chriſtians*. Secondly, ſuch as ſuppoſe a Deity, which acting wiſely, but neceſſarily, contriv'd the general Frame of things in the World; from which by a Series or Concatenation of Cauſes unavoidably reſults whatſoever is now done in it: in this Rank were the antient *Stoicks*, *Zeno* and *Chryſippus*, whom the *Jewiſh Eſſenes* ſeem to have follow'd. Laſtly, ſuch as hold the *material Neceſſity*, or mere Mechaniſm of all things without a Deity; to whom I therefore give the Name of Atheiſts: and theſe latter eſpecially are thoſe Enemys of God and Religion, with whom I am at preſent reſolv'd to ingage. Now I ſay, that to maintain with *Democritus* and others the abſolute Neceſſity of all Actions and Events whatſoever, is plainly to ſerve the Cauſe of Atheiſm, and to undermine Religion; in that it is either expreſly, or at leaſt in effect to deny a God, by ſuppoſing him to be, what, according to the true Notion of him, he cannot be; and with reference to Men, it is at once to take away all Merit and Demerit, Reward and Puniſhment, and ſo to render all Human Duty groundleſs, and a Day of Judgment ridiculous.

This is the only Form of Atheiſm that has publickly appear'd upon the Stage as an intire *Philoſophick* Syſtem, or that has been much taken notice of for two thouſand Years paſt; yet this withal it is, which ſtill has ſome Countenance and Vogue in the World: and therefore I ſhall think it worth my while to examine and confute it.

But now the Suppoſition of the *material Neceſſity* of all Things being grounded on the *Atomick Phyſiology*, I ſhall firſt be oblig'd to account for this latter, before

I can proceed to explode the former. The *Atomical Phyſiology* ſuppoſes that *Body* is nothing elſe but extended Bulk, and therefore aſcribes nothing to it, but what is included in the Nature and Idea of this: namely, more or leſs Magnitude, with Diviſibility into Parts, Figure, and Poſition; as alſo Motion or Reſt: but ſo, as that no Part of *Body* can ever move it ſelf, but is always mov'd by ſomething elſe. Conſequently it ſuppoſes that there is no need of any other Thing, beſides theſe ſimple Elements of Magnitude, Figure, Site, and Local Motion, that is, the different Modes of extended Subſtances, to ſolve the Corporeal *Phænomena* by. Thus do they deny *ſubſtantial Forms* and *real Qualitys*, making 'em to be the mere Reſult of Bodys, as they are thus or thus diſpos'd; and maintaining that the latter, tho vulgarly conceiv'd to be in the ſenſible Objects *without* us, yet are only Paſſions, Fancys, and Senſations *within* us.

The Invention of this *Phyſiology* is father'd by many on *Democritus*; by others on *Leucippus*, who was ſomewhat his Senior; by *Ariſtotle* and his Followers, on both of them together; and by *Plato*, on *Protagoras*, as may be largely ſeen in his *Thæetetus*. But the Opinion of *Poſidonius* ſeems to me more probable, who traces the Riſe of this *Philoſophy* much higher, aſcribing, as *Empiricus* tells us, the firſt Invention of it to one *Moſchus* a *Phœnician*, who, as *Strabo* alſo notes, liv'd before the *Trojan* War, and is probably the ſame with that *Mochus* a *Phœnician Naturaliſt* mention'd by *Jamblichus*; with whoſe Succeſſors, he tells us, that *Pythagoras* convers'd, while he ſojourn'd at *Sidon*, and was, it is likely inſtructed by them in the *Atomical Phyſiology*. Alſo this *Moſchus* or *Mochus* is ſuppos'd

by *Arcerius* the Editor of *Jamblichus*, and by Mr. *Selden*, to be the celebrated *Moſes* of the *Jews*, as alſo his Succeſſors to be the *Jewiſh Philoſophers*, *Prieſts*, and *Prophets*.

This way of Philoſophizing was alſo taken up by many others of the Antients, as by *Empedocles*, *Anaxagoras*, *Ecphantus* the *Syracuſian*, *Xenocrates*, *Heraclides*, *Aſclepiades*, *Diodorus*, *Metrodorus Chius*, *Archelaus* and others, who yet were no Favourers of Atheiſm. But as it muſt indeed be own'd that *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Protagoras*, building upon the ſame Principles, tho they did not firſt invent, yet firſt reduc'd the *Atomical Phyſiology* to a compleat and intire Syſtem: So were they likewiſe the firſt that expreſly deriv'd the Original of all Things in the Univerſe from ſenſleſs and empty Space, and by conſequence admitted of no God or Firſt Being, not even ſo much as a Corporeal one. Whereas thoſe before nam'd, tho they did indeed account for whatever is Corporeal in the *Atomical* Way, yet beſides this, acknowledg'd ſomething elſe, which is not mere *Bulk* and *Mechaniſm*; but *Life* and *Self-Activity*, that is, Immaterial and Spiritual Subſtance; the Head and Summity whereof is a God, diſtinct from the World. And to them, I take notice by the way, agreed in this admiſſion of Incorporeal Subſtance many others of the Antients, as *Pherecydes Syrus*, *Thales*, *Parmenides*, *Meliſſus*, *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Plotinus*, &c. This I thought fit to remark, at once to aſcertain the Belief of Incorporeal Subſtance, and conſequent to that the Immortality of Human Soul, as maintain'd among the Antients; and particularly in this place, occaſionally to vindicate the *Corpuſcular Philoſophy*, which tho ſome formerly have, and others do ſtill carry ſo far, as to

apply

apply it to all *Phænomena*, and ſo to make it ſerve the Cauſe of *Atheiſm*; yet *Atomiſm* as ſuch, has not always been join'd with an univerſal Corporealiſm, and therefore in it ſelf, as alſo appears by Inſtances of many, who embrac'd it with reference to mere Corporeal Subſtances, it is ſo very far from tending to that purpoſe, that, as it will be plain from what I ſhall now add, it mightily ſerves the Deſign of *Theiſm*, and is very well conſiſtent with, nay introductory to the Notion of *Incorporeal Subſtance:* Foraſmuch as the *Atomical Phyſiology* ſeems to have had its Origin and Riſe from the Strength of *Reaſon*, exerting its own inward active Power and Vigour, and thereby bearing up it ſelf againſt the Prejudices of *Senſe*, and at length prevailing over them after this manner.

The *Antients* conſidering and revolving the Ideas of their own Mind, found themſelves to have a clear conception of two Things, as the general Heads and Principles of whatſoever was in the Univerſe: the one whereof was *Paſſive Matter*; the other *Active Power* and *Vertue*. To the latter of which belong both Cogitation and alſo the Power of moving Matter, whether by expreſs Conſciouſneſs or otherwiſe; both which together may be call'd by one general Name of *Life*. So that they made theſe two Heads of Entity or Being, namely Paſſive Matter or Bulk, and Self-Activity or Life: the former of which was call'd by the *Greeks* [τὸ πάσχον] *the ſuffering and receiving Principle*; the latter [τὸ ποιοῦν] *the active Principle*, or [τὸ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις] *that from whence Motion proceeds*. And the ſame was the Sentiment not only of *Cicero* and *Seneca*, but alſo of moſt of the other Antient *Latins*.

Now as they apprehended a Neceſſity of theſe two Principles, ſo they conceiv'd them to be ſuch as could

not

not be confounded together into one and the ſame Thing or Subſtance; they having Ideas and Characters ſo eſſentially differing from one another: and indeed the Generality of the antient *Stoicks* were the only Perſons, who offering violence to their Apprehenſions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make theſe two diſtinct Things to be one and the ſame Subſtance. Wherefore as the firſt of theſe, namely *Matter* or Paſſive extended Bulk, is taken by all for Subſtance, and commonly call'd by the Name of *Body*: So the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that which acts upon the *Matter* and has a commanding Power over it, muſt needs be Subſtance too, of a different kind from *Matter* or *Body*, and therefore immaterial or incorporeal. Neither did they find any other Entity to be conceivable beſides theſe two, *Paſſive* Bulk or Extenſion, which is Corporeal Subſtance; and internal *Self-Activity* or *Life*, which is the eſſential Character of Subſtance Incorporeal: to which latter belongs not only Cogitation, but alſo the Power of moving *Body*.

Moreover, when they further conſider'd the firſt of theſe, the Material or Corporeal Principle, they being not able clearly to conceive any thing elſe in it, but Magnitude, Figure, Site, and Motion or Reſt, which are all but ſeveral Modes of extended Bulk, concluded therefore according to Reaſon, that there was really nothing elſe exiſting in Bodys *without*, beſides the various Complexions and Conjugations of thoſe ſimple Elements, that is, nothing elſe but *Mechaniſm*. Whence it neceſſarily follow'd, that whatſoever elſe was ſuppos'd to be *in* Bodys, was indeed nothing but our Modes of *Senſation*, or the *Paſſions* or *Fancys* in us, begotten from them, and miſtaken for things really exiſting *without us*. This is ſo obvious, that ſome of

thoſe Philoſophers who had taken little notice of the Atomical *Phyſiology*, particularly *Plotinus*, had notwithſtanding a Suſpicion of it. Wherefore I ſay that the *Antients* concluded the abſolute Nature of Corporeal Things in themſelves to be nothing but a certain Diſpoſition of Parts, in reſpect of Magnitude, Figure, Site, and Motion, which in Taſts do cauſe us to be differently affected with thoſe *Senſations* of Sweetneſs and Bitterneſs, and in Sight with thoſe of Colours, and accordingly in the other Senſes with other reſpective *Fancys*; and that the Corporeal World was to be explain'd by theſe two Things, whereof one is *abſolute* in the *Bodys* without us, the various Mechaniſm of them; the other *relative* only to us, the different *Fancys* in us, caus'd by the reſpective Differences of them in themſelves. Which *Fancys* or Fantaſtick Ideas are no Modes of the Bodys without us, but of that only in our ſelves, which is cogitative or ſelf-active, that is, incorporeal. For the ſenſible Ideas of hot and cold, red and green, *&c.* cannot be clearly conceiv'd by us as Modes of the Bodys without us: but they may be eaſily apprehended as Modes of *Cogitation*, that is, of Senſation or Sympathetical Perception in us. The Reſult of all which was, that whatſoever is either in our ſelves or the whole World, was to be reduc'd to one or other of theſe two Principles: paſſive *Matter*, and extended Bulk or ſelf-active *Power* and Vertue; Corporeal or Incorporeal *Subſtance*; *Mechaniſm* or *Life*: or elſe to a Complication of them both together.

From this general Account we have given of the Atomical *Phyſiology* it appears, that the Doctrine of Incorporeal Subſtance ſprung up together with it. But this will be further manifeſt from that which follows:

lows: for we ſhall in the next place ſhew how this Philoſophy did in a ſpecial manner owe its Original to the improvement of one particular Principle of Reaſon over and above all the reſt; namely, that famous Axiom ſo much talk'd of among the Antients:

De Nihilo Nihil, in Nihilum Nil poſſe reverti:

That Nothing can come from Nothing, nor go to Nothing. For tho *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, and *Lucretius* abus'd this Theorem, endeavouring to carry it further than the Intention of the firſt Atomiſts, to the diſproving of a Divine Creation of any Thing out of Nothing, and conſequently alſo of a Deity; yet as the Meaning of it was at firſt confin'd and reſtrain'd, that *Nothing* of it ſelf or in the ordinary Courſe of Nature *could come from Nothing or go to Nothing*; it is not only an undoubted Rule of Reaſon in it ſelf, but was alſo the chief Original of that Atomical *Phyſiology*, which tho it diſcarded *Forms* and *Qualitys*, and acknowledg'd really nothing elſe in *Body*, beſides Mechaniſm; yet at once eſpous'd the Belief of a diſtinct unbody'd Subſtance: and in this was it upheld by many other of the Antient Philoſophers, who were nevertheleſs Theiſts and Incorporealiſts, tho they at once built the Structure of their Phyſicks upon the ſame Foundation: ſuch were *Parmenides*, *Meliſſus*, *Zeno*, *Xenophanes*, *Anaxagoras*, *Empedocles*, &c. as is witneſs'd by *Ariſtotle*, *Simplicius*, and *Sextus* the Philoſopher.

But now why they made ſuch a mighty ſtir about, and ſo zealouſly drove at this Principle, I come next to make appear. One thing, which they all aim'd at, who inſiſted upon it, was the eſtabliſhing of ſome Atomical *Phyſiology* or other, and generally of that which

which takes away all *Forms* and *Qualitys* of Body, as Entitys really diſtinct from the *Matter* and *Subſtance*, and reſolves all into *Mechaniſm* and *Fancy*. For it is plain, that if the *Forms* and *Qualitys* of Bodys be Entitys really diſtinct from the Subſtance, and its various Modifications of Figure, Site, and Motion; that then, I ſay, in all the Changes and Tranſmigrations of Nature, all the Generations and Alterations of *Bodys* (thoſe *Forms* and *Qualitys* being ſuppos'd to have no real Exiſtence any where before) *Something* muſt of neceſſity be created or produc'd miraculouſly out of *Nothing*; as likewiſe reduc'd into *Nothing* in the Corruptions of them, they having no *Body* any where afterward. But that in all the *Protean* Transformations of Nature, which happen continually, there ſhould be real Entitys thus perpetually produc'd out of *Nothing* and reduc'd to *Nothing*, ſeem'd to be ſo great a Paradox to the *Antients*, that they could by no means admit of it. Becauſe, as we have before declar'd, firſt they concluded it clearly impoſſible by Reaſon, that any real Entity ſhould of it ſelf riſe out of *Nothing*; and ſecondly they thought it very abſurd to bring God upon the Stage at every turn with his miraculous extraordinary Power; as alſo that every thing might be made out of every thing: and then again there would be no Cauſe in Nature for the Production of one thing rather than another, and at this time rather than that, if they were miraculouſly made out of *Nothing*. Wherefore they ſagaciouſly apprehended, that there muſt needs be ſome other Myſtery or Intrigue of *Nature* in this buſineſs than was commonly dreamt of or ſuſpected: which they concluded to be this, that in all theſe Transformations there were no ſuch real Entitys of *Forms* and *Qualitys* diſtinct from the *Matter* and

the various Diſpoſitions of its Parts in reſpect of Figure, Site, and Motion (as is vulgarly ſuppos'd) produc'd and deſtroy'd; but that all theſe Feats were done either by the Concretion and Secretion of actually inexiſtent Parts, or elſe by the different Modifications of the ſame præ-exiſtent *Matter*, or the inſenſible Parts thereof. This only being added hereunto, that from thoſe different Modifications of the ſmall Particles of *Bodys*, they being not ſo diſtinctly perceiv'd by our Senſes, there are begotten in us certain confus'd *Phaſmata* or *Phantaſmata*, Apparitions, Fancys, and Paſſions, as of Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, and the like, which are vulgarly miſtaken for *Real Qualitys* exiſting in the Bodys without us: whereas indeed there is nothing abſolutely in the Bodys themſelves like to thoſe *Fantaſtick Ideas* which we have of them; and yet they are wiſely contriv'd by the Author of Nature for the adorning and embelliſhing of the Corporeal World to us. And thus they concluded that all the *Phænomena* of inanimate Bodys and their various Transformations might be clearly reſolv'd into theſe two things; partly ſomething that is *real* and *abſolute* in the Bodys themſelves, which is nothing but their different Mechaniſm or Diſpoſition of Parts in reſpect of Figure, Site, and Motion; and partly ſomething that is *relative* to, and Fantaſtical or appearing in the Sentient.

Thus, I ſay, began the Atomical Phyſiology from this Principle of Reaſon, that *Nothing* (of it ſelf) *comes from Nothing*, or *goes to Nothing*. Only 'tis remarkable that *Anaxagoras*, tho at once an Atomiſt and building too upon this Principle, yet, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves, being unable to reſolve all Corporeal *Phænomena* into Mechaniſm and Fancy, fram'd a new kind of *Atomology* of his own, in ſuppoſing the whole Corporeal World,

or Maſs of *Matter*, to conſiſt of ſimilar Atoms, that is, of ſuch as were originally endu'd with all thoſe different *Forms* and *Qualitys*, that are vulgarly conceiv'd to be in Bodys, ſome Bony, ſome Fleſhy, ſome Firy, ſome Watry, ſome White, ſome Black, ſome Bitter, ſome Sweet, and the like; ſo that all Bodys whatſoever had ſome of all ſorts of theſe Atoms which are in a manner infinite, ſpecifically differing from one another in them. But of this only by the way.

I proceed in the next place to ſhew how this very ſame Principle of Reaſon, which generally induc'd the Antients to reject *Subſtantial Forms* and *Qualitys* in Bodys, and to Phyſiologize Atomically, led them alſo unavoidably to aſſert Incorporeal Subſtances, and that the Souls of Men and Animals were ſuch, neither generated nor corrupted. Becauſe tho, as I have ſaid, they held that the *Forms* and *Qualitys* of Bodys are generated and corrupted in the ordinary Courſe, and therefore concluded that they are not real Entitys, diſtinct from the Subſtance of *Matter* and its Modifications: Yet as for the Souls of Men and Animals, which are endu'd with *Reaſon* and *Life*, theſe they apprehended to be real Entitys, diſtinct from the Subſtance and Mechaniſm of *Body*; and that therefore to make the Souls of Men or Brutes to riſe out of *Matter*, whenſoever either of 'em is generated, would be plainly to make a *real* Entity come out of *Nothing*, which is naturally impoſſible.

Wherefore theſe *Antients* conceiv'd a great difference betwixt the Souls whether of Men or Animals, and the *Forms* and *Qualitys* of inanimate Bodys, and conſequently betwixt their ſeveral Productions. Foraſmuch as in the Generation of inanimate Bodys, there is no new *real* Entity acquir'd, diſtinct from the Subſtance

of the Thing it ſelf, but only a peculiar Modification of it: but in the Generation of Men and Animals, beſides the new Diſpoſition of the Parts of *Matter* and its Organization, there is alſo the Acquiſition and Conjunction of another *real* Entity or Subſtance, diſtinct from the *Matter* and its Modifications; which could not be generated out of it, but muſt needs come into it ſome other way. To this purpoſe it is obſervable that even *Anaxagoras* himſelf, tho he conceiv'd a kind of *ſimilar, ſpecifick Atoms* to exiſt before Generations and after Corruptions, always immutably the ſame, yet did not ſuppoſe any *ſenſitive* or *rational Atoms*. The Reaſon whereof could not be, that he did not think Senſe and Underſtanding to be as *real Entitys* as Hot and Cold, Red and Green, *&c.* but becauſe they could not be ſuppos'd to be Corporeal *Forms* or *Qualitys*; and therefore muſt needs belong to another Subſtance, which is incorporeal and diſtinct from Body: ſo that he could not but acknowledg that all *Souls* and *Lives* did præ and poſt-exiſt by themſelves, as well as thoſe Corporeal *Forms* and *Qualitys* in his Homogeneous Atoms.

And now it is already manifeſt, that from the ſame Principle of Reaſon, that *Nothing* (of it ſelf) *can come from Nothing* or *go to Nothing*, the antient Philoſophers were likewiſe induc'd to aſſert the Soul's Immortality, together with its Incorporeity or Diſtinctneſs from the Body. No ſubſtantial *Entity* or *Being* ever vaniſheth of it ſelf into Nothing; for if it does, then in length of Time *All* might come to *Nothing*: but the Soul is a ſubſtantial Entity, really diſtinct from the *Body*, and not a mere Modification of it; and therefore when a Man dies, his Soul muſt ſtill remain and continue to have a Being ſomewhere elſe in the Univerſe. All Changes, that are in *Nature*, are either accidental

† Transfor-

Transformations and different Modifications of the same Substance, or else they are Conjunctions and Separations, or *Anagrammatical* Transpositions of things in the World, the Substance of the *Whole* remaining always the same. So that the Soul, which is now fled and gone from a lifeless Carcase, is only a loss to that particular Body or Compages of *Matter*, which by means thereof is now disanimated: but it is no loss to the *Whole*, it being but only transpos'd in the Universe, and lodg'd elsewhere.

It is also further evident, that this same Principle which thus induc'd the Antients to hold the Soul's Immortality or its future Permanency after Death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its *Præexistence*, and consequently its *Transmigration*; for that which præ-existed the Generation of any Animal, and was then somewhere else, but at length moves into the Body of that Animal, what, I say, does that do, but *transmigrate* into it? But as for that other *Transmigration* of Human Souls into the Bodys of Brutes, tho it cannot be deny'd that many of these Antients admitted it likewise; yet *Timæus Locrus*, and divers others of the *Pythagoreans* rejected it any otherwise, than as it might be taken for an Allegorical Description of that beastly Transformation which is made of Mens Souls by Vice. Agreeably to this, *Aristotle* tells us, That *the antient Philosophers were of nothing more cautious than to admit that any Thing can be made out of Nothing præ-existent*; and therefore they must unavoidably conclude, that the Souls of all Animals præ-existed their Generations. Neither was there ever any of the Antients before *Christianity*, that held the Soul's future Permanency after Death, who did not likewise hold its *Præ-existence*; they clearly perceiving that if it were once

once granted that the Soul was generated, it could never be prov'd but that it might alſo be corrupted. And therefore the Aſſerters of the Soul's Immortality moſt commonly begun here: Firſt to prove its *Præ-exiſtence*, proceeding thence to eſtabliſh its Permanency after Death. This was the Method us'd by *Plato*; and before him the chief Demonſtration of the Soul's *Præexiſtence* among the Antients was this, that it is an *Entity* really diſtinct from *Body* or *Matter*, and the Modifications of it; and no real or ſubſtantial Entity can either ſpring of it ſelf out of *Nothing*, or be made out of any other Subſtance diſtinct from it, becauſe no Thing can be made of no Thing either inexiſting or præ-exiſting; all *natural Generations* being but the various Diſpoſitions and Modifications of what before exiſted in the Univerſe.

But there was nothing of Soul or Mind inexiſting and præ-exiſting in Body before, there being nothing of *Life* and *Cogitation* in Magnitude, Figure, Site and Motion. Wherefore this muſt needs be not a Thing made or generated, as Corporeal *Forms* and *Qualitys* are, but ſuch as hath a Being in Nature ingenerably and incorruptibly. The *Mechaniſm* of Human Body is indeed a Thing made and generated, it being only a different Modification of what was before exiſtent, and having no new Entity in it diſtinct from the Subſtance: and the *Totum* or Compound of a Man or Animal may be ſaid to be generated and corrupted, in regard of the Union and Diſunion, the Conjunction and Separation of thoſe two Parts, the Soul and Body. But the *Soul* it ſelf, according to theſe Principles, is a Thing neither generable nor corruptible, but was as well before the Generation, and will be after the Deaths and Corruptions of Men, as the Subſtance of their *Bodys*, which

is

is ſuppos'd by all to have been either Eternal or from the firſt *Creation*, and no Part of it to be annihilated or loſt after Death, but only ſcatter'd and diſpers'd in the Univerſe.

Thus the antient *Atomiſts* concluded that *Souls* and *Lives* being ſubſtantial Entitys by themſelves, were all of them as old as any other Subſtance, and as the whole Maſs of Matter, and every the ſmalleſt Atom of it is: that is, they who maintain'd the Eternity of the World, did conſequently aſſert the Eternity of *Souls* or *Minds*; but they who conceiv'd it to have had a temporary Beginning or Creation, held the Souls to be coeval with it, and would by no means be induc'd to think that every Atom of ſenſleſs Matter and Particle of Duſt had ſuch a Privilege and Pre-eminence over the Souls of Men, as to be *ſenior* to them.

It is already alſo plain, that this Doctrine of the antient *Atomiſts* concerning the Immateriality and Immortality, the Præ and Poſt-exiſtence of *Souls*, was not by them confin'd to Human Souls only, but univerſally extended to all *Souls* and *Lives* whatſoever. It being a thing that was hardly ever queſtion'd by any before *Des-Cartes*, whether the Souls of Brutes had any *Senſe*, *Cogitation*, or *Conſciouſneſs* in them or no. Now all Life, Senſe, and Cogitation was undoubtedly concluded by them to be an *Entity* really diſtinct from the Subſtance of *Body*, and not the mere Modification or Mechaniſm of it; *Life* and *Mechaniſm* being two diſtinct Ideas of the Mind, which cannot be confounded together. Wherefore they reſolv'd that all *Lives* and *Souls* whatſoever, which now are in the World, ever were from the firſt beginning of it, and ever will be; that there will be no new ones produc'd, which are not already and have not always been; nor

any

any of thoſe, which now are, be deſtroy'd, any more than the Subſtance of any *Matter* will be created ro annihilated. So that the whole Syſtem of the created Univerſe conſiſting of *Body*, and particular Incorporeal Subſtances or Souls, in the ſucceſſive Generations and Corruptions or the Deaths of Men and other Animals, was, according to them, really nothing elſe but one and the ſame thing perpetually *anagrammatiz'd*, or like many different Syllables and Words variouſly and ſucceſſively compos'd out of the ſame præ-exiſtent *Elements* or Letters.

We have now declar'd how the ſame Principle of Reaſon, which made the antient *Phyſiologers* to become *Atomiſts*, muſt needs alſo induce 'em to be Incorporealiſts; how the ſame thing, which perſuaded 'em, that Corporeal *Forms* were no *real Entitys* diſtinct from the Subſtance of the Body, but only the different Modifications and Mechaniſms of it, convinc'd 'em likewiſe, that all *cogitative Beings*, all Souls and Lives whatſoever were ingenerable and incorruptible, and as well *præ-exiſtent* before the Generations of particular Animals, as *poſt-exiſtent* after their Deaths and Corruptions. This is plainly to be ſeen from the Doctrine of *Pythagoras* and others, particularly * *Empedocles* and *Plato*, ſhewing not only their own Opinion, but alſo that of the Antients before 'em. To this purpoſe the latter acquaints us that it was a ſtanding Tradition or Doctrine before his time, that as well the Living were made out of the Dead, as the Dead out of the Living, and that this was the conſtant Circle of *Nature*. Moreover the ſame † Philoſopher tells us, that ſome of

* *See* Cudworth's *True Intellect. Syſtem*, p. 40, *&c.*

† Τὶς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν.

thoſe

thoſe Antients were not without ſuſpicion, that what is now call'd *Death* was to Men more properly a Nativity or Birth into *Life*; and what is call'd Generation into Life, was comparatively rather to be accounted a ſinking into Death: the former being the Soul's Aſcent out of thoſe groſs terreſtrial *Bodys*, to a Body more thin and ſubtle; and the latter its Deſcent from a purer Body to that which is more groſs and terreſtrial. Wherefore tho it be a thing, which has not been commonly taken notice of, of late; yet we conceive it to be unqueſtionably true, that all thoſe antient Philoſophers, who inſiſted ſo much on this Principle, that no real Entity is either *generated* or **corrupted*, did therein at once drive at theſe two things: firſt the eſtabliſhing of the *Immortality* of all Souls, their *Præ* and *Poſt-exiſtence*; foraſmuch as being Entitys really diſtinct from the Body, they could neither be generated nor corrupted: and ſecondly the making of Corporeal *Forms* and *Qualitys* to be no real Entitys diſtinct from the Body and the Mechaniſm thereof, becauſe they are Things generated and corrupted, and have no *Præ* and *Poſt-exiſtence*. *Anaxagoras* in this latter point is the only Diſſenter, who ſuppoſing thoſe *Forms* and *Qualitys* to be real Entitys likewiſe, diſtinct from the Subſtance of *Body*, did therefore attribute Perpetuity of Being to them alſo, that is, *Præ* and *Poſt-exiſtence* in *ſimilar Atoms*, as well as to the Souls of Animals.

And now we have made it ſufficiently evident, that the Doctrine of the Incorporeity and Immortality of Souls, nay I might add, of their *Præ exiſtence* and *Tranſmigration*, had the ſame Original and ſtood upon the ſame Baſis with the Atomical *Phyſiology*; and therefore it ought not at all to be wonder'd at, that the

* Οὐδὲν ἄρα γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων.

ſame Philoſophers, and alſo the *Pythagoreans*, aſſerted both thoſe Doctrines, and that the antient *Atomiſts* were at once Theiſts and Incorporealiſts.

But now to declare our Senſe freely concerning this Philoſophy of the Antients, which ſeems to be ſo prodigiouſly paradoxical, in reſpect of that *Præ-exiſtence* and *Tranſmigration* of Souls. We conceive indeed that this Reaſoning of theirs from that Principle, that *Nothing*, naturally or of it ſelf, *comes from Nothing or goes to Nothing*, was not only concluſive againſt ſubſtantial *Forms* and *Qualitys* of Bodys, as really diſtinct from their Subſtance; but alſo for ſubſtantial Incorporeal Souls, and their Ingenerability out of the *Matter*; and particularly for the future *Immortality* or *Poſt-exiſtence* of all Human Souls. For ſince it is plain that they are not a mere Modification of *Body*, but an Entity or Subſtance really diſtinct from it, we have no more reaſon to think, that they can ever of themſelves vaniſh into Nothing, than that the Subſtance of the World or any part thereof can do ſo. To this we add, that this Reaſoning of the Antients would be altogether as firm and irrefragable likewiſe for the *Præ-exiſtence* and *Tranſmigration* of Souls, as it is for their *Poſt-exiſtence* and future *Immortality*, did we not (as indeed we do) ſuppoſe Souls to be created by God immediately, and infus'd in *Generations*. For they being unqueſtionably a diſtinct Subſtance from the Body; and no Subſtance, according to the ordinary Courſe of Nature, coming out of *Nothing*; muſt of neceſſity either *præ-exiſt* in the Univerſe before Generations, and *tranſmigrate* into their reſpective Bodys, or elſe come from God immediately, who is the Fountain of all, and who at firſt created all that Subſtance, which now is in the World beſides himſelf. Now the latter of theſe

was

was a thing, which those antient Philosophers would by no means admit of, they judging it altogether incongruous to bring God upon the Stage perpetually, and make him immediately interpose every where in the *Generations* of Men and all other Animals, by the miraculous Production of Souls out of *Nothing*. Notwithstanding which, if we well consider it, we shall find that there may be very good reason on the other side for the successive Divine *Creation* of Souls; namely, that God did not do all at first that ever he could or would do, and put forth all his Creative Vigor at once in a moment, ever after remaining a Spectator only of the consequent Results, and permitting *Nature* to do all alone, without the least Interposition of his at any time; just as if there were no God at all in the World. Accordingly this may be, and indeed has often been the Effect of such an *Hypothesis* as this, to make Men think that there is no other God in the World, but blind and dark *Nature*. God might also, for other good and wise Ends unknown to us, reserve to himself the continual Exercise of this his *Creative* Power in the successive Production of new Souls. And yet these Souls nevertheless, after they are once brought forth into Being, will, notwithstanding their Juniority, continue as firmly in the same, without vanishing of themselves into *Nothing*, as the Substance of senseless *Matter*, that was created many thousand Years before, will do. And thus our vulgar Hypothesis of the new Creation of Souls, as it is rational in it self, so does it sufficiently solve their Incorporeity, their future Immortality or *Post-eternity*, without introducing those offensive Absurditys of their *Præ-existence* and *Transmigration*.

But if there be any ſuch, who rather than they would allow a future Immortality or Poſt-exiſtence to all *Souls*, and therefore to thoſe of Brutes, which conſequently muſt have their ſucceſſive *Tranſmigrations*, would conclude all theſe, as likewiſe the ſenſitive Soul in Man, to be corporeal, and only allow the *rational* Soul to be diſtinct from *Matter*: to theſe we have only thus much to ſay, that they who will attribute Life, Senſe, Cogitation, Conſciouſneſs, and Self-Enjoyment, not without ſome footſteps of *Reaſon* many times, to Blood and Brains, or mere organiz'd Bodys in Brutes, will never be able clearly to defend the Incorporeity and Immortality of *Human Souls*, as moſt probably they do not intend any ſuch thing. From whence it would alſo follow, that there is no Deity diſtinct from the corporeal World. But tho there ſeems to be no very great reaſon why it ſhould be thought abſurd to grant Perpetuity of Duration to the *Souls* of Brutes, any more than to every Atom of *Matter* or Particle of Duſt that is in the whole World; yet we ſhall endeavour to ſuggeſt ſomething towards eaſing the Minds of thoſe, who are ſo much burden'd with this difficulty, namely, that they may, if they pleaſe, ſuppoſe the Souls of *Brutes*, being but ſo many particular Eradiations or Effluxes from that Source of *Life* above, whenſoever and whereſoever there is any fitly prepar'd Body capable to receive them and to be actuated by them, to have a Senſe and Fruition of themſelves in it, ſo long as it continues ſuch: but as ſoon as thoſe organiz'd *Bodys* of theirs, by reaſon of their Indiſpoſition, become uncapable of being further acted upon by them, then to be reſum'd again and retracted back to their original *Head* and *Fountain*; ſince it cannot be doubted, but what creates any Thing out of *Nothing*,

or ſends it forth from it ſelf by free and voluntary Emanation, may be able to retract the ſame back again to its original Source, or elſe to *annihilate* it at pleaſure. And I find that there have not been wanting ſome even among the *Gentile* Philoſophers, who have embrac'd this Opinion, and of whom *Porphyry* is one, who tells us, that * *every irrational Power is reſolv'd into the Life of the Whole.* Nor will this at all weaken the future Immortality or *Poſt-eternity* of Human Souls: for if we be indeed *Theiſts*, and do in good earneſt believe a Deity, according to the true Notion of it, we muſt needs then acknowledg, that all created *Being* whatſoever owes the Continuation and Perpetuity of its Exiſtence not to any Neceſſity of Nature without God and independently upon him, but to the Divine Will only. And therefore tho we had never ſo much Rational and *Philoſophical* Aſſurance, that our Souls are *immaterial* Subſtances diſtinct from the Body, yet we could not for all that have any abſolute Certainty of their *Poſt-eternity*, any otherwiſe than as it may be deriv'd to us from the Immutability and Perfection of the Divine Will and Nature, which always does that which is beſt; for the eſſential *Goodneſs* and *Wiſdom* of the Deity is the only Stability of all things: and for ought we Mortals know, there may be good reaſon, why that Grace or Favour of future Immortality and *Poſt-eternity*, which is indulg'd to Human Souls, endu'd with Reaſon, Morality, and Liberty of Will, by means whereof they are capable of *Praiſe* and *Blame*, of *Reward* and *Puniſhment*, that ſo they may be Objects for the Divine Juſtice to diſplay it ſelf upon after this Life, and in different kinds of Retribution, may notwithſtanding be deny'd to thoſe lower *Lives* and

* Λύεσθαι ἑκάστην δύναμιν εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζωὴν τοῦ παντός.

more

more contemptible Souls of *Brutes*, which are at once void of *Morality* and *Liberty*.

But if any for all this will ſtill obſtinately contend for that antient *Pythagorick* and *Empedoclean* Hypotheſis, that all Lives and Souls whatſoever are as old as the firſt Creation, and will continue to Eternity, or as long as the World does, as a thing more reaſonable and probable than our continual Creation of new Souls, by means whereof they become *Juniors* both to the Matter of the World and of their own Bodys, and withal, as they pretend, the *Divine Creative* Power is made too cheap and proſtituted a thing, as being always famulative to brutiſh and often to unlawful Luſts and undue *Conjunctions*; but eſpecially more reaſonable and probable than the continual *Decreation* and Annihilation of the Souls of Brutes: we ſhall not be unwilling to acknowledg thus much to 'em, that indeed of the two this Opinion is more tolerable than that other Extravagance of thoſe, who will either make all Souls to be *generated*, and conſequently to be corporeal, or at leaſt the *ſenſitive* Soul both in Men and Brutes. For beſides the Monſtroſity of this latter Opinion, in making two diſtinct Souls and perceptive Subſtances in every Man, which is a thing ſufficiently confuted by internal *Senſe*, it leaves us alſo in an abſolute Impoſſibility of proving the Immortality of the *rational* Soul, the Incorporeity of any Subſtance whatſoever, and by conſequence the Exiſtence of a Deity diſtinct from the corporeal World.

And as for that pretence of theirs, that ſenſleſs Matter may as well become ſenſitive and as it were kindled into *Life* and *Cogitation*, as a Body devoid of Light and Heat may be kindled into Fire and Flame; this ſeems to argue too much ignorance of the Doctrine of

† *Bodys*,

Bodys, in Perſons who are otherwiſe learned and ingenious. For the beſt *Naturaliſts* have already concluded that Fire and Flame are nothing elſe, but ſuch a Motion of the *inſenſible* Parts of a Body, as violently agitates and many times diſſipates and ſcatters 'em from each other, begetting in the mean while the *Fancys* of Light and Heat in Animals. Now there is no difficulty at all to conceive that the inſenſible Particles of a *Body*, which were before quieſcent, may be put into motion, this being no more but a new Modification of them, and not an Entity really diſtinct from the Subſtance of Body, as *Life*, *Senſe*, and *Cogitation* are. There is nothing in Fire and Flame or a kindled Body different from other Bodys, but only the *Motion* or *Mechaniſm* and *Fancy* of it. And therefore it is but a crude Conceit which the Atheiſts and Corporealiſts of former times have been always ſo fond of, that Souls are nothing but *firy* or *flammeous Bodys*. For tho Heat in the Bodys of Animals be a neceſſary Inſtrument for Soul and Life to act by in them, yet is it a thing really diſtinct from *Life*: and a red-hot Iron has not therefore any nearer Approximation to Life than it had before; nor the Flame of a Candle, than the extinguiſh'd Snuff or Tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the Agitation of the *inſenſible* Parts. We might alſo add, that according to this *Hypotheſis* the Souls of Animals could not be *numerically* the ſame throughout the whole Space of their Lives: ſince Fire, as needing a *Pabulum* to prey upon, does not always continue one and the ſame numerical Subſtance. The Soul of a new-born Animal could be no more the ſame with the Soul of that Animal ſeveral Years after, than the Flame of a new-lighted Candle is the ſame with that Flame which twinkles laſt in the Socket: which indeed

indeed are no more the ſame than a River or Stream is the ſame at ſeveral diſtances of Time. Which reaſon may be alſo extended further, to prove the *Soul* to be no *Body* at all; ſince the Bodys of all Animals are in a perpetual Flux.

We have now ſufficiently perform'd our firſt Task, which was to ſhew from the Origin of the *Atomical Phyſiology*, that the Doctrine of incorporeal Subſtance muſt needs ſpring up together with it. We ſhall in the next place make it evident, that the inward Conſtitution of this *Philoſophy* is alſo ſuch, that whoſoever really entertains it and rightly underſtands it, muſt of neceſſity admit Incorporeal Subſtance likewiſe. Firſt therefore the *Atomical Hypotheſis*, allowing nothing to *Body*, but what is either included in the Idea of a thing *impenetrably* extended, or can clearly be conceiv'd to be a *Mode* of it, as more or leſs Magnitude, with Diviſibility, Figure, Site, Motion, and Reſt, together with the Reſults of their ſeveral Combinations, cannot poſſibly make *Life* and *Cogitation* to be Qualitys of *Body*; ſince they are neither contain'd in thoſe things before mention'd, nor can reſult from any Conjugations of them. Wherefore it muſt needs be granted, that *Life* and *Cogitation* are the Attributes of another Subſtance diſtinct from Body, or Incorporeal.

Again, ſince according to the Tenour of this *Phyſiology*, Body has no other Action belonging to it but that of *Local Motion*, which *Local Motion* as ſuch never ſprings originally from the thing it ſelf moving, but from the Action of ſome other Agent upon it; it undeniably follows that there muſt be ſomething elſe in the World beſides Body, or elſe there could never have been any Motion in it. But of this we ſhall ſpeak more hereafter.

Moreover,

Moreover, according to this *Philoſophy* the corporeal *Phænomena* themſelves cannot be ſolv'd by *Mechaniſm* alone without *Fancy:* Now *Fancy* is no Mode of *Body*, and therefore muſt needs be a Mode of ſome other kind of Being in our ſelves, which is cogitative and incorporeal. A ſo it is evident from the ſame Principles, that *Senſe* it ſelf is not a mere corporeal Paſſion from Bodys without, in that they ſuppoſe that there is nothing really in Bodys, like to thoſe fantaſtick *Ideas* which we have of ſenſible things: as of hot and cold, red and green, bitter and ſweet, and the like; which therefore muſt needs owe their Being to ſome Activity of the Soul it ſelf, and this is all one as to make it incorporeal.

Laſtly, from this Philoſophy it is alſo manifeſt, that *Senſe* is not the *Criterion* of Truth concerning Bodys themſelves. in that it confidently aſſerts, that thoſe ſuppos'd *Qualitys* of Bodys, repreſented as ſuch or ſuch by *Senſe*, are merely fantaſtical things. Whence it plainly follows, that there is ſomething in us ſuperiour to *Senſe*, which judges of it, detects its Phantaſtry, condemns its Impoſture, and determines what really is or is not in *Bodys* without us; which muſt needs be a higher *ſelf-active* Vigour of the Mind, that plainly ſpeaks it to be incorporeal.

And now it is obſervable that this *Atomical Phyſiology* of the Antients ſeems to have two Advantages in it: the firſt of which is, that it renders the Corporeal World intelligible to us; ſince *Mechaniſm* is what we can clearly underſtand, and indeed we cannot diſtinctly conceive any thing elſe in *Bodys* but that. To ſay that this or that is done by a *Form* or *Quality*, is no more than to ſay, that it is done we know not how; or, which is yet more abſurd, to make our very *Ignorance* of the

Cauſe, diſguis'd under thoſe Terms of *Forms* and *Qualitys*, to be it ſelf the Cauſe of the Effect.

Moreover, hot and cold, red and green, bitter and ſweet, *&c.* formally conſider'd, may be clearly conceiv'd by us as different *Fancys* and *Vital Paſſions* in us, occaſion'd by different Motions from the Objects without, upon our Nerves: But they can never be clearly underſtood as abſolute *Qualitys* in the Bodys themſelves, really diſtinct from their Mechanical Diſpoſitions; nor is there indeed any more reaſon why they ſhould be thought ſuch, than that, when a Man is prick'd with a Pin or wounded with a Sword, the Pain which he feels ſhould be thought to be an abſolute Quality in the Pin or Sword. So long as our ſenſible Ideas are taken either for *ſubſtantial Forms* or *Qualitys* in Bodys without us, really diſtinct from the Subſtance of the Matter, ſo long are they perfectly unintelligible by us. Agreeably to this, * *Timæus Locrus* held, that corporeal things could not be any otherwiſe apprehended by us, than by *Senſe and a kind of ſpurious or baſtardly Reaſon*; by which he means that we could have no clear Conceptions of them in our Underſtanding: and of his Opinion in this reſpect were *Plato* and his Followers.

The ſecond Advantage which the *Atomical Phyſiology* ſeems to have is this: that it prepares an eaſy and clear way for the demonſtration of Incorporeal Subſtances, by ſettling a diſtinct Notion of *Body*. Whoever will undertake to prove, that there is ſomething elſe in the World beſides *Body*, muſt firſt determine what *Body* is; for otherwiſe he will go about to prove that there is ſomething, beſides he knows not what. Now whereas *Plato* and

* Αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ.

Aristotle holding all Body to consist of two substantial Principles, whereof one is *Matter* devoid of all *Form*, and therefore of Quantity and Quality, whence they themselves conclude that it is * incorporeal; the other *Form*, which being devoid of all Matter is incorporeal likewise; do so confound the Notions of *Body* and *Spirit*, Corporeal and Incorporeal, that it is impossible to prove any thing at all concerning 'em. Body it self according to them being made Incorporeal, and therefore every thing is incorporeal; because whatsoever is wholly compounded and made up of Incorporeals, must needs it self be also incorporeal. Also whereas according to their Doctrine of *Matter*, *Forms* and *Qualitys* in *Body*, Life and Understanding, may be suppos'd to be certain *Forms* or *Qualitys* of *Body*; and thus the Souls of Men may be nothing else but Blood and Brains endu'd with the *Qualitys* of Sense and Understanding; or else some other more subtle, sensitive, and rational *Matter* in us: God himself may also be conceiv'd to be nothing else but a certain rational or intellectual subtle and firy *Body*, pervading the whole Universe; or else a certain *Form* of the whole Corporeal World, together with the *Matter* making up but one Substance, which Opinion has been entertain'd by most of those Antients, who thought there could be no other Substance but *Body*.

On t'other hand I say, that the antient *Atomical Physiology*, settling a distinct Notion of *Body*, that it is a † *thing impenetrably extended*, which has nothing belonging to it but *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Site*,

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* Ἀσώματος δὲ ὕλη, Plotin.

† Διαστατὸν ἀντίτυπον.

Reſt, and *Motion*, without any ſelf-moving Power, takes away all Confuſion; ſhews clearly how far *Body* can go, where incorporeal Subſtance begins; as alſo that there muſt of neceſſity be ſuch a thing in the World. Again, this Philoſophy diſcovering not only that the Doctrine of *Qualitys* had its Original from Mens miſtaking their own *Fancys* for abſolute Realities in Bodys themſelves, but alſo that the Doctrine of *Matter* and *Form* ſprung from another Fallacy or Deception of the Mind, in taking logical Notions and our Modes of *conceiving* for Modes of *Being*, and real Entitys in things without us, it likewiſe ſhewing that becauſe there is nothing elſe clearly intelligible in Body, but Magnitude, Figure, Site, and Motion, together with their various Conjugations, there can be no ſuch Entitys of *Forms* and *Qualitys* really diſtinct from the Subſtance of Body, makes it evident that *Life*, *Cogitation*, and *Underſtanding* can be no corporeal things, but muſt needs be the Attributes of another kind of Subſtance diſtinct from *Body*.

We have now clearly prov'd theſe two things: Firſt, that the Philoſophy of the Antients, before not only *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, but alſo *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, was Atomical or Mechanical. Secondly, that as there is no Inconſiſtency between the Atomical *Phyſiology* and *Theology*, but indeed a real Cognation: ſo the antient *Atomiſts* before *Democritus* were neither Atheiſts nor Corporealiſts; but held the Incorporeity and Immortality of Souls, together with a Deity diſtinct from the Corporeal World. Wherefore the firſt and moſt antient *Atomiſts* did not endeavour to make up an intire Philoſophy out of *Atomology*: but the Doctrine of Atoms was to them only one Part or Member of the whole Philoſophick Syſtem, they joining thereunto

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the Doctrine of incorporeal Subſtance and Theology to make it compleat.

Our antient *Atomiſts* never went about, as blundering *Democritus* afterwards did, to build up a World out of mere *paſſive* Bulk and ſluggiſh *Matter*, without any active Principles or incorporeal Powers; as very well knowing that thus, it could not have ſo much as Motion, Mechaniſm, or Generation in it; the Original of all that Motion which is in Bodys ſpringing from ſomething which is not *Body*, that is, from *Incorporeal Subſtance*. And yet if *Local Motion* could have been ſuppos'd to have riſen up, or ſprung in upon this dead Lump and Maſs of *Matter*, no body knows how, and without dependance upon any incorporeal Being, to have actuated it fortuitouſly; theſe *Atomiſts* would ſtill have thought it impoſſible for the corporeal World it ſelf to be made up, ſuch as now it is, by fortuitous Mechaniſm, without the Guidance of any higher Principle. And particularly they would have concluded it the greateſt Imprudence or Madneſs for men to aſſert that Animals alſo conſiſted of mere Mechaniſm; or that *Life* and *Senſe*, *Reaſon* and *Underſtanding* were really nothing elſe but *Local Motion*, and conſequently that they themſelves were but Machines or a finer ſort of Clock-work. Wherefore they join'd both active and paſſive Principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal Nature, Mechaniſm and Life, *Atomology* and *Pneumatology*; and from both theſe united they made up one intire Syſtem of *Philoſophy*, correſpondent with and agreeable to the true and real World without 'em. And this Syſtem of Philoſophy, thus conſiſting of the Doctrine of incorporeal Subſtances, whereof God is the Head, together with the *Atomical* and *Mechanical Phyſiology*, ſeems to be the only genuine and compleat.

But

But it did not long continue thus; for after a while, this intire Body of *Philoſophy* came to be mangl'd and diſmember'd, ſome taking one Part of it alone, and ſome another: ſome ſnatching away the Atomical *Phyſiology*, without the *Pneumatology* and *Theology*; and others on the contrary, taking the *Theology* and Doctrine of Incorporeals without the Atomical or Mechanical *Phyſiology*. The former of theſe were *Democritus*, *Leucippus*, and *Protagoras*, who took only the dead Carcaſe or Skeleton of the old *Moſchical* Philoſophy, namely the Atomical *Phyſiology*; the latter were *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, who took indeed the better Part, the Soul, Spirit and Quinteſſence of it, the *Theology* and Doctrine of Incorporeals, but unbody'd and deveſted of its moſt proper and convenient Vehicle, the Atomical *Phyſiology*; whereby it became expos'd to ſundry Inconveniencys. I ſay, the firſt Corrupters or Manglers of this *Philoſophy* were *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Protagoras*; who being atheiſtically inclin'd, quickly perceiv'd that they could not in the ordinary way of *Phyſiologizing* ſufficiently ſecure themſelves againſt a Deity, nor effectually urge Atheiſm upon others: Foraſmuch as *Heraclitus* and other Philoſophers, who held that all Subſtance was Body, as well as they, did notwithſtanding aſſert a corporeal Deity, maintaining that the Form of the whole corporeal World was God, or elſe that he was * *a certain kind of ſubtle Body* or *Matter*, pervading, as a Soul, the whole Univerſe; and that the particular Souls of Men and Animals were but as it were ſo many Pieces, cut and ſlic'd out of the great Mundane Soul: So that according to them, the whole corporeal Univerſe or Maſs of Body was one

* Ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα.

way

way or other a God, a moſt wiſe and underſtanding Animal, which fram'd all Particularitys within it ſelf after the beſt manner poſſible, and govern'd the ſame. Wherefore, I ſay, thoſe Atheiſts apprehending upon what tickliſh and uncertain terms their impious Philoſophy then ſtood, and that thoſe very *Forms* and *Qualitys* and the *ſelf-moving* Power of Body, which were commonly made a Sanctuary for Atheiſm, might notwithſtanding prove on the contrary a *Latibulum* or *Aſylum* of the Deity; and that at leaſt a corporeal God, do what they could, might lie lurking under them, aſſaulting Mens Minds with doubtful Fears and Jealouſys, underſtanding moreover, that there was no other kind of *Phyſiology* ſet on foot, which baniſhing thoſe *Forms* and *Qualitys* of Body, aſcrib'd nothing to it but Magnitude, Figure, Site and Motion, without any ſelf-moving Power, they preſently thought to make ſome advantage of, and therefore greedily entertain'd the Atomical and Mechanical way of *Phyſiologizing*, but without the Doctrine of Incorporeals, to which it was naturally and vitally united, and ſo endeavour'd to ſerve their turns of it. And thus while they join'd theſe two things together; the Atomical *Phyſiology*, which ſuppoſes that there is nothing in Body but Magnitude, Figure, Site and Motion; and this Prejudice or Prepoſſeſſion of their own Minds, that there was no other Subſtance in the World beſides Body; by both theſe together, I ſay, they begat a certain mungrel and ſpurious Philoſophy *Atheiſtically-Atomical* or *Atomically-Atheiſtical:* which implies at the bottom a plain Contradiction, and thereby ſhews how deſperate the Cauſe of Atheiſm is, while forc'd to have recourſe to ſuch groundleſs Evaſions; foraſmuch as that very Atomical *Hypotheſis*, which for their purpoſe they chuſe to embrace,

embrace, and which they would erect and build for a ſtrong Caſtle to gariſon themſelves in, appears to be a moſt effectual Engine againſt themſelves, for the battering of all their Atheiſtical Structure down about their Ears.

Plato, the next Mutilator of the *Moſchical* Philoſophy, was much more excuſable; in that he took the *Theology* and *Metaphyſicks* of it, the whole Doctrine of Incorporeals, and abandon'd the Mechanical way of Phyſiologizing: which in all probability he did, partly becauſe the foremention'd *Atheiſts* having ſo much abus'd that Philoſophy, and adapted it as it were to themſelves, he began thereupon to entertain a Jealouſy of it; and partly becauſe he was not of himſelf ſo inclinable to *Phyſiology* as to *Theology*, not ſo much to the Study of Corporeal as of Divine things; and he was by his Genius addicted rather to *Ideas* than to *Atoms*, to *formal* and *final* than to *material* Cauſes. *Ariſtotle* here trod in *Plato*'s Footſteps, not only as to the better part, in aſſerting an Incorporeal Deity; but alſo in rejecting the Atomical Way, and Phyſiologizing with him by *Forms* and *Qualitys*: which way, as I have before obſerv'd, tho it had not that effect upon contemplative and thoughtful *Plato*, yet of it ſelf tends to confound the Notions of corporeal and incorporeal Subſtance, ſo that the true Limits of each can hardly be diſcern'd; and therefore 'tis the leſs to be wonder'd that *Ariſtotle*, tho he allow'd a perfect incorporeal Intellect to be the Head of all, yet poſitively affirm'd the Corporeity of *ſenſitive* Souls, and ſtagger'd at the Incorporeity of *rational*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

An impartial Account of all the pretended Grounds of Reaſon for the Atheiſtical Hypotheſis in the Democritick *Way.*

THO neither *Atomiciſm*, nor indeed *Corporealiſm* as ſuch be eſſentially Atheiſtical, yet when compounded and complicated together they neceſſarily are ſo. He therefore that holds theſe two Principles together, that there is no other Subſtance but *Body*; and that *Body* has nothing elſe belonging to it, but Magnitude, Figure, Site, and Motion without Qualitys: I ſay, whoſoever is that confounded thing of an *Atomiſt* and *Corporealiſt* jumbl'd together, is eſſentially and unavoidably that, which is meant by an *Atheiſt*, tho he ſhould in words never ſo much diſclaim it: becauſe he muſt needs fetch the Original of all things from ſenſleſs *Matter*; whereas to aſſert a God is to maintain that all things ſprung originally from a knowing and underſtanding *Nature.*

Wherefore this mongrel *Philoſophy*, of which *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Protagoras* were the Founders, and which was afterwards entertain'd by *Epicurus*, was really nothing elſe but a Philoſophical Form of *Atheology*, a Gigantick Attempt to dethrone the Deity, not only by ſolving all the *Phænomena* of the World without a God; but alſo by laying down thoſe other Principles, from which it muſt needs follow, that there could be neither a corporeal nor incorporeal Deity. So that in ſhort this *Phyſiology* was indeed downright Atheiſm,

boldly ſwaggering, under the appearance of Wiſdom and *Philoſophy*; tho by the Abettors of it, upon a politick account, it was not expreſly own'd to be ſuch. This therefore in a ſpecial manner deſerves our Conſideration, and accordingly now I proceed to exhibit a fair Account and full Proſpect of it, not doubting but that a plain and naked Repreſentation of its Myſterys and Depths will be a great part of a Confutation of 'em; or at leaſt, they being all afterwards baffl'd and expos'd, Theiſm will hereby obtain the greater and juſter Triumph over Atheiſm.

Now the grounds of Reaſon for the Atheiſtick *Hypotheſis* in the *Democritick* way, are chiefly theſe that follow. Firſt, that we have no Idea of God, and therefore can have no Evidence of his Being; which Argument is further deſcanted and flouriſh'd on after this manner: that the Notion or Conception of a Deity, which is commonly entertain'd, is, as we have it in a modern Author, nothing elſe but a Bundle of *Incomprehenſibles*, *Unconceivables*, and *Impoſſibles*; it being only a Compilement of all imaginable Attributes of Honour, Courtſhip, and Complement; which the confounded Fear and Aſtoniſhment of Mens Minds made 'em huddle up together without any Senſe or *Philoſophick* Truth. This, I ſay, is the firſt Argument, us'd eſpecially by our modern *Democriticks* againſt a Deity, who, becauſe they can have no *Fantaſtick Idea* of it, nor comprehend all that is included in the Notion of it, do imagine it to be but an incomprehenſible *Nothing*.

A ſecond Argument much inſiſted upon by the old *Democritick* Atheiſts is directed againſt the Divine *Omnipotence* and creative Power, after this manner: Tho there be indeed ſome difference, ſay they, among the Theiſts touching the Novity of the World; the eternal

Exiſtence of the Whole by way of Emanation from the firſt Being, or elſe the independent Exiſtence of the Matter of it, but withal ſuppoſing the *Forms* and *Qualitys* of inanimate Bodys, together with the Souls of all Animals, in the ſucceſſive Generations of them to be created: yet do they all agree in this, that God is in ſome ſenſe or other the Creator of real Entitys out of Nothing, or the Cauſe of that which otherwiſe would not have been of it ſelf; ſo that if there is no Creation or Production out of *Nothing*, in that inlarg'd ſenſe, we argue *ad hominem* that there is no Deity. Now it is utterly impoſſible that any Subſtance or real Entity ſhould be produc'd out of *Nothing*, this being repugnant to that undeniable Axiom of Reaſon, *De Nihilo Nihil, out of Nothing comes Nothing.* Wherefore ſay they, all Subſtance and real Entity, which is in the World, muſt needs have been from Eternity, uncreated and ſelf-exiſtent; and nothing can be made or produc'd, but only the different Modifications of eternally præ-exiſtent Matter. And ſays * *Epicurus, No Divine Power ought to be call'd in for the ſolving of theſe Phænomena:* becauſe all this is done by Motions, Mixtures, and Separations, by Concretions and Secretions of Atoms, without the Creation of any real diſtinct Entity out of Nothing. So that in ſhort, if no Subſtance nor real Entity can be made, which was not before: but all whatſoever is, will be and can be, was from Eternity ſelf-exiſtent, then creative Power, but eſpecially that Attribute of Omnipotence, can belong to nothing; which is in effect to ſay, that there is no God.

Thirdly, the Atheiſts argue againſt the ſtricter and higher ſort of Theiſts, who will have God to be the

* Ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῆ προσαγέσθω.

Creator of the whole corporeal Univerſe and all its Parts out of nothing, after this manner: That which created the whole Maſs of Matter and Body, cannot be it ſelf Body; wherefore this Notion of God plainly implies him to be Incorporeal; but there can be no Incorporeal Deity, becauſe by that Word muſt needs be underſtood either that which has no Magnitude or Extenſion at all, or elſe that which is indeed extended, but otherwiſe than *Body*. If the Word be taken in the former ſenſe, Nothing, ſay they, can be ſo incorporeal, as to be altogether unextended and void of all Geometrical Quantity, becauſe Extenſion is the very Eſſence of all exiſtent Entity. But if the word *Incorporeal* be taken in the latter ſenſe, for that which is indeed extended, but otherwiſe than Body, namely ſo as to penetrate Bodys and co-exiſt with 'em, this is alſo a thing next to nothing; ſince it can neither act upon any other thing, nor be acted upon by or ſenſible of any thing. Wherefore to ſpeak plainly, this can be nothing elſe but *empty Space*, which runs thro all things, without laying hold on any thing, or being affected from any thing. This is the only incorporeal thing that is or can be in Nature, and therefore to ſuppoſe an Incorporeal Deity is to make empty Space to be the Creator of all things; I ſay, empty Space, which according to the modern *Democriticks*, tho the Antients indeed thought otherwiſe, is not a real Nature or Entity without our Conception, but only the Phantaſm, and as it were the Ghoſt of a Body, which has no Exiſtence without our Imagination. So that there are not two Natures of Body and Space, which infer two diſtinct Subſtances, one of which muſt be incorporeal; but only one Nature of Body. The Conſequence of which is this, that an incorporeal Subſtance is as much

as to ſay an incorporeal Body, and therefore, as implying a Contradiction, is indeed Nothing.

But fourthly, as a Continuation of the former Argument, the Atheiſts undertake to ſhew likewiſe the Original of the Notion of Incorporeal Subſtances, and from what Miſapprehenſion it ſprung; and thence take occaſion further to diſprove a Deity. The Original, ſay they, of this Doctrine of Incorporeal Subſtances proceeded chiefly from the Abuſe of abſtract Names both of Subſtances and alſo of Accidents, when they are conſider'd alone without their Subjects or Subſtances; which Infatuation has not proceeded from the Mind of Man, unabus'd by Doctrine, but from thoſe deceiving and deceiv'd *Literati*, *Scholaſticks*, *Philoſophers*, and *Theologers*, who have us'd to ſtuff their Diſcourſes with Quiddity's, Entity's, Eſſences, Hæcceity's, and the like; and as it were inchanting Mens Underſtandings, have made 'em believe, that the abſtract Notions of Accidents and Eſſences could exiſt alone by themſelves, as certain ſeparate and incorporeal Subſtances: while they ſuppoſe that the Eſſences of things are eternal, ſo that when any thing is made or generated, there is no Being produc'd, but only an antecedent and eternal Eſſence cloth'd as it were with a new Garment of Exiſtence; and that, for example, theſe Accidents, the Life, the Senſe and Underſtanding of Animals, commonly call'd by the Names of Soul and Mind, may exiſt without the Bodys or Subſtances of 'em by themſelves, after the Animals are dead; which plainly makes 'em to be incorporeal Subſtances, and as it were the ſeparate and abſtract Eſſences of Men. Upon this ground it is, as a late Writer obſerves, that *when a Man is dead and bury'd, they ſay, his Soul, that is, his Life, can walk ſeparated from his Body, and is ſeen by night amongſt the Graves.*

Graves. By which means the vulgar are confirm'd in their ſuperſtitious Belief of Ghoſts, Spirits, Dæmons, Devils, Fairys, Hob-goblins, and other inviſible Powers and Agents call'd by ſeveral Names. Which Belief at firſt had alſo another Original, not altogether unlike to the former, namely from Mens miſtaking their own Fancys for things really exiſting without 'em; and thus the Fantaſm or Fancy even of the Deity, created by Fear, has upon no other account been taken for a Reality. Wherefore in ſhort, ſay they, to make an incorporeal Mind to be the Cauſe of all things, is to make our own Fancy, an imaginary Ghoſt of the World, to be a Reality; and to ſuppoſe the mere abſtract Notion of an Accident and a ſeparate Eſſence to be not only an abſolute thing by it ſelf and a real Incorporeal Subſtance, but alſo the firſt Original of all Subſtances, and of whatſoever is in the Univerſe.

Fifthly, becauſe I deſign to produce all the *Democritick*-Atheiſtick Grounds, I obſerve that the Atheiſts will not allow even ſo much as a Corporeal God. To this purpoſe firſt they argue, that there is no other Subſtance in the World but Body, and that it is the incommunicable Property of ſenſleſs Matter to be what we ſuppoſe an underſtanding Deity to be, that is, *Ingenerable and Incorruptible. No Man, ſay they, can deviſe any other Notion of Subſtance, than that it is a thing extended, exiſting without the Mind, not imaginary, but real and ſolid Magnitude; for whatſoever is not extended and conſequently Body, is Nothing and no where. This is the *Baſis* and *Subſtratum* of all, as being alone capable of † Reſiſtance; and

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* Ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον.
† Ἀντιτυπία.

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whatſoever elſe is in the World, is only an accidental Difference and Modification of this: thus even Life, Senſe, and Underſtanding, as well as Whiteneſs, Blackneſs, or the like, can neither exiſt by themſelves, nor are any further ſecur'd of Continuance, than this or that Mode of the Body remains, which is very often ſuſceptive of new Diſpoſitions, tho the ſame numerical Matter do continue. Whence it is plain that as no Animal, no living, underſtanding Body can be abſolutely and eſſentially incorruptible, this being the incommunicable Property of the firſt Matter, there can be no ſuch thing as a corporeal Deity, the Original of all things, and eſſentially undeſtroyable. Wherefore neither could the *Stoicks* conceive their corporeal God, that is, the whole Univerſe, to be any otherwiſe, than by Accident, incorruptible and immortal, in that they ſuppos'd that there was no other Matter, which exiſting without this World, and making Inroads upon it, could diſorder the Frame or diſunite the Parts of it.

Sixthly, to this purpoſe again, ſay they, the corporeal Theiſts are inconſiſtent with themſelves, and plainly infer by their way of arguing what in Words they pretend to deny, that is, Incorporeal Subſtance. While they ſuppoſe real Qualitys beſides Magnitude, Figure, Site, and Motion, as ſimple and primitive things belonging to it; and that there was ſuch a Quality or Faculty of Underſtanding in the Matter of the whole Univerſe as was coeternal with it, uncompounded and unoriginated. For ſuch original Qualitys and Powers really diſtinct from the Subſtance of extended Matter and its Modifications, can be no other but diſtinct Subſtances, and conſequently incorporeal. Wherefore in ſhort, ſay they, the firſt Principle of all things in the whole Univerſe is Matter or Atoms devoid

devoid of all Qualitys, and conſequently of all Life, Senſe and Underſtanding; and therefore the Original of things is no underſtanding Nature or Deity.

Seventhly, the *Democritick* Atheiſts argue further in this manner: They who aſſert a Deity, ſay they, ſuppoſe the * *whole World to be animated*, that is, to have a living, rational, and underſtanding Nature over it: now it is already plain from ſome of the Arguments premis'd, that the World cannot be animated in the ſenſe of the *Platoniſts*, that is, with an Incorporeal Soul, which is in order of Nature before Body, it being prov'd already that there can be no Subſtance incorporeal; as likewiſe that it cannot be animated either in the *Stoical* ſenſe, ſo as to have an original Quality of *Underſtanding* or *Mind* in the matter: Yet nevertheleſs ſome may imagine, that as in our ſelves and other Animals, tho compounded of ſenſleſs Atoms, there is a Soul and Mind reſulting from the Contexture of them, which being once made, domineers over the Body, governing and ordering it at pleaſure; ſo there may likewiſe be ſuch a living Soul and Mind not only in the Stars, which many have ſuppos'd to be a leſſer ſort of Deity; and in the Sun, which has been reputed a principal Deity: but alſo in the whole Mundane Syſtem, one general Soul and Mind, which tho reſulting at firſt from the fortuitous motion of Matter, yet being once produc'd, may rule, govern, and ſway over the *Whole*, knowingly and in a more perfect manner than our Souls do over our Bodys; and ſo long as it continues, may exerciſe a Principality and Dominion over it. Which tho it will not mount to the full Notion of a God, according to the ſtrict ſenſe of Theiſts, yet will approach

* Ἔμψυχον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον.

very

very near to it, and indanger the bringing in of all the Inconveniences attending it. Now therefore they will prove that there is no ſuch Soul or Mind as this, reſulting from the Contexture of Atoms, which preſides over the corporeal Univerſe, that ſo there may not be ſo much as even the Shadow of a Deity left. It was before obſerv'd that Life, Senſe, Reaſon and Underſtanding are but Qualitys of concreted Bodys, like thoſe other Qualitys of Heat and Cold, *&c.* ariſing from certain particular Textures of Atoms: Now as thoſe firſt Principles of Bodys, namely ſingle Atoms, have none of thoſe Qualitys in them, ſo neither has the whole Univerſe any, from which it can be denominated, but only the Parts of it; the whole World is neither black nor white, hot nor cold, or the like, it containing all thoſe Qualitys in its ſeveral Parts: and thus the *Whole* has no Life, Senſe, or Underſtanding, but only thoſe Parts of it which are call'd Animals; that is, Life and Senſe are Qualitys, which ariſe only from ſuch a Texture of Atoms, as produces ſoft Fleſh, Blood and Brains in Bodys organiz'd with Head, Heart, Bowels, Nerves, Muſcles, Veins, Arterys, and the like. And * Reaſon and Underſtanding properly ſo call'd are peculiar Appendices to Human Shape: from whence it is concluded, that there is no Life, Soul, or Underſtanding acting the whole World, becauſe the World has no Blood or Brains, no Animaliſh or Human Form. Now, ſay they, if there be no Life no Underſtanding above us or round about us, or any where elſe in the World, but only in our ſelves and our Fellow-Animals, and we are the higheſt of all Beings; if neither the whole Corporeal Syſtem be

* Ratio nuſquam eſſe poteſt niſi in Hominis Figurâ.

animated, nor thoſe greater Parts of it, the Sun, Moon, nor Stars, then can there be no danger of a Deity.

Eightly, the *Democritick* Atheiſts diſpute thus againſt a Deity: The Deity, ſay they, is generally ſuppos'd to be * *a perfectly happy Animal, Incorruptible and Immortal.* Now there is no living Being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore neither is there any perfectly happy one: Foraſmuch as Life is no ſubſtantial thing, nor any primitive or ſimple Nature; but it is only an *Accident* or *Quality*, ariſing from the Aggregation and Contexture of Atoms or Corpuſcles, the Compages or Frame of which is continually liable to be diſſolv'd and diſunited; and whenever that is done, the Life utterly periſhes and vaniſhes into nothing. Wherefore as no Life is immortal, there is no immortal nor conſequently moſt happy Animal or Deity: but this pretended † perfect Happineſs is, as the old *Hedonicks* and *Cyrenaicks* tell us, a mere Notion, a romantick Fiction, a thing which can have no real Exiſtence any where.

A ninth pretended Demonſtration of the *Democritick* Atheiſts is as follows: By God, ſay they, is underſtood a firſt Cauſe or Mover, which being not before acted upon by any thing elſe, but acting originally from it ſelf, was the Beginning of all things. Now it is an indubitable Axiom, that *whatſoever is mov'd, is mov'd by ſomething elſe*; and nothing can act otherwiſe than it is made to act, by ſomething without it, acting upon it.

A tenth Argument they uſe is this: Becauſe the Theiſts conceive that tho no Body can move it ſelf, yet

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* Ζῶον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον.

† Εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον.

a perfect cogitative and thinking Being might be the Beginning of all, and the firſt Cauſe of Motion; the Atheiſts will endeavour to evince the contrary after this manner: No Man can conceive how any Cogitation, which was not before, ſhould riſe up at any time unleſs there were ſome Cauſe for it, without the *Thinker*. For otherwiſe, there can no reaſon be given, why this Thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, ſhould ſtart up. Wherefore this is univerſally true of all Motion and Action whatſoever, as it was rightly urg'd by the *Stoicks*, That *there can be no* * *Motion without a Cauſe*, that is, no Motion, which has not ſome Cauſe without the Subject of it. Wherefore no thinking Being could be a *Firſt Cauſe* any more than a Machine or *Automaton* could. To this again they add, that theſe two Notions, the one of a *knowing underſtanding Being*, the other of a *perfectly happy Being*, are contradictory; becauſe all † Knowledg eſſentially implies Dependance on ſomething elſe as its Cauſe. In ſhort they tell us, that Cogitation and all Action whatſoever is really nothing elſe but *Local Motion*, which can never riſe of it ſelf, but is caus'd by ſome other Agent without the Subject.

In the eleventh place, the *Democritick Atheiſts* argue thus: If the World were made by any antecedent Mind or Underſtanding, that is, by a Deity; then muſt there needs be an Idea, Platform, and Exemplar of the whole World before it was made, and conſequently actual *Knowledg*, both in order of Time and Nature,

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* Κίνησις ἀναίτιος.

† Scientia & Intellectus ſignum eſt Potentiæ ab alio dependentis, id quod non eſt Beatiſſimum.

before *Things*. But now all Knowledg is the Information of the things themſelves known, all Conception of the Mind is a Paſſion from the things conceiv'd and their Activity upon it, and is therefore junior to and follows after them. Wherefore the *World* and *Things* were before *Knowledg* and Conception of any Mind; and no *Knowledg*, Mind, or Deity were before the World as its Cauſe.

A twelfth Argumentation of the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheiſts is to this purpoſe: That things could not be made by a * Deity, which is ſuppos'd to be a Being every way perfect; becauſe they are ſo faulty and ſo ill made. This Argument is inforc'd by *Lucretius* from the inconvenient Conſtitution of the Heavens, and from other Topicks relating to the Earth, Men, and Animals, and laſt of all from this way of reaſoning: The ſuppos'd Deity and Maker of the World was either willing to aboliſh all *natural* Evils, but not able; or he was able, but not willing; or thirdly he was neither willing nor able; or laſtly he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that fully anſwers to the Notion of a God. Now that the ſuppos'd Creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to aboliſh all Evils, is plain, becauſe then there would have been no Evils at all left. Wherefore there being ſuch a deluge of Evils overflowing all, it muſt needs be that either he was willing and not able to remove 'em, and then he was impotent; or elſe he was able and not willing, and then he was envious;

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* Nequaquam nobis Divinitùs eſſe paratam
Naturam Rerum, tantâ ſtat prædita Culpâ.
Lucret.

or

or laſtly he was neither able nor willing, and then he was at once both impotent and envious.

A thirteenth Argument urg'd by theſe Atheiſts is this: If the World were made by any Deity, then would it be govern'd by a Providence; and if there were any Providence, it muſt needs appear in Human Affairs: but here it is plain that all is *Chaos* and Confuſion; all things happening alike to all, whether they be wiſe or fooliſh, religious or impious, vertuous or vicious; and thus while ſcoffing *Dionyſius* the Tyrant, *Harpalus* the Robber, and the like are ſeen to fare as well, nay better than good Men, they * *bear Teſtimony as it were againſt the Gods.* Wherefore 'tis concluded that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven about by the tumbling Billows of careleſs *Chance* and *Fortune.*

A fourteenth Argumentation of the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheiſts is to this purpoſe: That whereas the Deity is ſuppos'd to be ſuch a Being, as both knows all that is done every where in the moſt diſtant Places of the World at once, and does himſelf immediately order all things; in the firſt place it is impoſſible for any one Being thus to animadvert and order all things in the whole Univerſe; and ſecondly, if it were ſuppos'd to be poſſible, yet ſuch an infinite Employ and Buſineſs would be abſolutely inconſiſtent with a *happy State*; nor could ſuch a Deity ever have any quiet Enjoyment of it ſelf, as being always fill'd with Tumult and Hurry. Wherefore this pragmatical and buſy Deity, which muſt needs intermeddle and have to do with every thing in the whole World, is a contradictory Notion, ſince it cannot but be the moſt unhappy of all things.

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* Teſtimonium dicunt contra Deos.

In the next place the Atheiſts diſpute by propounding ſeveral bold Querys, which they conceive to be unanſwerable: If the World, ſay they, were made by a Deity, why was it not made by him ſooner? or ſince it was ſo long unmade, why did he make it all? How came this Architect and Builder of the World to ſtart upon a ſudden, after he had ſlept for infinite Ages, and bethink himſelf of making a World? Certainly, if he had been awake all that while, he would either have made it ſooner or not at all; for either ſomething was wanting to his Happineſs before, or it was not; had any thing been wanting, then the World could not have been ſo long unmade: but if he was compleatly happy in himſelf without it, then *he wanting nothing, vainly went about to make ſuperfluous things* *.

Again, ſay they, was this World, as we ſuppoſe, made for Men? If ſo, then muſt it be either for wiſe Men or Fools; if for wiſe Men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for Fools, what reaſon could there be, why the Deity ſhould ſeek to deſerve ſo well at their hands?

Again, ſay they, if this Deity muſt needs go about to make a World, like † *an Artificer and Carpenter*, what Tools and Inſtruments could he have to work with? What Miniſters and ſubſervient Opificers? What Engines and Machines for the rearing up of ſo huge a Fabrick? How could he make the Matter to underſtand his meaning, and obey his beck? How could he move and turn it up and down? For if Incorporeal, he could neither touch nor be touch'd, but would run thro all things without faſtning upon any

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* Μηδ' ἐν ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἐμελλεν ἐπιχειρεῖν πραξεσι.

† Ἐργάτυ δίκην καὶ τέκτονος.

thing:

thing: but if Corporeal, then the ſame thing was both Materials and Architect, both Timber and Carpenter, and the Stones muſt hew each other, and bring themſelves together with diſcretion into a Structure.

In the laſt place the Atheiſts argue from Intereſt, which proves many times the moſt effectual of Argument againſt a Deity; endeavouring to perſuade firſt that it is the Intereſt of private Perſons and of all Mankind in general, and ſecondly that it is the particular Intereſt of Civil Sovereigns and States, that there neither be a God, nor the Belief of any ſuch thing entertain'd by the Minds of Men; that is, no Religion. Firſt, they ſay that it is the Intereſt of Mankind in general, becauſe ſo long as Men are perſuaded that there is an underſtanding Being infinitely powerful, having no Law but his own Will, becauſe he has no Superior, and therefore may do whatever he pleaſes at any time to them; they can never ſecurely enjoy themſelves or any thing about 'em, nor be ever free from diſquieting Solicitude and Fear. And beſides Mens Inſecurity from all manner of preſent Evils, on the ſuppoſition of a God, the Immortality of Souls can hardly be kept out, but will croud in after it; and then the fear of Eternal Puniſhments after Death will unavoidably follow thereupon, perpetually imbittering all the Comforts of Life, and never ſuffering Men to have the leaſt ſincere Enjoyment. Wherefore it is plain that they, who firſt introduc'd the Belief of a Deity and Religion, whatever they might aim at in it, deſerv'd very ill of all Mankind, becauſe thereby they very much * debas'd and

* Efficiunt Animos humiles formidine Divûm,
Depreſſoſque premunt ad terram, *&c.*

depreſs'd

depreſs'd Mens Spirits under a ſervile Fear, as alſo they occaſion the greateſt Calamitys and Griefs which now diſturb Human Society. It was therefore an heroick and a noble Exploit of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, thoſe two good-natur'd Men, who ſeeing the World thus oppreſs'd under the grievous Yoke of Religion, the fear of a Deity and Puniſhment after Death; and taking pity on this ſad Condition of Mankind, manfully encounter'd that frightful Spectre of a Providential Deity, and by clear *Philoſophick* Reaſonings chas'd it away and baniſh'd it out of the World, laying down withal ſuch Principles as would ſolve all the *Phænomena* of Nature without a God. So that * *Lucretius* does not without juſt cauſe erect a triumphal Arch or Monument to *Epicurus* for this Conqueſt or Victory of his over God and Religion.

That it is alſo the Intereſt of Civil Sovereigns and of all Communitys that there ſhould be neither Deity nor Religion, the *Democritick* Atheiſts would perſuade in this manner: A Body Politick or State, ſay they, is made up of Parts, which are naturally diſſociated one from another, by reaſon of that Principle of private *Self-love*, which therefore can be no otherwiſe held together than by Fear: now if there be any greater Fear than the Fear of the *Leviathan* and Civil Repreſentative, the whole Structure and Machine of this great *Coloſs* muſt needs fall to pieces and tumble down. The

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* Humana ante oculos fœdè cùm Vita jaceret
In terris oppreſſa gravi ſub Religione, *&c.*
Primùm Graius Homo mortales tendere contra
Eſt oculos auſus, primuſque obſiſtere contra;
Quem nec Fama Deûm, nec Fulmina, nec Minitanti
Murmure compreſſit Cœlum———

Civil Sovereign reigns only by *Fear*, and therefore unless the *Fear* of him be the King and Sovereign of all Fears, his Empire and Dominion ceases. But as the Rod of *Moses* devour'd the Rods of the *Magicians*, so certainly will the Fear of an Omnipotent Deity, which can punish with Eternal Torments after death, quite swallow up and devour the comparatively petty Fear of Civil Sovereigns, and consequently destroy the Being of Communitys, which have no Foundation in Nature, but are mere artificial things, made by the Inchantment and Magical Art of Policy. Wherefore, as a modern Author has observ'd, *if the Fear of Spirits*, the chief of which is the Deity, were taken away, Men would be much more fitted than they are for Civil Obedience. To this they add, that the Power of Civil Sovereigns is plainly indivisible; 'tis either all or nothing; it must be absolute and infinite, or else 'tis none at all: now this it cannot be, if there be any Power equal to it to share with it, much less, if there be any Superior, as that of a Deity, to check and controll it. Wherefore the Deity must of necessity be remov'd and displac'd, to make room for the *Leviathan* to spread himself in. Lastly, say they, 'tis perfectly inconsistent with the Nature of a Body Politick that there should be any *private* Judgment of Good or Evil, Lawful or Unlawful, Just or Unjust, allow'd: now *Conscience*, which Theism and Religion introduce, is *private* Judgment concerning Good and Evil, *&c.* and therefore the Allowance of it is contradictory to Civil Sovereignty and Communitys. There ought to be no other Conscience in a Kingdom or Commonwealth besides the Law of the Country; the Allowance of private Conscience being *ipso facto* a Dissolution of the Body *Politick*, and a Return to the State of Nature.

Upon all which accounts it muſt needs be acknowledg'd, that thoſe Philoſophers, who undermine and weaken *Theiſm* and Religion, do highly deſerve of all *Civil Sovereigns* and *States*.

Now from all the aforeſaid Conſiderations, the *Democriticks* with great Aſſurance conclude againſt a Deity, maintaining that the Syſtem and Frame of the Univerſe had not its Original from any intelligent Nature, but that *Mind* and *Underſtanding* it ſelf, as well as all things elſe in the World, ſprung up from ſenſleſs *Nature* and *Chance*, or from the undirected Motion of Matter: which is therefore call'd by the name of Nature and Neceſſity; and the mutual Occurſions and Rencounters of Atoms, their Strokes and Daſhings againſt each other, their Reflexions and Repercuſſions, their Coheſions, Implexions, and Intanglements, as alſo their ſcatter'd Diſperſions and Divulſions, are all of 'em *natural* and *neceſſary*: And it is alſo call'd by the name of *Chance* and *Fortune*, becauſe it is altogether unguided by any *Mind*, *Counſel*, or *Deſign*. Wherefore infinite Atoms of different Sizes and Figures, devoid of all Life and Senſe, moving fortuitouſly from Eternity in infinite Space, and making ſucceſſively ſeveral Rencounters, and conſequently various Implexions and Intanglements with one another, produc'd firſt a confus'd *Chaos* of thoſe omnifarious Particles, jumbling together with infinite Variety of Motions, which afterward by the tugging of their different and contrary Forces, whereby they all hinder'd and abated each others Activity, came as it were by joint Conſpiracy to be conglomerated into a *Vortex* or *Vortices*, where after many Convolutions and Evolutions, Molitions and Eſſays, in which all manner of Tricks were try'd, and all imaginable Forms experimented, they chanc'd

chanc'd in length of time here to ſettle, into this Form and Syſtem of things, which now is, of Earth, Water, Air, and Fire; Sun, Moon, and Stars; Plants, Animals, and Men: So that ſenſleſs *Atoms* fortuitouſly mov'd, and material *Chaos*, were the firſt Original of all things. This Account of the firſt Original of the Mundane Syſtem is repreſented by *Lucretius*, according to the Mind of *Epicurus*, tho without any mention of thoſe Vortices, which yet were an eſſential Part of the old *Democritick Hypotheſis*; and the ſame was done before by *Plato* according to the mind of the firſt Inventors of it, *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Protagoras*.

CHAP. III.

A further Account of the other Forms of Atheiſm; together with a neceſſary Digreſſion concerning the Plaſtick Life of Nature.

HAving in the precedent Chapter ſet down the chief Grounds of that particular notorious Form of Atheiſm, call'd the *Atomical* or *Democritick*, I come next to account for that other grand Form of it which I term *Stratonical* or *Hylozoical*, that is, which, quite contrary to the *Atomical* way, makes all *Body* as ſuch, and therefore every the ſmalleſt Particle of it, to be eſſentially endu'd with a certain natural or *Plaſtick Life*, not *accidental*, *generable*, nor *corruptible*, as the *Atomiſts* ſuppoſe; but *neceſſary*, *ingenerable*, and *incorruptible*. But now to prevent all Miſtakes, we think fit here by way of Caution to ſuggeſt, that as every *Atomiſt* is not therefore

neceſſarily an *Atheiſt*, ſo neither muſt every *Hylozoiſt* needs be reckon'd ſuch. For whoever ſo holds the *Life* of Matter, as notwithſtanding to aſſert another kind of *Subſtance* likewiſe, which is immaterial and incorporeal, is no way obnoxious to that foul Imputation. However I muſt own that there is a great difference between theſe two, *Atomiſm* and *Hylozoiſm*: in that the former of 'em, namely *Atomiſm*, as I have before noted, has in it ſelf a natural Cognation and Conjunction with *Incorporealiſm*, tho violently cut off from it by the *Democritick Atheiſts*; whereas the latter, namely *Hylozoiſm*, ſeems to have altogether as cloſe and intimate a Correſpondence with Corporealiſm: becauſe, as I have before ſignify'd, if all Matter, as ſuch, have not only ſuch a Life, Perception, and ſelf-active Power in it, as enables it to form it ſelf to the beſt advantage, to make this a Sun and that an Earth or Planet, and to frame the Bodys of Animals, *&c.* moſt artificially; but alſo to improve it ſelf into Senſe and Self-enjoyment; it may as well be thought able to advance it ſelf higher into all the Acts of *Reaſon* and *Underſtanding*: ſo that there will be no need of an incorporeal or immortal Soul in Men, or of a Deity in the Univerſe. Nor indeed is it eaſily conceivable how any ſhould be induc'd to admit ſuch a monſtrous Paradox as this, that every Atom of Duſt or other ſenſleſs Matter is wiſer than the greateſt *Politician* and the moſt acute *Philoſopher* that ever was, as having an infallible Omniſcience of all its own Capacitys and Congruitys: were it not by reaſon of ſome ſtrong Prepoſſeſſion againſt Incorporeal Subſtance and a Deity, there being nothing ſo extravagant and outrageouſly wild, which a Mind once affected with Atheiſtical Sottiſhneſs and Disbelief, will not rather greedily ſwallow down than

admit

admit a Deity; which to ſuch is the higheſt of all Paradoxes imaginable, and the moſt affrightful Bugbear. Notwithſtanding all which it may not be deny'd, but that it is poſſible for one who really entertains the Belief of a Deity, and of a rational Soul as ſpiritual and immortal, to be perſuaded firſt that the ſenſitive Soul in Men as well as Brutes is merely corporeal, and then that there is a material Plaſtick Life in the Seeds of all Plants and Animals, by which they artificially form themſelves; and from thence afterwards he may deſcend alſo further to Hylozoiſm, holding that all Matter as ſuch has a kind of natural tho not animal Life in it.

But tho every *Hylozoiſt* be not therefore neceſſarily an Atheiſt, yet whoſoever is at once a Hylozoiſt and Corporealiſt, that is, holds the Life of Matter in the ſenſe before declar'd, and alſo that there is no other Subſtance in the World beſides *Body* and *Matter*, cannot be excus'd from the Imputation of Atheiſm for two reaſons: Firſt, becauſe tho he derive the Original of all things, not from what is perfectly dead and ſtupid, as the Atomick Atheiſt does, but from that which has a kind of Life or Perception in it, nay an infallible Omniſcience of whatſoever it ſelf can do or ſuffer, or of all its own Capacitys and Congruitys, which ſeems to bear ſome Semblance of a Deity: Yet all this being only in the way of natural and not animal Perception, is indeed nothing but a dull and drowſy, Plaſtick and Spermatick Life, devoid of all Conſciouſneſs and Self-Enjoyment. The *Hylozoiſts* Nature is a piece of very myſterious Nonſenſe, a thing perfectly wiſe, yet without any Knowledg or Conſciouſneſs of it ſelf: whereas a Deity, according to the true Notion of it, is ſuch a perfect underſtanding Being, as with full Conſciouſneſs and Self-Enjoyment is compleatly happy.

happy. Secondly, becauſe the *Hylozoick* Corporealiſt ſuppoſing all Matter as ſuch to have Life in it, muſt needs make an Infinity of thoſe Lives, foraſmnch as every Atom of Matter has a Life of its own, co-ordinate and independent on any other, and conſequently as many independent firſt Principles, and no one common Life or Mind preſiding over the *Whole*. Whereas to aſſert a God is to derive all things from ſome one Principle, or to ſuppoſe one perfect, living, and underſtanding Being to be the Original of all things, and the Architect of the whole Univerſe.

Now the firſt and chief Aſſertor of this *Hylozoick* Atheiſm was, as we conceive, *Strato Lampſacenus*, commonly call'd alſo *Phyſicus*, that had been at once an Auditor of *Theophraſtus* and a famous *Peripatetick*, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine *Peripatetick* into a new-form'd kind of Atheiſt. For *Velleius* an *Epicurean* Atheiſt in * *Cicero*, reckoning up all the ſeveral ſorts of Theiſts that had been in former times, gives ſuch a Character of this *Strato*, as makes him to be a ſtrong kind of Atheiſtical Theiſt or Divine Atheiſt, if I may uſe this contradictious Expreſſion. And much the ſame account is alſo given of him by *Seneca* in St. † *Auſtin*; in that he did not fetch the Original of all things, as the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheiſts, from a mere fortuitous Motion of Atoms, in which reſpect he bore ſome ſlight Semblance of a Theiſt; but yet was a downright Atheiſt notwithſtanding, his God being no more than ſuch a Life of *Nature* in Matter, as was devoid both of Senſe and Conſciouſneſs, and multiply'd alſo together with the ſeveral Parts of it.

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* Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

† De Civit. Dei, lib. 6. c. 10.

But

But further it is obſervable, that tho * *Strato* thus attributed a certain kind of Life to Matter, yet did he by no means allow of any one common Life, whether *ſentient* and rational, or Plaſtick and Spermatick only, as ruling over the whole Maſs of Matter and the Corporeal Univerſe: but only ſuppos'd the ſeveral Parts of Matter to have ſo many ſeveral Plaſtick Lives of their own.

Thus far we ſee two different Schemes of Atheiſm, very different from each other: the one of which derives the Original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided Motion of Matter, without any vital or directive Principle; the other derives it from a certain Mixture of Chance and the Life of Matter both together; it ſuppoſing a Plaſtick Life, not in the whole Univerſe, as one thing, but in all the ſeveral Parts of Matter by themſelves: the firſt of which, as I ſaid, is the *Atomick* and *Democritick* Atheiſm, the ſecond the *Hylozoick* and *Stratonick*.

Some perhaps may here ſuſpect that the famous * *Hippocrates*, who liv'd long before *Strato*, was alſo an Aſſertor of the *Hylozoick* Atheiſm, becauſe of ſome Attributes in many of his Writings, which he applies to *Nature*: but to do him Juſtice, I ſay, that tho he was indeed a Corporealiſt, yet was he notwithſtanding a Theiſt, and aſſerted with *Heraclitus* ſuch a God as he ſuppos'd to be an underſtanding Immortal Fire pervading the whole Univerſe; and as for what he ſays of *Nature*, it is no more than *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* have done, who ſuppoſe it to be a Principle, which acts for ends, tho without Reaſoning or Conſultation. And I muſt

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* See Plutarch. adverſ. Colotem.

† Hip. de Princip. aut Carnibus, § 1.

confeſs,

confeſs, that it ſeems to me no way misbecoming any Theiſt to acknowledg ſuch a *Nature* or Principle in the Univerſe, as may act according to Rule and Method for the ſake of ends and in order to the beſt, tho it ſelf do not underſtand the reaſon of what it does; this being ſtill ſuppos'd to act dependently upon a higher intellectual Principle, and to have been firſt ſet awork and employ'd by it. But to aſſert any ſuch *Plaſtick Nature*, as is independent on any higher intellectual Principle, and ſo it ſelf the firſt and higheſt Principle of Activity in the Univerſe, this indeed muſt needs be either that *Hylozoick* Atheiſm already ſpoken of, or elſe another different Form of Atheiſm, which ſhall be afterwards deſcrib'd: but this is what* *Hippocrates* cannot be tax'd of; the utmoſt he ſaid to this purpoſe being this, That *Nature finds out ways to it ſelf, not by Ratiocination.*

Another Form of Atheiſm is that of *Anaximander*, and after him of *Hippo*, *Anaximenes*, *Diogenes*, *Apollinates*, and many others, who with the *Democriticks* deriv'd all things in the World from a mere fortuitous *Nature*: but with this difference, that whereas theſe latter did it in the way of Atoms and Mechaniſm, the former did it in the way of Forms and Qualitys. Both theſe are jointly oppos'd by *Plato* in his *Sophiſt*, and the latter particularly by *Ariſtotle* in his *Metaphyſicks*, where ſpeaking about the Quaternio of Cauſes, he affirms that many of thoſe who firſt philoſophiz'd, aſſign'd only a material Cauſe of the whole Mundane Syſtem, without either an intending or efficient Cauſe: the reaſon of which he intimates to have been this, becauſe they aſſerted a certain infinite *Materia Prima*, indifferent,

* Ἀνδρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας. 6 Epidem. §. 5.

unmingl'd

unmingl'd, and devoid of Underſtanding and Life, to be the only Subſtance and firſt Principle of all things; and that conſequently whatſoever elſe was in the World beſides the Subſtance or Bulk of *Matter* was nothing elſe but different *Paſſions* and *Affections*, *Accidents* and *Qualitys* of *Matter*, that were all generated out of it and corruptible again into it, from the fortuitous Motion and Commixture of the Parts of it. According to which ſuppoſition the World as ſuch is neither eternal, ſelf-exiſtent and independent; nor, as many Theiſts, namely *Ocellus Lucanus*, *Ariſtotle*, and the later *Platoniſts* conceiv'd, is it eternal by way of Emanation from, and of as neceſſary a dependance on the Deity, as Light has on the Sun, or as if it had been created by it: but according to this, there may have been, and there may hereafter be an infinite Succeſſion of Worlds, while the ſubject *Matter* of 'em, tho variouſly model'd by the fortuitous Conjunction and Separation of its Parts, do always remain the ſame, neither generated nor corrupted, but from Eternity independent and unmade. This kind of Atheiſm I have the rather nam'd, becauſe it is the very Doctrine of the Atheiſts at this day: but againſt it I obſerve, that *Ariſtotle* of old has very well made theſe two Exceptions. Firſt, that the Abettors of it, while they acknowledg'd no other Subſtance but *Matter*, which might be an active Principle in the Univerſe, could not poſſibly give any account of the original of Motion and Action; and ſecondly, that if there were no intending Cauſality, but ſenſleſs and ſtupid *Matter* were the only Principle of all things, they could not aſſign any Cauſe of * *Well and Fit*; nor conſequently give any account of the regular and or-

* Τὸ ἓυ καὶ καλῶς εἶναι.

derly Frame of this Mundane Syſtem. Whereupon therefore he afterwards ſubjoins a Commendation of *Anaxagoras*, as being the firſt of the *Ionick* Philoſophers who introduc'd *Mind* or *Intellect* for a Principle in the Univerſe, implying, that in this reſpect he alone ſeem'd to be ſober and in his Wits, comparatively with thoſe others who went before him, and who talk'd ſo idly and atheiſtically *. Again, ſays he, the Principle of *Anaxagoras* was ſuch, as was at once a Cauſe of Motion, and alſo of *Well and Fit*, of all the Regularity, Beauty and Order which are in the whole Univerſe †.

However the *Anaximandrian* Philoſophy, tho ſo abſurd, as deriving all things from ſenſleſs ſtupid Matter in the way of Forms and Qualitys, and ſo making that the only *Numen* or the Divineſt thing of all, was, as appears from the date of its chief Aſſertor, of great Antiquity; nay *Ariſtotle* tells us that it is as old as any Records of Time among the *Greeks*, and not only ſo, but alſo that the antient *Theologers* themſelves entertain'd it. Alſo *Plato* in his *Thæetetus* affirms this Atheiſtick Doctrine to have been very antient, that all things were the *Off-ſpring of Flux and Motion*, were made and generated out of the Ocean or floating Matter, or, which is all one, from *Night* and *Chaos*: of which *Ariſtophanes* in his *Aves* gives this jocular Deſcription; That at firſt was nothing but *Night* and *Chaos*, which latter laying an Egg, from thence was produc'd *Love*, which mingling again with *Chaos*, gradually gave a Beginning to all things. But tho this Hypotheſis be purely atheiſtical and abſurd, as making *Love*, which

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* Ariſt. Met. lib. 1. c. 3.

† Ἅμα τῇ καλῶς λέγειν, καὶ τοιαύτῃ, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει. Ibid.

 is

is ſuppos'd to be the original Deity, to have it ſelf ſprung at firſt from an *Egg* of the *Night*; and conſequently that *all Deity* was the Creature or Off-ſpring of *Matter and Chaos, or dark fortuitous Nature*; yet *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere conceives that not only *Parmenides*, but alſo *Heſiod* and ſome others, who did in like manner make *Love* the Supreme Deity, and derive all things from *Love* and *Chaos*, yet were to be exempted out of the Number of thoſe Atheiſtick Materialiſts before deſcrib'd: foraſmuch as they ſeem'd to underſtand by *Love* an active Principle and Cauſe of Motion in the Univerſe, which therefore could not ſpring from an *Egg* of the *Night*, nor be the Creature of *Matter*, but muſt needs be ſomething independent on it, and in order of Nature before it. To this purpoſe *Simmias Rhodius* in his *Wings*, a Poem which he made in honour of this *Love*, as ſenior to all the Gods, and a Principle of the Univerſe, tells us plainly, that it is not *Cupid* the ſoft and effeminate Son of *Venus*, but another kind of *Love*; a *Love* very probably he meant, which is the Supreme Deity and Original of all things; an eternal, ſelf-originated, intellectual *Love*, or eſſential and ſubſtantial Goodneſs, which having an infinite overflowing Fecundity and Fulneſs, diſpenſes it ſelf uninvidiouſly, according to the beſt Wiſdom ſweetly governs all, without any Force or Violence (all things being naturally ſubject to its Authority, and readily obeying its Laws) and ſo reconciles the whole World in Harmony. Agreeably to this the *Scripture* tells us that *God is Love*, by which it ſeems to warrant thus much to us, that *Love* in ſome rightly qualify'd ſenſe is God. But to return to *Anaximander*; it plainly appears * that he

† *See* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *fol.* 124, &c.

was really an Atheiſt, as abſolutely denying one ſovereign, intelligent, incorporeal God; tho perhaps among ſome, at leaſt of the Vulgar, he may have eſcap'd this Cenſure; becauſe he, as alſo *Democritus*, did outwardly conform to the idolatrous Rites and ſuperſtitious Opinions of the *Country:* while others, tho very good Theiſts, have been ſtigmatiz'd with the mark of Atheiſts, becauſe they piouſly diſſented from and diſapprov'd the national Doctrines and Religion, as namely *Anaxagoras* the *Clozomenian*, and *Socrates*, with many other diſcerning *Philoſophers*; nay even the Primitive *Chriſtians*, as *Juſtin Martyr* tells us, were vulgarly traduc'd as Atheiſts.

Thus far I have repreſented three ſeveral Forms of Atheiſm, the *Democritical*, the *Stratonical*, and the *Anaximandrian*. There is yet another Form of Atheiſm different from them all to be taken notice of, which ſuppoſes one kind of *Plaſtick*, *Spermatick*, *Methodical*, and *Artificial Nature*, but without any Senſe or conſcious Underſtanding, to preſide over the Univerſe, and diſpoſe and conſerve all things in that regular Frame, in which they are. Which Form of Atheiſm, tho it has ſome correſpondence with that *Hylozoick* Form before deſcrib'd, in that it does not ſuppoſe Nature to be a mere fortuitous, but a kind of artificial thing; yet differs from it in this, that the *Hylozoick* ſuppoſing all Matter as ſuch to have Life eſſentially belonging to it, muſt needs therefore attribute to every Part of *Matter*, or at leaſt to every particular *Totum* which is *one* by Continuity, a diſtinct *Plaſtick* Life of its own; but acknowledg no one common Life, as ruling over the whole Corporeal Univerſe, and conſequently impute the Original of all things, as I have before obſerv'd, to a certain mixture of *Chance* and *Plaſtick* or *Metho-*

dical Nature both together; whereas this *Coſmo-plaſtick* Atheiſm quite excludes *Fortune* or *Chance*, ſubjecting all things to the regular and orderly *Fate* of one *Plaſtick* or *Vegetative*, not *Animal Nature*, ruling over the *Whole*.

Now tho I can't deny but that ſome in all Ages may have entertain'd this Atheiſtical Conceit; that the Original of this whole Mundane Syſtem was from one artificial, orderly and methodical, but ſenſleſs *Nature* lodg'd in the Matter of it: Yet can we not trace the Footſteps of this Doctrine any where ſo much, as among the *Stoicks*, to which Sect * *Seneca*, who ſpeaks ſo waveringly and uncertainly in this point, whether the World were an *Animal* or *Plant*, belong'd. Not that I think this Point can be charg'd upon the Generality of the firſt and moſt antient *Stoicks*; but rather I account this Form of Atheiſm, which we now ſpeak of, to be but a certain Degeneracy from the right *Heraclitick* and *Zenonian Cabala*, which ſeem'd to contain in it theſe two things: Firſt that there was an Animaliſh, *Sentient*, and Intellectual *Nature*, or a conſcious Soul and Mind, that preſided over the whole World, tho lodg'd immediately in the *firy Matter* of it; ſecondly, that this ſentient and intellectual Nature, or corporeal Soul and Mind of the Univerſe, contain'd alſo under it or within it, as the inferior part of it, a certain *Plaſtick Nature* or Spermatick Principle, which was properly the *Fate* of all things. However tho this ſeems to have been the genuine Doctrine both of *Heraclitus* and *Zeno*; yet others of their Followers afterwards divided theſe two things from each other, and taking only the latter of them, made the *Plaſtick* or

* Sive Animal eſt Mundus, ſive Corpus Naturâ gubernante, ut Arbores, ut Sata, &c. *Senec. Nat. Quæſt. l.* 3. §. 29.

Spermatick

Spermatick Nature, devoid of all *Animality* and *conſcious Intellectuality*, to be the higheſt Principle in the Univerſe. Thus *Laertius* tells us, that *Boethus* an eminent and famous *Stoical* Doctor plainly deny'd the World to be an *Animal*, that is, to have ſentient, conſcious, or intellectual Nature preſiding over it; and conſequently muſt needs make it to be but a *Body govern'd by a Plaſtick or Vegetative Nature, as Trees, Plants, and Herbs.* And as it is poſſible that the other *Stoicks* and *Heracliticks* may have done the like before *Boethus*, ſo is it probable that he had after him many Followers; among whom was *Plinius Secundus*, and I may venture to ſay, *Seneca* himſelf, who was not without ſome tincture of this Atheiſm. Wherefore this Form of Atheiſm, which ſuppoſes one *Plaſtick or Spermatick Nature, one Plantal or Vegetative Life* in the whole World, as the higheſt Principle, may for diſtinction ſake be call'd the *Pſeudoſtoical* or *Stoical* Atheiſm. Beſides theſe *Philoſophick Atheiſts*, whoſe ſeveral Forms we have now deſcrib'd, it cannot be doubted but that there have been in all Ages many other Atheiſts, that have not at all Philoſophiz'd, nor pretended to maintain any particular Atheiſtick Syſtem or Hypotheſis in the way of *Reaſon*; but were only led by a certain dull and ſottiſh, tho confident disbelief of whatſoever they could not either ſee or feel; they being, I ſay, carry'd on into this way of Atheizing not by any clear Dictates of their *Reaſon* or *Underſtanding*, but only by a certain blind and irrational *Impetus*; and inſpir'd to it by that lower earthly Life and Nature, which is call'd in the *Scripture Oracles* * *the Spirit of the World*, and is oppos'd to † *the Spirit that is of God.*

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* Τὸ πνεῦμα τῦ κόσμυ. † Τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τῦ θεῦ.

Thus

And now I have deſcrib'd four ſeveral Forms of Atheiſm: Firſt the *Democritick*, which derives all things from dead and ſtupid Matter in the way of *Atoms* and *Figures*; Secondly the *Hylozoick* or *Stratonical*, which attributes to all Matter as ſuch a certain living and energetick *Nature*, but devoid of all *Animality*, *Senſe*, and *Conſciouſneſs*; Thirdly the *Hylopathian* or *Anaximandrian*, which with the *Democritick* fetches all things from dead and ſtupid Matter, but in the way of *Forms* and *Qualitys*, generable and corruptible; and laſtly the *Coſmo-plaſtick* or *Stoical* Atheiſm, which ſuppoſes one Plaſtick and methodical, but ſenſleſs Nature, to preſide over the whole Corporeal Univerſe. As we do not meet with any other Forms or Schemes of Atheiſm beſides theſe four, ſo do we conceive that there cannot eaſily be any other devis'd or thought on. Becauſe none may be concluded to be Atheiſts, but ſuch as are mere Corporealiſts; and neither muſt all Corporealiſts be condemn'd for Atheiſts, but only thoſe of them, who aſſert that there is no *Conſcious Intellectual Nature*, preſiding over the whole Univerſe. Now they who do this, and on t'other hand derive the Original of all things from Body or Matter, devoid of all Animality, Senſe, or Conſciouſneſs, muſt needs do this either in the way of Atoms and Figures, and theſe are the *Democritical* Atheiſts; or in the way of Forms, and theſe are the *Anaximandrian* Atheiſts: or if with the former they don't ſuppoſe Matter to be perfectly dead and ſtupid, yet muſt they conceive it to be endu'd either with one *Plaſtick*, *Spermatick* Life in the whole Univerſe, and theſe are the *Stoical* Atheiſts; or elſe to have Life and an energetick Nature belonging to it, tho without any Senſe or Self-perception, and conſequently that all the particular Portions of Matter, and every *Totum*

by

by Continuity, has a diſtinct Plaſtick Life of its own; and theſe are the *Stratonick* Atheiſts. Wherefore there does not ſeem to be room left for any other Form of Atheiſm to thruſt in beſides theſe four, which do all agree in theſe two things: Firſt that there is no other Subſtance in the World beſides *Body*; Secondly that all animal Life, Senſe, Self-perception, conſcious Underſtanding and Perſonality are generated and corrupted, ſucceſſively educ'd out of *Nothing*, and reduc'd into *Nothing* again.

Indeed I am not ignorant, that ſome who ſeem to be well-wiſhers to Atheiſm, have talk'd ſometimes of *ſenſitive* and *rational* Matter, as having a mind to ſuppoſe three ſeveral ſorts of Matter in the Univerſe ſpecifically different from one another, which were originally ſuch and ſelf-exiſtent from all Eternity, *ſenſleſs*, *ſenſitive*, and *rational*: as if the Mundane Syſtem might be conceiv'd to ariſe from a certain jumble of theſe three ſeveral ſorts of *Matter*, as it were ſcuffling together in the dark, without a God, and ſo producing Brute Animals and Men. But as this is a mere precarious *Hypotheſis*, there being no imaginable account to be given, how there ſhould come to be ſuch an eſſential difference betwixt *Matters*; or why this piece of *Matter* ſhould be *ſenſitive* and that *rational*, when another is altogether *ſenſleſs*: So the Suggeſtors of it are but mere Novices in Atheiſm, and a kind of bungling Well wiſhers to it. Firſt becauſe, according to this *Hypotheſis*, no Life would be produc'd or deſtroy'd in the ſucceſſive Generations and Corruptions of *Animals*, but only concreted and ſecreted in them; and conſequently all human Perſonalitys muſt be eternal and incorruptible: which is all one as to aſſert the Præ and Poſt-exiſtence of all Souls from Eternity to Eternity;

a thing that all genuine and thorough-pac'd Atheiſts are in a manner as abhorrent from, as from the Deity it ſelf. And ſecondly, becauſe there can be no imaginable reaſon given by them, why there might not be as well a certain *Divine Matter*, perfectly intellectual and ſelf-exiſtent from Eternity, as a *ſenſitive* and *rational Matter*; and therefore ſuch an Hypotheſis as this can never ſerve the turn of *Atheiſts*. But all thoſe that are Maſters of the Craft of Atheiſm, and thoroughly initiated in the Myſterys of it, do, as I have before noted, perfectly agree in this, that all *animal*, *ſentient*, and *conſcious Life*, all *Souls* and *Minds*, and conſequently all Human Perſonalitys, are generated out of Matter, and corrupted again into it; or rather educ'd out of *Nothing*, and reduc'd into *Nothing* again.

Alſo I am aware, that there are certain canting *Aſtrological Atheiſts*, who would deduce all things from the *occult Qualitys* and Influences of the Stars, according to their different *Conjunctions*, *Oppoſitions*, and *Aſpects*, in a certain blind and unaccountable manner. But theſe being very ſenſleſs Perſons, who neither ſo much as pretend to give an account of theſe Stars, whether they be Animals or not, nor whence they derive their Original, (which if they did undertake to do *Atheiſtically*, they muſt needs at length reſolve themſelves into one or t'other of the afore-nam'd *Hypotheſes*) I conceive 'em unworthy of the leaſt Conſideration. But I think fit here to obſerve, that ſuch *Devotos* to the Heavenly Bodys, as look upon all the other Stars as petty Deitys, but upon the Sun as the Supreme Deity and Monarch of the Univerſe, conceiving it at once to be perfectly intellectual (which is in a manner the ſame with the *Cleanthean Hypotheſis*) are not ſo much to be accounted Atheiſts, as ſpurious and idolatrous Theiſts.

Wherefore upon all these Considerations I again conclude, that there is no other Philosophick Form of Atheism that can be easily devis'd, besides those which I have before mention'd.

But among these Forms of Atheism there is yet another difference to be observ'd, and accordingly another Distribution to be made of 'em; it being first premis'd that all the fore-mention'd sorts of Atheists, if they will speak consistently and agreeably to their own Principles, must needs suppose all things to be one way or other *necessary*: for tho *Epicurus* introduc'd *contingent Liberty*, yet is it well known that he therein plainly contradicted his own Principles. And this indeed was the first and principal thing intended by us in this whole Undertaking, to confute that false Hypothesis of the Mundane System, which makes all Actions and Events *necessary* upon Atheistick gronnds, but especially in the *Mechanick Way*. Wherefore in the next place we must observe, that tho the Principles of all *Atheists* do introduce *Necessity*, yet the *Necessity* of these Atheists is not one and the same, but of two different kinds; some of 'em supposing a Necessity of dead and stupid Matter, which is commonly term'd a *material*, and by *Aristotle* an *absolute Necessity*; others supposing the *Necessity* of a *Plastick Life*, which the same *Aristotle* calls an *Hypothetical Necessity*. For the *Anaximandrian* and *Democritick* Atheists do both of them assert a material and absolute Necessity of all things; one in the way of *Qualitys*, and the other of *Motion* and *Mechanism*: but the *Stoical* and *Stratonical* Atheists assert only a *Plastick* and *Hypothetical Necessity*. Now one grand difference between these two sorts of Atheisms and their *Necessitys* appears in this, that the former, tho they make all things *necessary*, yet do at once suppose 'em to be

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fortuitous, there being no Inconſiſtency between theſe two. And the ſenſe both of the *Anaximandrian* and the *Democritick* Atheiſms ſeems to be thus deſcrib'd by * *Plato*; *All things*, ſays he, *were mingl'd together by Neceſſity according to Fortune.* For that Nature, from which theſe Atheiſts deriv'd all things, is at once both *neceſſary* and *fortuitous.* But the Plaſtick Atheiſms ſuppoſe ſuch a neceſſary Nature for the firſt Principle of things, as is not merely *fortuitous*, but orderly and methodical; the *Stoical* excluding all *Chance* and *Fortune* univerſally, in that they ſubject all things to one *Plaſtick Nature*, ruling over the whole Univerſe; but the *Stratonical* doing it only in part, in that they derive things from a mixture of *Chance* and *Plaſtick Nature* both together.

Again it is obſervable that thoſe Atheiſms, which derive all things from a mere fortuitous Principle, and withal ſuppoſe every thing, beſides the bare Subſtance of Matter or extended Bulk, to be generated and corrupted, tho they aſſerted the Eternity of Matter, yet could not, as I have before remark'd, agreeably to their own *Hypotheſis*, maintain the Eternity and Incorruptibility of the World: but inſtead of that, theſe two ſorts of Atheiſts, the *Anaximandrian* and the *Democritick*, introduc'd another Paradox, namely an Infinity of Worlds, and that not only ſucceſſive in that Space, which this World of ours is conceiv'd now to occupy, with reſpect to the Infinity of paſt and future Time; but alſo a contemporary Infinity of co-exiſtent Worlds at all times throughout endleſs and unbounded Space. However I muſt own that ſome Perſons Atheiſtically inclin'd, have been always apt to run out

* Πάντα καλὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη.

another way, and to ſuppoſe that the Frame of things and Syſtem of the World ever was from Eternity, and ever will be to Eternity, ſuch as now it is, diſpens'd by a certain orderly and regular, yet ſenſleſs and unknowing *Nature*. And it is propheſy'd in Scripture that ſuch Atheiſts as theſe ſhould abound eſpecially in theſe latter Days of ours: *There ſhall come in the laſt Days* * Atheiſtical *Scoffers*, ſays St. *Peter*, *walking after their own Luſts, and ſaying, Where is the Promiſe of his coming? For ſince the Fathers fell aſleep, all things continue as they were from the Beginning of the Creation* †. Which latter Words are ſpoken only according to the receiv'd *Hypotheſis* of the *Jews*, the meaning of theſe *Atheiſts* being quite otherwiſe, that there was neither Creation nor Beginning of the World, but that things had continu'd ſuch as now they are from all Eternity: as alſo appears from what the *Apoſtle* there adds by way of Confutation, that *they were wilfully ignorant of this, that by the Word of God the Heavens were of old, and the Earth ſtanding out of the Water and in the Water: and that as the World that then was, overflowing with Water, periſh'd; ſo the Heavens and Earth, which now are, by the ſame Word are kept in ſtore and reſerv'd unto Fire againſt the Day of Judgment and Perdition of ungodly Men.* And it is evident that ſome of theſe Atheiſts, tho they march indeed in the Garb of *Religioniſts*, yet acknowledg no more a God than a *Chriſt* without them; that they allegorize the Day of Judgment and future Conflagration into a kind of a ſeemingly *Myſtical*, but really Atheiſtical Non-ſenſe. Theſe Perſons, if they did at all philoſophize, would reſolve themſelves

* Ἐμπαῖκται.

† 2 Pet. 3. 3, 4.

into

into one or t'other of thoſe two fore-mention'd *Hypotheſes:* either that of one *Plaſtick*, *Orderly*, and *Methodical*, but *ſenſleſs Nature*, ruling over the whole Univerſe; or elſe that of the *Life of Matter*, making one or other of theſe two Natures to be their only God or *Numen:* it being ſufficiently agreeable to the Principles of both theſe Atheiſtick *Hypotheſes* and no others, to maintain the World's *Præ* and *Poſt-eternity*, yet ſo as that the latter of them, namely the *Hylozoiſts*, admitting a certain mixture of *Chance* together with the *Life* of *Matter*, would ſuppoſe, that tho the main Strokes of things might be preſerv'd the ſame, and ſome kind of conſtant Regularity always kept up in the World, yet the whole Mundane Syſtem did not in all reſpects continue the ſame without any Variation from Eternity to Eternity; but there had been many Alternations and Viciſſitudes in all the greater Parts of it. Whereas the generality of the *Stoical* Atheiſts (for ſome, I grant, thought otherwiſe) who made the whole World to be diſpens'd by one *Orderly* and *Plaſtick Nature*, might very well and agreeably to their own *Hypotheſis*, maintain, beſides the World's Eternity, one conſtant and invariable Courſe or Tenor of things in it, as * *Plinius Secundus* does; who, if he were any thing, ſeems to have been one of theſe Atheiſts, in that he aſſerted no other *Numen* or God, *eternal, immenſe, ſuch as never was made and ſhall never be deſtroy'd; but the World, and that*, as he ſpeaks, *which by another Name is call'd the Heavens, by whoſe Circumgyration all things are govern'd.*

The four-fold Atheiſm, which I have thus far repreſented, is the *Kingdom of Darkneſs divided*, or labour-

* Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. 2. c. 1.

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ing with an inteſtine ſeditious War in its own Bowels, and thereby deſtroying it ſelf: inſomuch that we might very well ſave our ſelves the pains of any further Confutation of Atheiſm, merely by committing theſe ſeveral Schemes of it together, and daſhing 'em one againſt another, they oppoſing and contradicting each other no leſs, than they do Theiſm it ſelf. For firſt, thoſe two Pairs of Atheiſms; on one hand the *Democritick* and *Anaximandrian*, on t'other the *Stratonical* and *Stoical*, do abſolutely deſtroy each other; the former of them ſuppoſing the firſt Principle of all things to be *ſtupid Matter*, devoid of all manner of *Life*, and contending that all *Life*, as well as other Qualitys, is *generable* and *corruptible*, or a mere accidental thing, and looking upon the *Plaſtick Life* of Nature as a fantaſtick Capricio or Figment, a thing almoſt as formidable, and altogether as impoſſible as a Deity; the others on the contrary founding all upon this Principle, that there is a Life and natural Perception eſſential to Matter, ingenerable and incorruptible, and contending that it is utterly impoſſible to give any account of the *Phænomena* of the World, the Original of Motion, the orderly Frame and Diſpoſition of things, and the Nature of Animals, without this fundamental Life of *Nature*.

Again, the ſingle Atheiſms belonging to theſe ſeveral Pairs do alſo as much quarrel between themſelves. For the *Democritick* Atheiſm explodes the *Anaximandrian Qualitys* and *Forms*, demonſtrating that the natural Production of ſuch Entitys out of nothing, and the Corruption of 'em again into nothing, is of the two rather more impoſſible than a Divine Creation or Annihilation. And on the other ſide, the *Anaximandrian* Atheiſt plainly diſcovers, that when the *Democriticks* and *Atomicks* have ſpent all their Fury againſt theſe

Qualitys and *Forms*, and done what they can to ſolve the *Phænomena* of Nature without 'em another way, do themſelves notwithſtanding, like drunken Men, reel and ſtagger back again into them, and are unavoidably neceſſitated at laſt to take up their Sanctuary in them.

In like manner the *Stratonical* and *Stoical* Atheiſts may as effectually undo and confute each other; the former of 'em urging againſt the latter, that beſides the prodigious Abſurdity of making every Atom of ſenſleſs *Matter infallibly wiſe* or *omniſcient*, yet without any Conſciouſneſs, there can be no reaſon at all given by the *Hylozoiſt*, why the *Matter* of the whole Univerſe might not as well conſpire and confederate together into one, as all the ſingle Atoms, that compound the Body of an Animal or Man; or why one conſcious *Life* might not as well reſult from the *Totum* of the former, as of the latter; by which means the whole World would become an Animal or God. Again, the latter contending that the *Stoical* or *Coſmoplaſtick* Atheiſt can pretend no reaſon why the whole World might not have one *ſentient* and *rational*, as well as one Plaſtick Soul in it, that is, as well be an Animal as a *Plant*. Moreover, that the ſenſitive Souls of Brute Animals and the rational Souls of Men could never poſſibly emerge out of one ſingle, *Plaſtick*, and vegetative Soul in the whole Univerſe. And laſtly, that it is altogether as impoſſible, that the whole World ſhould have Life in it, and yet none of its Parts ſhould have any Life of their own, as that the whole World ſhould be white or black, and yet no part of it ſhould have any Whiteneſs or Blackneſs at all in it. And therefore that the *Stoical* Atheiſts as well as Theiſts do both alike deny *Incorporeal Subſtance*, but in words only, while they really admit the thing it ſelf; becauſe one and the ſame Life ruling

ruling over all the diſtant Parts of the Corporeal Univerſe, muſt needs be an incorporeal Subſtance, it being *all* in the *Whole*, and *all* acting upon every *Part*, and yet none of it in any part by it ſelf; for then it would be many and not *one*. From all which it may be concluded that Atheiſm is a certain ſtrange kind of Monſter with *four Heads*, which are all of 'em perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring each other.

But tho theſe ſeveral Forms of Atheiſm do mutually deſtroy each other, and neither of 'em be really formidable or conſiderable in it ſelf, as to any Strength of *Reaſon*, which it has; yet as they are compar'd together among themſelves, ſome of 'em may be more conſiderable than the reſt. For firſt, as the *Qualitys* and *Forms* of the *Anaximandrian* Atheiſt, ſuppos'd to be really diſtinct from the Subſtances, are things unintelligible in themſelves; ſo can he not with any colour or pretence of Reaſon maintain the natural Production of 'em out of *Nothing*, and the Reduction of 'em again into *Nothing*, and yet withſtand a *Divine Creation* or *Annihilation* as an Impoſſibility. Moreover, the *Anaximandrian* Atheiſm is as it were ſwallow'd up in the *Democritick*, and further improv'd by it, this latter carrying on the ſame Deſign with more ſeeming Artifice, greater Plauſibility of Wit, and a more pompous ſhew of ſomething, where indeed there is nothing. Upon which account it has for many Ages paſt beaten the *Anaximandrian* Atheiſm in a manner quite off the Stage, and reign'd there alone. So that the *Democritick* or *Atomick* Atheiſm ſeems to be much more conſiderable of the two than the *Anaximandrian* or *Hylopathian*.

Again, as for thoſe two other Forms of Atheiſm; if there were any *Life* at all in *Matter*, as the firſt and immediate

immediate Recipient of it, then muſt this in reaſon needs be ſuppos'd to be after the ſame manner in it, that all other Corporeal Qualitys are in Bodys, ſo as to be diviſible together with it, and ſome of it in every Part of the *Matter*, agreeably to the *Hypotheſis* of the *Hylozoiſts*: whereas on the contrary the *Stoical* Atheiſts ſuppoſing one *Life* only in the whole Maſs of *Matter*, and in ſuch a manner, as that none of the Parts of it by themſelves ſhould have any *Life* of their own, do thereby, no leſs than the *Stoical* Theiſts, make this *Life* of theirs to be no corporeal *Quality* or *Form*, but an *incorporeal Subſtance*; which is to contradict their own *Hypotheſis*. From whence we may conclude that the *Coſmo-plaſtick* or *Stoical* Atheiſm is of the two leſs conſiderable than the *Hylozoick* or *Stratonical*.

Wherefore among theſe kinds of Atheiſm, which we have propounded, the *Atomick* or *Democritical*, and the *Hylozoick* or *Stratonical*, are the chief. The former of which admitting a true Notion of *Body*, that, according to the firſt and moſt antient *Atomiſts*, it is nothing elſe but *Reſiſting Bulk*, devoid of all manner of Life; yet becauſe it takes for granted, that there is no other Subſtance in the World beſides Body, does therefore conclude that all *Life* and *Underſtanding* in Animals and Men is generated out of dead and ſtupid *Matter*, tho not as *Forms* and *Qualitys* in the *Anaximandrian* way; but as reſulting from the Contextures of Atoms, or ſome peculiar Compoſition of *Magnitudes*, *Figures*, *Sites*, and *Motions*; and conſequently that they are themſelves really nothing elſe but *Local Motion* and *Mechaniſm*. But the latter, namely the *Hylozoick* Atheiſm, tho truly acknowledging on the contrary, that *Life*, *Cogitation*, and *Underſtanding* are Entitys really diſtinct from *Local Motion* and *Mechaniſm*, and

that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and ſtupid *Matter*, but muſt needs be ſomewhere in the World, originally, eſſentially and fundamentally; yet becauſe it alſo takes it for granted that there is no other Subſtance beſides *Matter*, does thereupon adulterate the Notion of *Matter* or *Body*, blending and confounding it with *Life*, as making 'em but two inadequate Conceptions of *Subſtance*, and concluding that all *Matter* and Subſtance as ſuch has *Life* and *Perception*, or *Underſtanding natural* and *inconſcious*, eſſentially belonging to it; and that *Senſe* and *conſcious Reaſon* or Underſtanding in Animals ariſes only from the accidental Modification of this fundamental *Life* of *Matter* by Organization. Wherefore we conclude, that if theſe two *Atheiſtick Hypotheſes*, which are found to be the moſt conſiderable, are once confuted, the Reality of all Atheiſm will be *ipſo facto* baffl'd and confounded; there being indeed nothing more requiſite to a thorough Confutation of *Atheiſm*, than the proving of theſe two things: Firſt, that *Life* and Underſtanding are not eſſential to Matter as ſuch; and ſecondly, that they can never poſſibly riſe out of any Mixture or Modification of *dead* and *ſtupid Matter* whatſoever. The reaſon of which Aſſertion is, becauſe all Atheiſts, as was before obſerv'd, are mere *Corporealiſts*, of which there can be but theſe two ſorts: either ſuch as make *Life* to be eſſential to *Matter*, and therefore to be *ingenerable* and *incorruptible*, or elſe ſuch as ſuppoſe *Life*, and every thing beſides the * bare Subſtance of *Matter* or extended Bulk, to be merely accidental, generable, or corruptible, as riſing out of ſome Mixture or Modification of it. And as the proving of theſe two

* Ὕλη ἄποιος.

will

will overthrow all Atheiſm, ſo will it likewiſe lay a clear Foundation for demonſtrating a Deity, diſtinct from the corporeal World.

Now that *Life* and *Perception* or *Underſtanding* ſhould be eſſential to *Matter* as ſuch, or that all ſenſleſs *Matter* ſhould be perfectly and infallibly *wiſe* (tho without Conſciouſneſs) as to all its own Congruitys and Capacitys, which is the Doctrine of the *Hylozoiſts*; this, I ſay, is an Hypotheſis ſo highly *Paradoxical* and ſo outrageouſly wild, as that very few Men could ever have Atheiſtical Faith enough to ſwallow it down and digeſt it. Wherefore this *Hylozoick* Atheiſm has been very obſcure ever ſince its firſt Riſe, and has found ſo few Favourers and Abettors, that it has look'd like a forlorn and deſerted thing. Nor indeed are there any publick Monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintain'd, or ſtated and reduc'd into a Syſtem. Inſomuch that we ſhould not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular Form of Atheiſm, nor have conjur'd it up out of its Grave, had we not underſtood that *Strato*'s Ghoſt had begun to walk of late, and that among ſome Well-wiſhers to Atheiſm, deſpairing in a manner of the *Atomick* Form, this *Hylozoick Hypotheſis* began already to be look'd upon as the Riſing Sun of Atheiſm, —*& tanquam ſpes altera Trojæ*; it ſeeming to ſmile upon 'em and flatter 'em at a diſtance, with ſome fairer hopes of ſupporting that ruinous and deſperate Cauſe.

Whereas on the contrary, that other Atomick Atheiſm, as it inſiſts upon a true Notion of *Body*, that it is nothing but *reſiſting Bulk*; by which means we joining iſſue thereupon, ſhall be fairly conducted on to a clear Deciſion of this preſent Controverſy, and likewiſe to the diſentangling of many other points of *Philoſophy*: ſo is

it that which has fill'd the World with the Noiſe of it for two thouſand Years paſt; that, concerning which ſeveral Volumes have been written, in which it has been formerly ſtated, and brought into a kind of Syſtem; and which has of late obtain'd a Reſurrection among us together with the *Atomick Phyſiology*, and been recommended to the World under the ſpecious ſhew of Wit and profound *Philoſophy*.

Wherefore as we could not here inſiſt upon both theſe Forms of Atheiſm together, becauſe that would have been to confound the Language of Atheiſts, and to have made 'em like the *Cadmæan* Off-ſpring, to do immediate execution upon themſelves: So were we in all reaſon oblig'd to make our firſt and principal Aſſault upon the *Atomick* Atheiſm, as being the only conſiderable upon this account; becauſe it is that alone which publickly confronts the World, and like the *proud uncircumcis'd Philiſtine*, openly *defies the Hoſts of the living God*. However we intend in the Cloſe of this whole Diſcourſe, where we ſhall directly aſſert an *Incorporeal* Deity, to demonſtrate that *Life*, *Cogitation*, and *Underſtanding*, do not eſſentially belong to *Matter* and all *Subſtance* as ſuch, but are the peculiar Attributes and Characteriſticks of *Subſtance Incorporeal*.

But ſince we have now ſtarted theſe ſeveral Forms of Atheiſm, we ſhall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither; for in anſwer to the ſecond Atheiſtick ground we ſhall confute 'em all at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental Principle, that the *Original* of all things in the Univerſe is *ſenſleſs Matter*, or *Matter devoid of all Animality or conſcious Life*. In reply to the fourth Atheiſtick Argumentation, we ſhall briefly hint the grounds of *Reaſon*, from which *Incorporeal* Subſtance is demonſtrated. In the examination of the fifth, we ſhall

confute the *Anaximandrian* Atheiſm there propounded, which is as it were the firſt Draught and rude Delineation of Atheiſm. And in the Confutation of the ſixth we ſhall ſhew how the antient *Atomick* Atheiſts did preventively overthrow the Foundation of *Hylozoiſm*. Beſides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough Confutation both of the *Coſmo-plaſtick* and *Hylozoick* Atheiſms, we ſhall in this very place take occaſion to inſiſt largely upon the *Plaſtick Life* of *Nature*, giving firſt a true account of it, and then afterwards ſhewing how groſly it is miſunderſtood, and the Pretence of it abus'd by the Aſſerters of both theſe Atheiſtick *Hypotheſes*.

For we think fit here to obſerve, that neither the *Coſmo-plaſtick* or *Stoical*, nor the *Hylozoick* or *Stratonical* Atheiſts are therefore condemn'd by us, becauſe they ſuppoſe ſuch a thing as a *Plaſtick Nature* or *Life*, diſtinct from the *Animal*; albeit this be not only exploded as an abſolute Non-entity, by the *Atomick* Atheiſts, who might poſſibly be afraid of it, as that which approach'd too near to a Deity, or elſe would hazard the introducing of it; but alſo utterly diſcarded by ſome profeſs'd Theiſts of latter times, who might notwithſtanding have an undiſcern'd Tang of the Mechanical Atheiſm hanging about 'em, in that they have ſo confidently rejected all *final* and *intending Cauſality* in *Nature*, and admitted of no other Cauſes of things as *Philoſophical*, but the material and mechanical only; this being really to baniſh all *Mental*, and conſequently all *Divine* Cauſality quite out of the World, and to make the Univerſe to be nothing elſe but a mere Heap of Duſt fortuitouſly agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that has no Signatures of *Mind* and *Underſtanding*, *Counſel* and *Wiſdom* at all upon it; nor indeed any other

ther *Vitality* acting in it, than only the Production of a certain Quantity of *Local Motion*, and the Conſervation of it according to ſome general Laws; which things the *Democritick* Atheiſts take for granted would all be as they are, tho there were no God.

But, I ſay, that unleſs there be ſuch a thing admitted as a *Plaſtick Nature*, which acts *for the ſake of ſomething*, and *in order to Ends*, *regularly*, *artificially*, and *methodically*, it ſeems that one or other of theſe two things muſt be concluded: That either in the Efformation and Organization of the Bodys of Animals, as well as the other *Phænomena*, every thing comes to paſs *fortuitouſly*, and happens to be as it is, without the Guidance and Direction of any *Mind* or *Underſtanding*; or elſe that God himſelf does all immediately, and as it were with his own Hands forms the Body of every Gnat and Fly, Inſect and Mite, as well as that of other Animals in Generation, all whoſe Members have ſo much of Contrivance in 'em, that *Galen* profeſs'd he could never enough admire the Artifice which is in the Leg of a Fly; (and yet he would have admir'd the Wiſdom of Nature much more, had he been but acquainted with the Uſe of Microſcopes) I ſay upon ſuppoſition of no *Plaſtick Nature*, one or other of theſe two things muſt be concluded; becauſe it is not conceiv'd by any, that the things of Nature are all thus adminiſter'd with ſuch exact Regularity and Conſtancy every where, merely by the Wiſdom, Providence, and Efficiency of thoſe inferior Spirits, *Dæmons*, or Angels. Alſo tho it be true that the Works of Nature are diſpens'd by a Divine Law and Command, yet this is not to be underſtood in a vulgar Senſe, as if they were all effected by the mere force of a verbal Law or outward Command; becauſe

becauſe inanimate things are not *commandable* nor *governable* by ſuch a *Law*; and therefore, beſides the Divine *Will* and *Pleaſure*, there muſt needs be ſome other immediate Agent and Executioner provided for the Production of every Effect: ſince not ſo much as a Stone, nor any other heavy Body could at any time fall downward merely by the force of a *verbal Law*, without any other *efficient Cauſe*; but either God himſelf muſt immediately impel it, or elſe there muſt be ſome other ſubordinate Cauſe in *Nature* for that Motion. Wherefore the Divine *Law* and *Command*, by which the things of Nature are adminiſter'd, muſt be conceïv'd to be the real Appointment of ſome *energetick*, *effectual*, and *operative Cauſe*, for the Production of every Effect.

Now to aſſert the former of theſe two things, that all the Effects of *Nature* come to paſs by *material* and *Mechanical Neceſſity*, or the mere *fortuitous Motion* of *Matter* without any Guidance or Direction, is a thing no leſs irrational, than it is impious and atheiſtical: not only becauſe it is utterly inconceivable and impoſſible, that ſuch mighty Regularity and Artificialneſs, as is every where ſeen throughout the whole World, ſhould conſtantly reſult out of the *fortuitous Motion* of *Matter*; but alſo becauſe there are many ſuch particular *Phænomena* in Nature, as do plainly tranſcend the Powers of *Mechaniſm*, of which therefore no ſufficient *mechanical* Reaſons can be devis'd, and ſuch is the Motion of Reſpiration in *Animals*. Alſo there are other *Phænomena*, which are perfectly croſs to the Laws of *Mechaniſm*, as namely that of the diſtant *Poles* of the *Æquator* or Ecliptick, which we ſhall inſiſt upon hereafter *.

* *See other Inſtances of this in Dr.* More's Enchiridion Metaphyſicum.

More-

Moreover, thoſe *Theiſts* who philoſophize in this manner, by reſolving all the corporeal *Phænomena* into fortuitous *Mechaniſm* or the neceſſary and unguided *Motion* of *Matter*, make God to be nothing elſe in the World, but only an idle Spectator of the various Reſults of the *fortuitous* and *neceſſary* Motions of Bodys; and render his Wiſdom altogether uſeleſs and inſignificant, as being a thing wholly inclos'd and ſhut up within his own Breaſt, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him. And again I ſay that all ſuch *Mechaniſts* as theſe, whether *Theiſts* or *Atheiſts*, do, according to that judicious Cenſure paſs'd by *Ariſtotle* long ſince upon *Democritus*, but ſubſtitute as it were a * *Carpenter's or Artificer's wooden Hand, mov'd by Strings and Wires inſtead of a living Hand*: They make a kind of dead and wooden World, as it were a carv'd Statue that has nothing either *vital* or *magical* in it. Whereas to thoſe that are conſiderate it will plainly appear that there is a Mixture of Life and *Plaſtick Nature* together with *Mechaniſm*, which runs thro the whole corporeal Univerſe.

And whereas it is pretended not only that all corporeal *Phænomena* may be ſufficiently ſolv'd *mechanically*, without any *final*, *intending*, and *directive Cauſality*; but alſo that all other Reaſons of things in *Nature*, beſides the *material* and *mechanical*, are altogether unphiloſophical, the ſame *Ariſtotle* ingeniouſly expoſes the Ridiculouſneſs of this Pretence, after this manner: That it is juſt as if a Carpenter, Joiner, or Carver ſhould give this account as the only ſatisfactory one, of any artificial Fabrick or Piece of carv'd Imagery; *that becauſe the Inſtruments, the Axes and Hatchets,*

* Χεὶρ ξυλίνη τέκτονος. Ariſtot. de Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

Plains

Plains and Chizzles happen'd to fall ſo and ſo upon the Timber, cutting it here and there, that therefore it was hollow in one place and plain in another, and the like; and by that means the Whole came to be of ſuch a Form. For is it not altogether as abſurd and ridiculous for Men to undertake to give an account of the Formation and Organization of the Bodys of Animals by mere fortuitous Mechaniſm, without any *final or intending Cauſality*; as why there was a Heart here and Brains there, and why the Heart had ſo many and ſuch different Valves in the Entrance and Outlet of its Ventricles, and why all the other organical Parts, the Veins and Arterys, Nerves and Muſcles, Bones and Cartilages, with the Joints and Members, were of ſuch a Form? becauſe forſooth the fluid Matter of the Seed happen'd to move ſo and ſo in ſeveral places, and thereby to cauſe all thoſe differences, which are alſo diverſe in different *Animals*; all being the neceſſary Reſult of a certain Quantity of Motion at firſt indifferently impreſs'd upon the ſmall Particles of the Matter in this Univerſe, turn'd round in a *Vortex*. But as the ſame *Ariſtotle* adds, * *a Carpenter would give a better account than ſo; for he would not think it ſufficient to ſay, that the Fabrick came to be of ſuch a Form, becauſe the Inſtruments happen'd to fall ſo and ſo: but he will tell you, that it was becauſe he himſelf made ſuch Strokes, and that he directed the Inſtruments and determin'd their Motion after ſuch a manner, to this end that he might make the* Whole *a Fabrick fit and uſeful for ſuch Purpoſes*; which is to aſſign the *final Cauſe*. And certainly there is ſcarcely any Man in his Wits, who will not acknowledg the reaſon of the different *Valves* in the Heart,

* Ibid.

from the apparent Uſefulneſs of 'em, according to the particular Structure of them, to be more ſatisfactory than any which can be brought from mere fortuitous *Mechaniſm*, or the unguided Motion of the *ſeminal Matter*.

And as for the latter part of the Disjunction, that every thing in *Nature* ſhould be done immediately by God himſelf: this, as according to vulgar apprehenſion it would render Divine Providence operoſe, ſolicitous, and diſtractious, and thereby make the Belief of it to be entertain'd with greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheiſts; ſo in the Judgment of the Writer *de Mundo*, it is not ſo decorous in reſpect of God neither, that he ſhould ſet his own Hand as it were to * every Work, and immediately do all the meaneſt and moſt trifling things himſelf, without making uſe of any inferior and ſubordinate Inſtruments.

Moreover, it ſeems not ſo agreeable to Reaſon neither, that *Nature* as a diſtinct thing from the Deity, ſhould be quite ſuperſeded, and made to ſignify nothing; God himſelf doing all things immediately and miraculouſly: whence it would alſo follow, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or elſe artificially only, and none of 'em by any inward Principle of their own.

Laſtly, this Opinion is further confuted by that ſlow and gradual Proceſs, which is in the Generations of things; which therefore would ſeem to be but a vain and idle Pomp or trifling Formality, if the Agent were Omnipotent; as alſo by thoſe Errors and Bungles, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves, † which are committed, when the

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* Ἀυτουργεῖν ἅπαντα. † Ἁμαρτήματα.

Matter

Matter is inept and contumacious; which argue the Agent not to be irreſiſtible, and that *Nature* is ſuch a thing as is not altogether uncapable, as well as Human Art, of being ſometimes fruſtrated and diſappointed by the Indiſpoſition of *Matter*. Whereas an Omnipotent Agent, as it could diſpatch its work in a moment, ſo would it always do it *infallibly* and *irreſiſtibly*; no Ineptitude or Stubborneſs of Matter being ever able to hinder ſuch a one or make him bungle in any thing. Wherefore ſince neither all things are produc'd fortuitouſly or by the unguided Mechaniſm of *Matter*, nor God himſelf may reaſonably be thought to do all things immediately and miraculouſly, it may well be concluded, that there is a *Plaſtick Nature* under him, which as an inferiour and ſubordinate Inſtrument, drudgingly executes that part of his Providence, which conſiſts in the regular and orderly Motion of *Matter*: yet ſo as that there is alſo beſides this, a higher Providence to be acknowledg'd, which preſiding over, does often ſupply the Defects of it, and ſometimes over-rule it; foraſmuch as this *Plaſtick Nature* cannot act *electively* nor with *Diſcretion*. And by this means the Wiſdom of God will not be concluded or wholly ſhut up within his own Breaſt, but will diſplay it ſelf abroad, and print its ſtamps and ſignatures every where throughout the World: So that God, as *Plato*, after *Orpheus*, ſpeaks, will be not only the *Beginning* and *End*, but alſo the *Middle* of all things, they being as much to be aſcrib'd to his Cauſality, as if he himſelf had done 'em all immediately, without the concurrent Inſtrumentality of any ſubordinate natural Cauſe. Notwithſtanding which, it will alſo in this way appear to Human Reaſon, that all things are diſpos'd and order'd by the Deity, without any ſolicitous Care or

diſtractious Providence. And indeed thoſe *Mechanick Theiſts*, who rejecting a *Plaſtick Nature*, affect to concern the Deity as little as is poſſible in mundane Affairs, either for fear of debaſing and bringing him down to too mean Offices, or elſe of ſubjecting him to ſolicitous Encumberment, and for that cauſe would have God to contribute nothing more to the Mundane Syſtem and Oeconomy, than only the firſt impreſſing of a certain Quantity of *Motion* upon the *Matter*, and the after-conſerving of it, according to ſome general *Laws*: theſe Men, I ſay, ſeem not very well to underſtand themſelves in this. Foraſmuch as they muſt of neceſſity either ſuppoſe theſe their Laws of Motion to execute themſelves, or elſe be forc'd perpetually to concern the Deity in the immediate Motion of every Atom of Matter throughout the Univerſe, in order to the Execution and Obſervation of them. The former of which being a thing very plainly abſurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which theſe *Philoſophers* themſelves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any other Concluſion than this, that they do but unskilfully and unawares eſtabliſh that very thing, which in words they oppoſe; and that their *Laws* of *Motion* are really nothing elſe but a Plaſtick Nature acting upon the *Matter* of the whole corporeal Univerſe, both maintaining the ſame Quantity of Motion always in it, and alſo diſpenſing it, by transferring it out of one Body into another, according to ſuch or ſuch Laws, fatally impreſs'd upon it. Now if there be a *Plaſtick Nature*, that governs the *Motion* of *Matter* every where, according to *Laws*, there can be no reaſon given, why the ſame might not alſo extend further, to the regular diſpoſal of that *Matter*, in the Formation of *Plants* and *Animals*, and other things, in order to that apt

† coherent

coherent Frame and Harmony of the whole Univerſe.

And as this *Plaſtick Nature* is a thing, which ſeems to be in it ſelf moſt reaſonable, ſo has it alſo had the Suffrage of the beſt *Philoſophers* in all Ages, as namely of *Heraclitus*, *Empedocles*, *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Plotinus*, and in a word of all the ſucceeding *Platoniſts* and *Peripateticks*, who have zealouſly maintain'd, that Mundane things are not effected merely by the neceſſary and unguided *Motion* of *Matter*, or by fortuitous Mechaniſm: but by ſuch a *Nature* as acts *regularly* and *artificially* for *Ends*, yet ſo as that this *Nature* is not the higheſt Principle neither or the Supreme *Numen*, but ſubordinate to a perfect *Mind* or *Intellect*; they all ſubſcribing to theſe Words of * *Ariſtotle*, that *Mind together with Nature was the Cauſe of this Univerſe*; and that Heaven and Earth, Plants and Animals, were fram'd by them both; that is, by *Mind* as the principal and directive Cauſe, but by *Nature* as a ſubſervient or executive Inſtrument. To which I add, that the *Chymiſts* and *Paracelſians* do alſo inſiſt upon the ſame thing, and ſeem to have carry'd the Notion further in the Bodys of Animals, calling the *Plaſtick Nature* by a new Name of their own, the *Archeus* †.

But now this *Plaſtick Nature* being a thing, not without ſome difficulty in the Conception of it, we ſhall here endeavour to do theſe two things concerning it: Firſt to ſet down a right Deſcription of it, and afterwards to ſhew how extremely the Notion of it has been miſtaken, perverted, and abus'd by thoſe Atheiſts, who would make it to be the only God Almighty or firſt Principle of all things. How the

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* Νοῦς ἄριστον καὶ φύσις τοῦδε τοῦ παντός.

† *See* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *fol.* 151, 152, 153, *&c.*

Plaſtick

Plaſtick Nature is in general to be conceiv'd, * *Ariſtotle* inſtructs us in theſe Words: *If the Art of the Shipwright, for example, were in the Timber it ſelf operatively and effectually, it would there act, juſt as Nature does.* To which purpoſe the ſame Philoſopher adds, that *Nature may be yet more clearly reſembl'd to the medicinal Art, when it is employ'd by the Phyſician in curing himſelf.* And thus from him may we take the firſt general Conception of the *Plaſtick Nature*, that it is Art it ſelf acting immediately on the *Matter* as an inward Principle.

In the next place we are to obſerve, that tho the *Plaſtick Nature* be a kind of *Art*, yet are there ſome conſiderable Pre-eminences, which it has above *Human Art*, the firſt of which is this; that whereas Human Art cannot act upon *Matter* any otherwiſe than from without and at a diſtance, nor communicate it ſelf to it, but with a great deal of Tumult and Noiſe, it uſing Hands and Axes, Saws and Hammers, and after this manner with much ado, by knockings and thruſtings ſlowly introducing the Form or Idea of ſome Artifice into the Materials: Nature in the mean time is another kind of Art, which inſinuating it ſelf immediately into the things themſelves, is as it were imbody'd in the Matter of them, and there acting more commandingly upon it as an inward Principle, does its work eaſily, cleverly, and ſilently. Thus as God is intimately preſent to every thing, ſo *Nature* immediately acts upon the Matter of things as a living Soul or Law within it.

Another Pre-eminence of *Nature* above *human Art* is this: That whereas human *Artiſts* are often to ſeek

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* Phyſ. l. 2. c. 8.

and

and at a loſs, and therefore conſult and deliberate, as alſo upon ſecond thoughts mend their former work; Nature on the contrary is never to ſeek and at a ſtand, and for that reaſon alſo, beſides another that will be ſuggeſted afterward, it never conſults or deliberates, as unreſolv'd what to do; but is always readily prompted: nor does it ever repent afterwards of what it has formerly done, or go about as it were upon ſecond thoughts to alter and mend its former Courſe; but it goes on in one conſtant, unrepenting Tenor, from Generation to Generation, becauſe it is the ſtamp or impreſs of that infallibly omniſcient Art of the Divine Underſtanding, which is the very Law and Rule of what is ſimply the beſt in every thing.

Notwithſtanding which, we are to take notice in the next place, that as *Nature* is not the Deity it ſelf, but a thing very remote from it and far below it, ſo neither is it the Divine Art, as it is in it ſelf, *pure* and *abſtract*, but *concrete* and *imbody'd* only. *Art* is defin'd by *Ariſtotle* to be * *the Reaſon of the thing without Matter*; and ſo the Divine Art or Knowledg in the Mind of God is *unbody'd Reaſon*, whereas *Nature is Reaſon immers'd and plung'd into Matter*. *Nature* is not the Divine Art Archetypal, but only Ectypal; it is a living ſtamp or ſignature of the Divine Wiſdom, which, tho it act preciſely according to its Archetype, yet does it not at all comprehend nor underſtand the reaſon of what it ſelf does; and the difference between theſe two may be reſembl'd to that between the † *Reaſon of the Mind, and the Reaſon of external Speech*: the latter of which, tho it bear a certain Stamp and Impreſs of the

* Λόγος τῦ ἔργυ ἄνευ ὕλης.
† Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, καὶ λόγος προφορικός.

former

former upon it, yet is it ſelf nothing elſe but *articulate Sound*, devoid of all *Underſtanding* and *Senſe*. Or elſe we may illuſtrate this point by another Similitude, comparing the Divine Art and Wiſdom to an Architect, but *Nature* to a manuary Opificer; the difference between which two is thus ſet forth by *Ariſtotle*, pertinently to our purpoſe: *We account the Architects*, ſays he, *in every thing more honourable than the manuary Opificers, becauſe they underſtand the reaſon of the things done; whereas the others, like ſome inanimate things, only do, not knowing what they do; the difference between 'em being only this, that inanimate things act by a certain Nature in them, but the manuary Opificer by Habit.* Thus *Nature* may be call'd the manuary Opificer, which acts ſubſerviently under the *Architectonical Art* and Wiſdom of the Divine Underſtanding, which *does nothing without knowing the reaſon of it.*

Wherefore, as we did before obſerve the Pre-eminences of *Nature* above human Art, ſo muſt we likewiſe here take notice of its Defects and Imperfections, with reference to which it falls ſhort of human Art; and theſe are two: the firſt of 'em is this, that tho it act artificially for the ſake of ends, yet does it neither it ſelf intend thoſe ends, nor underſtand the reaſon of what it does. Nature is not Miſtreſs of that conſummate Art and Wiſdom according to which it acts, but is only a Servant to it, and a drudging Executioner of its Dictates. To this purpoſe a modern judicious *Naturaliſt* tells us, after having admir'd that Wiſdom and Art, by which the Bodys of Animals are fram'd, that one or other of theſe two things muſt needs be acknowledg'd, that * *either the Vegetative or Plaſtick Power of*

* Harvy de Gen. An. Ex. 49.

the

the Soul, by which it organizes and forms its own Body, is more excellent and divine than the rational; or elſe, that in the Works of Nature *there is neither Prudence nor Underſtanding, but only it ſeems ſo to our Apprehenſions, who judg of theſe Divine things of Nature, according to our own Arts and Facultys, and Patterns borrow'd from our ſelves, as if the active Principles of Nature produc'd their Effects in the ſame manner, as we do our artificial Works.* And to this Doctrine, not only the Antients, but moſt of the other Moderns have readily ſubſcrib'd.

But becauſe this may ſeem ſtrange at firſt ſight, that Nature ſhould be ſaid to act *for the ſake of Ends*, and regularly or artificially, and yet be it ſelf devoid of Knowledg and Underſtanding; we ſhall therefore endeavour to perſuade the Poſſibility and facilitate the Belief of it, by ſome other Inſtances: and firſt by that of *Habits*, particularly thoſe Muſical ones of Singing, playing upon Inſtruments and Dancing; which *Habits* direct every Motion of the Hand, Voice, and Body, and prompt 'em readily, without any Deliberation or ſtudy'd Conſideration what the next following Note or Motion will be. Agreeably to this Conceit, the antient *Mythologiſts* repreſented the Nature of the Univerſe by *Pan* playing on a Pipe or Harp, and being in love with the *Nymph Eccho*; as if *Nature* did by a kind of ſilent Melody make all the Parts of the Univerſe every where dance in meaſure and proportion, while it ſelf is delighted and raviſh'd with the Re-ecchoing of its own Harmony.

Moreover, that ſomething may act artificially and for Ends, without comprehending the reaſon of what it does, may be further evinc'd from thoſe natural Inſtincts which are in Animals, and which without Knowledg direct 'em to act regularly, in order to the

good both of themſelves and of the Univerſe. As for example, the Bees in making Hony, and in framing their Combs and Hexagonical Cells; the Spiders in ſpinning their Webs; the Birds in building their Neſts; and many other Animals in ſuch Actions of theirs, as would ſeem to argue a great Sagacity in 'em: whereas notwithſtanding, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves, *They do theſe things neither by Art nor by Counſel, nor by any Deliberation of their own*; and therefore are not Maſters of that Wiſdom, according to which they act, but only paſſive to the Inſtincts and Impreſſes thereof made upon 'em. And indeed to affirm that brute Animals do all things by a Knowledg of their own, and which they themſelves are Maſters of, and that without any Deliberation or Conſultation, were to make 'em to be endu'd with a moſt perfect Intellect, far tranſcending that of *Human Soul:* whereas it is ſufficiently plain, that Brutes are not above Conſultation, but below it, and that theſe Inſtincts of Nature in 'em are nothing but a kind of Fate upon 'em.

There is in the next place another Imperfection to be obſerv'd in the *Plaſtick Nature*; that as it does not comprehend the Reaſon of its own Action, ſo neither is it clearly and expreſly conſcious of what it does: in which reſpect it does not only fall ſhort of Human Art, but even of that very manner of acting which is in Brutes themſelves, who, tho they do not underſtand the reaſon of thoſe Actions, to which their natural Inſtincts lead 'em, yet are generally conceiv'd to be conſcious of them, and to do them by Fancy: whereas the *Plaſtick Nature* in the Formation of Plants and Animals ſeems to have no Animal Fancy, no expreſs Conſciouſneſs of what it does, or Self-enjoyment in it, as Animals have.

Now

Now we are well aware that this is a thing, which the narrow Principles of ſome late *Philoſophers* will not admit of, that there ſhould be any Action diſtinct from *Local Motion*, beſides expreſly *conſcious Cogitation*. For they making the firſt general Heads of all Entity to be *Extenſion* and *Cogitation*, or extended Being and cogitative, and then ſuppoſing that the Eſſence of Cogitation conſiſts in expreſs Conſciouſneſs, muſt needs by this means exclude ſuch a *Plaſtick Life* of *Nature*, as we ſpeak of, which is ſuppos'd to act without Animal Fancy or expreſs *Conſciouſneſs*. Wherefore we conceive that the firſt Heads of Being ought rather to be expreſs'd thus: *Antitypous* or *Reſiſting* Extenſion and Life, that is, internal Energy and Self-Activity; and then again, that Life or internal Self-activity is to be ſubdivided into ſuch as acts either with expreſs Conſciouſneſs or Self-perception, or ſuch as is without it; the latter of which is this *Plaſtick Life* of Nature: So that there may be an Action diſtinct from *Local Motion* or vital Energy, and not accompany'd with that Fancy or Conſciouſneſs, which is in the Energys of the *Animal Life*; that is, there may be a ſimple internal Energy or vital Self-motion, without that Duplication, which is included in the Nature of Conſciouſneſs, and which makes a Being to be preſent with it ſelf, attentive to its own Actions or animadverſive of them, to perceive it ſelf to do or ſuffer, and to have a Fruition or Enjoyment of it ſelf. And indeed it muſt be granted that what moves *Matter* or determines the Motion of it vitally, muſt needs do it by ſome other Energy of its own; as it is reaſonable alſo to conceive, that it ſelf has ſome *vital Sympathy* with that Matter, upon which it acts: but we apprehend that both theſe may be without expreſs *Conſciouſneſs*. Wherefore this

Controverſy, whether the Energy of the *Plaſtick Nature* be Cogitation or no, ſeems to be but a mere Logomachy or Diſpute about Words. For if clear and expreſs *Conſciouſneſs* be ſuppos'd to be included in Cogitation, then muſt it needs be granted that Cogitation does not belong to the *Plaſtick Life* of Nature: but if the Notion of that Word be enlarg'd, ſo as to comprehend all Action diſtinct from *Local Motion*, and to be of equal extent with *Life*, then the Energy of Nature is *Cogitation*. Nevertheleſs, if any one think fit to attribute ſome obſcure and imperfect Senſe or Perception, different from that of Animals, to the Energy of *Nature*, and will therefore call it a kind of drowſy unawaken'd Cogitation, I ſhall not much gainſay it, but ſhall grant with *Plotinus*, that Nature has indeed a certain dull and obſcure Idea of that which it ſtamps and prints upon *Matter*; which Idea this *Philoſopher* ſticks not to call a * *Spectacle* and *Contemplamen*, as likewiſe the Energy of Nature towards it, a † *ſilent Contemplation*; nay he allows that *Nature* may be ſaid to be in ſome ſenſe a || *Lover of Spectacles or Contemplation*.

However, that there may be ſome vital Energy without clear and expreſs *Conſciouſneſs*, *Animadverſion*, *Attention*, or *Self-perception*, ſeems reaſonable on ſeveral accounts. For firſt, thoſe Philoſophers themſelves, who make the Eſſence of the Soul to conſiſt in *Cogitation*, and again the Eſſence of *Cogitation* in clear and expreſs *Conſciouſneſs*, cannot render it any way probable that the Souls of Men in all profound Sleeps, Lethargys and Apoplexys, as alſo all Embryo's in the

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* Θεαμα & θεώρημα. † Θεωρία ἄυλος. || Φιλοθεάμων. Plotin. En. 3. l. 1. §. 3.

Womb,

Womb, from their very first Arrival thither, are never so much as one moment without expressly conscious *Cogitations*; which if they were, according to the Principles of their *Philosophy*, they must *ipso facto* cease to have a Being. Now if the Souls of Men and Animals be at any time without *Consciousness* and *Self-perception*, then must it needs be granted that clear and express *Consciousness* is not essential to *Life*. There is some appearance of *Life* and *vital Spmpathy* in certain Vegetables and Plants, which however call'd *sensitive Plants* and *Plant-Animals*, cannot be suppos'd to have *Animal Sense* and *Fancy* or express *Consciousness* in 'em; tho we are not ignorant in the mean time that some would endeavour to solve all those *Phænomena* mechanically. It is certain that our Human Souls themselves are not always *conscious* of whatever they have in them; for even the sleeping *Geometrician* has, when in that State, all his Geometrical Theorems and Knowledg some way in him; as also the sleeping Musician has all his musical Skill and Songs: and therefore why may it not be possible for the Soul to have likewise some actual Energy in it, of which it is not expressly conscious? We have all of us an experience of our doing many animal Actions without Attention, which we reflect upon afterwards, as also that we often continue a long Series of bodily Motions, by a mere virtual Intention of our Minds, and as it were by half a *Cogitation*. That vital Sympathy, by which our Soul is united and ty'd fast, as it were with a Knot, to the Body, is a thing that we have no direct Consciousness of, but only in its Effects; nor can we tell how we come to be so indifferently affected in our Souls, from the many different Motions made upon our Bodys; as likewise we are not conscious to our selves of that

Energy,

Energy, by which we impreſs variety of Motions and Figurations upon the animal Spirits of our Brain in our *Phantaſtick* Thoughts. For tho the *Geometrician* perceive himſelf to make *Lines*, *Triangles*, and *Circles* in the Duſt with his Finger, yet is he not aware how he makes all thoſe ſame Figures, firſt on the corporeal Spirits of his Brain, from whence notwithſtanding as from a Glaſs, they are reflected to him; *Fancy* being rightly concluded by *Ariſtotle* to be a weak and obſcure Senſe.

There is alſo another more inferior kind of *Plaſtick Power* in the Soul, if we may ſo call it, by which it is formative of its own *Cogitations*, whereof it ſelf is not always conſcious: as when in Sleep or Dreams it frames interlocutory Diſcourſes between it ſelf and other Perſons in a long Series, with coherent Senſe and apt Connections, in which oftentimes it ſeems to be ſurpriz'd with unexpected Anſwers and Repartees, tho it ſelf were all the while the *Poet* and Inventor of the whole Fable. Not only our Nictations for the moſt part, when we are awake, but alſo our nocturnal Volutations in Sleep are perform'd with very little or no *Conſciouſneſs*. Reſpiration, or that Motion of the *Diaphragma* and other Muſcles which cauſes it, may well be concluded to be always a *vital*, tho it be not always an *animal* Motion; ſince no Man can affirm that he is perpetually conſcious to himſelf of that Energy of his Soul which produces it, when he is awake, much leſs when aſleep. Laſtly, the *Carteſian* Attempts, to ſolve the Motion of the Heart *mechanically*, ſeem to be confuted by ocular Demonſtration and Experiment, evincing the *Syſtole* of the Heart to be a *Muſcular Conſtriction*, caus'd by ſome vital Principle; to make which nothing elſe but a *pulſifick corporeal* Quality is very abſurd and *unphiloſophical*

ſophical. Now as we have no voluntary *Imperium* or Dominion at all upon the *Syſtole* and *Diaſtole* of the Heart, ſo are we not conſcious to our ſelves of any Energy of our Soul, which cauſes 'em; and therefore we may reaſonably conclude from hence likewiſe, that there is ſome *Vital Energy* without *Animal Fancy*, expreſs *Conſciouſneſs* and *Self-perception.*

Wherefore the *Plaſtick Nature* acting neither by *Knowledg* nor by *Animal Fancy*, neither elective nor intendingly, muſt be concluded to act *fatally*, *magically*, and *ſympathetically.* To this purpoſe a curious and diligent Inquirer into *Nature* ſays, That * *Nature moves as it were by a kind of Fate or Command, acting according to Laws.* Which Fate, or the Laws and Commands of the Deity concerning the Mundane Oeconomy (they being really the ſame thing) ought not to be look'd on either as *verbal things*, or as mere *Will* and *Cogitation* in the Mind of God: but as an *energetical* and *effectual* Principle conſtituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things decreed to paſs. The *Aphrodiſian* Philoſopher, with others of the Antients, have concluded that *Fate* and *Nature* are but two different Names for one and the ſame thing; and thus we ſay, that the *Plaſtick Nature* is the true and proper *Fate* of *Matter*, or the corporeal World. And now again we ſay, that whatever acts not by any *Knowledg* or *Fancy*, by any *Will* or *Appetite* of its own, but only fatally according to Laws and Impreſſions made upon it, does alſo act *magically* and *ſympathetically*, as having not only one vital unitive Principle, which exiſts in all the Univerſe; but alſo a certain *Vital Energy*, not in the way of *Knowledg* and *Fancy*, *Will* and *Animal Ap-*

* Harvy de Gen. Anim.

petite,

petite, but fatally ſympathetical and magical: as indeed that mutual *Sympathy*, of which we have a conſtant Experience, between our Soul and Body, being not a material and mechanical thing but vital, may be call'd alſo *Magical*. From what has been hitherto declar'd concerning the *Plaſtick Nature*, it appears, that tho it be a thing, which acts for Ends *artificially*, and which may be alſo call'd the Divine *Art* and *Fate* of the corporeal World: yet for all that it is neither a God nor Goddeſs, but a low and imperfect *Creature*. Foraſmuch as it is not Miſtreſs of that *Reaſon* and *Wiſdom*, according to which it acts, nor does it properly intend thoſe Ends which it acts for, nor indeed is it expreſly conſcious of what it does; it not *knowing*, but only *doing* according to Commands and Laws impreſs'd on it. Neither of which things ought to ſeem ſtrange or incredible, ſince Nature may as well act *regularly* and *artificially* without any Knowledg and Conſciouſneſs of its own, as Forms of Letters compounded together, may print coherent *Philoſophick* Senſe, tho they underſtand nothing at all; and it may alſo act for the ſake of thoſe Ends, which are not intended by it ſelf, but by ſome higher Being, as well as the Saw or Hatchet does in the Hand of the Architect or Mechanick. Indeed our human Actions are not govern'd by ſuch exact *Reaſon*, *Art*, and *Wiſdom*, nor carry'd on with ſuch Conſtancy, Evenneſs, and Uniformity, as the Actions of Nature are; notwithſtanding which, ſince we act according to a Knowledg of our own, and are Maſters of that Wiſdom by which our Actions are directed, in that we do not act *fatally* only, but electively and intendingly, with *Conſciouſneſs* and *Self-perception*; the *rational Life*, which is in us, ought to be accounted a much higher and nobler Perfection, than that Plaſtick

Life

Life of *Nature.* Nay this *Plaſtick Nature* is ſo far from being the firſt and higheſt *Life*, that it is indeed the laſt and loweſt of all *Lives*, it being really the ſame thing with the *vegetative*, which is inferior to the *ſenſitive.*

However it muſt be own'd that this *Plaſtick Nature* contains in it no ſmall part of *Divine Providence:* but withal it being ſuch a thing as cannot act electively nor with diſcretion, it muſt alſo be granted that there is a higher and diviner Providence than this, which alſo preſides over the corporeal World it ſelf; that it is not * *Reaſon drown'd in Matter and confounded with it*, which is the Supreme Governor of the World, but a *Providence* perfectly intellectual, abſtract, and free from *Matter.*

Again, tho the *Plaſtick Nature* be indeed the loweſt of all *Lives*, yet ſince it is a *Life*, it muſt needs be *Incorporeal*, becauſe all Life is ſuch. For Body being nothing but *Antitypous Extenſion* or *Reſiſting Bulk*, nothing but mere *Outſide*, together with *paſſive Capability*, has no *internal Energy*, *Self-activity*, or *Life* belonging to it; it is not able ſo much as to move it ſelf, and therefore much leſs can it artificially direct its own Motion. Moreover, in the Efformation of the Bodys of Animals it is one and the ſelf-ſame thing that directs the *Whole.* That which contrives and frames the Eye, cannot be a diſtinct thing from that which frames the Ear; the ſame thing which delineates the Veins, muſt alſo form the Arterys; and that which fabricates the Nerves, muſt alſo project the Muſcles and Joints; it muſt be the ſame thing that deſigns and organizes the Heart and Brain with ſuch Communications betwixt

* Ratio merſa & confuſa.

'em; and one and the ſelf-ſame thing muſt needs have in it the intire Idea and Platform of the whole organick Body. For the ſeveral Parts of *Matter* diſtant from one another, acting alone by themſelves without any common Director, being not able to confer together nor to communicate with each other, could never poſſibly conſpire to make up one ſuch orderly Syſtem or Frame as the Body of every *Animal* is. The ſame is alſo to be ſaid concerning the Plaſtick Nature of the whole corporeal Univerſe, * *in which all things are order'd conſpiringly together into one.* It muſt be one and the ſame thing which forms the whole World, otherwiſe it could never have faln into ſuch an uniform Order and Harmony. Now that which is one and the ſame, acting upon ſeveral diſtant Parts of Matter, cannot be corporeal. *Ariſtotle* indeed is ſeverely cenſur'd by ſome learned Men, becauſe, tho he talks every where of ſuch a Nature as acts regularly, artificially and methodically, in order to the *beſt*, yet he does no where poſitively declare, whether this Nature of his be *corporeal* or *incorporeal*, *ſubſtantial* or *accidental*; which yet is no leſs to be wonder'd at in him, than that he does not clearly determine theſe points even touching the *Rational Soul*, but ſeems, as I have before intimated, to ſtagger uncertainly about 'em. However I ſay, that according to the Principles of his *Philoſophy*, it cannot be ſuppos'd that *Nature* is corporeal; becauſe in this nothing elſe is attributed to Body, but *Matter*, *Form*, and *Accidents*, neither of which can be the *Ariſtotelian Nature* †.

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* Ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται.

† *See* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *fol.* 164.

† Now

Now if the *Plaſtick Nature* be incorporeal, then muſt it of neceſſity be either an inferior Power or Faculty of ſome Soul, which is alſo conſcious, ſenſitive, or rational, or elſe a lower ſubſtantial *Life* by it ſelf, devoid of animal *Conſciouſneſs*. The *Platoniſts* ſeem to affirm both theſe together, namely that there is a *Plaſtick Nature* lodg'd in all particular Souls of Animals, Brutes and Men; and alſo that there is a general Plaſtick or Spermatick Principle of the whole Univerſe, diſtinct from their higher mundane Soul, tho ſubordinate to it, and dependent on it: and tho *Ariſtotle* does not ſo clearly acknowledg the Incorporeity and Subſtantiality of Souls, yet does he concur very much with this *Platonick* Doctrine, that *Nature* is either a lower Power or Faculty of ſome conſcious Soul, or elſe an inferior kind of *Life* by it ſelf, depending upon a Superior Soul *. And certainly it ſeems very agreeable to the *Phænomena*, to acknowledg ſomething in the Bodys of Animals ſuperior to Mechaniſm, as that may well be thought to be, which conſtantly keeps the more fluid Parts of 'em in the ſame Form and Figure, ſo as that they are not enormouſly alter'd in their Growth by diſproportionate Nouriſhment; that which reſtores Fleſh that was loſt, conſolidates diſſolv'd Continuitys, incorporates the newly receiv'd Nouriſhment, and joins it continuouſly with the præ-exiſtent Parts of Fleſh and Bone; which regenerates and repairs Veins conſum'd or cut off; which cauſes Dentition or the breeding of Teeth in ſo regular a manner, and that not only in Infants, but adult Perſons; which caſts off Excrements, and diſcharges Superfluitys; which makes things ſeem ungrateful to an internal Senſe, which were notwith-

* *See* Cudworth *again*, fol. 165, *&c.*

ſtanding pleaſing to the Taſt; that *Nature* of *Hippocrates*, which is the * Curatrix of Diſeaſes, and that *Archeus* of the *Chymiſts* or *Paracelſians*, to which all Medicaments are but only ſubſervient, as being able to effect nothing of themſelves without it: I ſay, there ſeems to be ſuch a Principle as this in the Bodys of Animals, which is not *mechanical* but *vital*; and therefore ſince Entitys are not to be multiply'd without Neceſſity, we may with *Ariſtotle* conclude it to be a † *certain Part of the Soul* of thoſe Animals, or a lower inconſcious Power lodg'd in 'em.

But beſides this *Plaſtick Nature*, which is in Animals, forming their ſeveral Bodys artificially, like ſo many *Microcoſms* or little Worlds, there muſt be alſo a general *Plaſtick Nature* in the *Macrocoſm*, or whole corporeal Univerſe; which makes all things thus to conſpire every where and agree together in one Harmony: Agreeably to what the Author *de Mundo* writes, That *one Power paſſing thro all things, order'd and form'd the whole World*; which Power again he calls *a Spirit, and a living and generative Nature*, and plainly declares it to be a thing diſtinct from the Deity, but withal ſubordinate to it and dependent on it. To this purpoſe || *Ariſtotle* alſo ſpeaks very clearly and poſitively, telling us that we partake of Life and Underſtanding from that which is in the Univerſe, juſt as we partake of Heat and Cold, from the Heat and Cold which is in the Univerſe: which Notion, it is obſervable, that he borrow'd from *Socrates*, as both *Xenophon* and *Plato* give us to underſtand; that Philoſopher having us'd it

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* Αἱ φύσεις τῶν νοσέων ἰήτροι.
† Μέρος, or μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς.
|| De Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

as an Argumentation to prove a Deity. From whence it may be collected that *Ariſtotle* ſuppos'd this *Plaſtick Nature* of the Univerſe to be either a Part of ſome mundane Soul, which was alſo conſcious and intellectual, as that *Plaſtick Nature* in Animals is, or at leaſt ſome inferior Principle depending on ſuch a Soul *. And indeed whatever the Doctrine of the modern *Peripateticks* be, we make no doubt at all, but that *Ariſtotle* himſelf held the World's Animation or a Mundane Soul, foraſmuch as he plainly declares himſelf concerning it elſewhere, ſaying, *We commonly think of the Heavens as nothing elſe but Bodys and Monads, having only a certain Order, but altogether inanimate: whereas we ought on the contrary to conceive of them, as partaking of Life and Action*; that is, as † *Simplicius* rightly expounds the Place, as being endu'd with a *rational or intellectual Life.* And again ſays he in plain terms, ‖ *The Heaven is animated, and has a Principle of Motion within it ſelf:* where by *the Heaven*, as in many other places of *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, is to be underſtood the whole World.

But however, tho there were no ſuch *Mundane Soul*, as both *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* ſuppos'd, diſtinct from the Supreme Deity, yet there might notwithſtanding be a *Plaſtick Nature* of the Univerſe, depending immediately upon the Deity it ſelf. For the *Plaſtick Nature* eſſentially depends upon *Mind* or *Intellect*, and could not poſſibly be without it; for which reaſon the *Philoſopher* joins ** *Mind* and *Nature* both together.

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* Ἡ μέρος ψυχῆς ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς.

† *This he draws from the Word* πρᾶξεως of Action *there us'd by* Ariſtotle, *which he ſays is applicable to none but* Rational Beings. *In Lib. de Cœlo, l.* 2. *c.* 12.

‖ Ibid. ** Νῦς and φύσις.

More-

Moreover, beſides this general *Plaſtick Nature* of the Univerſe, and thoſe particular Plaſtick Powers in the Souls of Animals, it is not impoſſible but that there may be other *Plaſtick Natures* alſo, as certain lower Lives or vegetative Souls in ſome greater Parts of the Univerſe, all of 'em depending, if not upon ſome higher conſcious Soul in themſelves, yet at leaſt upon a perfect Intellect preſiding over the *Whole*. As for example, tho it be not reaſonable to think that every Plant, Herb, and Pile of Graſs has a particular Plaſtick Life or vegetative Soul of its own, diſtinct from the Mechaniſm of the Body, nor that the whole Earth is an Animal, endu'd with a conſcious Soul; yet may there poſſibly be, for ought we know, one Plaſtick Nature or Life belonging to the whole terreſtrial or terraqueous Globe, by which all Plants and Vegetables, continuous with it, may be differently form'd, according to their different Seeds; as alſo Minerals and other Bodys fram'd, and whatſoever elſe is above the power of Mechaniſm, effected as by the immediate Cauſe, tho always ſubordinate to other Cauſes; the chief whereof is the Deity. And this perhaps may eaſe the Minds of thoſe, who cannot but think it too much, to impoſe all upon one *Plaſtick Nature* of the Univerſe.

And now we have finiſh'd our firſt Task, which was to give an account of the *Plaſtick Nature*, the Sum whereof is this: That it is a certain lower Life than the Animal, which acts regularly and artificially, according to the Direction of *Mind* and *Underſtanding*, *Reaſon* and *Wiſdom*, for *Ends*, or in order to *Good*; tho it ſelf do not know the reaſon of what it does, nor is Miſtreſs of that Wiſdom, according to which it acts, but only a Servant to it, and a drudging Executioner

of

of its Dictates; it operating *fatally* and *ſympathetically*, according to Laws and Commands preſcrib'd to it by a perfect Intellect, and impreſs'd upon it; and which is neither a lower Faculty of ſome conſcious Soul, or elſe an inferior kind of Life or Soul by it ſelf; but is eſſentially dependent upon a higher kind of *Life*.

We proceed in the next place to our other Undertaking, which is to ſhew how groſly thoſe two ſorts of Atheiſts before mention'd, the *Stoical* or *Coſmoplaſtick*, and the *Stratonical* or *Hylozoick*, both of 'em tho acknowledging this Plaſtick Life of Nature, yet do miſtake the Notion of it, or pervert and abuſe it, to make a certain ſpurious and counterfeit God-Almighty of it, or firſt Principle of all things, thereby excluding the true Omnipotent Deity, which is a perfect *Mind* or conſciouſly *underſtanding Nature* preſiding over the Univerſe, in that they ſubſtitute in the room of it this ſtupid *Plaſtick Nature*.

Now the chief miſtakes of theſe Atheiſts concerning the *Plaſtick Nature* are theſe that follow: Firſt, in that they make that to be the firſt Principle of all, and the higheſt thing in the Univerſe, which is the laſt and loweſt of all *Lives*; a thing eſſentially ſecondary, derivative and dependent. For the *Plaſtick Life* of Nature is but the mere Umbrage of *Intellectuality*, a faint and ſhadowy Imitation of *Mind* and *Underſtanding*; upon which it does as eſſentially depend, as the Shadow upon the Body, the Image in the Glaſs upon the Face, or the *Eccho* upon the original Voice. Wherefore *Ariſtotle* acquits himſelf like a Philoſopher in joining *Nature* and *Mind* both together: whereas theſe Atheiſts do very abſurdly and unphiloſophically in making a *ſenſleſs* and *inconſcious Nature* to be the firſt Original of all things.

Secondly,

Secondly, theſe Atheiſts augment the former Error in ſuppoſing thoſe higher Lives of *Senſe* or *Animality*, and of Reaſon or Underſtanding, to riſe both of 'em from that lower *ſenſleſs Life* of Nature, as the only original fundamental *Life*. Which is a thing altogether as irrational and abſurd, as if one ſhould ſuppoſe the Light, which is in the Air or *Æther*, to be the only original and fundamental Light, and the Light of the Sun and Stars to be but a ſecondary and derivative thing from it, and nothing elſe but the Light of the Air modify'd and improv'd by Condenſation. Or as if one ſhould maintain that the Sun and Moon and all the Stars were really nothing elſe but the mere Reflections of thoſe Images which we ſee in Rivers and Ponds of Water. But this has ever been the ſottiſh humour and guiſe of Atheiſts, to invert the Order of the Univerſe, and to hang the Picture of the World, as that of a Man, with its Heels upward; conſcious *Reaſon* and *Underſtanding* being a far higher degree of *Life* and *Perfection*, than that dull *Plaſtick Nature*, which only *acts*, but does not *know*, can never poſſibly emerge out of it; nor can the Duplication of corporeal Organs be ever able to advance that ſimple and ſtupid *Life* of Nature into reflex Conſciouſneſs or Self-perception; nor can any Triplication or Retriplication of 'em improve the ſame into *Underſtanding*.

Thirdly, the *Hylozoiſts*, for the better colouring of the former Errors, adulterate the Notion of the *Plaſtick Life* of Nature, confounding it with *Wiſdom* and *Underſtanding*. And tho they acknowledg, that no animal *Senſe*, *Self-perception*, or *Conſciouſneſs* belongs to it, yet will they have it to be a thing perfectly *wiſe*, and conſequently every Atom of ſenſleſs *Matter*, that is in the whole World to be *infallibly Omniſcient*, as to all its

its own Capacitys and Congruitys, or whatſoever it ſelf can do or ſuffer, which is plainly contradictory. For tho there may be ſuch a thing as the *Plaſtick Nature*, which according to the former deſcription of it, can *do* without *knowing*, and is devoid of expreſs *Conſciouſneſs* or *Self-perception*; yet perfect Knowledg and Underſtanding without *Conſciouſneſs* is Nonſenſe and Impoſſibility. Wherefore this muſt needs be condemn'd for a great piece of Sottiſhneſs in the *Hylozoick* Atheiſts, that they attribute perfect *Wiſdom* and *Underſtanding* to a ſtupid *inconſcious Nature*, which is nothing but the mere drudging Inſtrument or *manuary Opificer* of *perfect Mind.*

Laſtly, theſe Atheiſts err in this, that they make this Plaſtick Life of *Nature* to be a mere material or corporeal thing: whereas *Matter* or *Body* cannot move it ſelf, much leſs then can it artificially order and diſpoſe its own Motion. And tho the *Plaſtick Nature* be indeed the loweſt of all *Lives*, yet notwithſtanding, ſince it is a *Life* or *internal Energy* and *Self-activity*, diſtinct from *Local Motion*, it muſt needs be incorporeal, all *Life* being eſſentially ſuch. But the *Hylozoiſts* conceive very groſly both of *Life* and *Underſtanding*, ſpreading 'em all over upon Matter, and accordingly ſlicing 'em out as it were in different Quantitys and Bulks, together with it; they contending that they are but inadequate Conceptions of *Body* as the only Subſtance, and therefore concluding that the vulgarly receiv'd Notion of God is nothing elſe but ſuch an inadequate Conception of the *Matter* of the whole corporeal Univerſe, miſtaken for a compleat and entire Subſtance by it ſelf, and ſuppos'd to be the Cauſe of all things: which fond Dream or Dotage of theirs will be confuted in due place.

But here again on t'other hand I cannot but make this curſory Remark upon ſome eſpecially of the modern *Atomologiſts*: Firſt, I obſerve that the *Carteſian* Philoſophy is highly obnoxious to Cenſure upon ſome accounts, the chief whereof is this; that deviating from the primitive *Moſchical Atomology*, in rejecting all *Plaſtick Nature*, it derives the whole Syſtem of the corporeal Univerſe from the neceſſary Motion of *Matter*, only divided into Particles inſenſibly ſmall, and turn'd round in a *Vortex*, without the guidance or direction of any *underſtanding Nature*. Which way, tho it boaſt of ſolving all the corporeal *Phænomena* by mere fortuitous *Mechaniſm*, and without any *final* or *mental Cauſality*, yet does it give no account at all of the greateſt of all *Phænomena*, which is *the* * *orderly Regularity and Harmony* of the Mundane Syſtem. The occaſion of which miſcarriage has been already intimated, namely from the acknowledging of only two Heads of *Being*, *extended* and *cogitative*; and making the Eſſence of *Cogitation* to conſiſt in expreſs *Conſciouſneſs*; from whence it follows that there could be no *Plaſtick Nature*, and therefore either all things muſt be done by fortuitous *Mechaniſm*, or elſe God himſelf be brought immediately upon the ſtage for ſolving all *Phænomena*. Which latter Abſurdity our *Philoſopher* being very careful to avoid, caſt himſelf upon the former, the baniſhing of all *final* and *mental Cauſality* quite out of the World, and acknowledging no other Philoſophick Cauſes but only the *material* and *mechanical*. It cannot be deny'd but that even ſome of the antient religious *Atomiſts* were alſo too much infected with this mechanizing Humour: but *Des Cartes* has not only outdone

* Το ἓυ καὶ καλῶς.

† *them*

them all in this, but even the Atheiſts themſelves, as ſhall be ſhewn hereafter; while as much as in him lay, he endeavour'd to diſarm the World of that grand Argument for a Deity, taken from the regular Frame and Harmony of the Univerſe. To which groſs miſcarriage of his we may alſo add another, in that he ſeems to make Matter *neceſſarily exiſtent* and *eſſentially infinite* and *eternal.* Notwithſtanding all which, we cannot entertain that uncharitable Opinion of him, that he really deſign'd Atheiſm; the fundamental Principles of his Philoſophy being ſuch, as that no Atheiſtick Structure can be built upon 'em. But ſhortly after this *Carteſian* Reſtitution of the primitive *Atomology*, which acknowledges incorporeal Subſtance, we have had *Leucippus* and *Democritus* reviv'd, who have brought again upon the ſtage that other Atheiſtick *Atomology*, which makes ſenſleſs and lifeleſs* Atoms to be the only Principles of all things in the Univerſe, thereby neceſſarily excluding, beſides *Incorporeal Subſtance* and the *Immortality* of Souls, a Deity alſo and natural Morality; and making all Actions and Events *materially* and *mechanically neceſſary.*

But now we having thus far obſerv'd the ſtanding and ſtrength, and view'd the Intrenchments of our Enemys, it is, I think, high time for us to come to an Attack. It is certain that the Source of all Atheiſm is generally a dull and earthy Disbelief of the Exiſtence of things beyond the reach of Senſe; and it cannot be deny'd but that there is ſomething of Immorality as well in the Temper as Doctrine of Atheiſts: notwithſtanding which it muſt not therefore be concluded that all Dogmatick Atheiſts came to be ſuch merely by means

* Ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους.

of groſs Intemperance, Senſuality, and Debauchery; for beſides theſe there is alſo a kind of externally honeſt or civiliz'd Atheiſts, who are tempted to Atheiſm merely by an affectation of Singularity, or of ſeeming wiſer than the generality of Mankind: agreeably to what the *Athenian* Hoſt told *Clinias* in *Plato*; *There is*, ſaid he, *another Cauſe of Atheiſm, which you, who live retiredly are not aware of, namely a certain* * *grievous Ignorance, which notwithſtanding has the appearance of the greateſt Wiſdom.* And this indeed was one great reaſon, which induc'd me nakedly to reveal all the Myſterys of Atheiſm, becauſe I conſider'd, that ſo long as theſe things are conceal'd and kept in hugger-mugger, many will be the rather apt to ſuſpect, that there is ſome great depth and profundity of Wiſdom lodg'd in 'em, and that they prove ſome noble and generous Truth, which the bigotted Religioniſts endeavour to ſmother. Whereas in the Sequel of this Writing I ſhall withal ſhew that Atheiſm inſtead of being grounded on ſolid Wiſdom and Philoſophy, is really nothing elſe but a moſt grievous Ignorance, Sottiſhneſs, and Stupidity; that all its pretended Reaſonings are vain Imaginations of deluded Minds, and void of all Truth and Reality. Nor ſhall I only confute the Atheiſtick Arguments, and ſo ſtand in the defenſive poſture, but I ſhall alſo aſſault Atheiſm with its own Weapons, and plainly demonſtrate that all the Forms of it are unintelligible Nonſenſe and abſolute Impoſſibility to human Reaſon; as likewiſe over and above I ſhall occaſionally inſert ſome, as I think, undeniable Arguments for a Deity.

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* Ἀμαθία μάλα χαλεπὴ δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις.

CHAP. IV.

The Idea of God declar'd, in way of Anſwer to the firſt Atheiſtick Argument; and the grand Objection againſt the Naturality of this Idea, as eſſentially including in it Unity or Onelyneſs, remov'd. Prov'd at large that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledg'd one Supreme Deity.

THE firſt Atheiſtick Ground we propos'd is this: *That there is no Idea of God, and therefore either no ſuch thing exiſting in Nature, or at leaſt no poſſible Evidence of it.* Now to affirm that there is no *Idea* of God, is all one as to affirm that there is no Conception of the *Mind* anſwering to that Word or Name; and this the modern Atheiſts ſtick not to maintain, that the word *God* has no Signification, and that there is no other Idea or Conception in mens Minds anſwering to it beſides the mere Phantaſm of the *Sound*. Now for any one to go about ſoberly to confute this, and to prove that *God* is not only a *Word* without ſignification, and that Men do not every where pay all their religious Devotions to the mere *Phantaſm* of a tranſient Sound, expecting all Good from it, might very well ſeem to all intelligent Perſons a moſt abſurd and ridiculous Undertaking; both becauſe the thing is ſo evident in it ſelf, and becauſe the plaineſt things of all can leaſt be prov'd. Wherefore we ſhall here ſuggeſt but thus much, that ſince there are different *Words* for

God

ſeveral Languages, and Men have the ſame Notion or Conception in their Minds anſwering to them all, it muſt needs be granted, that they have ſome other Idea or Conception belonging to thoſe Words, beſides the *Phantaſms* of their ſeveral Sounds. And indeed it can be nothing elſe but either *monſtrous Sottiſhneſs* and *Stupidity* of Mind, or elſe *prodigious Impudence* in theſe Atheiſts to deny that there is any Idea of God at all in the Minds of Men, or that the *Word* has any ſignification.

But whatever theſe Atheiſts deny in Words, it is notwithſtanding evident, that even they themſelves have an Idea or Conception in their Minds anſwering to the word *God*, even when they deny his Exiſtence, becauſe otherwiſe they would deny the Exiſtence of *Nothing*. Nor can it be at all doubted, but that they have alſo the ſame Idea of God with *Theiſts*, inaſmuch as they deny the Exiſtence of no other thing, but what theſe latter aſſert. And as in all other Controverſys, when Men diſpute together, the one affirming, the other denying, both Partys muſt needs have the ſame Idea in their Minds of what they diſpute about, otherwiſe their Diſputation would be but a kind of *Babel-Language* and Confuſion: So muſt it likewiſe be in this preſent Controverſy between Theiſts and Atheiſts. Neither indeed would there be any Controverſy at all between 'em, did they not both by *God* mean one and the ſame thing; nor would the Atheiſts be any longer Atheiſts, did they not deny the Exiſtence of that very ſame thing, which the Atheiſts affirm, but of ſomething elſe.

Wherefore we ſhall in the next place declare what this Idea of God is, or what is that thing, whoſe Exiſtence they that affirm are call'd Theiſts, and they that

that deny it, Atheiſts. In order to which we muſt firſt lay down this *Lemma* or preparatory Propoſition: That as it is generally acknowledg'd, that all things did not exiſt from Eternity, ſuch as they are, *Unmade*, but that ſome things were made and generated or produc'd; ſo is it not poſſible that all things ſhould be *made* neither, but there muſt of neceſſity be ſomething *ſelf-exiſtent* from Eternity and *unmade*; becauſe if there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. The reaſon of which is ſo evident and irreſiſtible, that even the Atheiſts confeſs themſelves conquer'd by it, and readily acknowledg it for an unqueſtionable Truth, that there muſt be ſomething, which was never *made* or produc'd, and which therefore was the Cauſe of thoſe other things that are *made*; ſomething *ſelf-originated* and *ſelf-exiſtent*, which is as well *incorruptible* as *ingenerable*; whoſe Exiſtence therefore muſt needs be *neceſſary*, becauſe if it were ſuppos'd to have happen'd by *Chance* to exiſt from Eternity, then might it as well happen again to ceaſe to be. Wherefore all the queſtion now is, what is this *ingenerable* and *incorruptible*, this *ſelf-originated* and *ſelf-exiſtent* thing, which is the Cauſe of all other things that are *made*.

Now there are two grand Opinions oppoſite to each other concerning it: For firſt ſome contend that the only *ſelf-exiſtent*, *unmade*, and *incorruptible* thing, and firſt Principle of all others, is *ſenſleſs Matter*, that is, *Matter* either perfectly dead and ſtupid, or at leaſt devoid of all animaliſh and conſcious *Life*. But becauſe this is really the loweſt and moſt imperfect of all Beings, others on the contrary judg it reaſonable, that the firſt Principle and Original of all things ſhould be that, which is *moſt perfect*, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves of

Pherecydes

Pherecydes and his Followers, that *they made the* * *firſt Cauſe and Principle of Generation to be the beſt:* and hen apprehending, that to be endu'd with *conſcious Life* and *Underſtanding*, is a much greater Perfection, than to be devoid of both, as *Balbus* in † *Cicero* declares upon this very occaſion. They therefore concluded that the only *unmade* thing, which was the *Principle*, *Cauſe*, and *Original* of all other things, was not *ſenſleſs Matter*, but a *perfect*, *conſcious*, *underſtanding Nature* or *Mind*; and ſuch are properly term'd *Theiſts:* whereas they, who hold that *ſenſleſs Matter* is the firſt Original of all, however to avoid the diſgrace of Atheiſm, they may indeed abuſively apply to this the Name of *God*, as 'tis known that *Anaximander*, *Epicharmus*, *Pliny*, and others mention'd by *Ariſtotle* have done, yet are notwithſtanding properly Atheiſts; this being the only true and genuine *Idea* of God in general, That *he is a perfect*, *conſcious*, *underſtanding Being* or *Mind*, *exiſting of it ſelf from Eternity*, *and the Cauſe of all other things.* But that we may more fully and punctually declare the true Idea of God, we muſt here take notice of a certain Opinion of ſome *Philoſophers*, who went as it were in a middle way betwixt both the former, and neither made *Matter* alone, nor *God* the ſole Principle of all things: but join'd 'em both together, and held two firſt Principles or *ſelf-exiſtent unmade Beings*, *independent* upon one another, *God* and *Matter.* Among theſe the *Stoicks* are to be reckon'd, who notwithſtanding, becauſe they held that there was no other Subſtance but *Body*, ſtrangely confounded themſelves, being thereby neceſſitated to

* Τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον τιθέασι.
† De Nat. Deor. l. 2.

make

make their two firſt Principles, the *active* and the *paſſive*, to be both of 'em really but one and the ſelf-ſame *Subſtance*, as we find their Doctrine repreſented by *Cicero*. But beſides theſe *Stoicks*, there were alſo other *Philoſophers*, who admitting of *Incorporeal Subſtance*, ſuppos'd two firſt Principles, as Subſtances really diſtinct from each other, that were co-exiſtent from Eternity, an *Incorporeal Deity* and *Matter*: as for example, *Anaxagoras*, *Archelaus*, *Atticus*, and many more; nay *Pythagoras* himſelf was reckon'd among thoſe by *Numenius*; and *Plato*, by *Plutarch* and *Laertius* *. And we find it commonly taken for granted that *Ariſtotle* alſo was of this perſuaſion, tho it cannot be certainly concluded from thence, as ſome ſeem to think, becauſe he aſſerted the Eternity of the World; *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Jamblichus*, *Proclus*, and *Simplicius* having done the like: yet notwithſtanding they maintain'd, that *God* was the ſole Principle of all things, and that *Matter* alſo was deriv'd from him. But it is plain that *Plutarch* was an Abettor of this Doctrine, from his Diſcourſe upon the *Platonick Pſychogonia*, beſides other places. It is alſo well known that *Hermogenes* and other antient Pretenders to Chriſtianity did in like manner aſſert the *Self-exiſtence* and Improduction of the *Matter*, for which reaſon, as *Tertullian* obſerves, they were commonly call'd † *Materiarian Hereticks*. Laſtly, it is alſo ſufficiently known that ſome modern Sects of the Chriſtian Profeſſion at this day, do alſo aſſert the Uncreatedneſs of Matter, ſuppoſing likewiſe, as the *Stoicks* did, that *Body* is the only Subſtance.

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* *See* Euſeb. Præp. Ev. l. 7. c. 7.

† Materiarii; Tertul. adverſ. Hermog.

Now of all theſe, whoſoever they were, who thus maintain'd two *ſelf-exiſtent* Principles, *God* and *Matter*, we may pronounce univerſally, that they were neither better nor worſe than a kind of imperfect *Theiſts*. They had a certain Notion or Idea of God, ſuch as it was, which ſeems to be the very ſame with that expreſs'd in *Ariſtotle*, * *an Animal the Beſt Eternal*; and is alſo repreſented by *Epicurus* in this manner, † *an Animal which has all Happineſs with Incorruptibility*. In which Deſcriptions they both acknowledg'd, that beſides ſenſleſs *Matter*, there was alſo an *animaliſh* or *conſcious*, or *perceptive* Nature, *ſelf-exiſtent* from Eternity, in oppoſition to Atheiſts, who made Matter either devoid of all manner of Life, or at leaſt of ſuch as is *animaliſh* and conſcious, to be the ſole Principle of all things. For it has been often obſerv'd, that ſome Atheiſts attributed a kind of Plaſtick Life or Nature to that *Matter*, which they made to be the only Principle of the Univerſe; and theſe two ſorts of Atheiſms were long ſince taken notice of by ‖ *Seneca*. But no Atheiſt ever acknowledg'd *conſcious Animality* to be a firſt Principle in the Univerſe, nor that the *Whole* was govern'd by any *animaliſh*, *ſentient*, and *underſtanding Nature*, preſiding over it as the Head of it; but, as I have before declar'd, they concluded all *Animals* and *Animality*, all *conſcious*, *ſentient*, and *ſelf-perceptive Life* to be *generated* and *corrupted*, or *educ'd out of Nothing* and *reduc'd to Nothing again*: wherefore, agreeably to what *Balbus* in *Cicero* declares, they who on the contrary aſſerted *Animality* and *conſcious Life* to be the

* Ζῶον ἄριστον ἄϊδιον.
† Ζῶον πᾶσαν ἔχον μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας.
‖ Nat. Quæſt. Præf. lib. 1.

firſt

firſt Principle or unmade thing in the Univerſe, are to be accounted Theiſts. But to diſtinguiſh this *Divine Animal* from all others, theſe Philoſophers add, That it is the * *Beſt and moſt happy Animal*; alſo theſe *Materiarian* Theiſts acknowledg'd God to be a perfectly *underſtanding Being*, and ſuch as alſo had Power over all the *Matter* of the Univerſe, this being utterly unable to move it ſelf, or to produce any thing without him. And all of 'em, except the *Anaxagorean*, concluded, that he was the Creator of all the *Forms* of inanimate Bodys, and of the Souls of Animals. In ſhort, it was univerſally agreed among 'em, that he was at leaſt the Orderer and Diſpoſer of all, and that he might therefore upon that account be well call'd the *Maker* or *Framer of the World*. Notwithſtanding which, ſo long as they maintain'd *Matter* to exiſt independently on *God*, and ſometimes alſo to be *contumacious* and *refractory* to him, and by that means to be the Cauſe of *Evil*, contrary to the *Divine Will*, it is plain that they could not acknowledg the *DivineOmnipotence*, according to the full and proper ſenſe of it; whence it alſo follows that thoſe *Materialiſts* had not a right and genuine Idea of God.

Nevertheleſs it does not therefore follow, that they muſt needs be concluded abſolute Atheiſts; for there may be a Latitude allow'd in *Theiſm:* and tho in a ſtrict and proper ſenſe they be only Theiſts, who acknowledg *one God* perfectly omnipotent to be the ſole Original of all things, and as well the Cauſe of Matter, as of every thing elſe; yet does it ſeem reaſonable that ſuch Conſideration ſhould be had of the Infirmity of Human

* Ἄειστον, μακαειώτατον. In omni Naturâ nihil illo præſtantius. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

Underſtandings, as that the Word may be extended further, ſo as to comprehend within it thoſe alſo, who aſſert one intellectual Principle, *ſelf-exiſtent* from Eternity, the Framer and Governor of the whole World, tho not the Creator of the *Matter*; and that none ſhould be condemn'd for abſolute Atheiſts, merely becauſe they hold *eternal uncreated Matter*, unleſs they alſo deny an *eternal unmade Underſtanding*, ruling over the *Matter*, and ſo make *ſenſleſs Matter* the ſole Original of all things. And this certainly is moſt agreeable to common Apprehenſions; for *Democritus* and *Epicurus* would never have been condemn'd as Atheiſts, merely for aſſerting *eternal ſelf-exiſtent Atoms*, any more than *Anaxagoras* and *Archelaus* were, who maintain'd the ſame thing; had they not alſo deny'd that other Principle of theirs, a *perfect Mind*, and concluded that the World was made * *without the ordering and diſpoſing of any intelligent Being, which had all Happineſs with Incorruptibility.*

The true and proper Idea of God in its moſt contracted Form is this: *a Being abſolutely perfect.* For this is that alone, to which *neceſſary* Exiſtence is eſſential, and of which it is demonſtrable. Now as abſolute Perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, ſo does it not only comprehend beſides *neceſſary Exiſtence* perfect *Knowledg* or Underſtanding, but alſo *Omnipotence* or infinite Power; and therefore neither Matter nor any thing elſe can exiſt of it ſelf, independently on God; but he is the only Principle and Source, from which all other things are deriv'd. But becauſe this *infinite Power* is a thing which the Atheiſts quarrel

* Μηδενὸς διαλάττοντος ἢ διαλαξαμένου, τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχοντος μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας.

much

much with, as tho it were altogether unintelligible and therefore *impoſſible*, we ſhall here briefly declare the ſenſe of it, and render it, as we think, eaſily conceivable in theſe two particulars: Firſt, that by infinite Power is meant nothing elſe but *perfect Power*, or, as *Simplicius* calls it, a * *whole* and *intire Power*, ſuch as has no mixture of Impotency, or Defect of Power mingl'd with it: And then again, that this perfect Power, which is alſo the ſame with infinite, is really nothing elſe but a Power of producing and doing whatſoever is conceivable, and which does not imply a Contradiction; *Conception* being the only meaſure of *Power*, as ſhall be more fully ſhewn in due place.

Now here we think fit to obſerve, that the Pagan Theiſts did themſelves alſo commonly own Omnipotence, as an Attribute of the Deity, as might be made appear from ſundry Paſſages of their Writings: particularly of *Linus*, *Homer*, *Callimachus*, *Agatho*, *Virgil*, and *Ovid* †. Nay that Atheiſts themſelves under *Paganiſm* look'd upon *Omnipotence* or infinite Power as an eſſential Attribute of the Deity, is plain from the Words of *Lucretius*, in which he tells us, that *Epicurus* in order to the taking away of *Religion* ſet himſelf to confute || *infinite Power*; and he again condemns *Religioniſts* as guilty of great Folly in aſſerting *Omnipotence* **.

But we have not yet diſpatch'd all, that belongs to the intire Idea of God. For *Knowledg* and *Power* alone will not make a God: accordingly God is generally conceiv'd to be a *moſt venerable* and *deſirable Being*.

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* Ὅλη δύναμις,

† *See 'em quoted in* Cudworth's True Intellect. Syſtem, *f.* 201. || Lib. 1.

** Rurſus in antiquas referuntur Religiones,
Et Dominos acres aſciſcunt, *omnia poſſe*,
Quos miſeri credunt, ignari quid queat eſſe,
Quid nequeat, *&c.*

Whereas

Whereas an *omniſcient* and *omnipotent arbitrary Deity*, that has nothing either of *Benignity* or *Morality* in its Nature, to regulate its Will, as it could not be truly auguſt and venerable, according to that Maxim, * *without Goodneſs there is no Majeſty*; ſo neither could it be deſirable, as being that, which could be only fear'd and dreaded, but not have any firm Faith or Affiance plac'd in it. And indeed an omnipotent arbitrary Deity may ſeem in ſome ſenſe a worſe and more undeſirable thing, than the *Manichæan* evil God: foraſmuch as the latter could be but finitely *evil*, whereas the former might be ſo *infinitely*. Wherefore I think the *Manichæan Hypotheſis* taken altogether is to be prefer'd before that of one *omnipotent arbitrary Deity*, devoid of *Goodneſs* and *Morality*, ruling all things: becauſe there the *evil* Principle is yok'd with another eſſentially *good*, checking and controlling it. And withal it ſeems leſs diſhonourable to God to impute to him Defect of *Power*, than of *Goodneſs* and *Juſtice*. Neither can Power and Knowledg alone make a Being in it ſelf compleatly *happy*; and accordingly we have all of us by Nature, as both *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* call it, a certain † *Preſage and Divination in our Minds*, of ſome higher Good and Perfection, than either *Power* or *Knowledg*. *Knowledg* is plainly to be prefer'd before *Power*, as that which directs and rules its blind Impetus and Force; and *Ariſtotle* declares, that *there is ſomething better than Reaſon and Knowledg, which is the Principle and Original of it* ||: where he alſo intimates this to be the proper and eſſential Character of the Deity; for

* Sine Bonitate nulla Majeſtas.

† Μάντευμα τι.

|| Λόγε τὶ κρεῖττον λόγε ἀρχή. Ariſt. Eth. Endem. l. 7. c. 14.

what

* *what*, ſays he, *is there that can be better than Knowledg, but God?* Likewiſe the ſame *Philoſopher* elſewhere plainly determines, that there is Morality in the Nature of God, and that his Happineſs chiefly conſiſts in that, and not in external things, and in the exerciſe of Power. Which Doctrine of *Ariſtotle* ſeems to have been borrow'd from *Plato*, who in his Dialogues *de Republicâ*, diſcourſing about moral Vertue, occaſionally falls upon a Diſpute concerning the *chiefeſt Good*; wherein he concludes that it neither conſiſted in *Pleaſure* as ſuch, according to the Opinion of the *Vulgar*; nor yet in mere *Knowledg* and *Underſtanding*, according to the conceit of others, who were more polite and ingenious. And what he adds to this purpoſe afterwards, ſeems to be little more, than what may be experimentally found within our ſelves, namely that there is a certain *Life* or *vital* and *moral* Diſpoſition of Soul, which is much more inwardly and thoroughly ſatisfactory, not only than ſenſual *Pleaſure*, but alſo than all *Knowledg* and *Speculation* whatſoever †.

But whatever this chiefeſt Good be, which is a Perfection ſuperior to *Knowledg* and *Underſtanding*; that *Philoſopher* is poſitive, that it muſt needs be firſt and principally in God, who is therefore call'd by him the very ‖ *Idea* or *Eſſence of Good*: agreeably to the Doctrine of the *Pythagoreans*, and particularly of *Timæus Locrus*; as alſo to that of the *Hebrew Cabaliſts*, who do alſo make a *Sephirah* in the Deity ſuperior both to *Binah* and *Chochmah*, *Underſtanding* and *Wiſdom*, which they call *Chether* or the *Crown*; which *Cabaliſtick* Learning ſome

* Τὶ ἂν ἂν κρεῖττον τῆς ἐπιστήμης, πλὴν ὁ Θεὸς. Ibid.
† De Repub. l. 6.
‖ Ἰδέα τ' ἀγαθῦ.

would

would ſuſpect to have been very antient among the *Jews*, and that *Parmenides* was tinctur'd with it, he calling God in like manner the * *Crown*; for which *Velleius* in *Cicero* blames him.

But all this while we ſeem to be to ſeek what the chief and higheſt Good ſuperior to Knowledg is, in which the Eſſence of the Deity principally conſiſts; and it cannot be deny'd but that *Plato* ſometimes talks too *metaphyſically* and cloudily about it: for which cauſe as he lay open to the laſh of *Ariſtotle*, ſo was he alſo vulgarly cenſur'd for it. However, he plainly intimates theſe two things concerning it: Firſt, that this Nature of Good, which is alſo that of God, includes Benignity in it, when he gives this account of God's both making the World, and after ſuch a manner, namely, *becauſe he was good, and that which is good has no Envy in it; and therefore he both made the World, and alſo made it as well and as like to himſelf as was poſſible.* And ſecondly, that it comprehends eminently all Vertue and Juſtice, the Divine Nature being the original Pattern hereof; whence Vertue is defin'd an *Aſſimilation to the Deity:* So that Juſtice and Honeſty are no factitious things, made by the Will and Command of the more Powerful to the Weaker, but they are *Nature* and *Perfection*, and are deriv'd downward to us from the Deity.

But the Holy *Scripture* without any Metaphyſical Pomp and Obſcurity tells us plainly both what is that higheſt Perfection of intellectual Beings, which *is better than Reaſon and Knowledg*, and which is alſo the Source, Life and Soul of all Morality, namely that it is *Charity* or *Love*. *Tho I ſpeak with the Tongue of Men and An-*

* Στεφάνην.

gels,

gels, ſays the Apoſtle, *and have not Love, I am but as ſounding Braſs or a tinkling Cymbal*, which only makes a noiſe without any inward Life; *and tho I have Prophecy and underſtand all Myſteries and all Knowledg, and tho I have all Faith, ſo that I could remove Mountains, and have not Love, I am nothing*; that is, I have no inward ſatisfaction, no true Peace or Happineſs: *and tho I beſtow all my Goods to feed the Poor, and give my Body to be burn'd, and have not Love, it profiteth me nothing*; I am for all that, utterly deſtitute of all true Morality, Vertue and Grace. And accordingly it tells us further what the Nature of God is, that he is properly neither *Power* nor *Knowledg*, tho having the Perfection of both theſe in him, but that he is *Love*. And certainly whatever dark Thoughts concerning the Deity ſome Men in their Cells may ſit brooding on, it can never be reaſonably conceiv'd, that what is the moſt *ſelf-ſufficient* and *ſelf-happy* Being ſhould have any narrow and ſelfiſh Deſigns abroad without it ſelf, much leſs that it ſhould harbour any malignant and deſpiteful ones toward its Creatures. Nevertheleſs becauſe ſo many are apt to abuſe the Notion of the Divine Love and Goodneſs, and to frame ſuch Conceptions of it, as deſtroy that awful and reverential Fear, which ought to be had of the Deity, and make Men preſumptuous and regardleſs of their Lives, therefore we think fit to ſuperadd alſo here, that God is no ſoft or fond or partial *Love*, but that *Juſtice* is an eſſential Branch of this Divine *Goodneſs*, *God being*, as the Writer *De Mundo* well expreſſes it, an * *impartial Law*, and, as *Plato*, † *the Meaſure of all things*. Nay, it is evident that Atheiſts themſelves, in thoſe former times of *Paganiſm*, took it for granted, that *Goodneſs*

* Νόμος ἰσονομώτατος. † Μέτρον πάντων.

was an eſſential Attribute of the Deity, whoſe Exiſtence they oppos'd, as appears by thoſe Argumentations of theirs before mention'd, particularly the twelfth and thirteenth taken from the Topick of *Evils*, the pretended ill Frame of things, and want of Providence over human Affairs. Which if they were true, would not at all diſprove ſuch an arbitrary Deity, as is fancy'd by ſome to be made up of nothing but *Will* and *Power*, without any eſſential *Goodneſs* and *Juſtice*. But thoſe Arguments of the Atheiſts are directly level'd againſt the Deity, according to the true Idea or Notion of it; and could they be made good, would do execution upon the ſame. For it cannot be deny'd but that the natural conſequence of this Doctrine, that there is a God eſſentially *good*, is this, that therefore the World is well made and govern'd. But we ſhall hereafter declare that tho there be *Evil* in the Parts of the World, yet is there none in the *Whole*; and that moral Evils are not imputable to the Deity.

Thus we have propos'd the three principal Attributes of the Deity: the firſt of which is infinite *Goodneſs* with Fecundity; the ſecond, infinite *Knowledg* and *Wiſdom*; and the laſt, *infinite, active, and perceptive Power*. From which three Divine Attributes the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts* ſeem'd to have fram'd their *Trinity* of *Archical Hypoſtaſes*, ſuch as have the nature of Principles in the Univerſe; and which tho they apprehended, as ſeveral diſtinct Subſtances gradually ſubordinate to one another, yet many times they extend the τὸ θεῖον or *Divinity* ſo far, as to comprehend them all within it. But of this *Pythagorick Trinity* I ſhall ſay more hereafter. By this time we may inlarge, and fill up that compendious Idea of God, which has been premis'd, namely that he is a *Being abſolutely perfect*, by

by adding further to it what is more particular, namely that he is infinitely good, wiſe and powerful, neceſſarily exiſting, and not only the Framer of the World, but alſo the Cauſe of all things; which Idea of the Deity is ſufficient in order to our preſent Undertaking.

However again, if we would not only attend to what is barely neceſſary for a Diſpute with Atheiſts, but alſo conſider the Satisfaction of other free and devout Minds, that are hearty and ſincere Lovers of this moſt admirable and moſt glorious Being, we might venture for their gratification to propoſe a yet more full, more free and copious Deſcription of the Deity, after this manner: *God is a Being abſolutely perfect, unmade, or ſelf-originated and neceſſarily exiſting, that has an infinite Fecundity in him, and virtually contains all things; as alſo an infinite Benignity or overflowing Love, uninvidiouſly diſplaying or communicating it ſelf, together with an impartial Rectitude or Nature of Juſtice: who fully comprehends himſelf, and the Extent of his own Fecundity; and therefore all the Frame or Syſtem of the Whole: who has alſo infinite active and perceptive Power: the Fountain of all things, who made all that could be made and was fit to be made, producing them according to his own Nature, his eſſential Goodneſs and Wiſdom, and therefore according to the beſt Pattern and in the beſt manner poſſible, for the good of the Whole; and reconciling all the Variety and Contrariety of things in the Univerſe into one moſt admirable and lovely Harmony. Laſtly, who contains and upholds all things, and governs 'em after the beſt manner alſo, and that without any Force or Violence, they being all naturally ſubject to his Authority, and readily obeying his Laws.* Whence we ſee that God is ſuch a Being, as that if he could be ſuppos'd not to be, there is nothing

whoſe Exiſtence a good Man could poſſibly more wiſh or deſire. Alſo hence it appears, that there can be but *one* ſuch Being, and that Unity or Singularity is eſſential to it: foraſmuch as there cannot poſſibly be more than *one ſupreme*, than *one omnipotent* or infinitely powerful *Being*, and than *one* Cauſe of all Beings beſides it ſelf. And however *Epicurus* endeavouring to pervert and adulterate the Notion of God, pretended to ſatisfy that natural *Prolepſis* and Anticipation in the Minds of Men by a counterfeit and feign'd aſſerting of a multiplicity of co-ordinate Deitys, independent upon one Supreme, and ſuch as were likewiſe altogether unconcern'd either in the Frame or Government of the World; yet notwithſtanding he plainly took notice of this Idea of God, which we have propos'd, including *Unity* or *Onelineſs* in it, he profeſſedly oppoſing the Exiſtence of ſuch a Deity, and commonly ſpeaking of him in the ſingular Number, as appears from his Reaſonings ſet down by * *Lucretius* and † *Cicero*. And it is alſo plain that the other antient Atheiſts under *Paganiſm* were not unacquainted with ſuch an Idea of God, as we have declar'd, including Unity or Onelineſs in it, ſince they principally directed their Arguments againſt it. But this is that which lies as the grand Prejudice and Objection againſt that Idea of God, which we have propos'd, eſſentially including *Singularity* in it, or the real Exiſtence of ſuch a Deity as is the ſole Monarch of

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* Quis regere immenſi ſummam, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis eſt moderanter habenas? *&c.*
Lucret. l. 2.

† Sive ipſe Deus mundus eſt, quid poteſt eſſe minus quietum, quam nullo puncto temporis intermiſſo, verſari circum axem Cœli admirabili Celeritate? ſive in ipſo mundo Deus ineſt aliquis, qui regat, *&c.* Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

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the Univerſe; that all the Nations of the World heretofore (excepting a ſmall and inconſiderable handful of *Jews*) together with their wiſeſt Men and greateſt *Philoſophers*, were generally look'd on as *Polytheiſts*, or ſuch as acknowledg'd and worſhip'd a multiplicity of *Gods*. Now *one* God and *many* Gods, being directly contradictory, it is therefore concluded from hence, that this Opinion of *Monarchy*, or of one Supreme God the Maker and Governor of all, has no Foundation in *Nature*, nor in the genuine Ideas and Prolepſes of Mens Minds, but is a mere artificial thing, owing its Original wholly to private Fancys and Conceits, or to poſitive Laws and Inſtitutions among *Jews*, *Chriſtians*, and *Mahometans*. To ſatisfy which Difficulty, ſeemingly ſo formidable at the firſt ſight, it will be needful that we make a diligent Inquiry into the true and genuine ſenſe of this *Pagan Polytheiſm*. For ſince it is impoſſible that any Man in his wits ſhould believe a multiplicity of Gods, according to that Idea of God before declar'd, that is, a multiplicity of *Supreme*, *Omnipotent*, or *infinitely Powerful Beings*; it is certain that the *Pagan Polytheiſm* and multiplicity of Gods muſt be underſtood according to ſome other Notion of the word *God*, or ſome Equivocation in the uſe of it. Firſt then, I ſay, that either the *Pagans* meaning by *Gods* nothing elſe but *underſtanding Beings ſuperior to Men*, ſuppos'd a multitude of ſuch Deitys, which yet they conceiv'd to be all, as well as Men, native and mortal, generated ſucceſſively out of *Matter* and corrupted again into it, as *Democritus*'s Idols were ſuppos'd to be: and theſe indeed are deſervedly condemn'd by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* for downright Atheiſts. Others there might be of the *Pagans*, who indeed owning the Generation of ſome Gods, yet withal aſſerted either *one* Supreme God ruling over the reſt,

reſt, or *many* unmade, ſelf exiſtent and co-ordinate Gods; and both theſe might more properly be term'd *Polytheiſts* than downright Atheiſts, as not making ſenſleſs *Matter* the only ſelf-exiſtent thing, and the Original of all other things, nor conſequently ſuppoſing all conſcious intellectual Beings to be generable and corruptible. Now it is not to be queſtion'd, but that the forementioned Objectors againſt that Idea of God, which includes Singularity or Onelineſs in it, becauſe of the Pagan Polytheiſm or multiplicity of *Gods*, do take it for granted, that this is to be underſtood in the latter ſenſe, of unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deitys. But here the Queſtion will be, whether the *Pagans* univerſally underſtood their Gods to be all or many of 'em *eternal* and *unmade*, altogether independent upon one Supreme, and ſo many firſt Principles or partial Cauſes of the World: if ſo, then I confeſs that the Argument fetch'd from thence againſt the Naturality of the Idea of God propos'd, as eſſentially including Singularity in it, might ſeem to have no ſmall force in it. But as to this, I ſay, that this Opinion of many ſelf-exiſtent Deitys independent upon one Supreme, is both very irrational in it ſelf, and alſo repugnant to the *Phænomena*. Firſt, I ſay, it is irrational in it ſelf, becauſe *Self-exiſtence* and *neceſſary Exiſtence* being eſſential to a *perfect* Being and to nothing elſe, it muſt needs be very abſurd and irrational to ſuppoſe a multitude of *imperfect* underſtanding Beings ſelf-exiſtent, and no *perfect* one. Moreover, if imperfect underſtanding Beings were imagin'd to exiſt of themſelves from Eternity, there could not poſſibly be any reaſon given, why juſt ſo many of them ſhould exiſt, and neither more nor leſs, there being indeed no reaſon why any at all ſhould. But if it be ſuppos'd that theſe many ſelf-exiſtent Deitys *happen'd* only

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to exiſt thus from Eternity, and their Exiſtence notwithſtanding was not *neceſſary* but *contingent*, the conſequence hereof will be, that they might as well *happen* again to ceaſe to be, and ſo could not be incorruptible. Again, if any one imperfect *Being* whatſoever could exiſt of it ſelf from Eternity, then might all as well do ſo, not only *Matter*, but alſo the Souls of Men and other Animals; and conſequently there could be no Creation by any Deity, nor conſequently could thoſe pretended Deitys deſerve that Name. Laſtly, we might alſo add, that there could not be a multitude of intellectual things ſelf-exiſtent, becauſe it might be prov'd by *Reaſon*, that all *imperfect* underſtanding Beings or *Minds* do partake of one *perfect Mind*, and ſuppoſe alſo *Omnipotence* or *infinite Power*; were it not, that this is a Conſideration too remote from vulgar Apprehenſion, and therefore not ſo fit to be urg'd in this place. But again, as this Opinion of many ſelf-exiſtent Deitys is irrational in it ſelf, ſo is it likewiſe plainly repugnant to the *Phænomena* of the World, in which, as *Macrobius* writes, * *all things conſpire together into one Harmony*, and are carry'd on peaceably and quietly, conſtantly and evenly, without any Tumult or Diſorder, or at leaſt any appearance of *Schiſm* or Faction; which could not poſſibly be ſuppos'd, were the World made and govern'd by a rabble of *ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys, co-ordinate and independent on one Supreme. Now ſince this Opinion is both irrational in it ſelf and alſo repugnant to the *Phænomena*, there is the leſs probability that it ſhould have been receiv'd and entertain'd by all the more intelligent *Pagans:* who moreover, that they did not thus univerſally look upon all their Gods

* Omnia ſunt connexa.

as ſo many unmade *ſelf-exiſtent* Beings, is unqueſtionably manifeſt from hence, becauſe ever ſince *Heſiod*'s and *Homer*'s time, as * *Herodotus* witneſſeth, who was about four hundred years their junior, the *Greekiſh Pagans* generally acknowledg'd a *Theogonia*, a temporary Generation and Production of the *Gods*; which yet is not to be underſtood univerſally neither, foraſmuch as he is no Theiſt, who does not acknowledg ſome *ſelf-exiſtent Deity*. And again, tho perhaps ſome in thoſe antient Times might believe one way, and ſome another, concerning the Generation or Eternity of their Gods, yet neither does it follow that they who thought 'em to be all eternal, muſt therefore needs ſuppoſe 'em to be alſo *unmade* or *ſelf-exiſtent*. For *Ariſtotle*, we find, who aſſerted the Eternity of the World, and conſequently alſo of thoſe Gods of his, the Heavenly Bodys, did not for all that ſuppoſe 'em to be ſelf-exiſtent or firſt Principles, but that they all depended upon one *Principle* or *Original Deity*.

But tho it be thus plain that all the *Pagan* Gods were not *univerſally* accounted by them ſo many *unmade, ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys, they acknowledging a *Theogonia* or Generation of Gods; yet may it be ſuſpected notwithſtanding that they ſuppos'd a multitude of them alſo, and not only one, to have been *unmade* from Eternity and *ſelf-exiſtent*. Wherefore we add in the next place, that neither does any ſuch thing appear, as that the *Pagans* or any others did ever publickly or profeſſedly aſſert a multitude of *unmade ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys. For firſt it is plain concerning the *Heſiodian* Gods, which were all the Gods of the *Greekiſh Pagans*, that either there was but one of them only ſelf exiſtent, or elſe

* Herod. Euterp.

none

none at all. Indeed it appears from ſome Paſſages in *Ariſtotle*, that this Philoſopher had been ſometimes divided in his Judgment concerning *Heſiod*, where he ſhould rank him; whether among the Atheiſts or the Theiſts: for in his Book *de Cælo* he ranks him among thoſe, who made all things to be generated and corrupted, beſides the bare Subſtance of the *Matter*, that is, among the abſolute Atheiſts; and look'd upon him as a Ring-leader of 'em: but in his *Metaphyſicks*, upon further thoughts he ſuſpects that many of thoſe, who made *Love* the chief of the Gods, were Theiſts, they ſuppoſing it to be a *firſt Principle* in the Univerſe, or the *active Cauſe* of all things, and that not only *Parmenides* but *Heſiod* alſo was ſuch. Which latter Opinion of his is by far the more probable, and therefore embrac'd by *Plutarch*, who ſomewhere determines *Heſiod* to have aſſerted one * *unmade* Deity; to whom agrees the antient *Scholiaſt* writing thus upon him: *The Heavenly Love, which is alſo God, that other Love, which was born of* Venus, *being Junior* †.

The next conſiderable Appearance of a multitude of ſelf-exiſtent Deitys, ſeems to be in the *Valentinian thirty Gods* and *Æons*, which have been taken by ſome for ſuch: but it is certain, that all theſe ſave one, were ſuppos'd to have been generated, they being deriv'd by the *Phantaſtick* Deviſer of 'em from *one ſelf-originated* Deity call'd *Bythus*, ſignifying Profundity, by which accordingly he meant the || *Higheſt and Ineffable Father*.

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* Θεὸν ἀγέννητον.

† Ὁ ἀφάνιος ἔρως, ὅς ϗ θεὸς, ὁ γὰρ ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης νεώτερος ἐστιν.

|| Ὁ ἀνωτάτω ϗ ἀκατονόμαστος Πατὴρ. Epiphan. Hæreſ. 31.

We do indeed own that there have been ſome, who have really aſſerted a Duplicity of Gods in the ſenſe before declar'd, that is, of *animaliſh or perceptive Beings ſelf-exiſtent*; one as the Principle of *Good*, and the other of *Evil*. And this *Ditheiſm* of theirs ſeems to be the neareſt approach, that ever was really made, to *Polytheiſm*. Unleſs we ſhould here give heed to *Plutarch*, who ſeems to make the antient *Perſians*, beſides their two Gods the *Good* and *Evil*, *Oromaſdes* and *Arimanius*, to have alſo aſſerted a third middle Deity, call'd by them *Mithras*; or to ſome Eccleſiaſtick Writers, who impute a *Trinity* of Gods to *Marcion*, which number *Tertullian* increaſes to an *Ennead*. For thoſe that were commonly call'd *Tritheiſts*, being but miſtaken *Chriſtians* and *Trinitarians*, fell not under this Conſideration. Now as to that foremention'd *Ditheiſm* or Opinion of two Gods, a *good* and an *evil* one, it is evident that it originally ſprung from nothing elſe, but firſt a firm Perſuaſion of the eſſential Goodneſs of the Deity, together with a conceit that the Evil which is in the World, was altogether inconſiſtent and irreconcilable with the ſame; and that therefore to ſolve this *Phænomenon*, it was abſolutely neceſſary to ſuppoſe another *animaliſh Principle ſelf exiſtent*, or an *evil God*. Wherefore as theſe Ditheiſts, as to all that which is *good* in the World, held a *Monarchy* or one ſole Principle and Original, ſo is it plain, that had it not been for this buſineſs of *Evil*, which they conceiv'd could not be ſolv'd any other way, they would never have aſſerted any more *Principles* or *Gods* than *one*.

The moſt noted Aſſertors of this *Ditheiſtick Doctrine* of two ſelf-exiſtent animaliſh Principles in the Univerſe, a *good God* and an *evil Dæmon*, were the *Marcionites* and the *Manicheans*; both of which, tho they made

ſome ſlight pretences to *Chriſtianity*, yet were not by *Chriſtians* own'd for ſuch. But it is certain that beſides theſe and before them too, ſome of the profeſs'd *Pagans* alſo, entertain'd the ſame Opinion; particularly that famous *Moraliſt*, *Plutarch* of *Chæronea*, was an undoubted Patron of it, as appears from many of his Writings, eſpecially his Book *de Iſide & Oſiride*, his *Platonick Queſtions*, and his *Timæan Pſycogonia*, wherein he endeavours to eſtabliſh this Doctrine as much as ever he can, upon rational Foundations. As firſt, becauſe nothing can be made or produc'd without a Cauſe, and therefore of neceſſity there muſt be ſome cauſe of Evil alſo, and that a poſitive one too; he repreſenting the Opinion of thoſe as very ridiculous, who would make the Nature of Evil to be but an * accidental Appendix to the World, and all that Evil which is in it, to have come in only conſequentially and by the by, without any *poſitive Cauſe*. Secondly, that God being eſſentially *good*, could not poſſibly be the Cauſe of Evil, where he highly applauds *Plato* for removing God to the greateſt diſtance imaginable from being the Cauſe of *Evil*. Thirdly, that as God himſelf could not, ſo neither could *Matter* devoid of all *Form* be the Cauſe of *Evil*, noting this to have been the Subterfuge of the *Stoicks*. Upon which account he often condemns 'em, but uncertainly, ſometimes as ſuch who aſſign'd no Cauſe at all of *Evils*, and ſometimes again as thoſe who made God the Cauſe of 'em: the former he does in his *Pſychogonia*, the latter in his Book againſt the *Stoicks*. Wherefore he concludes that the *Phænomenon* of *Evil* could no otherwiſe poſſibly be ſolv'd, but by ſuppoſing a *ſubſtantial Principle*, a certain irrational and male-

* Ἐπεισόδιον.

ficent *Soul* or *Dæmon* unmade and co-exiſting with God and *Matter* from Eternity, to have been the Cauſe of it. And accordingly he reſolves, that as whatever is *good* in the Souls of *Men* and *Dæmons* is to be aſcrib'd to God as its only Original, ſo whatſoever is evil, irregular, and diſorderly in 'em, is to be imputed to this other *ſubſtantial Principle*, which inſinuating it ſelf every where throughout the World, does continually interfere with the better Principle; and tho it be not ſo prevailing as this latter, yet could never be utterly deſtroy'd, much of it being intermingl'd in the *Soul*, and much in the *Body* of the Univerſe, and there perpetually tugging againſt the Principle of *Good*. Nay *Plutarch* was likewiſe ſo ſtrongly poſſeſs'd with a conceit, that no thing ſubſtantial could be created, no not even by a Divine Power out of *nothing præ-exiſting*, that he ſuppos'd all the Subſtance of whatſoever is in the world to exiſt from Eternity *unmade*; God being only the Orderer and the Harmonizer or Methodizer of it: in like manner he reſolv'd that the *Soul* of the World, for ſuch a thing is always ſuppos'd by him, tho it had a temporary beginning, yet was not made by God out of nothing neither, nor out of any *inanimate* thing præexiſting, but out of a præ-exiſting diſorderly *Soul*, was brought into a regular and orderly Frame *; and in this ſenſe he concludes the Soul, as partaking of *Mind*, *Reaſon*, and *Harmony*, to be not only the Work of God, but alſo a part of him, and that *it is not a thing ſo much made by him*, as from *him and exiſting out of him*. The ſame, according to him, muſt alſo be affirm'd concerning all other Souls, as namely thoſe of *Men* and

* *See his Words cited at large out of the* Pſychogonia, *in* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 215, *&c.*

Dæmons, that they are either all of them the Subſtance of God himſelf, together with that of the *evil Dæmon*, or elſe ſome certain Delibations from both, (if any one could underſtand this) blended and confounded together; he not allowing any new Subſtance at all to be created by God out of nothing præ-exiſtent.

We are not ignorant that *Plutarch* endeavours with all his might to perſuade this to have been the conſtant Belief of all the Heathen Nations, and of all the wiſeſt Men and Philoſophers that ever were among 'em, particularly of *Zoroaſter* and the *Perſian Magi*, of the *Chaldæan Aſtrologers*, the *Egyptians*, and the moſt famous of the *Greek* Philoſophers, as namely, *Pythagoras*, *Empedocles*, *Heraclitus*, *Anaxagoras*, *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle*, and eſpecially that *Plato* was an undoubted Champion for it. But becauſe *Plutarch*'s Authority has paſs'd ſo uncontrol'd, and his Teſtimony in this particular ſeems to be of late generally receiv'd as an Oracle, and conſequently the thing to be taken for an unqueſtionable Truth, that the Ditheiſtick Doctrine of a good and evil Principle was the univerſal Doctrine of the *Pagan Theiſts*, and particularly that *Plato* above all the reſt, was a profeſs'd Champion for the ſame; we ſhall therefore make bold to examine *Plutarch*'s grounds for this ſo confident Aſſertion of his, and firſt moſt largely concerning *Plato*. Now his grounds for imputing this Opinion to him are theſe three: Firſt, becauſe that Philoſopher in his *Politicus*, ſpeaks of a *neceſſary and innate Appetite, that may ſometimes turn the Heavens a contrary way*; and by that means occaſion Diſorder and Confuſion. Secondly, becauſe in his tenth *de Legibus* he ſpeaks of two kinds of *Souls, one of which is beneficent, the other the contrary*. And laſtly, becauſe in his *Timæus* he ſuppoſes, the Matter to have been mov'd diſ-

orderly

orderly before the World was made, which implies that there was a diſorderly and irrational Soul conſiſting with it as the Mover of it, *Matter* being unable to move it ſelf. But as to the firſt of theſe Allegations out of *Plato*'s *Politicus*, we ſhall only obſerve that that Philoſopher, as if it had been purpoſely to prevent ſuch an Interpretation of his meaning there, as this of *Plutarch*'s, inſerts theſe very Words: *Neither muſt any ſuch thing be ſuppos'd, as if there were two Gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the Heavens ſometimes one way and ſometimes another.* Which plain Declaration of *Plato*'s ſenſe, being directly contrary to *Plutarch*'s Interpretation, and this *Ditheiſtick* Opinion, might alſo ſerve for a Confutation of his ſecond ground from the tenth *de Legibus*, as if *Plato* had there affirm'd, that there were two Souls moving the Heavens, the one *beneficent*, but the other the *contrary*; becauſe this would be all one as to aſſert two Gods, contrarily minded to one another. Notwithſtanding which, for a fuller Anſwer thereunto, we ſhall further add, that this *Philoſopher* did there firſt only diſtribute *Souls* in general into *Good* and *Evil*, thoſe moral differences properly belonging to that rank of Beings, call'd by him *Souls*, and firſt emerging in 'em: for *Soul*, ſays he, *is the Cauſe of Good and Evil, Honeſt and Diſhoneſt, Juſt and Unjuſt.* And again, making Inquiry concerning the Soul of the World or Heaven, what kind of Soul that was, he poſitively concludes that is is no other, than a Soul endu'd with all Vertue, and that it is impious to maintain the contrary *. And as for the laſt thing urg'd by *Plutarch*, that before the World was, the *Mat-*

* Οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν, ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους πεφυκέναι φάσκειν.

ter

ter is ſaid by *Plato* to have been mov'd diſorderly; we conceive that that *Philoſopher* did therein only adhere to that vulgarly receiv'd Tradition, which was originally *Moſaical*, that the firſt beginning of the World's Formation was from a *Chaos* or *Matter* confuſedly mov'd, and afterwads brought into *Order*. And now we think it ſufficiently plain, that there is no Strength at all in any of *Plutarch*'s fore-mention'd Allegations, nor any ſuch Monſter to be found any where in *Plato*, as this *ſubſtantial evil Principle* or God, a wicked Soul or Dæmon, unmade and ſelf-exiſtent from Eternity, oppoſite and at enmity with the *good God*, and ſharing with him the Empire and Dominion of the World. Which Opinion is really nothing elſe but a Deifying of the Devil or Prince of evil Spirits, making him to be a Corrival with God, and intitling him to a right of receiving Divine Honour and Worſhip. Accordingly, 'tis obſervable that *Plutarch* himſelf confeſſes this Interpretation, which he makes of *Plato*, to be new and paradoxical, or an Invention of his own, and *ſuch as becauſe it was contrary to the generally receiv'd Opinion of* Platoniſts, *he himſelf thought to ſtand in need of ſome Apology and Defence.* Moreover *Proclus* upon the *Timæus* takes notice of no other Philoſophers, that ever imputed this Doctrine to *Plato*, or indeed maintain'd any ſuch Opinion of two *ſubſtantial Principles of Good and Evil*, but only *Plutarch* and *Atticus*, tho I confeſs *Chalcidius* cites *Numenius* alſo to the ſame purpoſe.

But becauſe perhaps it may be here demanded, what account it was then poſſible for *Plato* to give of the Original of *Evils*, ſo as not to impute 'em to God himſelf, if he neither deriv'd 'em from * *unqualify'd Matter*,

* Ὕλη ἄποιος.

which

which *Plutarch* has plainly prov'd to be abſurd, nor yet from an *irrational and maleficent Soul of the World* or *Dæmon, ſelf-exiſtent from Eternity*; we ſhall therefore briefly reply to this: That tho that *Philoſopher* deriv'd not the Original of *Evils* from unqualify'd Matter, nor from a wicked Soul or Dæmon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute 'em to God neither, but, as it ſeems, to the *neceſſity of imperfect Beings*. For he determines with *Timæus Locrus* that the World was made by *God* and *Neceſſity*; that the former was properly and directly the Cauſe of all *Good*, and indeed of nothing elſe but *Good*; and that the *Neceſſity* of lower imperfect things unavoidably gives Being and Birth to *Evils*. Thus firſt, as to *moral Evils*, which are the chiefeſt, there is a *Neceſſity* that there ſhould be *higher* and *lower Inclinations* in all rational Beings, vitally united to *Bodys*; and that as they are free-will'd, they ſhould have a power of determining themſelves more or leſs, either way; as there is alſo a *Neceſſity*, that the ſame *Liberty* of Will, eſſential to rational Creatures, which makes 'em capable of *Praiſe* and *Reward*, ſhould likewiſe put 'em in a poſſibility of deſerving *Blame* and *Puniſhment*. Again, as to the *Evils* of *Pain* and *Inconvenience*, there ſeems to be a *Neceſſity* that imperfect *terreſtrial Animals*, which are capable of the Senſe of *Pleaſure*, ſhould in contrary Circumſtances, which will likewiſe ſometimes happen, by reaſon of the Inconſiſtency and Incompoſſibility of things, be obnoxious to *Diſpleaſure* and *Pain*. And laſtly, for the *Evils* of *Corruptions* and *Diſſolutions*, there is a plain *Neceſſity*, that if there be natural *Generations* in the World, there ſhould be alſo Corruptions. To all which may be added, according to the Opinion of many, that there is a kind of *Neceſſity* of ſome *Evils* in the World, as it were to ſet off, and give a reliſh

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to *Good*; ſince the Nature of imperfect Animals is ſuch, that they are apt to have but a dull and ſluggiſh ſenſe, a flat and inſipid Taſt of *Good*, unleſs it be quicken'd and provok'd, heighten'd and invigorated, by being compar'd with the contrary *Evil*. As alſo that there ſeems to be a *neceſſary* Uſe in the world of thoſe *involuntary Evils of Pain and Suffering*, both for the exerciſe of Vertue, and for the quickening and exciting the Activity of the World; and for the repreſſing, chaſtizing and puniſhing of thoſe *voluntary Evils, of Vice and Action*. Upon which ſeveral accounts *Plato* very probably concluded, that *Evils* could not be utterly deſtroy'd, at leaſt in this lower World, which, according to him, is the Region of lapſed Souls; *From which*, ſays he, *we ought to endeavour to flee with all poſſible ſpeed; and to fly hence is to aſſimilate our ſelves to God, as much as may be; which Aſſimilation to God conſiſts in being juſt and holy with Wiſdom*. Thus, according to the ſenſe of *Plato*, tho God be the Original of all things, yet is he not properly to be accounted the Cauſe of *Evils*, at leaſt of *moral ones*, they being only Defects: but they are to be imputed to the *Neceſſity* of imperfect Beings; * *to that Neceſſity, which does often reſiſt God, and as it were ſhake off his Bridle*; inaſmuch as rational Creatures are by means thereof, in a capacity of acting contrary to God's Will and Law, as weſl as their own true Nature and Good; and other things are hinder'd from that Perfection, which the Divine Goodneſs would elſe have imparted to 'em. But however, *Mind* or *God* is ſaid by *Plato* to rule, and in the end to get the better of *Neceſſity*, becauſe thoſe Evils occaſion'd by the *Neceſſity* of imperfect

* Ἀνάγκη πολλὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσα καὶ ἀφνιδίζουσα.

Beings, are over-rul'd by the Divine Art, Wiſdom, and Providence for *good*; *Typhon* and *Arimanius*, if we may uſe that Language, being as it were out-witted by *Oſiris* and *Oromaſdes*, and the worſt of all *Evils* made, in ſpite of their own Nature, to contribute ſubſerviently to the Good and Perfection of the *Whole*; *and this muſt needs be own'd to be the* * *greateſt Art of all, to be able to bonify* Evils, *and tincture them with Good.*

And now, I think, I have made it appear that *Plutarch* had no ſufficient ground to impute this Opinion to *Plato*, of two *active perceptive Principles* in the World, one the Cauſe of *Good*, and the other of *Evil.* And as for the other *Greek* Philoſophers, his Pretences to make them Aſſertors of the ſame Doctrine ſeem to be yet more ſlight and frivolous. For he concludes the *Pythagoreans* to have held two ſuch *ſubſtantial Principles of Good and Evil*, merely beeauſe they talk'd ſometimes of the *Contrarietys* and *Conjugations* of things, ſuch as finite and infinite, dextrous and ſiniſtrous, even and odd, and the like. As alſo that *Heraclitus* entertain'd the ſame Opinion, becauſe he ſpoke of a † *verſatatile Harmony of the World*, whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a Bow is ſucceſſively intended and remitted; and likewiſe becauſe he affirm'd, that *all things flow, and that War is the Father and Lord of all.* Moreover, he reſolves that *Empedocles*'s Friendſhip and Contention could be no other than a *good* and *evil* God; tho it be very probable, that nothing elſe was underſtood by that, but an *active ſpermatick Power* in this corporeal World, cauſing Viciſſitudes of *Generation* and *Corruption.* Again, *Anaxagoras* is entitled by him

* Καὶ τῦτο μεγίσης τέχνης ἀ᾽γαθοποιεῖν τὰ κακά.
† Παλίντροπος ἁρμονία κόσμυ.

to the ſame Philoſophy, for no other reaſon, but becauſe he made *Mind* and *infinite Matter* two Principles of the Univerſe. And laſtly, *Ariſtotle* himſelf cannot eſcape him from being made an Aſſertor of a *good* and *evil* God too, merely becauſe he concluded Form and Privation to be two Principles of natural Bodys; from which as it cannot be in any wiſe infer'd that this was his real meaning, ſo likewiſe do we find him plainly declare the contrary in his *Metaphyſicks*, where he expreſly confutes this Doctrine, ſaying, that *they, who ſuppoſe one Principle of one thing and another of another, would make the whole World to be like an incoherent and diſagreeing Poem, where things do not all of 'em mutually contribute to one another, nor conſpire together to make up one Senſe and Harmony: but the contrary,* ſays he, *is moſt evident in the World, and therefore there cannot be many Principles, but only one.* Which Words, tho they were wrongfully and enviouſly directed againſt the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*, as if they had held more than one firſt Principle; yet ſhew what *Ariſtotle*'s inward meaning was, as to the Point in hand*; tho I grant indeed, that he was a Polytheiſt, or a Worſhipper of many Gods. Nor does *Plutarch* acquit himſelf any thing better, as to the ſenſe of whole Nations; when this Doctrine is therefore imputed by him to the *Chaldæans*, becauſe their *Aſtrologers* ſuppos'd two of the Planets to be *Beneficent*, two *Maleficent*, and three of a *middle Nature*; and to the antient *Greeks*, becauſe they ſacrific'd not only to *Jupiter Olympius*, but alſo to *Hades* or *Pluto*, who was ſometimes call'd by them the *Infernal Jupiter*. We confeſs, that his Interpretation of the Traditions and Myſterys of the antient *Egyptians* is ingenious; yet is

* Ariſt. Met. l. 14. c. 10.

there no Neceſſity for all that, that by their *Typhon* ſhould be underſtood a *ſubſtantial evil Principle*, or God *ſelf-exiſtent*, as he contends. For it being the manner of the antient *Pagans*, as ſhall be more fully declar'd hereafter, to *phyſiologize* in their *Theology*, and to perſonate all the ſeveral things in Nature, it ſeems more likely that theſe *Egyptians* did after that manner only perſonate that Evil and Confuſion, that Tumult and Diſorder, that conſtant Alteration and Viciſſitude of *Generations* and *Corruptions*, which is in this lower World, tho not without a Divine Principle, by *Typhon*.

Wherefore the only probability now left is, that of the *Perſian Magi*, that they might aſſert two ſuch active Principles of *Good* and *Evil*, as *Plutarch* and the *Manichæans* afterwards did; and indeed we muſt confeſs that there is ſome probability of this, becauſe beſides *Plutarch*, *Laertius* affirms the ſame of them, and ſeems withal to vouch it from the Authoritys of *Hermippus*, *Eudoxus*, and *Theopompus*. But notwithſtanding this it may very well be queſtion'd, whether the meaning of thoſe *Magi* were not herein miſunderſtood, they perhaps intending nothing more by their *evil Dæmon*, than ſuch a *Satanical* Power as we acknowledg, that is, not a *ſubſtantial evil Principle*, *unmade* and independent on God, but only a Polity of *evil Dæmons* in the World, united together under one Head and Prince: and this, not only becauſe *Theodorus* in *Photius* calls the *Perſian Arimanius* by that very name, *Satanas*; but alſo becauſe thoſe Traditions of theirs repreſented by *Plutarch* and *Theopompus*, ſeem very much to favour this Opinion: while from theſe it appears, that they did not, like *Plutarch* himſelf and the *Manichæans*, ſuppoſe this *evil Principle* to be *ſelf-exiſtent* and undeſtroyable; inaſmuch as they plainly tell us, That *there is a fatal time at hand, when* Ari-

† manius,

manius, *or* Hades, *the Introducer of Plagues and Famines, will in the Concluſion be utterly aboliſh'd*, &c. Whence it is probable that theſe *Perſian Magi* did in their *Arimanius* either only *perſonate Evil*, as we ſuppoſe the *Egyptians* to have done in *Typhon*; or elſe underſtood by it a *Satanical Power*: notwithſtanding which, they might poſſibly ſacrifice to it, as the *Greeks* did to *evil Dæmons*, for its appeaſement and mitigation; or elſe as worſhipping the Deity it ſelf in the Miniſters of its Wrath and Vengeance. However from what has been ſaid, we think it ſufficiently appears that this Ditheiſtick Doctrine of a *good* and *evil God*, or a *good God* and *evil Dæmon*, both ſelf-exiſtent, aſſerted by *Plutarch* and the *Manichæans*, was never ſo univerſally receiv'd among the *Pagans*, as the ſame *Plutarch* pretends. Which may be yet further evidenc'd from hence, becauſe the *Manichæans* profeſs'd themſelves not to have deriv'd this Opinion from the *Pagans*, nor to be a Subdiviſion under them or Schiſm from them, but a quite different Sect by themſelves. Thus we have it in the Words of *Fauſtus* in St. *Auſtin*, that *there were indeed but two Sects of Religion in the World, really diſtinct from one another, namely* Paganiſm *and* Manichæiſm. And a little before he blames the *Pagans* in general for deriving all things, both *good* and *evil*, from one and the ſame Principle: whereas their approv'd *Theologer Manes* determin'd God to be the Principle of *Good*, but *Hyle* or the *evil Dæmon* to be the Principle of *Evil**. From whence it may be concluded that this Doctrine of two *active Principles* of *Good* and *Evil* was not then look'd upon as the generally receiv'd Doctrine of the *Pagans*. And therefore it ſeems reaſonable to think that *Plutarch*'s imputing it ſo uni-

* D. Auguſt. cont. Fauſt. l. 20. c. 3.

verſall

verſally to them, was either out of deſign, thereby to gain the better Countenance and Authority to a conceit, which he himſelf was fond of; or elſe becauſe he being deeply tinctur'd as it were with the Suffuſions of it, every thing that he look'd upon ſeem'd to be colour'd with it. And indeed, for ought we can yet learn, this *Plutarch* of *Chæronea*, *Numenius* and *Atticus*, were the only *Greek* Philoſophers, that ever in publick Writings poſitively aſſerted any ſuch Opinion. And probably St. *Athanaſius* is to be underſtood of theſe, when in his Oration *contra Gentes*, he writes thus concerning this Opinion: *Some of the* Greeks, ſays he, *wandering out of the right way, and ignorant of Chriſt, have determin'd Evil to be a real Entity by it ſelf; erring upon two accounts, becauſe they muſt of neceſſity either ſuppoſe God not to be the Maker of all things, if Evil has a Nature and Eſſence by it ſelf, and yet is not made by him; or elſe that he is the Maker and Cauſe of Evil: whereas it is impoſſible that he who is eſſentially good ſhou'd produce the contrary.*

But if notwithſtanding all that we have hitherto aſſerted to the contrary, what *Plutarch* ſo much contends for ſhould be granted to be true, that the Pagan Theologers generally aſſerted two *ſelf-exiſtent Principles*, a *good God* and an *evil Soul* or *Dæmon*, and no more, it would unavoidably follow, that all thoſe other Gods, which they worſhip'd, were not look'd upon by them, as ſo many *unmade ſelf-exiſtent Beings*, becauſe then they ſhould have own'd ſo many *firſt Principles*. However it is certain, that if *Plutarch* believ'd his own Writings, he muſt of neceſſity take it for granted that none of the Pagan Gods, thoſe two Principles of Good and Evil only excepted, were by their Theologers accounted *unmade* or *ſelf exiſtent* Beings. And as to *Plutarch* himſelf, it is unqueſtionably manifeſt, that tho he were

were a *Pagan* and a Worſhipper of all thoſe many Gods of theirs, and eſpecially among the reſt of the *Delian Apollo*, whoſe Prieſt he declares himſelf to have been, yet he ſuppos'd 'em, excepting only one *good God* and an *evil Soul of the World*, to be no *ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys, but * *generated* or created *Gods* only. And the ſame is to be ſaid of all his *Pagan* Followers, and alſo of the *Manichæans*; foraſmuch as they, beſides their good and evil God, the only unmade ſelf-exiſtent Beings acknowledg'd by 'em, worſhip'd alſo innumerable other Deitys.

Hitherto we have endeavour'd to ſhew that the Pagans in general neither ſuppos'd that *All* their Gods were ſelf-exiſtent, becauſe they acknowledg'd a *Theogonia* or temporary Generation of 'em; nor withal that they ſuppos'd a *multitude* of 'em to be ſo: only we find that indeed a few of the profeſs'd Pagans, as alſo of pretended *Chriſtians*, have indeed aſſerted a duplicity of Gods, or *underſtanding Beings unmade*, one *good* and the other *evil*, and no more. But this will yet more fully appear from a ſhort ſurvey of their Religion, and of the ſeveral kinds of Gods worſhip'd by them. In the firſt place then it is certain, that many of the *Pagan* Gods were only *dead Men* or the *Souls* of Men deceas'd, call'd by the *Greeks* Ἡρωες, and by the *Latins Manes*, ſuch as *Hercules*, *Liber*, *Æſculapius*, *Caſtor*, *Pollux*, *Quirinus*, and the like. Nor was this only true of the *Greeks* and *Romans*, but alſo of the *Egyptians*, *Syrians*, and *Babylonians*. For which reaſon the *Pagan* Sacrifices are call'd in the Scripture by way of contempt, *the Sacrifices of the Dead*, that is, not of dead or lifeleſs Statues, as ſome would put it off, but of dead Men.

* Θεοὶ γενητοὶ.

Upon

Upon which account many of the religious Rites and Solemnitys obſerv'd by the *Pagan* Prieſts were funeral and mournful; agreeably to what is expreſs'd in *Baruch*, concerning the *Babylonians*: *Their Prieſts ſit in their Temples, having their Clothes rent and their Heads and Beards ſhaven, and nothing upon their Heads; they roar and cry before their Gods, as Men do at the Feaſt, when one is dead**. And the ſame thing is noted likewiſe by the *Poet* concerning the *Egyptians*:

Et quem tu plangens, hominem teſtaris, Oſirin;

The ſenſe whereof is expreſs'd by *Xenophanes* the *Colophonian*, when he reprehenſively admoniſh'd the *Egyptians* after this manner, That *if they thought thoſe to be Gods, they ſhould not ſo lament 'em; but if they would lament 'em, they ſhould no longer think 'em Gods.* Moreover, it is well known, that this humour of Deifying Men was afterwards carried on further, and that Emperors, living Men, had alſo Temples and Altars erected to 'em; nay human Politys and Citys were alſo ſometimes Deify'd by the *Pagans*, *Rome* it ſelf being made a Goddeſs. Now no Man can imagine that thoſe *Men-Gods* and *City-Gods* were look'd on by them as ſo many *unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deitys*, they being not indeed ſo much as Gods made or generated by Nature, but rather artificially made by human Will and Pleaſure. Again, another ſort of the *Pagan* Deitys were all the greater parts of the viſible Mundane Syſtem or corporeal World, as ſuppos'd to be animated, the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars, and even the Earth it ſelf, under the names of *Veſta* and *Cybele* the Mother of the Gods, and the like. Now it is alſo certain, that neither

* Bar. c. 31.

could

could any of theſe be taken for *unmade ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys by thoſe, who ſuppos'd the whole World it ſelf to have been generated or to have had a beginning, which, *Ariſtotle* tells us, was the univerſally receiv'd Opinion before his time. There was alſo a third ſort of *Pagan* Deitys, *Ethereal* and *Aereal Animals* inviſible, call'd *Dæmons*, *Genii*, and *Lares*, ſuperior indeed to Men, but inferior to the celeſtial or mundane Gods before mention'd. Wherefore theſe muſt needs be look'd on alſo by them, but as *generated* or *created Gods*, they being but certain inferior parts of the whole generated World.

But other *Pagans* there were, who had yet another ſort of Gods, which were nothing but mere *Accidents* or Affections of *Subſtances*, and therefore could not be ſuppos'd by 'em to be *ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys, becauſe they could not ſo much as ſubſiſt by themſelves: ſuch were *Vertue*, *Piety*, *Felicity*, *Truth*, *Faith*, *Hope*, *Juſtice*, *Clemency*, *Love*, *Deſire*, *Health*, *Peace*, *Honour*, *Fame*, *Liberty*, *Memory*, *Sleep*, *Night*, and the like; all which had their Temples or Altars erected to 'em. Now this kind of *Pagan* Gods cannot well be conceiv'd to have been any thing elſe, but the ſeveral and various Manifeſtations of that one Divine Force, Power, and Providence, which runs thro the whole World, fictitiouſly perſonated, as referring to the *Good* or *Evil* of Men; and ſo repreſented as ſo many Gods and Goddeſſes.

Laſtly, there is ſtill another kind of *Pagan* Gods, having *ſubſtantial and perſonal Names*, which yet neither can we conceive to be ſo many *underſtanding Beings*, *unmade and independent* upon one *Supreme*, were it for no other reaſon but only this, becauſe they have all of 'em their particular Places and Provinces, their Offices and Functions ſeverally, as it were aſſign'd to 'em, and

to which they are confin'd; ſo as not to interfere or claſh with one another, but agreeingly to make up one orderly and harmonious Syſtem of the *Whole*; one of thoſe Gods ruling only in the Heavens, another in the Air, another in the Sea, and another in the Earth and Hell; one being the God or Goddeſs of Learning and Wiſdom, another of Speech and Eloquence, another of Juſtice and Political Order; one the God of War, another the God of Pleaſure; one the God of Corn, and another the God of Wine, and the like. For how can it be conceiv'd that a multitude of underſtanding Beings, *ſelf exiſtent* and *independent*, could thus of themſelves have faln into ſuch a uniform Harmony and Order, and without any claſhing, peaceably and quietly ſharing the Government of the whole World amongſt 'em, ſhould carry it on with ſuch a conſtant Regularity? Whence we conclude that neither thoſe *Dii majorum gentium*, whether the *twenty Selecti*, or the *twelve Conſentes*, nor yet that *Triumvirate* of Gods, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, amongſt whom, as *Maximus Tyrius* obſerves, *Homer* ſhares the Government of the whole World; nor laſtly, that other *Roman* and *Samothracian Trinity* of Gods, worſhip'd all together in the Capitol, *Jupiter*, *Minerva*, and *Juno*: I ſay, that none of all theſe could reaſonably be thought by the *Pagans* themſelves to be ſo many really diſtinct, *unmade* and *ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys.

Wherefore the Truth of this whole buſineſs ſeems to be this, that the antient Pagans did *phyſiologize* in their Theology; and whether looking upon the whole *World animated* as the *ſupreme* God, and by conſequence the ſeveral parts of it as his living Members, or elſe apprehending it at leaſt to be a Mirror, or viſible Image of the inviſible Deity, and conſequently all its ſeveral parts and things of Nature, but as ſo many ſeveral Mani-

Manifeſtations of the Divine *Power* and *Providence*, they pretended that all their Devotion towards the Deity ought not to be huddl'd up in one general and confus'd acknowledgment of a *ſupreme inviſible Being*, the Creator and Governor of all, but that all the ſeveral Manifeſtations of the Deity in the World, conſider'd ſingly and apart by themſelves, ſhould be made ſo many diſtinct Objects of their pious Veneration: and therefore in order hereunto did they ſpeak of the things in Nature and the parts of the World as *Perſons*, and conſequently as ſo many Gods and Goddeſſes; yet ſo, as that the Intelligent might eaſily underſtand the meaning, that theſe were all indeed nothing elſe, but ſo many ſeveral Names and Notions of that one Numen, that one Divine *Force* or *Power*, which runs thro the whole World, variouſly diſplaying it ſelf therein. To this purpoſe * *Balbus* in *Cicero*; *See you not*, ſays he, *how from the things of Nature fictitious Gods have been made?* And *Origen* ſeems to inſiſt upon this very thing, where *Celſus* upbraids the *Jews* and *Chriſtians* for worſhipping one only God, ſhewing that all that ſeeming multiplicity of *Pagan* Gods could not be underſtood of ſo many diſtinct *ſubſtantial independent Deitys*; ſaying, That *he would never be able to prove, that thoſe Figments of the* Greeks, *which ſeem to be really nothing elſe but the things of Nature turn'd into Perſons, are ſo many diſtinct ſelf-exiſtent Deitys* †.

Now this fictitious perſonating and deifying of things by the *Pagan* Theologers, was done two ways: either when thoſe things in Nature were themſelves, without any more ado or change of Names, ſpoken of as *Perſons*,

* Videtiſne ut a Phyſicis Rebus tracta Ratio ſit ad commentitios & fictos Deos? † Cont. Celſ. l. 1.

and ſo many Gods and Goddeſſes, as in the many Inſtances before propos'd; or elſe, when there were diſtinct proper and perſonal Names accommodated ſeverally to thoſe things, as of *Minerva* to *Wiſdom*, of *Neptune* to the *Sea*, of *Ceres* to *Corn*, and of *Bacchus* to *Wine*. In which latter caſe thoſe perſonal Names do properly ſignify the *inviſible Divine Powers*, ſuppos'd to rule over thoſe ſeveral things in Nature; and theſe are therefore properly thoſe Gods and Goddeſſes which are the * *Givers and Diſpenſers of the good things*, and the Removers of the contrary: but they are us'd improperly alſo for the things of Nature themſelves, which therefore as manifeſtations of the Divine Power, Goodneſs and Providence *perſonated*, are ſometimes alſo abuſively call'd Gods and Goddeſſes †. Now as the ſeveral things in Nature and parts of the corporeal World are thus metonymically and abuſively call'd Gods and Goddeſſes, it is evident, that ſuch Deitys as theſe could not be ſuppos'd to be *unmade* or *ſelf-exiſtent*, by thoſe who acknowledg'd the whole World to have been generated and to have had a beginning. And as theſe Names were us'd more properly to ſignify *inviſible* and *underſtanding Powers*, preſiding over the things in Nature and diſpenſing them about, however they have an appearance of ſo many ſeveral diſtinct Deitys, yet do they all ſeem to have been really nothing elſe but, as *Balbus* in *Cicero* expreſſes it, ‖ *God paſſing thro and acting in the Nature of every thing*, and conſequently but ſeveral Names, or ſo many different Notions and

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* Δωτῆρες ἐάων.

† *Of this Myſtery of Polytheiſm more fully diſcover'd*, vide Moſcopulum in Heſiod, *p.* 1.

‖ Deus pertinens per naturam cujuſque rei.

Con-

Considerations of that one supreme *Numen*, that Divine Force, Power and Providence, which runs thro the whole World, as variously manifesting it self therein.

Wherefore since there were no other kinds of Gods among the *Pagans* besides those already mention'd, we conclude universally, that all that multiplicity of *Pagan* Gods, which makes so great a shew and noise, was really either nothing but several Names and Notions of one supreme Deity, according to its different Manifestations, Gifts and Effects in the world, *personated*; or else many inferior understanding Beings generated or created by one *Supreme:* so that one *unmade self-existent* Deity and no more was acknowledg'd by the more intelligent of the antient *Pagans* (of the sottish Vulgar no Man can pretend to give an account in any Religion) and consequently the *Pagan* Polytheism or Idolatry consisted not in worshipping a multiplicity of *unmade Minds*, Deitys, and Creators *self-existent* from Eternity and independent upon one *Supreme*; but in mingling and blending some way or other unduly, the Worship of the *Creature* with that of the *Creator*.

And that the antient Pagan Theists thus acknowledg'd one *Supreme God*, who was the only *unmade* or *unproduc'd Deity* (I say Theists, because those among the *Pagans*, who admitted of many Gods, but none at all *unmade*, were, as I before intimated, absolute Atheists) may be undeniably concluded from what was before prov'd, that they acknowledg'd Omnipotence or infinite Power to be a Divine Attribute. Because upon the *Hypothesis* of many *unmade self-existent Deitys*, it is plain that there could be none omnipotent, and consequently no such thing as Omnipotence *in rerum Naturâ*: and therefore Omnipotence was rightly and properly stil'd

by

by *Macrobius*, *ſummi Dei omnipotentia*, it being an Attribute eſſentially peculiar to one ſupreme and ſole ſelf-exiſtent Deity; and agreeably to this, * *Simplicius* likewiſe a *Pagan* confuted the *Manichæan* Hypotheſis of two ſelf-exiſtent Deitys from hence alſo, becauſe it deſtroy'd *Omnipotence*. And we think it here obſervable, that to ſhew that the Opinion of *Monarchy*, or of *one Supreme* Deity ruling over all, was generally receiv'd under *Paganiſm*, *Fauſtus* the *Manichæan* took up this Conceit, that both the *Chriſtians* and *Jews* paganiz'd in this point, as deriving this Doctrine of one Deity, the ſole Principle of all things, only by Tradition from the *Pagans*, and by conſequence being no other than *Schiſmaticks* or ſubdivided *Sects* of *Paganiſm*. Now tho this Charge be falſe and fooliſh, yet does it ſufficiently ſhew the general ſenſe of the Pagans touching one ſupreme God; that they neither acknowledg'd a *Multitude* of unmade Deitys, nor even that *Duplicity* of 'em, one *good* and the other *evil*, which *Plutarch* contended for, and accordingly deny'd God to be the Cauſe of all things: *for*, ſays he in his *Defect of Oracles*, *they are guilty of one Extreme, who make God the Cauſe of nothing, and they of another, who make him the Cauſe of all things*. But this Paradox was both late ſtarted among the *Greeks*, and quickly cry'd down by the ſucceeding Philoſophers; and therefore does not prejudice the Truth of *Fauſtus*'s general Aſſertion concerning the *Pagans*, which St. † *Auſtin* in his Reply yet more fully confirms: *Let* Fauſtus *know*, ſays he, *that we Chriſtians have not deriv'd the Opinion of Monarchy from the* Pagans, *tho the* Pagans *indeed have not ſo far degenerated, ſinking down*

* In Epictet. c. 4.

† D. Auguſt. cont. Fauſt. l. 20. c. 19.

into

into the Worſhip of falſe Gods, as to have loſt the Opinion of one true God, from whom is all Nature whatſoever. And the ſame was done by him more largely before *.

It follows from what we have declar'd that the *Pagan Polytheiſm* or multiplicity of Gods is not to be underſtood in the ſenſe before expreſs'd, of many *unproduc'd ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys, but according to ſome other Notion or Equivocation of the word *God*. For *God* is a word that has been us'd in many different ſenſes, the Atheiſts themſelves acknowledging a God and Gods according to ſome private Conſtruction of their own, which yet they do not all agree in neither, and Theiſts likewiſe not always having the ſame Notion of the word: foraſmuch as Angels in Scripture are call'd Gods in one ſenſe, that is, as they are *underſtanding Beings ſuperior to Men, immortal, holy,* and *happy:* and the word again is ſometimes carry'd down lower to *Princes* and *Magiſtrates*; and not only ſo, but alſo to *good Men* as ſuch, when they are ſaid to be *made Partakers of the Divine Nature.* To this purpoſe that learned Philoſopher and Chriſtian *Boethius*; *Every good and happy Man,* ſays he, *is a God, and tho there be only one God by Nature, yet nothing hinders but that there may be many by Participation.* But then again all *Men* and *Angels* are alike deny'd to be *Gods* in other reſpects, and particularly as to *Religious Worſhip*; for, *Thou ſhalt worſhip the Lord thy God, and him only ſhalt thou ſerve.* Now this is that, which ſeems to be eſſentially included in the Pagan Notion of the word *God* or *Gods* when taken in general, namely a reſpect to Religious Worſhip. Wherefore God in general, according to the ſenſe of the *Pagan Theiſts*, may be thus defin'd, *an underſtanding*

* L. 20. c. 10.

Being

Being ſuperior to Men, not originally deriv'd from ſenſleſs Matter, and look'd upon as an Object of Mens religious Worſhip. But this general Notion of the word *God* is again reſtrain'd and limited by differences in the diviſion of it; for ſuch a God as this may be either *ingenerate* or *unproduc'd*, and conſequently *ſelf exiſtent*, or elſe *generated* or *produc'd*, and *dependent* on ſome higher *Being* as its Cauſe. In the former ſenſe the intelligent *Pagans*, as we have declar'd, acknowledg'd only one God: but in the latter they admitted of *many Gods*, many *underſtanding Beings*, which tho generated or produc'd, yet were ſuperior to Men, and look'd upon as fit Objects for their religious Worſhip; and thus the *Pagan Theiſts* were both *Polytheiſts* and *Monotheiſts* in different ſenſes, acknowledg'd both *many Gods* and *one God*, that is many *inferior Deitys*, ſubordinate to *one Supreme*, who alone was unmade and ſelf-exiſtent, and in the *Poetick Phraſe*, the eternal * *Father of Men and Gods*. Indeed the *Theogonia* of the antient *Pagans* before mention'd, was commonly thus declar'd by them univerſally, that † *the Gods were generated*; or as *Herodotus* expreſſes it, that ‖ *every one of the Gods was generated or produc'd*. But as to which I ſay, that this is not ſo to be underſtood as if they had therefore ſuppos'd no God at all *unmade* or *ſelf-exiſtent*: which had been abſolute Atheiſm, but that the οἱ θεοὶ *the Gods*, as diſtinguiſh'd from ὁ θεὸς or τὸ θεῖον, from *God* or the *ſupreme Deity*, were all of 'em univerſally *made* or *generated*. To this purpoſe I cannot paſs by this emphatical Acknowledgment of *Maximus Tyrius*, which he affirms

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* Πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. Hominum Pater atque Deorum.

† Γενητὸς τὸς θεὸς εἶναι.

‖ Ὅτι ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν ἐγένετο.

to

to have been the general ſenſe of all the *Pagans: One God the King and Father of all; and many Gods, the Sons of God, reigning together with God* *.

But to render this matter yet more unqueſtionable, I ſhall further obſerve, that the *Theogonia* of thoſe antient *Pagans*, their *Geneſis* or *Generation* of Gods, was really one and the ſame thing with their *Coſmogonia*, the *Geneſis* or *Generation* of the World, and both of 'em indeed underſtood of a temporary Production both of theſe Gods and the World. And this we ſhall firſt prove from *Plato* in his *Timæus*, where he being to treat of the *Coſmogonia*, premiſes this diſtinction concerning two Heads of *Being*: that ſome were *eternal and never made*, and ſome again were *made and generated*; the former of which he calls Οὐσία or *Eſſence*, the latter γένεσις or *Generation*; adding alſo this difference between 'em, that the *eternal* and *immutable* things were the proper Objects of *Science* and *Demonſtration*, but the other *generated* things, of Faith and Opinion only: for, ſays he, *what Eſſence is to Generation, the ſame is Certainty of Truth or Knowledg, to Faith.* And thereupon he declares that his Reader was not to expect the ſame Evidence and Certainty of Truth from him, where he was now to treat of *things generated*, namely the *Gods* and the *viſible World*, as if he had been to diſcourſe about things *immutable* and *eternal.* Where we find that the Gods are plainly refer'd by *Plato* to † *Generation* and not to eternal or *immutable Eſſence*; as they are alſo join'd with the Generation of the World, as being but the very ſame with it: inaſmuch as he and

* Θεὺς εἷς πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ, θεοῦ παῖδες συνάρχοντες θεῷ. Diſſ. 1. p. 5.

† Το Γένεσις, and not to Οὐσία.

the other *Pagans* held the whole viſible World and all the greater parts of it, as namely the *Sun* and *Moon*, the *Stars* and *Earth*, to be ſo many *Gods*. Again, ſays he in the ſame Book, *This was the Reaſoning or Reſolution of that God which* always is, *concerning that God which was ſometime about to be made, that it ſhould be ſmooth and ſphærical*, &c. *Thus that Eternal God procreated this perfectly happy God, the World.* Where there is plainly mention made of one God, who belong'd to *Geneſis*, or that Head of *Being* which he calls *Generation*, and therefore muſt needs have an antecedent Cauſe of his Exiſtence, ſince nothing can be made without a Cauſe; and of another God, which was truly and properly *immutable Eſſence*, the Cauſe of that *generated God* the Univerſe, and therefore of all things. To which purpoſe he further adds: *When therefore all the Gods, both thoſe which move viſibly about the Heavens, and thoſe which appear to us as often as they pleaſe, that is, both the Stars and Dæmons, were generated and created; that God which made this whole Univerſe, beſpake theſe generated Gods after this manner, Ye Gods of Gods, of whom I my ſelf am the Maker and Father, attend.* Where tho *Plato*, beſides the *mundane generated Gods*, ſeems to underſtand by θεοὶ θεῶν another ſort of *ſupramundane Gods*, yet does it appear from the whole Tenor of this and his other Writings, that even all theſe were alſo produc'd, tho perhaps of a higher Order than ſome others, and all of 'em depended on one ſupreme God, as their Cauſe. Accordingly he afterwards ſubjoins in this place, that *then that God who made all things*, who was by conſequence himſelf unmade, *remain'd conſtantly in his former State; and his Sons, or the Gods that were created by him, obſerv'd his Order and Appointment.* Thus much out of *Plato*'s *Timæus*. The ſame thing might be yet further prov'd out of his other

other Writings, and particularly from that Paſſage in his tenth Book of *Laws*, where he again takes notice of the *Theogonia* of the *Antients*, and that as it had been deprav'd and corrupted by a great mixture of impious and immoral Fables: *There are*, ſays he, *extant among us Athenians certain Storys and Traditions very antient, concerning the Gods, written partly in Metre and partly in Proſe, declaring how the Heaven and the other Gods were at firſt made or generated; and then carrying on their fabulous* Theogonia *further, how theſe generated Gods afterwards convers'd with one another, and ingendring after the manner of Men, begat other Gods.* Here that Philoſopher taking off his Vizard, plainly diſcovers his great diſlike of that whole *fabulous Theogonia*, as a thing that was deſtructive of all Piety and Vertue, by reaſon of its attributing all human Paſſions and Vices to the Gods. Indeed he acknowledges elſewhere, that it contain'd ſome Phyſiological Allegories under it: yet, as *Euſebius* well obſerves, tho he ſeem'd to give ſome credit to it, out of a ſeeming compliance with the Laws of his City; yet does he but all the while ſlily jear it, plainly inſinuating the Fabulouſneſs of it, while he affirms it to have been introduc'd not only * *without neceſſary Demonſtrations*, but alſo *without ſo much as Probabilitys*. However, from what has been ſaid, it plainly appears that the *Theogonia* and the *Coſmogonia* were one and the ſame thing; the *Generation of the Gods* being here, the Generation of the Heaven, of the Sun, Moon and Stars, and the like.

But notwithſtanding theſe plain Declarations out of *Plato*, we are not ignorant that the latter *Platoniſts*, as *Plutarch* has obſerv'd, endeavour'd with all their might

* Ἄνευ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων. ἄνευ εἰκότων.

to force a contrary sense even upon the *Timæus*, as if *Plato*, tho indeed he there talks of a *Theogonia* and *Cosmogonia*, yet did not thereby mean a *temporary* Production of *Gods* or the *World*; but an eternal Generation of 'em, such as we *Christians* do commonly ascribe to the second Person in the Blessed *Trinity*. But on the contrary, as to what we have been proving, we have *Aristotle* on our side, who tells us that such a temporary *Generation* of *Gods* and the *World*, as was before describ'd, was universally entertain'd before his time, and particularly that *Plato* was an Assertor of it. And certainly *Aristotle* was better able to understand both *Plato*'s *Philosophy* and *Greek*, than any of those junior *Platonists*, who liv'd hundreds of Years after. And besides his we have also the Suffrages of *Philo* the *Jew*, of *Plutarch* and *Atticus*, who were both of 'em *Platonick* Pagans; and likewise of *Alexander Aphrodisius*, a judicious *Peripatetick*. But still to set this matter beyond all doubt, I think it may be prov'd yet further from his own Sayings, that when he spoke of the *Theogonia* and *Cosmogonia*, he really understood a temporary Production of the *mundane* Gods, and the World; I say of the mundane Gods, because indeed I grant that beyond this he had a Reserve, as supposing with the *Pythagoreans* some other *supra mundane* Gods, which fell not under that consideration, as being eternal, yet withal dependent upon *one supreme* God, and produc'd by, or rather deriv'd from him by way of *necessary Emanation:* so that neither does this contradict the purpose I am driving at, that the Heathens believ'd in *one supreme God*; as neither does it prejudice what I said before with reference to his *Timæus*; where he expressly treating of the *Theogonia* and *Cosmogonia*, I aver that he particularly asserts a *temporary* Gene-

Generation of Gods, and of the World, as ſhall be further evidenc'd from his own Words. For firſt, in the entrance of that Diſcourſe he oppoſes theſe two things to one another, namely that * *which always is*, and that which *is generated or made*; and therefore in affirming the World to be generated, as we have already prov'd that he did, he muſt needs deny the *Eternity* thereof. Again, the Queſtion is ſo plainly ſtated by him afterwards, that there is no poſſibility of any Subterfuge left: *Whether the World always was, having no Beginning or Generation; or whether it was made or generated, having commenc'd from a certain* Epocha? To which the anſwer is, that † *it was made or had a Beginning*. Moreover, this Philoſopher there plainly affirms, that || *Time it ſelf was made or had a Beginning together with the Heaven*. And as to what he ſeems to ſay in his third and ſixth Book of *Laws* about an *Infinity* of Time, the Context makes it plain, that by this he only meant an ineſtimable or uncomputable Time ſince the World begun, there having happen'd, as he ſays, in the mean time ſeveral ſucceſſive Deſtructions and Conſumptions of Mankind, by means of various Accidents, as particularly one moſt remarkable Deluge and Inundation of Waters. And this it is likely he the rather thought fit to mention, becauſe of the Clamours of *Ariſtotle* or ſome others againſt his *Timæus*, that hereby he might ſomewhat mollify the Opinion of the *Novity of the World*, by removing its Date at ſo great a diſtance off.

But laſtly I ſay, that he plainly declares in his *Timæus*, that before this orderly World was produc'd, the *Matter* of it mov'd diſorderly, and that *God brought it into Order*

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* Τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, & τὸ γένεσιν ἔχον. † Γέγονεν.
|| Χρόνος δ' ὢν μετ' ἐκείνων γέγονεν.

out

out of Confuſion: as if he had ſaid that God made this World out of an antecedent Chaos, which, as I before took notice, was the conſtant Tradition of the antient *Pagans*; who for the generality ſubſcrib'd to this Novity of the *World* and *Gods*, as ſet forth by *Plato*. This is the import of what *Heſiod* ſays in his Poem on that Subject, and accordingly the antient *Scholia* comment thus upon it: * *We muſt know that the whole Doctrine of the* Theogonia *contains under it, in way of Allegory, a Phyſiological Declaration of things*; Heſiod's Gods being not only the animated Parts of the World, but alſo all the other things of Nature, fictitiouſly perſonated and deify'd, or abuſively call'd Gods and Goddeſſes.

The very ſame Doctrine is particularly declar'd by *Ovid*, as the general ſenſe of the antient *Pagans*. Firſt, that the World had a Beginning, and was produc'd out of *Chaos*; to this purpoſe the Poet thus utters himſelf:

† *Before that Sea and Earth and Heav'n were fram'd,*
One Face had Nature which they Chaos *nam'd*, &c.

In the next place that the Generation of the *World* was alſo a Generation of *Gods*, we find in theſe words:

‖ *That nought with Animals might unfurniſh'd lie,*
The Gods in form of Stars poſſeſs the Sky.

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* Ὅτι ὁ περὶ τῆς θεογονίας λόγος φυσικὴν διήγησιν τῶν ὄντων ὑπαινίττεται.

† Ante Mare & Terras & quod tegit omnia Cœlum,
Unus erat toto Naturæ vultus in Orbe,
Quem dixêre Chaos, *&c.* *Ovid. Met. l.* 1.

‖ Neu Regio foret ulla ſuis Animalibus orba,
Aſtra tenent cœleſte ſolum formæque Deorum. *Ibid.*

And

And that all this was effected, not by a fortuitous Motion of *Matter*, but by the Providence and Command of *one unmade Deity*, which alſo furniſh'd all the Parts of the World with reſpective Animals; the Sea with Fiſhes; the Earth with Men; and the Heaven with Gods; Mr. *Sandys* again thus renders the Poet's mind to this purpoſe:

* *This Strife (with better Nature) God decides,*
He Earth from Heav'n, the Sea from Earth divides.

But here perhaps ſome one may cenſure the Poet as an Antimonarchiſt, or at leaſt one that was wavering or indifferent as to the belief of *one ſupreme God:* becauſe tho, when ſpeaking of the Formation of Man, he had indeed aſcrib'd it to God, as the † *Framer and Maker of things, and the beſt World's Original*; yet a little after he drops theſe words, that Man was made after the ‖ *Image or Likeneſs of the Gods, who govern all things.*

Now in this there ſeems to be a plain Contradiction, that *one God* ſhould be ſaid to be the Maker of the whole World and of Man; and yet that the Government of the World ſhould be attributed to Gods *plurally*, and that Man ſhould be ſaid to be form'd *according to their Likeneſs.* But as to this I ſay, that according to the Tenor of the *Pagan* Theology, the *inferior* and *minor* Gods were all of 'em ſuppos'd to have their ſeveral ſhares in the Government of things below 'em:

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* Hanc Deus & melior litem Natura diremit;
Nam Cœlo Terras & Terris abſcidit Undas, *&c.*

† ——— Mundi Fabricator,
Ille Opifex rerum, Mundi melioris Origo.

‖ Finxit in Effigiem moderantûm cuncta Deorum.

whence

whence they are call'd by *Maximus Tyrius*, * *Co-rulers with God*, and alſo by *Plato* himſelf, † *the Co-governors and Co-reigners with the ſupreme God.* So that the Government of this inferior World was by the *Pagans* often attributed to them jointly, the *ſupreme* and *inferior Gods* both together, under that one general name of *Gods*. But the chief of thoſe inferior Deitys, *after whoſe Image Man is alſo ſaid to have been made*, as well as in the likeneſs of the *Supreme*, were either thoſe *Celeſtial Gods* and *animated Stars* before mention'd by the *Poet*, or elſe the *eternal Gods* of *Plato*, which were look'd upon likewiſe as ſubordinate Co-makers of the World.

Next to *Ovid*, we might here inſtance in many others of the *Pagan Theogoniſts*, who clearly own'd in like manner *one unmade* Deity, which generated both the World it ſelf and all the other Gods that are in it; as for example *Strabo*, who affirming that *the World was the joint Work both of Nature and Providence*, as it was before aſcrib'd by *Ovid* to *God* and *better Nature*, adds concerning Providence or the Deity in this manner: *That having a multiform Fecundity in it, and delighting in variety of Works, it deſign'd principally to make Animals, as the moſt excellent things, and amongſt them thoſe two nobleſt kinds of Animals, Gods and Men*, &c ‖. Thus alſo *Seneca* in *Lactantius*, ſpeaking about God, ſays, That *tho he intended or ſtretch'd himſelf thro the Whole, ſo as to preſide in chief over all, yet did he alſo generate Gods, as ſubordinate Miniſters of his Kingdom under him.* Much the ſame is alſo reckon'd to have been the Opinion of

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* Συνάρχοντες θεῷ.
† Τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονι συνάρχοντες.
‖ Strab. Geog. l. 17.

all

all the *Barbarian Pagans*, particularly of the *Perſian Magi*, and the antient *Egyptians*, as is witneſs'd by *Diogenes Laertius*, and *Diodorus*. We ſhall forbear to mention the Teſtimonys of others here, becauſe they may be more ſeaſonably inſerted elſewhere; only we ſhall add, as to *Heſiod* and *Homer*, that however they may ſeem to have been ſometimes ſuſpected both by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* for Atheiſtick Theogoniſts, yet while they ſuppos'd indeed many generated Gods, they aſſerted notwithſtanding *one ſupreme unmade* Deity, the Maker both of the World and them. And this, not only for the grounds before alledg'd concerning *Heſiod*, and becauſe both of 'em do every where affirm even their generated Gods to be immortal, which no Atheiſts ever did, but alſo for ſundry other reaſons, ſome of which may be more conveniently mention'd elſewhere. Moreover, it has been already intimated, that the generated Gods of *Heſiod* and *Homer* extend yet further than thoſe of *Plato*, they being not only the animated Parts of the World, but alſo all the other things of *Nature* fictitiouſly perſonated, and improperly or abuſively call'd Gods and Goddeſſes, whereof a further account will be given hereafter.

Nor ought it at all to be wonder'd at, if theſe Divine Theogoniſts among the *Pagans* did many times, as well as thoſe other Atheiſtick ones, make *Chaos* and the *Ocean* ſenior to the Gods, and *Night* the *Mother* of 'em; the former of theſe being not only done by *Heſiod* and *Homer*, but alſo by the generality of the antient *Pagan* Theiſts in *Epicharmus*; and the latter, by *Orpheus* an undoubted Theiſt, in his *Hymn of the Night*. While 'tis obſervable that they did not mean this abſolutely and univerſally, of all the Gods without exception, as the other Atheiſtick Theogoniſts did, as if there had been no *unmade* Deity at all, but *Chaos* and *Night*, that is,

ſenſleſs Matter blindly and fortuitouſly mov'd, had been the ſole Original of all things; but only of the οἱ Θεοὶ *the Gods*, ſo call'd by way of diſtinction from *God* or the *ſupreme Deity*, that is, the *inferior mundane Gods* generated together with the World. The reaſon of which was, becauſe it was a moſt antient, and in a manner univerſally receiv'd Tradition among the *Pagans*, as we have more than once intimated, that the *Coſmogonia* or Generation of the World took its firſt beginning from a *Chaos* (the Divine *Coſmogoniſts* agreeing herein with the Atheiſtick ones) this Tradition having been deliver'd down from *Orpheus* and *Linus* by *Heſiod*, *Homer*, and others; acknowledg'd by *Epicharmus*, and embrac'd by *Thales*, *Anaxagoras*, *Plato* and other Philoſophers, who were Theiſts. The great Antiquity of it is own'd by *Euripedes* *, nor can it be reaſonably queſtion'd but that it was originally *Moſaical*, and indeed at firſt a *Divine Revelation*; ſince no Man could otherwiſe pretend to know what was done, before Mankind had any Being. Wherefore thoſe *Pagan Coſmogoniſts*, who were Theiſts, being *Polytheiſts* and *Theogoniſts* alſo, and aſſerting, beſides the *one ſupreme unmade Deity*, other *inferior mundane Gods*, *generated* together with the World, the chief whereof were the *animated Stars*, they muſt needs, according to the Tenor of that Tradition, ſuppoſe 'em, as to their corporeal Parts at leaſt, to have been juniors to *Night* and *Chaos*, and the Off-ſpring of them, becauſe they were all made out of an antecedent *Dark* Chaos. And the caſe was the ſame concerning their Dæmons likewiſe, they being conceiv'd to have their corporeal Vehicles alſo: for which cauſe, as *Porphyrius* from *Numenius* writes, the antient

* *See* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 248.

Egyptians

Egyptians pictur'd 'em in Ships or Boats floating upon the Water. But as for the incorporeal Parts or Souls of thoſe *inferior Gods*, tho theſe Divine *Theogoniſts* could not derive their Original from *Chaos* or *Matter*, but rather from that other Principle call'd *Love*, as being divinely created, and ſo having God for their Father, yet might they notwithſtanding in another ſenſe, fancy *Night* to have been their *Mother* too, inaſmuch as they were all made from an antecedent Non-exiſtence or *Nothing*, brought forth into Being. Whence there ſeems to have been in *Orpheus* a Dialogue between the *Maker* of the World and *Night*; and it is certain, that this antient *Cabala*, which deriv'd the *Coſmogonia* from *Chaos* and *Love*, was at firſt Religious and not Atheiſtical: and that *Love* was underſtood in it not to be the Off-ſpring of *Chaos*, may be concluded from hence, becauſe this *Love* as well as *Chaos* was of a *Moſaical* Extraction alſo, and plainly deriv'd from that *Spirit* of God, which is ſaid in the *Scripture* to have *mov'd upon the Waters*, that is, upon the *Chaos*; whether by this *Spirit* be meant God himſelf, as acting immediately upon the *Matter*, or ſome other active Principle deriv'd from God and not from *Matter*, as the *mundane* Soul or *Plaſtick Nature*; whence alſo the antient *Pagans*, as *Porphyrius* teſtifys, thought the Water to be *divinely inſpir'd* *.

And that this *Cabala* was thus underſtood by ſome of the antient *Pagan Coſmogoniſts* themſelves, very plainly appears, not only from *Simmias Rhodius* and *Parmenides*, but alſo from theſe following Verſes of *Orpheus*, or whoever was the Writer of thoſe *Argonauticks*, undoubtedly antient, where *Chaos* and *Love* are thus brought in together:

* De Aut. Nymph. p. 256.

* *We will firſt ſing a ſweet and pleaſant Song*
Concerning th' antient Chaos, *and how Heav'n,*
How Earth and Seas were form'd out of its Womb;
And about that much-wiſe ſagacious Love,
The oldeſt thing of all and ſelf-perfect,
Which actively produc'd all other things,
And ſeparated thoſe which lay confus'd.

Thus we have repreſented the Senſe and generally receiv'd Doctrine of the antient *Pagan* Theologers, that there was indeed a multiplicity of Gods, but yet ſo as that *one* of them only was *ingenerate* or *unmade*, by whom all the other *Gods* together with the World were made, ſo as to have had a Novity of Being or *temporary* Beginning of their Exiſtence. *Plato* and the *Pythagoreans* do differ here from the reſt only in this, that tho they acknowledg'd the World and all the *mundane Gods*, to have been generated together in Time, yet did they differ ſuppoſe certain other *intelligible* and *ſupra-mundane* Gods alſo, which however produc'd from one original Deity, were nevertheleſs *eternal* or without *Beginning*.

But now we muſt acknowledg that among the *Pagan* Theiſts ſome were of a different perſuaſion from the reſt, who therefore did not admit of any *Theogonia* in the ſenſe before declar'd, that is, any *temporary* Generation of Gods, becauſe they acknowledg'd no *Coſmogonia*, no temporary Production of the World, but con-

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* Πρῶτα μὲν ἀρχαίυ χάεος μελιήφατον ὕμνον
Ὡς ἐπάμειψε φύσεις, ὡς τ' ἄρανος εἰς πέρας ἦλθε·
Γῆς εὐρυσέρνυ γένεσιν πυθμενάτε θαλάσσης,
Πρεσβύτατον τε χ' ἀυτοσελῆ πολύμητιν Ἔρωτα
Ὅσσα τ' ἔφυκεν ἅπαντα, διέκρινε δ' ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλυ.
P. 17. Ed. Steph.

cluded

cluded it to have been from *Eternity*. That *Ariſtotle* was one of theſe, is ſufficiently known, whoſe inferior Gods therefore, the Sun, Moon and Stars, muſt needs be *ingenerate* in this ſenſe, ſo as to have had no temporary Production, becauſe the whole World to him was ſuch. And if that Philoſopher be to be credited, he himſelf was the firſt, at leaſt of all the *Greeks*, who aſſerted this *Ingenerateneſs* or *Eternity* of the World; and by conſequence of all thoſe Gods, which were but only Parts of it. Notwithſtanding which, the Writer *de Placitis Philoſophorum* and *Stobæus* impute this *Dogma* of the World's *Eternity* to certain others of the *Greek* Philoſophers before *Ariſtotle*, beſides *Ocellus Lucanus*, who is alſo acknowledg'd by *Philo* to have been an Aſſerter of it. And indeed *Epicharmus*, tho a Theiſt, ſeems plainly to have been of this perſuaſion, that the World was *unmade*, as alſo that there was no *Theogonia* nor temporary Production of the inferior Gods, *becauſe nothing*, ſays he, *could come from nothing*, and therefore both the Gods and indeed whatſoever elſe is ſubſtantial in the world was from Eternity *unmade* *. Moreover, *Diodorus Siculus* affirms the *Chaldæans* likewiſe to have aſſerted this Opinion of the World's *Eternity*; tho notwithſtanding they were no more Atheiſts than *Ariſtotle*, as appears from the following words of that *Hiſtorian*: *They do alſo believe*, ſays he, *that the Order and Diſpoſition of the World is by a certain Divine Providence, and that every one of thoſe things which come to paſs in the Heavens, happens not by chance, but by a certain determinate and firmly ratify'd Judgment of the Gods* †. Alſo it is a thing known to all, that the later *Platoniſts*

* *See his Verſes to this purpoſe in* Cudw. Intel. Syſt. *p.* 251.

† L. 2. p. 82.

ſtiffly

ſtiffly adher'd to *Ariſtotle* in this; nor did they only aſſert the corporeal World, with all the *inferior mundane Gods* in it, to be *ingenerate*, and to have exiſted from *Eternity*, but alſo maintain'd the ſame concerning the *Souls* of Men and other Animals; they concluding that no *Souls* were *younger* than *Body* or the World: and becauſe they would not ſeem to depart from their Maſter *Plato*, therefore did they endeavour, as we have before obſerv'd, violently to force this ſame ſenſe upon *Plato*'s words alſo. Notwithſtanding which, as touching theſe latter *Platoniſts*, it is here obſervable, that tho they thus aſſerted the World and all inferior *Gods* and *Souls* to have been * *ingenerate*, according to that ſtricter ſenſe of the word before declar'd, that is, to have had no temporary Beginning or Generation, but to have exiſted from *Eternity*; yet did they by no means therefore conceive 'em to be † *ſelf-originated* or *ſelf-exiſtent*: but concluded 'em to have been all deriv'd from *one ſole ſelf-exiſtent* Deity, as their Cauſe, which therefore, tho not in order of *Time*, yet of *Nature*, was before them. And thus is the World ſaid by *Plotinus* to be *always made*, in that it depends upon God perpetually, as the emanative Cauſe thereof, from which the World muſt needs have been ſo long as there was a God, and coeval with it, as *the Light with the Sun* ||. So likewiſe *Proclus* concludes that the World was ** *always generated or eradiated from God*, and therefore muſt needs be *eternal*, God himſelf being ſo. Wherefore theſe latter *Platoniſts* ſuppos'd the ſame thing concerning the corporeal World, and the lower *mundane Gods*, which their Maſter *Plato*

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* Ἀγενήτους. † Αὐτογενεῖς καὶ αὐθυποστάτους.
|| Plotin. En. 3. l. 2. c. 1. & En. 2. l. 9. c. 3.
** Ἀεὶ γινόμενος, καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνός.

did

did concerning his *higher eternal God*; that tho they had no *temporary Production*, yet they all no leſs depended on *one ſupreme* Deity, than if they had been made out of nothing by him. From whence it is manifeſt, that none of theſe Philoſophers apprehended any Repugnancy at all between theſe two things: *Exiſtence from Eternity*, and *being caus'd or produc'd by another*. Nor can we make any great doubt, but that if the latter *Platoniſts* had been fully convinc'd of any contradictious Inconſiſtency here, they would readily have diſclaim'd that their ſo beloved *Hypotheſis* of the World's *Eternity*: and indeed it is ſo far from Truth, what ſome have ſuppos'd, that the Aſſertors of the World's *Eternity* were all Atheiſts; that theſe latter *Platoniſts* were led into this Opinion no otherwiſe, than from the ſole Conſideration of the Deity, that is, *its eſſential Goodneſs and generative Power*, or *emanative Fecundity*, as *Proclus* plainly declares upon the *Timæus*.

Now tho *Ariſtotle* were not acted by any ſuch Divine *Enthuſiaſm*, as theſe *Platoniſts* ſeem to have been, yet did he notwithſtanding after his ſober manner, really maintain the ſame thing, tho ſometimes indeed he ſeems a little ſceptical about it *; namely, that tho the World and the *inferior mundane Gods* had no *temporary Generation*, yet were they all of 'em produc'd from one *ſupreme Deity*, as their Cauſe †.

And now we plainly ſee, that tho there was a real Controverſy among the *Pagan* Theologers, eſpecially from the time of *Ariſtotle* downward, concerning the *Coſmogonia* and *Theogonia*, according to the ſtricter Notion of thoſe Words, the *temporary* Generation or

* De Part. Animal. l. 1. c. 1.
† *See* Simplic. in Ariſt. Phyſ. l. 8.

Production

Production of the World and *inferior Gods*, or whether they had any Beginning or no; yet was there no Controverſy at all concerning the Self-exiſtency of them: but it was univerſally agreed upon among 'em, that the World and the *inferior Gods*, however ſuppos'd by ſome to have exiſted from *Eternity*, yet were all deriv'd from one *ſole ſelf-exiſtent Deity*, as their Cauſe, *being either produc'd or eradiated from God* *. Wherefore it is obſervable that theſe *Pagan* Theiſts, who aſſerted the World's Eternity, diſtinguiſh'd concerning the word *Generated* as that which was equivocal; and tho in one ſenſe of it they deny'd that the World and inferior Gods were *generated*, yet notwithſtanding did they in another ſenſe clearly affirm the ſame. For the word *Generated*, ſay they, ſtrictly and properly taken, ſignifies that *which in reſpect of Time paſs'd out of Non-exiſtence into Being*. Nevertheleſs they acknowledg that in a larger ſenſe this word *generated* may be alſo taken for that, which doth † *any way depend upon a ſuperior Being as its Cauſe*. Accordingly there muſt needs be the ſame Equivocation in the word || *Ingenerate*: ſo that this in like manner may be alſo taken either for that which is unproduc'd in reſpect of Time, as having indeed no temporary Beginning; or elſe for that, which is unproduc'd from any Cauſe; in which latter ſenſe that word *Ingenerate* is of equal force and extent with that which *is* ** *ſelf-ſubſiſtent* or *ſelf-originated*, and accordingly it was us'd by thoſe *Pagan* Theiſts, who concluded that Matter was *unmade*, that is, not only exiſted from *Eternity* without beginning, but alſo was

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* Ὑπὸ θεῦ παραχόμενοι ἢ ἐλλαμπόμενοι.

† Τὸ ὁπωσδὴν ἀπ' ἀἰτίας ὑφισάμενον. || Ἀγένητον.

** Αὐθυπόσαλον or αὐυπόγαες.

* *ſelf-*

ſelf-exiſtent and independent upon any ſuperior Cauſe. Now as to the former of theſe two ſenſes of thoſe words, *generate* and *ingenerate*, the greateſt part of the antient *Pagans*, and together with them *Plato*, affirm'd the World and all the inferior Gods to *have been made in time*, or to have had a *Beginning* (for whatever the later *Platoniſts* pretend, this was undoubtedly *Plato*'s own Notion of that Word, when he concluded the World to be generated; foraſmuch as he himſelf expreſly oppoſes it to that which is * *eternal*) But on the contrary, *Ariſtotle* and the latter *Platoniſts* determin'd the World and all the inferior Gods to be in this ſenſe ſuch as had no *temporary Beginning*, but were from *Eternity*. However according to the latter ſenſe of thoſe words, all the *Pagan* Theologers agreed together that the World and all the *inferior Gods*, whether having a *Beginning* or exiſting from *Eternity*, were notwithſtanding † *produc'd or deriv'd from a ſuperior Cauſe*; and that thus there was only one *unproduc'd* and *ſelf-exiſtent Deity*, who is ſaid by them to be ‖ *ſuperior to a Cauſe, and older than any Cauſe*, he being the Cauſe of all things beſides himſelf. Thus *Crantor* and his Followers, together with *Proclus*, that grand Champion for the World's Eternity, plainly acknowledg'd, notwithſtanding the Generation of the *Gods and World* in this ſenſe, as being produc'd from a *ſuperior Cauſe*; and to them agrees *Saluſtius* in his Book about *Gods and the World*, whoſe 13*th* Chapter accordingly bears this Title: ** *How eternal things may be ſaid to be made or generated.* It is true indeed, as we before intimated, that ſome of.

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* Ἀΐδιον. † Γενητοὶ ἀπ' αἰτίας.
‖ Αἰτίας κρείττων καὶ πρεσβύτερος.
** Πῶς τὰ ἀΐδια λέγεται γίνεσθαι.

the *Pagan Theiſts* aſſerted God not to be the only *ſelf-exiſtent unmade Being*, but that Matter alſo was ſuch; however this Opinion was not ſo generally receiv'd among them, as is commonly ſuppos'd: and tho ſome of the antient Fathers confidently impute it to *Plato*, yet there ſeems to be no ſufficient ground for their ſo doing; and *Porphyrius*, *Jamblichus*, *Proclus* and other *Platoniſts* do not only profeſſedly oppoſe the ſame as falſe, but alſo as that which is diſſonant from *Plato*'s Principles. Wherefore, according to that larger Notion of the word *ingenerate*, as taken ſynonymouſly with *ſelf-originated* and *ſelf-exiſtent*, there were very many of the *Pagan* Theologers, who agreed with *Chriſtians* in this: that * *God is the only ingenerate or unmade Being, and that his very Eſſence is Ingenerability*; all other things, even Matter it ſelf, being made by him. But all the reſt of 'em, only a few *Ditheiſts* excepted, tho they ſuppos'd *Matter* to be *ſelf-exiſtent*, yet concluded that there was only *one unmade unproduc'd God*, and that all their other Gods were in one ſenſe or other, if not *made in time*, yet at leaſt produc'd from a *ſuperior Cauſe*.

Nothing now remains but that we ſhew, how the *Pagans* diſtinguiſh'd between the *one ſupreme unmade Deity*, and all their other *inferior generated Gods*. Which we are the rather concern'd to do, becauſe it is notorious that they did many times alſo confound 'em together, attributing the Government of the whole World to the Gods promiſcuouſly, and without putting any due diſcrimination between the *ſupreme* and the *inferior*; the true reaſon of which ſeems to have been this, becauſe they ſuppos'd the *ſupreme* God not to do all

* Ὅτι αὐτὸ Ἀγέννητον ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ οὐσία αὐτῷ ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις ἡ Ἀγεννησία.

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immediately in the Government of the World, but to permit a great deal to his *inferior Miniſters*: one Inſtance of which we had before in *Ovid*, and innumerable ſuch others might be cited out of their moſt ſober Writers. Upon which account it will be now expedient for us to ſhew how the *Pagans*, who ſometimes jumble and confound the *ſupreme* and the *inferior* Gods all together, do notwithſtanding at other times, many ways diſtinguiſh between the *one ſupreme* God and their other *many inferior Gods*. Firſt therefore as the Pagans had many proper Names for one and the ſame *ſupreme* God, according to ſeveral particular Conſiderations of him, in reſpect of his different Manifeſtations and Effects in the World; which are often miſtaken for ſo many diſtinct Deitys, ſome ſuppoſing 'em independent, others ſubordinate: So had they alſo beſides theſe, other proper Names of God, according to that more full and comprehenſive Notion of him, as he is the Maker of the whole World, and the *ſupreme* Governor of it. For thus the *Greeks* call him ζεὺς and ζὴν, &c. the *Latins Jupiter* and *Jovis*, the *Babylonians Belus* and *Bel*, the *Perſians Mithras* and *Oromaſdes*, the *Egyptians* and *Scythians Ammoun* and *Pappæus*. In the mean time we do not deny, but that both the *Greeks* us'd that word ζεὺς, and the *Latins Jupiter*, ſometimes φυσικῶς or in a *natural* way, for the *Æther*, *Fire* or *Aer*; ſome accordingly etymologizing ζεὺς from ζέω, others Δεὺς from δεύω: whence came thoſe Forms of Speech *ſub Jove*, *ſub Dio*, and the like. The reaſon of which Speeches ſeems to have been this, becauſe in antient times ſome had ſuppos'd the *animated Heaven*, *Æther* and *Air*, to be the *ſupreme Deity*. Moreover, we grant that the ſame Words have been ſometimes us'd in an *Hiſtorical way*, for an *Hero* or Deify'd Man, ſaid by ſome to have been born in *Crete*,

the *Pagan Theiſts* aſſerted God not to be the only *ſelf-exiſtent unmade Being*, but that Matter alſo was ſuch; however this Opinion was not ſo generally receiv'd among them, as is commonly ſuppos'd: and tho ſome of the antient Fathers confidently impute it to *Plato*, yet there ſeems to be no ſufficient ground for their ſo doing; and *Porphyrius*, *Jamblichus*, *Proclus* and other *Platoniſts* do not only profeſſedly oppoſe the ſame as falſe, but alſo as that which is diſſonant from *Plato*'s Principles. Wherefore, according to that larger Notion of the word *ingenerate*, as taken ſynonymouſly with *ſelf-originated* and *ſelf-exiſtent*, there were very many of the *Pagan* Theologers, who agreed with *Chriſtians* in this: that * *God is the only ingenerate or unmade Being, and that his very Eſſence is Ingenerability*; all other things, even Matter it ſelf, being made by him. But all the reſt of 'em, only a few *Ditheiſts* excepted, tho they ſuppos'd *Matter* to be *ſelf-exiſtent*, yet concluded that there was only *one unmade unproduc'd God*, and that all their other Gods were in one ſenſe or other, if not *made in time*, yet at leaſt produc'd from a *ſuperior Cauſe*.

Nothing now remains but that we ſhew, how the *Pagans* diſtinguiſh'd between the *one ſupreme unmade Deity*, and all their other *inferior generated Gods*. Which we are the rather concern'd to do, becauſe it is notorious that they did many times alſo confound 'em together, attributing the Government of the whole World to the Gods promiſcuouſly, and without putting any due diſcrimination between the *ſupreme* and the *inferior*; the true reaſon of which ſeems to have been this, becauſe they ſuppos'd the *ſupreme* God not to do all

* Ὅτι αὐτὸ Ἀγέννητον ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ οὐσία αὐτῷ ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις ἡ Ἀγεννησία.

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immediately in the Government of the World, but to permit a great deal to his *inferior Miniſters*: one Inſtance of which we had before in *Ovid*, and innumerable ſuch others might be cited out of their moſt ſober Writers. Upon which account it will be now expedient for us to ſhew how the *Pagans*, who ſometimes jumble and confound the *ſupreme* and the *inferior* Gods all together, do notwithſtanding at other times, many ways diſtinguiſh between the *one ſupreme* God and their other *many inferior Gods*. Firſt therefore as the Pagans had many proper Names for one and the ſame *ſupreme* God, according to ſeveral particular Conſiderations of him, in reſpect of his different Manifeſtations and Effects in the World; which are often miſtaken for ſo many diſtinct Deitys, ſome ſuppoſing 'em independent, others ſubordinate: So had they alſo beſides theſe, other proper Names of God, according to that more full and comprehenſive Notion of him, as he is the Maker of the whole World, and the *ſupreme* Governor of it. For thus the *Greeks* call him ζεὺς and ζὴν, &c. the *Latins Jupiter* and *Jovis*, the *Babylonians Belus* and *Bel*, the *Perſians Mithras* and *Oromaſdes*, the *Egyptians* and *Scythians Ammoun* and *Pappæus*. In the mean time we do not deny, but that both the *Greeks* us'd that word ζεὺς, and the *Latins Jupiter*, ſometimes φυσικῶς or in a *natural* way, for the *Æther*, *Fire* or *Aer*; ſome accordingly etymologizing ζεὺς from ζέω, others Δεὺς from δεύω: whence came thoſe Forms of Speech *ſub Jove*, *ſub Dio*, and the like. The reaſon of which Speeches ſeems to have been this, becauſe in antient times ſome had ſuppos'd the *animated Heaven*, *Æther* and *Air*, to be the *ſupreme Deity*. Moreover, we grant that the ſame Words have been ſometimes us'd in an *Hiſtorical way*, for an *Hero* or Deify'd Man, ſaid by ſome to have been born in *Crete*,

by others in *Arcadia*. Which is a plain Argument that the *Pagan* Theology was all along confounded with a certain Mixture of *Phyſiology* and *Herology*, or Hiſtory blended together. But nevertheleſs it is unqueſtionable, that the more Intelligent of the *Greekiſh Pagans* did frequently underſtand by ζεὺς the *higheſt Mind*, or that *ſupreme unmade Deity*, which was the Maker of the World and of all the *inferior Gods*: as their general ſenſe is declar'd by *Porphyry*, *Maximus Tyrius*, *Phornutus* and other Heathens, and is own'd even by *Euſebius*, who yet was not very forward to grant any more, than needs he muſt, to *Pagans* *.

And as for the Vulgar of the *Greekiſh Pagans*, whether they apprehended God to be a *Mind* or *Intellect*, *ſeparate from the World*, or elſe to be a *Soul of the World only*; however certain it is, that by the word ζεὺς they commonly underſtood the *ſupreme Deity* as the *Father* and *King* of *Gods*; he being frequently thus ſtil'd in their ſolemn Nuncupations of Vows, ζεῦ πάτερ, ζεῦ ἄνα, *O Jupiter Father*, and *O Jupiter King*; as alſo he was invok'd ζεῦ βασιλεῦ in that excellent Prayer of an antient Poet, deſervedly commended in *Plato*'s *Alcibiades*:

* *O* Jupiter, *beſtow on us good things,*
Whether we do or do not pray for them:
But with-hold from us all miſchievous things,
Tho we ſhould ne'er ſo earneſtly beg them.

But Inſtances of this kind being innumerable, we ſhall forbear to mention any more of 'em. Only we ſhall

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* Præp. Ev. l. 3. c. 13.

† Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ καὶ ἐυχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις,
Ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ ευχομένοις ἀπάλεξειν.

observe

obſerve that *Zeus Sabazius* was a Name for the *ſupreme God*, ſometimes introduc'd amongſt the *Greeks*, and deriv'd in all probability from the *Hebrew Sabaoth* or *Adonai Tſebaoth*, *the Lord of Hoſts*, that is, of the heavenly Hoſts, or the ſupreme Governor of the World. Which therefore *Ariſtophanes* took notice of, as a ſtrange and foreign God, lately crept in among them, and which ought to be baniſh'd out of *Greece*; theſe ſeveral Names of Gods being then vulgarly ſpoken of, as ſo many diſtinct Deitys, as ſhall be more fully declar'd hereafter; likewiſe we ſhall ſhew elſewhere that beſides ζεὺς, πὰν alſo was us'd by the *Greeks*, as a Name for that God, who is the ſupreme Moderator and Governour of the whole World.

That the *Latins* did in like manner, by *Jupiter* and *Jovis*, frequently denote the ſupreme Deity and Monarch of the Univerſe, is a thing unqueſtionable: this ſufficiently appears from thoſe Epithets, which were commonly given to him, of *Optimus* and *Maximus*, the *Beſt* and the *Greateſt*, as alſo of *Omnipotens*, frequently beſtow'd on him by *Virgil* and others. Which word *Jupiter* or *Jovis*, tho *Cicero* etymologize it *a juvando* or from *juvans Pater*, as not knowing how to do it otherwiſe, yet may we rather conclude it to have an *Hebraical* Extraction, and to be deriv'd from that *Tetragrammaton* or Name of God, conſiſting of four Conſonants; whoſe Vowels which it was to be pronounc'd with, tho they be not now certainly known, yet muſt it needs have ſome ſuch Sound as this, either *Jovah* or *Jahvoh* or Ἰεύω or Ἰάω, or the like: and the Abbreviation of this Name was *Jah*. For as the *Pagan* Nations, beſides their *Appellatives*, had their reſpective *proper* Names for God, ſo alſo had the *Hebrews* theirs, and that ſuch a one as being given by God himſelf,

ſelf, was moſt expreſſive of his Nature, it ſignifying *eternal* and *neceſſary Exiſtence*.

But in the next place we think fit to ſuggeſt, that the *Pagans* did not only ſignify the *ſupreme God* by theſe *proper Names*, but alſo frequently even by the *Appellatives*, when us'd not for a God in general, but for *the God*, or *God by way of eminency*: Thus as οἱ θεοὶ among them denoted the *inferior Gods*, by way of diſtinction from the *Supreme*; ſo ὁ θεὸς and θεὸς were often taken by the *Greeks*, not for θεῶν τὶς, a *God* or one of *the Gods*, but for *God* or the *Supreme Deity*. Thus likewiſe was the word δαίμων often us'd *ſignantèr* for the *ſupreme God*; as might be made appear together with the former, by numerous Inſtances out of the antient Writers *.

Notwithſtanding which, I own that δαίμων and δαίμονες are alſo often diſtinguiſh'd from θεὸς and θεοὶ, they being put for an inferior Rank of *Beings* below the Gods, vulgarly call'd *Dæmons*, which word in a large ſenſe comprehends alſo under it *Heroes*. For tho theſe *Dæmons* be ſometimes call'd *Gods* too, yet were they rather accounted *Demi-gods* than *Gods*. And thus Gods and Dæmons are frequently join'd together, as things diſtinct from one another; which Notion of the word, *Plato* refers to, when he concludes *Love* not to be a *God*, but a *Dæmon* only. But of theſe *Dæmons* we ſhall ſpeak more hereafter.

Furthermore, the Pagan Writers frequently underſtand the *ſupreme God* by τὸ θεῖον when us'd ſubſtantively, and alſo by τὸ δαιμόνιον. The former appears from *Epicharmus*, *Plato*, *Plotinus* and other antient Authors; and to this purpoſe that diligent and impartial Searcher of the Force of Words, *Henricus Stephanus*, writes in

* *See* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 260, 261, &c.

general,

general, That *the* τὸ θεῖον *is often render'd God, yet not ſo as to be underſtood of any God indifferently, even among profane Authors, but of him, whom they term'd* God *by way of Eminency, to diſtinguiſh him from thoſe which being many, are call'd Gods*; namely, *as he is the chief and ſupreme Deity, the God of Gods, the *Higheſt* and the *Beſt*, as *Homer* ſpeaks of him: The latter is no leſs plain from *Herodotus*, *Ariſtotle*, *Iſocrates*, *Epictetus*, *Demoſthenes*, &c. However I own that the word δαιμόνιον, as well as δαίμων from which it is deriv'd, is often us'd in Pagan Writings for an inferior Rank of Beings below the Gods, tho ſometimes call'd *Gods* too, and ſuch was the *Dæmon* of *Socrates*; and indeed in the New Teſtament, according to the Judgment of *Origen*, *Euſebius*, and other antient Fathers, both thoſe words δαίμονες and δαιμόνια are alike taken always in a worſe ſenſe, for evil and impure Spirits only.

But beyond this, the *Pagans* do often characterize the *ſupreme God* by ſuch Titles, Epithets, and Deſcriptions, as are incommunicably proper to him, and by which conſequently they diſtinguiſh him from all other *inferior Gods*. Thus is he call'd by them † *the Architect* or *Maker of the World*; ‖ *the Prince and chief Ruler of the Univerſe*; ** *the firſt God*; †† *the firſt Mind*; ‖‖ *the greateſt, the higheſt, and the ſupreme God*; [] *the moſt tranſcendent, the chief or principal God, the God of Gods*; (a) *the Principle of Principles, the firſt Cauſe, he that*

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* Quaſi dicas θεὸν θεῶν ὕπαλον καὶ ἄνεισον. † Δημιουργὸς.

‖ Ὁ ἡγεμὼν τῶ παντὸς καὶ Αρχηγέτης.

** Ὁ πρῶτος & ὁ πρώτιστος θεὸς, by the *Greeks*; and *Primus Deus* by the *Latins*.

†† Ὁ πρῶτος νᾶς. ‖‖ Ὁ μέγιστος δαίμων, ὁ ὕψιστος, ὁ ὕπατος θεῶν.

[] Ὁ ανωτάτω θεὸς, Princeps ille Deus, θεὸς θεῶν.

(a) Αρχὴ Αρχῶν, τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γενήσας.

gene-

generated or created this whole Universe; * *he that ruleth over the whole World, the supreme Lord and Governor of all*; † *the ingenerated, unmade or self-subsisting Deity*; ‖ *Unity and Goodness it self, one God and all Gods, one and all things, the Beginning and End and Middle of all things.* Lastly, to name no more, he is call'd *Providence*, to distinguish him from *Nature* (*a*), which because it is of the feminine Gender, the impious and Atheistical *Epicureans* took occasion from it to call God ridiculously and jeeringly a (*b*) *Fortune-telling old Woman.* Now these and other such like Expressions being found in the Writings of profess'd *Pagans*, as we are able to shew, and some of 'em very frequently, it cannot be deny'd, but that they put a manifest difference betwixt the *supreme* God and all their other *inferior Gods.*

But to confirm this yet further, I add, that after the publication of *Christianity*, and all along during that Tugging and Contest which was between it and *Paganism*, none of the profess'd Champions for *Paganism*, and Opposers of *Christianity*, when occasion was now offer'd 'em, did ever assert any such thing as a multiplicity of *understanding Deitys unmade*, or *Creators*; but on the contrary they all generally disclaim'd it, professing themselves to acknowledg *one supreme self-existent Deity, the Maker of the whole Universe.*

I make no question, that *Apollonius Tyanæus*, shortly after the Gospel was publish'd to the World, was a Person made choice of by the Policy, and assisted by the

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* Ὁ Κρατέων τῦ παντὸς, summus Rector & Dominus, ὁ ὅτι πᾶσι θεὸς.

† Ὁ θεὸς ἀγέννητος, ἀυλοφυὴς, ἀυλογενὴς, ἀυδυπόστατος.

‖ Τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν, Deus unus & omnes, ἓν καὶ πάντα, ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσον ἁπάντων.

(*a*) Ἡ Πρόνοια in opposition to Φύσις.

(*b*) Anum Fatidicam Pronœan.

Powers

Powers of the *Kingdom of Darkneſs*, for the doing of ſome things extraordinary, merely out of deſign to derogate from the Miracles of our Saviour Chriſt, and to enable Paganiſm the better to bear up againſt the Aſſaults of Chriſtianity; accordingly has he been ſet off for this purpoſe by many of the Heathens, particularly by *Philoſtratus* and *Hierocles*; and by a late Atheiſtick Tranſlator of the former. He was a zealous Upholder of the *Pagan Polytheiſm*, profeſſing himſelf to have been taught how to worſhip the Gods, inviſible as well as viſible, and to have Converſe with 'em by the Ghoſt of *Pythagoras* the *Samian*; whence he is ſtyl'd by *Vopiſcus*, † *a true Friend of the Gods*, that is, a hearty and ſincere Lover of that old *Pagan* Religion, now aſſaulted by *Chriſtianity*; in which, ſaid he, not *one only true God*, but a multiplicity of Gods were worſhip'd. But notwithſtanding all this, *Apollonius* himſelf was a clear and undoubted Aſſertor of *one ſupreme Deity*, as is evident from his Apologetick Oration in *Philoſtratus*, prepar'd for *Domitian*, in which he calls him ‖ *That God who is the Maker of the whole Univerſe, and of all things.* And as he elſewhere in *Philoſtratus* declares, ſaying that both the *Indians* and *Egyptians* agreed in this Theology, tho they differ'd in many other points, * *That God was the Maker both of the Generation and Eſſence of all things, and that the reaſon of his making them was his eſſential Goodneſs.*

Thus does he alſo very much commend this Philoſophy of *Jarchas* the *Indian Brachman*, namely that the whole World was but *one great Animal*, and might be reſembl'd to a *vaſt Ship*, in which there are many inferior ſubordinate Governors under one Supreme, the

† Amicus verus Deorum.

‖ Τὸν τῶν ὅλων, & τὸν πάντων δημιουργὸν θεὸν.

* Τῆς μὲν ὅλων γενέσεως τε καὶ ὑσίας θεὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τῦδε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ταῦτα αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αὐτόν.

oldeſt and wiſeſt; under that God who is *the Generator or Creator of this great Animal, and to whom the firſt and higheſt Seat is due.*

Next to *Apollonius* comes *Celſus*, the firſt *Pagan* Writer againſt *Chriſtianity*; who liv'd in the time of *Adrian*, and was ſo profeſs'd a *Polytheiſt*, that he taxes the *Jews* for having been ſeduc'd by the Frauds of *Moſes* into the Opinion of *one God* *. Nevertheleſs this *Celſus* himſelf plainly own'd among his many Gods, *one Supreme*, whom he ſometimes calls the *firſt God*, ſometimes the *greateſt God*, and ſometimes the *ſuper-celeſtial God* †, and the like. And he does ſo zealouſly aſſert the Divine *Omnipotence*, that he caſts an Imputation upon the *Chriſtians*, as if they derogated from it, in ſuppoſing an adverſe Power of *Satan*, which continually reſiſts the good deſigns of God. Laſtly, where he pleads moſt of all for the Worſhip of *Dæmons*, he thus concludes touching the *ſupreme God*: ‖ *God*, ſays he, *is by no means to be laid aſide or left out, either by day or by night, either in publick or in private, either in our Words or Actions; but in every thing our Mind ought conſtantly to be directed towards God.* A Saying that might very well become a *Chriſtian.*

The next and greateſt Champion for the *Pagan* Cauſe, in Books and Writings, was that famous *Tyrian* Philoſopher, *Malchus*, call'd by the *Greeks Porphyrius*; who publiſh'd a voluminous and elaborate Treatiſe, containing fifteen Books, againſt the *Chriſtians*: and yet notwithſtanding was as zealous an Aſſertor of one *ſupreme* Deity, and *one only unmade ſelf-exiſtent* Principle of all things, as any of the *Chriſtians* themſelves could

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* Orig. cont. Celſ. *p.* 17, 18.

† Τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν. τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν. τὸν ὑπερουράνιον θεὸν.

‖ Θεῷ δὴ ἀδιαιρέτως ἀπολειπτέον, ὅτε μεθ' ἡμέραν ὅτε νύκτωρ, ὅτ' ἐν κοινῷ, ὅτ' ἰδίᾳ, &c.

be;

be; he ſtrenuouſly oppoſing the afore-mention'd Doctrine of *Plutarch* and *Atticus*, concerning three *unmade Principles*, a *good God*, an *evil Soul* or *Dæmon*, and *Matter*; and endeavouring to demonſtrate that all things whatſoever, even *Matter* it ſelf was deriv'd from one *perfect underſtanding Being*, or *ſelf-originated Deity*. The Sum of whoſe Argumentation to this purpoſe we find repreſented by *Proclus* upon the *Timæus*, pag. 119.

After *Porphyrius*, the next eminent Antagoniſt of *Chriſtianity*, and Champion for *Paganiſm*, was *Hierocles*, the Writer of that Book entitl'd in *Euſebius*, Φιλαλήθης; or, as the Learned Biſhop *Pearſon* in his Preface to the late Edition of *Hierocles on the Golden Verſes*, &c. probably concludes, the whole Title at firſt was, Λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς χριστιανὸς; in which his main buſineſs is to compare *Apollonius* with *Jeſus Chriſt*. Now if this *Hierocles*, who, as *Lactantius* and *Epiphanius* tell us, was alſo a Prefect or Governor of *Alexandria*, and a Judg or chief Actor in the perſecuting times of *Diocleſian*, and, as *Euſebius* adds, withal a very learned Man; if he, I ſay, were the ſame with that *Hierocles*, who wrote upon the *Golden Verſes*, and the Books *de Fato & Providentia*; it is plain from theſe Writings, that tho he was a very ſtiff Polytheiſt in the Pagan way, yet was he notwithſtanding a zealous Aſſertor of *one ſupreme Deity*. But whether he were the ſame with that *Hierocles* or not, it is clearly manifeſt from the Confeſſion of *Lactantius*, that this *Hierocles*, tho a Champion for *the Gods*, yet aſſerted *one God* above them all, ſaying that in the Cloſe of the Book before-mention'd, * *he proſecuted the Praiſes of the ſupreme God, and own'd him to*

* Proſecutus enim ſummi Dei laudes, quem Regem, quem Maximum, quem Opificem rerum, quem Fontem Bonorum, quem Parentem omnium, quem Factorem Altoremque viventium confeſſus es, ademiſti, &c.

be the King, the Greateſt, and the Opificer of the World, the Fountain of Good, the Parent of all things, and the Conſerver of all living Beings.

But the greateſt Oppoſer of *Chriſtianity* every way was *Julian* the Emperor, who cannot reaſonably be ſuſpected to have diſguis'd or blanch'd *Paganiſm*; becauſe he was an Emperor, and had ſo great an Animoſity againſt *Chriſtianity*, and was ſo ſuperſtitiouſly or bigottically zealous for the Worſhip of the *Gods*; and yet this very *Julian* notwithſtanding was an unqueſtionable Aſſerter of *one ſupreme Deity*. In his Book written againſt the *Chriſtians*, he thus declares the general ſenſe of the *Pagans*: *Our Theologers*, ſays he, *affirm the Maker of all to be a common Father and King; but that the Nations, as to particular things, are diſtributed by him to other inferior Gods, which are appointed to be Governours over Countrys and Citys, every one of which adminiſters in his own Provinte, agreeably to himſelf. For whereas in the common Father all things are perfect, and* one is all; *in the particular or partial Deitys, one excels in one Power, and another in another.* The ſame thing might be further manifeſted from *Julian*'s Oration in praiſe of the *Sun*, as a great God in this viſible World; he therein acknowledging another far more *glorious Deity*. Again in the ſame Oration he declares that the antient *Poets*, making the Sun to be the Offspring of *Hyperion*, did by this *Hyperion* underſtand nothing elſe but the *ſupreme Deity*, * *even him, who is above all things, and about whom and for whoſe ſake are all things.* Which ſupreme Deity is thus more largely deſcrib'd by him in the ſame Oration, where he alſo calls him the King of all things: *This God*, ſays he, *whether he ought to be call'd that, which is above*

* Τὸν πάντων ὑπερέχοντα, πάντων ἐπέκεινα, περὶ ὃν πάντα, καὶ δι' ὃν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐστίν.

Mind

Mind and Underſtanding, or the Idea of all things, or the One *(ſince Unity ſeems to be the oldeſt of all things) or elſe, as* Plato *was wont to call him,* the Good; *this uniform Cauſe of all things, which is the Original of all Beauty and Perfection, Unity and Power, produc'd from himſelf a certain intelligible Sun, every way like himſelf, of which the ſenſible Sun is but an Image.* Where we may take notice how near this Pagan Philoſopher and Emperor approach'd to *Chriſtianity*, tho ſo much oppos'd by him; in that he alſo ſuppos'd an eternal *Mind* or *Intellect*, as the immediate Offspring of the firſt Fountain of all things; which ſeems to differ but little from the *Chriſtian* Λόγος. However it is plain that this devout Reſtorer of *Paganiſm* and zealous Contender for the Worſhip of the *Gods*, aſſerted no *multiplicity of independent, ſelf-exiſtent Deitys*, but deriv'd all his *Gods* from *One*.

As for thoſe other Philoſophers and Learned Men, who in thoſe latter times of the declining of *Paganiſm*, after *Conſtantine*, ſtill ſtood out in oppoſition to *Chriſtianity*, ſuch as *Jamblichus*, *Syrianus*, *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, and many others, it is unqueſtionably evident concerning 'em all, that they clearly acknowledg'd *one ſupreme Deity*, as the Original of all things. *Maximus Madaurenſis*, a confident and reſolv'd Pagan in St. *Auſtin*'s time, expreſs'd both his own and the general ſenſe of Pagans after this manner: * *Truly that there is one ſupreme God without beginning, as the great and magnificent Father of Nature, who is ſo mad or devoid of Senſe as not to acknowledg it to be moſt certain? His Vertues diffus'd throughout the whole World, becauſe we know not what his proper Name is, we invoke under many different Names; whence it comes to paſs, that while we pra-*

* Equidem unum eſſe Deum ſummum ſine Initio, &c. Quis tam demens, tam mente captus negat eſſe certiſſimum? &c.

ſecute

ſecute with our Supplication his, as it were, divided Members ſeverally, we muſt needs be judg'd to worſhip the whole Deity. Alſo *Longimanus*, another more modeſt *Pagan* Philoſopher, upon the requeſt of the ſame St. *Auſtin*, declares his ſenſe concerning the way of worſhipping God and arriving at Happineſs, to this purpoſe: *We do not come*, ſays he, *to the ſupreme God by the minor or inferior Gods, without purifying Rites and Expiations*; he ſuppoſing that beſides a vertuous and holy Life, certain religious Rites and Purifications were needful to be obſerv'd in order to that end. After this the ſupreme God is alſo ſtil'd by him, *Unus, Univerſus, Incomprehenſibilis, Ineffabilis, & Infatigabilis Creator* *.

Moreover, that the Pagans generally diſclaim'd this Opinion of *many unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deitys*, appears very plainly from † *Arnobius*, where he brings 'em in complaining that they were falſly and maliciouſly accus'd by ſome Chriſtians, as guilty thereof, after this manner: *In vain do you* Chriſtians *calumniate us* Pagans, *and accuſe us as if we deny'd one ſupreme omnipotent God; tho we both call him* Jupiter, *and account him the beſt and the greateſt, having dedicated the moſt auguſt Seats to him, the vaſt Capitols.* And to this purpoſe *Arnobius* himſelf, diſmiſſing the Advantage he might have taken of their Poetick Fables of the Gods, and their confounding Herology with Theology, grants that *Jupiter* was held by the wiſer Pagans to be the true omnipotent Deity, and conſequently that ſame God whom Chriſtians worſhip'd †.

As for the Judgment of the Fathers in this particular, ‖ *Clemens Alexandrinus* was not only of this Opinion, that the Pagans, at leaſt the *Greekiſh*, did worſhip the

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* D. Auguſt. Ep. 43. & 21. † Arnob. l. 1.
‖ Strom. 6. p. 639.

true

true God, and the ſame God with the Chriſtians, tho not after a due manner; but alſo endeavours to confirm it by the Authority of St. *Peter*. Alſo *Lactantius Firmianus* in many places affirms the Pagans to have acknowledg'd one *ſupreme Deity*: *That there is*, ſays he, *one ſupreme Deity, both Philoſophers and Poets, and even the vulgar Worſhippers of the Gods themſelves do frequently acknowledg* *. *Euſebius Cæſarienſis* likewiſe gives us this account of the *Pagans* Creed, or the Tenor of their Theology, as it was then held forth by them: *The Pagans*, ſays he, *declare themſelves in this manner, that there is one God, who with his various Powers filleth all things, and paſſeth thro all things, and preſideth over all things; but being incorporeally and inviſibly preſent in all things and pervading them, he is reaſonably worſhip'd by or in thoſe things, which are manifeſt and viſible.* What St. *Auſtin*'s ſenſe was concerning the Theology of the *Pagans*, has been already declar'd, namely, *That they had not ſo far degenerated as to have loſt the Knowledg of one ſupreme God, from whom is all Nature whatſoever; and that they deriv'd all their Gods from one.* We ſhall now in the laſt place conclude with the Judgment of *Paulus Oroſius*, who was his Contemporary: † *The Philoſophers of the* Gentiles, ſays he, *while with intent ſtudy of Mind they inquir'd and ſearch'd after things, found that there was one God, the Author of all things, and to which One all things ſhould be refer'd. Whence alſo the Pagans at this very day, whom the declar'd Truth rather convinceth of Contumacy than Ignorance, when they are urg'd by us, confeſs themſelves not to follow many Gods, but only under one God, to worſhip many Miniſters. So that there remains only a confus'd Diſſenſion concerning*

* De J. D. p. 727. † Paul. Oroſ. Hiſt. l. 6. c. 1.

the

the manner of underſtanding the true God; becauſe about one God, there is almoſt one and the ſame Opinion of all. And by this time we think it is ſufficiently evident, that the *Pagans*, at leaſt after *Chriſtianity*, tho they aſſerted *many Gods*, they calling, as St. * *Jerom* tells us, all *underſtanding Beings* ſuperior to Men by that Name; yet did they acknowledg *one ſupreme Omnipotent and only unmade Deity.*

But becauſe it's very poſſible that ſome may ſtill ſuſpect all this to have been nothing elſe, but a Refinement and Interpolation of *Paganiſm*, in order to render it more plauſible and better able to defend it ſelf againſt the Aſſaults of *Chriſtianity*, then newly appearing upon the ſtage; while in the mean time the genuine Doctrine of the antient *Pagans* was far otherwiſe: tho the contrary to this might ſufficiently appear from what has been already declar'd, yet however for the fuller ſatisfaction of the more ſtrongly prejudic'd, we ſhall yet further, by an hiſtorical Deduction made from the moſt antient times all along downwards, demonſtrate that the Doctrine of the greateſt *Pagan Polytheiſts*, as well before *Chriſtianity* as after it, was always the ſame; that beſides their *many Gods*, there was one *ſupreme*, *omnipotent* and *only unmade Deity.*

Now not to mention many Paſſages to this purpoſe in the *Sibylline Prophecys* and ſome other *Pagan Oracles*, becauſe their Authority is deſervedly ſuſpected, as being mingl'd with a great deal of ſuppoſititious and counterfeit ſtuff; I proceed to the moſt antient Theologers, and moſt eminent Aſſertors of *Polytheiſm* among the Pagans: ſuch were in the firſt place, *Zoroaſter* in the Eaſtern Parts, and *Orpheus* among the *Greeks.* The

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* Deum quicquid ſupra ſe eſſet Gentiles putabant.

former

former of which, as ſome pretend, had the very Name *Zoroaſter* given him after his Death, as having been a *Worſhipper of the Stars*, the Termination of it *Ster* in the *Perſian* Language undoubtedly ſignifying *Star*: as to which however tho I rather ſuſpect the Termination to be *Greek*, the word being not only in the Oriental Languages written *Zertooſt* and *Zaraduſt*, but alſo in *Agathias*, *Zarades*; yet do I find it beyond all doubt and acknowledg'd by all that *Zoroaſter* was a *Polytheiſt*, a Worſhipper of many Gods, and among others, of the Stars. But notwithſtanding how many Gods ſoever he worſhip'd, that he own'd *one ſupreme unmade Deity*, appears from the Teſtimony of *Eubulus*, cited by *Porphyrius*: Zoroaſter, ſays he, *firſt of all, as* Eubulus *teſtifys, in the Mountains adjoining to* Perſis, *conſecrated a native Orbicular Cave, adorn'd with Flowers and water'd with Fountains, to the Honour of* Mithras, *the Maker and Father of all things; this Cave being an Image or Symbol to him of the whole World, which was made by* Mithras. From which Authority we may alſo conclude, that notwithſtanding the *Sun* was generally worſhip'd by the *Perſians* as a *God*, and as being the moſt lively Image of one ſupreme God, yet *Zoroaſter* and the antient *Magi*, who were beſt initiated in the *Mithraick Myſterys*, aſſerted another Deity ſuperior to the Sun for the true *Mithras* or *Oromaſdes*; ſuch as was the Maker and Father of all things or of the whole World, and, as we have it in the *Zoroaſtrian* Tradition recorded by *Plutarch*, * *as far remov'd from the Sun, as the Sun was from the Earth.* Nor again do I think that *Zoroaſter* or the *Magi* were guilty of *Tritheiſm*, becauſe

* Ὅτι ἀπέχουσι τοῦ ἡλίου τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς ἀφέστηκε.

they term'd even this *Mithras* or *Oromaſdes*, * Threefold or triplicated: but that this ſhew'd 'em either to have a dark Conception of the Myſtery of the Trinity, ſutable to the *Hypotheſis* of *Chriſtians*, which was the Opinion of *Gerard J. Voſſius*; or rather to that of the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*, they ſeeming to aſſert three diſtinct Perſons in the ſame Divine Eſſence, orderly diſtinguiſh'd, as *Pletho* has obſerv'd partly out of *Plutarch*, by the Names of *Oromaſdes*, *Mithras*, and *Arimanius*, and characteriz'd by the ſeveral Attributes of *Goodneſs*, *Wiſdom*, and *Power*; and withal in this *Magick* or *Perſian Trinity* the ſecond Perſon *Mithras*, the *Mind* or Son of the Great Father, was, as we have before obſerv'd, agreeably to the *Platonick* and *Chriſtian* Doctrine, made the immediate Architect and Framer of the World †.

But again notwithſtanding this *Triplicity* in the *one ſupreme God*, and alſo the real Multiplicity of *Gods* worſhip'd by *Zoroaſter*, it is yet further evident from his own Deſcription of *God*, extant in *Euſebius*, that he was an Aſſertor of *one Supreme: God*, ſays he, *is the firſt Incorruptible, Eternal, Unmade, Indiviſible, moſt unlike to every thing, the Head or Leader of all Good, not to be brib'd, the Beſt of the Good, and Wiſeſt of the Wiſe; he is alſo the Father of Law and Juſtice, ſelf-taught, perfect, and the only Inventor of the natural Holy.* Which *Euſebius* tells us, that this *Zoroaſtrian* Deſcription of God was contain'd *verbatim* in a Book entitl'd, *A holy Collection of the* Perſian *Monuments*; as alſo that *Oſtanes*, a famous Magician and Admirer of *Zoroaſter*, had re-

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* Τριτλάσιος, as we have it in *Dionyſius* the *Pſeudo-Areopagite*; and τρὶς ἑαυτὸν αὐξήσας, as we have it in *Plutarch*.

† *Of this ſee more in* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 286, 287, 288, &c.

corded

corded the very same of him in his *Octateuchon*. The same might be also abundantly prov'd not only concerning *Zoroaster* and the *Magi*, but also the *Chaldæans*, from the reputed *Chaldaick* Oracles; had we full Assurance of the Antiquity and Sincerity of them, and that they were not forg'd by *Christians*, as the Learned * Dr. *Cudworth*, for several reasons, thinks they were not.

But now we pass out of *Asia* into *Europe*, from *Zoroaster* to *Orpheus*, who according to the universal Consent of *Antiquity* (tho some of late have controverted the Point, as if there never had been any such Person at all) was the Son of *Oeager*, by Birth a *Thracian*, the Father or chief Founder of the *Mystical* and *Allegorical Theology* amongst the *Greeks*, and of all their most arcane *Religious Rites* and Ceremonys; accordingly *Suidas* tells us, That *their Religion was therefore call'd* † Threscheia, *because it was a* Thracian *Invention*. He is commonly suppos'd to have liv'd before the *Trojan* War, that is, in the time of the *Israelitish* Judges, or at least to have been senior to *Hesiod* and *Homer*, and himself an excellent Poet, as some conclude from those Verses, which because they suted with his Doctrine and Spirit, are term'd *Orphical*; tho perhaps it is more probable that he having convey'd down his Thoughts by Oral *Cabala* or Tradition, they were for their better Preservation expres'd in Metre by some other hands, but imputed to *Orpheus*, just as the Golden Verses written by *Lysis* were to *Pythagoras*. However it is unquestionable that those Poems, by whomsoever written, were of great Antiquity, much older than *Herodotus*, *Plato*, and *Aristotle*, as also that they were had in very great esteem

* True Intel. Syst. *p.* 292, 293, &c.

† Τὸ τιμᾶν θεὸν θρησκεύειν ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς θρᾳκίας ὔσης τῆς εὐσέβειας.

among the *Pagans*; and therefore may we very well make a Judgment of the Theology of the antient Pagans from what they contain. Now that the *Orphick* Doctrine and Poems were Polytheiſtical, is acknowledg'd by all: inſomuch that *Juſtin Martyr* affirms that *Orpheus* aſſerted *three hundred and ſixty Gods*; and to him agrees *Athenagoras* alſo, in ſaying that Orpheus *was the Father and firſt Teacher of Polytheiſm amongſt the* Greeks, *and that* Homer *deriv'd his Polytheiſm from him.* To him are owing thoſe Fables, in which not only the things of Nature and Parts of the World were all Theologiz'd, but alſo all manner of human Paſſions, Imperfections, and Vices were, in a literal ſenſe, attributed to the Gods; I ſay, in a literal ſenſe, becauſe moſt of the Pagans were of opinion, that his *Fables* of the Gods were ſuch *Myſterys* and *Allegorys*, as had ſome arcane and more recondite ſenſe under 'em, than what was verbally expreſs'd, and were therefore had in mighty Veneration, as coming from a Perſon divinely inſpir'd. But ſtill that *Orpheus*, notwithſtanding all his Polytheiſm and multiplicity of Gods, acknowledg'd *one ſupreme unmade God*, as the Original of all things, may be preſum'd from the following Obſervations. Firſt, becauſe thoſe two moſt religious Philoſophick Sects, the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*, not only had *Orpheus* in great eſteem, he being commonly call'd by 'em by way of eminency *the Theologer*; but were alſo thought in great meaſure to have ow'd their Theology and Philoſophy to him, as deriving the ſame from his Principles and Traditions. And it is moſt certain that both thoſe deriv'd all the Gods from one *ſelf-exiſtent Deity.*

Again, this may be yet further evidenc'd from that Epitome of the *Orphick* Doctrine, made long ſince by *Timotheus* the *Chronographer* in his *Coſmopœia*, ſtill extant

extant in *Cedrenus* and *Euſebii Chronica*, and imperfectly ſet down by * *Suidas*, upon the word *Orpheus*, as his own, or at leaſt without mentioning the Author's Name: that *firſt of all the Æther was made by God, and after the Æther a Chaos, a dark and dreadful Night, then covering all under the whole Æther.* Orpheus *hereby ſignifying*, ſays *Timotheus*, *that Night was ſenior to Day, or that the World had a Beginning; he alſo having declar'd in his Explication, that there was a certain incomprehenſible Being, which was the higheſt and oldeſt of all things, and the Maker of every thing, even of the Æther it ſelf and all things under the Æther. But the Earth being then inviſible by reaſon of the Darkneſs, a Light breaking out thro the Æther illuminated the whole Creation; this* Light *being ſaid by him to be that Higheſt of all Beings beforementiond, which is call'd alſo* Counſel *and* Life; theſe three Names implying a kind of *Triplicity* or *Trinity* according to *Orpheus*, but ſtill declaring *one and the ſame Force and Power of that God, who is the Maker of all, and who produces all out of nothing into Being, whether viſible or inviſible.* To which purpoſe *Timotheus* tells us that the ſame *Orpheus* again aſſerted, That *all things were made by one Godhead in three Names, and that thus God is all things.*

But thirdly, this matter might be yet made more evident from the *Orphical Verſes* themſelves, did we not ſuſpect the Credit of 'em, as we did of the *Sibylline*, as being partly counterfeited by *Chriſtians* or *Jews*, and not written by *Orpheus* himſelf, nor by *Onomacritus*, nor any other Pagan of that Antiquity, according to the *Orphick Cabala* or Tradition. However, tho we do not credit theſe Poems in groſs, yet I think we may rely as to the

* Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνεδείχθη τῷ κόσμῳ ὁ αἰθὴρ, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργηθείς, &c.

point

point in hand on the Authority of ſuch of 'em as we find atteſted in Pagan Writings; one or two of which I ſhall venture to produce, and firſt that Copy produc'd by *Proclus* upon the *Timæus*:

* *Wherefore together with the Univerſe*
Were made within great Jupiter, *the Height,*
The Breadth of th' Earth and Seas, and the
Vaſt Ocean, deep Tartara, *the Streams,*
And the Fountains, and all the other things,
All the immortal Gods and Goddeſſes.
Whatever has been or ſhall be, at once
Was all contain'd in Jove's *extenſive Womb.*

Another plain Copy to this purpoſe is cited by *Proclus*, and extant alſo in the Writer *de Mundo*, which is this:

† *High thundring* Jove *is both the firſt and laſt;*
Jove *is the Head and Middle of all things;*
All things were made out of great Jupiter.

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* Τ' ἅνεκα σὺν τῷ παντὶ Διὸς παλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη,
Αἰθέρος ἐυρείης ἠδ' ὀφάνυ ἀγλαον ὕψος
Πόντε τ' ἀτρυγέτε, γαίης τ' ἐρικυδέος ἔυρη.
Ὠκεανός τε μεγας καὶ νειαλα τάρταρα γαίης,
Καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ πόντος ἀπείρεσιος, ἄλλα τε πάντα,
Πάντες τ' ἀθανάτοι μάκαρες θεοὶ ἠδε θεαίναι
Ὅσσα τ' ἔην γεγαῶτα, καὶ ὕστερον ὅππος' ἐμελλεν,
Εγένετο. Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέι σύρφα πεφύκει.

Proc. in Tim. p. 95.

† Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέραυνος.
Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται.
Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη.
Ζεὺς πύθμην γαίης τε καὶ ὀφανὸς ἀστερόεντος.
Ζεὺς πνοιὴ πάντων, Ζεὺς ἀκαματε πυρὸς ὁρμή.
Ζεὺς ποντε ῥίζα, Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἠδε σελήνη.
Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς, Ζεὺς αὐτος ἀπάντων ἀρχγένεθλος.
Ἑν κράτος, εἷς δαίμων γένετο μεγας ἀρχὸς απάντων.

Jove

* Jove *is a Man and an immortal Maid;*
Jove *is the Depth and Height of Earth and Heav'n;*
Jove *is the Breadth of all the things which live;*
Jove *is the Force of Fire, which can't be tam'd;*
Jove *is the bottom of the deepeſt Sea;*
Jove *is at once the Sun, the Moon, and Stars;*
Jove *is the Source and Ruler of all things;*
One Pow'r, one God, one King is over all.

From theſe and many other *Orphick* Fragments ſcatter'd up and down in *Proclus*, and collected by *Euſebius* out of *Porphyrius*, it is plain that the Opinion of Monarchy or *one ſelf-exiſtent Deity*, the Original of all things, was an eſſential Part of the *Orphick* Theology or † *Cabala.*

From *Orpheus* I proceed to the *Egyptians*, who notwithſtanding their multifarious Polytheiſm and Idolatry, yet acknowledg'd *one ſupreme* and *univerſal Deity*; as may in the firſt place be probably collected from that great Fame, which they antiently had over all the World for their Wiſdom and Learning. This is no ſmall Argument that the *Egyptians* cou'd not be ignorant of *one ſupreme Deity*; and the ſame is confirm'd by that eſteem, which thoſe Divine Philoſophers, *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, had for them. To this I add, that the *Egyptians*, however they attributed more Antiquity to the World than they ought, yet ſeem to have had a conſtant Perſuaſion, and the firmeſt of all other Nations, touching the beginning of it: upon which account, as *Kircher* tells us, they pictur'd *Horus* or the *World*, as

* *An uſual Expreſſion among Heathens to denote the Divine Fecundity and Power of producing both Males and Females.*

a *Young Man* beardleſs; not only to ſignify its conſtant uſeful and flouriſhing Vigor, but alſo the Youngneſs and Newneſs of its Duration. Nor ought it to be ſuſpected that tho the *Egyptians* held the World to have had a beginning, yet conceiv'd it to be made by Chance, without a God, as *Anaximander*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus* afterwards did; the contrary thereunto being ſo confeſs'd a thing, that *Simplicius*, a zealous Contender for the World's Eternity, affirms the *Moſaick* Hiſtory of *its Creation by God* to have been nothing elſe, but * *Egyptian Fables*.

Moreover, the *Egyptians* are noted to have philoſophiz'd about Incorporeal Subſtance, in that they aſſerted the *Immortality of Souls*, *their Præ-exiſtence* and *Tranſmigration*, from whence their Incorporeity is neceſſarily infer'd. Now if they own'd that Souls are incorporeal, it is alſo very probable that beſides their many corporeal ones, they alſo own'd one incorporeal God. Again, as other Nations, beſides their vulgar Theology, had another Doctrine concerning the *one ſupreme* and *univerſal Deity* and *Maker of the World*; ſo is it very likely that the Arcane, Myſterious, and Ænigmatical Theology of the *Egyptians*, ſo much talk'd of, was no other than a kind of *Metaphyſicks* concerning God, as *one incorporeal Subſtance*, the *Original of all things*. That this was an eſſential part of the arcane and true Theology of the *Egyptians*, *A. Stenchus Eugubinus* and many other learned Men have thought to be unqueſtionably evident from the *Hermetick* or *Triſmegiſtick* Writings; as *Kircher* and ſome others did, from that ſuppos'd *Ariſtotelick* Book, *de ſecretiore parte Divinæ Sapientiæ ſecundum Ægyptios*; they taking it for granted,

* Μύθοι Αἰγύπτιοι. Simplic. in Ariſt. Phyſ. l. 8.

that

that theſe are genuine and ſincere: As to which I ſay, that the latter of theſe Writings is indeed moſt certainly ſpurious and counterfeit; and the former were thought to be entirely ſo by the Learned *Is. Caſaubon*; yet however I add, that were he in the right, that is, were all the *Triſmegiſtick* Books, that now are, or have been formerly extant, forg'd by ſome pretended *Chriſtians*, as the Book before nam'd of the *Arcane Egyptian Wiſdom*, was by ſome Philoſopher, and imputed to *Ariſtotle*; yet would they for all that upon another account, afford no inconſiderable Argument, to prove that the *Egyptian Pagans* aſſerted *one ſupreme* Deity; namely, becauſe every Cheat or Impoſture muſt needs have ſome Baſis or Foundation of Truth to ſtand upon, there muſt have been ſomething truly *Egyptian*, even in ſuch counterfeit *Egyptian* Writings, and therefore this at leaſt of *one ſupreme Deity*; otherwiſe they could never have obtain'd credit at firſt, or afterwards have maintain'd the ſame; eſpecially again, becauſe thoſe *Triſmegiſtick* Books were diſpers'd in thoſe antient times, before the *Egyptian* Paganiſm and their ſucceſſion of Prieſts were yet extinct. And therefore had that, which is ſo much inſiſted upon in them, been diſſonant from the *Egyptian* Theology, they muſt needs have been preſently exploded as mere Lies and Forgerys.

But withal I ſay again that *Caſaubon* ſeems not to have concluded well, when from the detection of Forgery in two or three *Triſmegiſtick* Books at moſt, he pronounces of 'em all univerſally, that they were nothing elſe but *Chriſtian* Cheats and Impoſtures. And indeed I think, that the Judgment of *Jamblichus* ought in this caſe to be far prefer'd before *Caſaubon*'s, both by reaſon of his great Antiquity, and his being much better ſkill'd not

only in the *Greek*, but alſo the *Egyptian* Learning: *That the Books imputed to* Hermes Triſmegiſt * *did really contain the* Hermaick *Opinions and* Egyptian *Doctrine, tho they ſometimes ſpake the Language of the* Greek *Philoſophers.* Wherefore I conceive it reaſonable to conclude, that tho there have indeed been ſome *Hermaick* Books counterfeited by *Chriſtians*, ſince *Jamblichus*'s time, as namely the *Pæmander*, and the *Sermon on the Mount concerning Regeneration*, neither of which are found cited by any antient Father; yet there were other *Hermaick* Books, which tho not written by *Hermes Triſmegiſt* himſelf, nor all of 'em in the *Egyptian* Language, but ſome of 'em in *Greek*, were notwithſtanding truly *Egyptian*, and did, for the Subſtance of 'em, contain the *Hermaick* Doctrine. Such very probably are thoſe mention'd by the antient Fathers, but ſince loſt, as the τὰ γενικὰ, which ſeems to be a Diſcourſe concerning the *Coſmogonia*, and the τὰ διεξοδικὰ, and the like. And ſuch alſo may ſome of theſe *Hermaick* Books be, which are ſtill extant; as for inſtance, the *Aſclepian Dialogue*, entitl'd in the *Greek* τέλειος λόγος, *the perfect Oration*, the Doctrine whereof is rankly Pagan, and was vulgarly known before *Jamblichus*'s time: And it cannot be imagin'd, that he who was ſo devout a Pagan, ſo learned a Philoſopher, and ſo witty a Man ſhould be ſo far impos'd upon, by a counterfeit *Triſmegiſtick* Book, and mere *Chriſtian* Cheat, as to beſtow tranſlating upon it, and recommend it to the World, as that which was genuinely *Pagan*.

The Reſult then of our preſent Diſcourſe is this, that tho ſome of the Triſmegiſtick Books were either wholly counterfeited, or elſe had certain ſuppoſititious Paſſages inſerted in 'em by ſome *Chriſtian* Hand, yet there being others of them originally *Egyptian*, or

* Ἑρμαϊκὰς πειέχειν δόξας.

which,

which, as to the ſubſtance of 'em, do contain *Hermaical* or *Egyptian* Doctrines, in all which *one ſupreme Deity* is every where aſſerted; we may well conclude from hence, that the *Egyptians* had an Acknowledgment amongſt 'em of *one ſupreme Deity*. And in this Opinion ſeveral of the antient Fathers have gone before us, as firſt of all *Juſtin Martyr*: "*Ammon*, ſays he, in his Books calls "God *moſt hidden*; and *Hermes* plainly declares, that "it is hard to conceive God, but impoſſible to expreſs "him. Thus again St. *Cyprian*: "*Hermes Triſmegiſt*, ſays he, alſo acknowledges one God, confeſſing "him to be *ineffable* and *ineſtimable*. Which Paſſage is alſo cited by St. *Auſtin*: "*Thoth*, ſays he, that is "*Hermes*, the moſt antient and inſtructed in all kind "of Learning, for which he was call'd * *Triſmegiſt*, "wrote many Books belonging to the knowledg of "Divine things, in which he aſſerts the Majeſty of "*one Supreme Deity*, calling him by the ſame Names "that we do, *God* and *Father*; but leſt any one ſhould "require a proper Name of him, he held him to be "*Anonymous*. Laſtly, St. *Cyril* has much more to the ſame purpoſe alſo.

But tho it could not be prov'd from the *Triſmegiſtick* Writings, concerning which we leave others to judg as they ſee cauſe, that the *Egyptians*, beſides their many Gods, acknowledg'd *one ſupreme all-comprehending Deity*; this would otherwiſe very plainly appear, not only becauſe *Orpheus*, who was an undoubted Aſſertor of *Monarchy*, or *one firſt Principle* of all things, is generally affirm'd to have deriv'd his Doctrine from the *Egyptians*, but alſo from plain and expreſs Teſtimonys. For beſides *Apollonius Tyanæus*'s affirmation concerning both *Indians* and *Egyptians* before cited, *Plutarch* throughout his

* Τρις μέγιστος.

whole Book *de Iſide & Oſiride*, ſuppoſes the *Egyptians* to have thus aſſerted *one ſupreme Deity*: in the Beginning of it he tells us, that the end of all the Religious Rites and Myſterys of that *Egyptian* Goddeſs *Iſis*, was * *the Knowledg of that firſt God, who is the Lord of all things, and only intelligible by the Mind, whom this Goddeſs exhorteth Men to ſeek, in her Communion.* After which he declares, that this *firſt God* was accounted by them an *obſcure* and *hidden* Deity, and accordingly he gives the reaſon why they made the *Crocodile* a Symbol of him; namely, *becauſe they ſay the Crocodile is the only Animal, which living in the Water, hath his Eyes cover'd by a thin tranſparent Membrane falling down over them, by reaſon whereof it ſees and is not ſeen; which is a thing that belongs to the firſt God, to ſee all things, himſelf being not ſeen.* Tho *Plutarch* in that place gives alſo another reaſon, why the *Egyptians* made the *Crocodile* a Symbol of the Deity, ſaying, That *neither were the* Egyptians *without a plauſible reaſon for worſhipping God ſymbolically in the* Crocodile, *that being ſaid to be an Imitation of God, in that it is the only Animal without a Tongue. For the Divine* Λόγος, *or Reaſon, ſtanding not in need of Speech, and going on thro a ſilent Path of Juſtice in the World, does without noiſe righteouſly govern and diſpenſe all human Affairs.* In like manner *Horus Apollo* in his Hieroglyphicks tells us, that the *Egyptians* acknowledging *an omnipotent Being, that was the Governour of the whole World, did ſymbolically repreſent him by a Serpent; they picturing alſo a great Houſe or Palace within its Circumference, becauſe the World is the Royal Palace of the Deity.* Which Writer alſo gives us another reaſon, why the Serpent was made to be the Hieroglyphick of the Deity; *becauſe the Serpent feeding as it were upon its own Body, doth aptly ſignify, that all things generated in*

* Ἡ τῦ πρώτυ, καὶ κυρίυ, καὶ νοητῦ γνῶσις, &c.

the

the World by divine Providence, are again reſolv'd into him. And *Philo Byblius* from *Sanchuniathon* gives the ſame reaſon, why the Serpent was deify'd by *Taut* or the *Egyptian Hermes*, namely, *becauſe it is immortal and reſolv'd into it ſelf.* Tho ſometimes the *Egyptians* added to the *Serpent* alſo a *Hawk*, thus complicating the Hieroglyphick of the Deity, according to that of a famous *Egyptian* Prieſt in *Euſebius*: That *the firſt and divineſt Being of all is ſymbolically repreſented having the Head of a Hawk.* And that a Hawk was alſo ſometimes us'd alone for a Hieroglyphick of the Deity, appears from that of *Plutarch*, that in the Porch of an *Egyptian* Temple at *Sais* were engraven theſe three Hieroglyphicks: a *Young Man*, an *old Man*, and a *Hawk*; to make up this Sentence, that *both the Beginning and End of human Life depends upon God or Providence.* But we have two more remarkable Paſſages in the forementiond *Horus Apollo*, concerning the *Egyptian* Theology, which we muſt not paſs by: the firſt is this, that * *according to them there is a Spirit paſſing thro the whole World, namely God*; and again, † *it ſeems to the* Egyptians *that nothing at all conſiſts without God.* In the next place *Jamblichus* was a Perſon, who had made it his buſineſs to inform himſelf throughly, concerning the Theology of the *Egyptians*, and who undertakes to give an account of it, in his Anſwer to *Porphyrius*'s Epiſtle to *Anebo*, an *Egyptian* Prieſt; whoſe Teſtimony may therefore well ſeem to deſerve Credit. Now he firſt gives us a ſummary Account of their Theology after this manner: " That God, who is the Cauſe " of Generation and the whole Nature, and of all the " Powers in the Elements themſelves, is ſeparate, ex- " empt, elevated above, and expanded over all the

* Παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ παντὸς κόσμῳ τὸ διῆκον ἐστι πνεῦμα.
† Δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δίχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι.

" Powers

" Powers and Elements in the World. For being
" above the World and tranſcending the ſame, imma-
" terial, incorporeal, ſupernatural, unmade, indiviſi-
" ble, manifeſted wholly from himſelf and in himſelf,
" he ruleth over all things, and in himſelf containeth all
" things. And becauſe he virtually comprehends all
" things, therefore does he impart and diſplay the ſame
" from himſelf. According to which excellent De-
ſcription of the Deity, it is plain that the *Egyptians* aſſerting *one God, who comprehends all things*, could not poſſibly ſuppoſe a *multitude* of *ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys. In which place alſo the ſame *Jamblichus* tells us, that as the *Egyptian* Hieroglyphick for material and corporeal things, was Mud or floating Water, ſo they pictur'd God, *ſitting upon the Lote-tree above the watery Mud; which ſignifies the tranſcendent Eminency of the Deity above Matter, and its intellectual Empire over the World, becauſe both the Leaves and Fruit of that Tree are round, repreſenting the Motion of Intellect.* Again he likewiſe there adds, that the *Egyptians* ſometimes pictur'd God, ſitting at the Helm of a Ship. But afterwards in the ſame Book, he ſums up the Querys, which *Porphyrius* had propounded to the *Egyptian* Prieſt, to be reſolv'd concerning 'em in this manner: " You deſire to be
" reſolv'd what the *Egyptians* think to be the firſt
" Cauſe of all, whether Intellect or ſomething above
" Intellect? And that whether alone or with ſome
" other? Whether incorporeal or corporeal? Whether
" the firſt Principle be the ſame with the Architect of
" the World, or before him? Whether all things pro-
" ceed from one or many? Whether they ſuppoſe Mat-
" ter or qualify'd Bodys to be the firſt; and if they ad-
" mit a firſt Matter, whether they aſſert it to be un-
" made or made? In anſwer to which *Porphyrian* Que-
rys, *Jamblichus* thus begins: " I ſhall firſt reply to what
" you

" you first demand, that, according to the *Egyptians*,
" * before all Entitys and Principles, there is one God,
" who is in order of Nature before him that is com-
" monly call'd *the first God and King*, immoveable and
" always remaining in the Solitarineſs of his own
" Unity, there being nothing intelligible nor any thing
" elſe complicated with him. In which Words of *Jamblichus*, and thoſe others which there follow after, tho there be ſome Obſcurity, yet he plainly declares, that according to the *Egyptians*, the firſt Original of all things was a perfect *Unity* above *Intellect*; but intimating withal, that beſides this firſt Unity, they admitted of certain other Divine Hypoſtaſes, as namely a perfect *Intellect* and *mundane Soul* ſubordinate thereunto and dependent on it. But that they did not acknowledg a plurality of co-ordinate and independent Principles, is further declar'd by him after this manner:
" And thus, ſays he, the *Egyptian* Philoſophy from
" firſt to laſt, begins with Unity, and thence deſcends
" to Multitude; the Many being always govern'd by
" the One; and the infinite or undeterminate Nature,
" every where maſter'd and conquer'd by ſome finite
" and determin'd Meaſure; and all ultimately by that
" higheſt Unity, *i. e.* the firſt Cauſe of all things. Moreover in anſwer to the laſt *Porphyrian* Queſtion concerning *Matter*, whether the *Egyptians* thought it to be *unmade* and *ſelf-exiſtent* or *made*, *Jamblicus* thus replies: That *according to* Hermes *and the* Egyptians, *Matter was alſo made or produc'd by God.* To him agrees *Proclus*, who in his Comment on the *Timæus* cites this Paſſage, and adds that he thinks it probable that *Plato* was alſo of the ſame opinion concerning *Matter*, becauſe he is ſuppos'd to have follow'd *Hermes* and the *Egyptians*.

* Περὶ τῶν ὅλων καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν ἐστι Θεὸς εἷς, &c.

Which

Which indeed is the more likely, if that be true, which the ſame *Proclus* affirms concerning *Orpheus*, That * *he alſo did after the ſame manner derive Matter from the firſt Hypoſtaſis of Intelligibles, that is, from the ſupreme Deity.* To this I add the Teſtimony of *Damaſcius* in his Book of Principles, writing after this manner concerning the *Egyptians*: " *Eudemus*, ſays he, has given us no exact " account of the *Egyptians*; but the *Egyptian* Philo- " ſophers that have been in our times, have declar'd " the hidden Truth of their Theology, having found " in certain *Egyptian* Writings, † that there is, according " to them, *one Principle of all things*, prais'd under " the name of the *unknown Darkneſs*, and that thrice " repeated. Which *unknown Darkneſs* is a Deſcription of that ſupreme Deity, which is incomprehenſible.

But again, that the *Egyptians*, among their *many Gods*, did acknowledg *one Supreme*, may likewiſe ſufficiently appear, even from their vulgar Religion and Theology; in which they had firſt a proper and peculiar Name for him as ſuch. For as the *Greeks* call'd the ſupreme God ζεὺς or πὰν, in that he was all things, or virtually contain'd in himſelf all things; the *Latins Jupiter* or *Jovis*: ſo the *Egyptians*, according to *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, and *Heſychius* out of *Ariſtotle*, call'd him *Amous* or *Ammous*, which the *Greeks* pronounc'd *Hammon* or *Ammon*; and accordingly the *Latins* term'd him *Jupiter Hammon*, and ſometimes the *Lybian Jupiter*, from the Temple of *Ammon* in *Marmarica* a Part of *Lybia* or *Africa*. To which I add, that *Hammon* among the *Egyptians*, was not only the Name of the *ſupreme Deity*, but alſo of ſuch an one as was *hidden*, *inviſible*, and *incorporeal*;

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* Ὥστε καὶ Ὀρφεὺς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτίστης τῶν νοητῶν ὑποστάσεως παράγει τὴν ὕλην.

† Ὡς εἶπ κατ' αὐτὰς ἡ μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνημένη, &c.

for

for ſo they interpreted the Word, as is witneſs'd by *Manetho Sebennites* and *Hecataeus* in *Plutarch*, and alſo by *Jamblichus*. And this Name is ſo antient as to have been often taken notice of in the Old Teſtament, tho vulgar Interpreters have not been aware of it *.

Again, there is an excellent Monument of *Egyptian* Antiquity preſerv'd by *Plutarch* and others; from whence it may be made yet further evident, that the *Egyptians* did not ſuppoſe a multitude of *unmade ſelf-exiſtent* Deitys, but acknowledg'd *one ſupreme*, univerſal, and all-comprehending God; and this is an Inſcription upon the Temple at *Sais*: *I am all that hath been, is, and ſhall be, and my* Peplum *or Veil no Mortal hath ever yet uncover'd* †: As if it had been ſaid, the whole World is nothing but my ſelf veil'd; but my naked and unveil'd Brightneſs, no Mortal could ever yet behold or comprehend; or as *Philo* gloſſes on the Words, *It is ſufficient for a wiſe Man to know God from his Effects, but whoſoever will needs behold the naked Eſſence of the Deity, will be blinded with the tranſcendent Radiancy and Splendor of his Beams.* To this agrees that Saying of God himſelf to *Moſes*: *Thou ſhalt ſee my Back-parts, but my Face ſhall not be ſeen.* And to this purpoſe *Proclus* upon the *Timæus* affirms that the *Egyptian* God was ‖ *at once inviſible and manifeſt*; agreeably to that of *Plutarch*, that *the* Egyptians *firſt God or ſupreme Deity did ſee all things, himſelf being not ſeen.*

We have now made it manifeſt, that according to the antient *Egyptian* Theology, from which the *Greekiſh*

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* *See* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 339, *&c.*

† Ἐγὼ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονὸς, καὶ ὂν, καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδεὶς πω θνητὸς ἀπεκάλυψεν.

‖ Ἀφανὴς ἅμα καὶ ἐμφανὴς.

and *European* were deriv'd, there was *one intellectual Deity, one Mind or Wiſdom*, which as it produc'd all things from it ſelf, ſo does it contain and comprehend the Whole, and is it ſelf in a manner *all things*. And this might be yet further ſeen throughout the *Triſmegiſtick* Writings *. Agreeably to which Acknowledgment I add, that a great part of the *Egyptian* Polytheiſm was really nothing elſe, but the worſhipping of one and the ſame ſupreme God, under many different Names and Notions, not only of *Hammon*, but alſo of *Neith*, *Iſis*, *Oſiris*, *Serapis*, *Eicton*, *Emeph* or *Cneph*, and *Phtha*. Which different Names for one and the ſame ſupreme God, might perhaps be miſtaken by ſome of the ſottiſh Vulgar for ſo many diſtinct *unmade* and *ſelf-exiſtent Deitys*; and this might give occaſion to ſome of the Learned of theſe latter times to think that the generality of the *Egyptians*, not excepting their Theologers and Prieſts, were of that opinion.

But here by the way it is obſervable, that tho the *Egyptians* aſſerted but *one ſupreme unmade* Deity, yet agreeably to the *Orphick*, the *Pythagorean*, and *Platonick Triad*, which, it is very probable, was deriv'd from them, they held a kind of Triplicity or Trinity in the ſame Divine Eſſence, whoſe ſeveral Hypoſtaſes or Perſons they diſtinguiſh'd by ſome or other of the Names before-mention'd. The firſt whereof was an indiviſible Unity, which they term'd *Eicton*; the ſecond a perfect Mind converting its Intellections into it ſelf, which they term'd *Emeph* or *Cneph*; the third an immediate Principle of Generation, which they call'd by any of the other Names, according to its ſeveral

* *See Citations in* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 346, &c.

Powers,

Powers, as *Ammon*, *Oſiris*, *Phtha*, and the like. Accordingly *Athanaſius Kircher* tells us, that in the *Pamphylian* Obelisk, that firſt Hieroglyphick of a *winged Globe with a Serpent coming out of it*, was the *Egyptian* Hieroglyphick of a Triform Deity, or Trinity of Divine Hypoſtaſes; which he confirms by the Teſtimony of *Abenephius* an *Arabian* Writer, and a *Chaldaick* Fragment imputed to *Sanchuniathon*; the Globe being ſaid to ſignify the firſt incomprehenſible Deity, ſelf-exiſtent and without beginning or end; the Serpent ſignifying the Divine Wiſdom and creative Virtue; and laſtly the Wings denoting that active Spirit, which cheriſheth, quickeneth, and enliveneth all things. To this account have ſubſcrib'd St. *Cyril*, *A. Stenchus Eugubinus*, *&c.* the latter citing for this purpoſe this Paſſage out of *Damaſcius*: That, according to the *Egyptians*, * *the firſt Principle of all was Darkneſs, above all Knowledg and Underſtanding, or unknown Darkneſs, they thrice repeating the ſame.*

Again, it is obſervable concerning the *Egyptians*, that tho their aſſerting of one incorporeal Deity to be *all things*, did indeed make it evident, that they could not really admit a multitude of ſelf-exiſtent independent Deitys, yet did this ſame Principle give occaſion in a great meaſure to their *ſeeming* Polytheiſm; they being thereby led in a certain ſenſe to *perſonate* and *deify* the ſeveral Parts of the World and things of Nature, beſtowing the Names of Gods and Goddeſſes upon them. Not that they therefore worſhip'd the inanimate Parts of the World as ſuch, much leſs things not *ſubſtantial*, but only mere *Accidents*, for ſo many real, diſtinct, and

* Πρώτην ἀρχὴν σκότος ὑπῆρ πάσαν νόησιν, σκότος ἄγνωστον, τρὶς τοῦτο ἐπιφημίζοντες.

perſonal Deitys: but becauſe conceiving that God, who was *all things*, ought to be worſhip'd in *all things*, ſuch eſpecially as were moſt beneficial to Mankind, they did, according to the *Aſclepian* and *Triſmegiſtick* Doctrine, call God by the name of *every thing*, or every thing by the name of *God*. However the wiſer of them very well underſtood that it was really *one* and the ſame *ſimple Deity*, which was thus worſhip'd amongſt them by piece-meal, in the ſeveral Parts of the World and things of Nature, and under different Names and Notions, with different Ceremonys: to this purpoſe *Plutarch* intimates, that the *Egyptian* Fable of *Oſiris* being mangl'd and cut in pieces by *Typhon*, did allegorically ſignify the Diſcerption and Diſtraction of the *ſimple Deity*, by reaſon of the Weakneſs and Ignorance of vulgar Minds not able to comprehend it all at once; and therefore dividing it by ſeveral Names and partial Notions, which yet true *Knowledg* and *Underſtanding*, that is *Iſis*, makes up whole again and unites into *One*.

But now from the *Egyptians* we paſs to the *Heathen Poets*, who, notwithſtanding they were in many reſpects the grand Depravers and Adulterators of the *Pagan* Theology *, and ſeeming Sticklers for *Polytheiſm*, yet did not really and in earneſt aſſert a multitude of *ſelf-exiſtent independent* Deitys, but *one only unmade Deity*, and all the other to be *generated* or *created Gods*. This has been already prov'd concerning *Orpheus*, from ſuch Fragments of the *Orphick* Poems, as have been own'd and atteſted by *Pagan* Writers: Wherefore in this place we begin with *Homer*. Now it is certain that not all his *Gods* were *eternal*, *unmade*, and *ſelf-*

* *See* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. p. 355, &c.

exiſtent,

exiſtent, he plainly declaring the contrary touching the Gods in general; that they together with the whole viſible World had a * *Geneſis* or temporary Production, out of the *Ocean* or *Watery Chaos*,

Nevertheleſs tho the ὁι θεοὶ, or the Gods in general, be thus *generated*, yet is this to be underſtood of none other but the inferior *Gods*; and he is ſuppos'd to be diſtinguiſh'd from them, who in the ſame *Poet* is frequently call'd *God* by way of eminency, and ζεὺς or *Jupiter*, to whom he plainly aſcribes Omnipotence, and ſtiles him † *the moſt powerful of all*, the ‖ *firſt and chiefeſt of the Gods*, ** *the higheſt of Gods and Governors*, and affirms him †† *infinitely to tranſcend the Gods*, and |||| *reign over Gods as well as Men*; and laſtly, he makes him to be the [] *Father of Gods as well as Men*, that is, nothing leſs than the Creator of them and the whole World. He therefore who thus produc'd the *Gods* and viſible World out of the *Ocean* or *Watery Chaos*, muſt needs be excluded out of that number of Gods, ſo as not to have been himſelf *made* or *generated* out of it. Thus have we before obſerv'd that the ὁι θεοὶ, or *Gods* in general, are frequently taken by *Greek* Writers, in way of diſtinction from ὁ θεὸς or *Jupiter*, that is, for the *inferior Gods* only. It is true indeed that others of the *Pagan* Gods, beſides *Jupiter*, were by the *Latins* in their ſolemn Rites and Prayers ſtyl'd *Patres*, Fathers: but notwithſtanding, here is a great

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* Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, &c.
——— ὅς γένεσις παντέσσι τέτυκται.
† Κάρτιστον ἀπάντων. ‖ Πρῶτα θεῶν.
** Ὕπατον θεῶν καὶ μητιόεντων.
†† Τόσσον ἐγὼ περὶ τ' εἰμὶ θεῶν περὶ τ' ἐμὶ ἀνθρώπων. Il. θ.
|||| ——Ὅσσε θεοῖσι καὶ ανθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει. Il. α.
[] Πατέρα θεῶν.

difference

difference to be obſerv'd, that tho thoſe other *Gods* were call'd *Fathers*, yet none of them was ever call'd either by the *Greeks* πατὴρ θεῶν, or by the *Latins*, *Pater optimus Divûm*, ſave only ζεὺς or *Jupiter*, the *ſupreme Deity*. The ſame is further witneſs'd concerning *Homer*, that is, his aſſerting of a Divine Monarchy by * *Ariſtotle*, *Proclus*, and *Plutarch*.

As for *Heſiod*, we have already prov'd from his *Theogonia*, that his Gods were *generated* and *made*, as well as Men: yet this *Theogonia* or *Generation of Gods*, is not to be underſtood univerſally neither, but only of the inferior Gods; that ζεὺς or *Jupiter* being to be excepted out of the Number of them, whom the ſame *Heſiod* as well as *Homer* makes to be *the Father of the Gods* †, as alſo the *King* of them; and attributes to him the Creation of all things, ſaying, ‖ *by whom all mortal Men are*, that is, ſays *Proclus*, *by whom all things are, and not by chance; the Poet by a Synecdoche, here aſcribing the making of all to* Jupiter.

In like manner, that *Pindar*'s Gods were not eternal, but *made* or *generated*, is plainly declar'd by him to this purpoſe: ** *There is one kind both of Gods and Men, and we both breath from the ſame Mother, or ſpring from the ſame Original.* By the common Mother of Gods and Men, the *Scholiaſt* underſtands the *Earth* and *Chaos*, taking the Gods here for the inferior Deitys only, and

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* *See 'em quoted in* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 359, &c.

† Αὐτὸς γὰρ πάντων Βασιλεὺς καὶ κοίρανος ἐστὶν
Ἀθανάτων.

‖ "Οὔτε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὅμως, &c. *upon which Words* Proclus, δι' ὃν πάντα καὶ ὄκ ἀυτομάτως. πάντα τῷ Διὶ προσαναπλάττει.

** "Εν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος, ἐκ
Μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν
Μάτρὸς ἀμφότεροι. Nem. Od. 6.

prin-

principally the Stars. Wherefore this of *Pindar* is to be underſtood of all the other *Gods*, that they were made as well as *Men* out of the Earth or *Chaos*, but not of that *ſupreme Deity*, whom the ſame *Pindar* elſewhere calls * *the moſt powerful of the Gods*, and † *the Lord of all things*, and || *the Cauſe of every thing*, and ** *that God, who was the beſt Artificer.* Which God alſo, according to *Pindar*, *Cheiron* inſtructed *Achilles* to worſhip principally, and above all the other Gods; his ſenſe to this purpoſe being thus render'd by the *Scholiaſt*: *That he ſhould honour and worſhip the loud-ſounding* Jupiter, *the Lord of Thunder and Lightning, tranſcendently above all the other Gods* ††. Which by the way confutes the Opinion of thoſe, who contend that the *ſupreme God*, as ſuch, was not at all worſhip'd by the *Pagans*.

There might be ſeveral remarkable Paſſages to the ſame purpoſe produc'd out of thoſe two *Tragick Poets*, *Æſchylus* and *Sophocles*; which yet, becauſe they have been already cited by *Juſtin Martyr*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and others, to avoid unneceſſary Tediouſneſs, we ſhall here paſs by: only I ſhall mention one famous Paſſage of *Sophocles* atteſted by that antient Pagan Hiſtorian *Hecatæus*, and cited by *Juſtin Martyr*, *Athenagoras*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Euſebius*, *Cyril*, and *Theodoret*; and which imports thus much: |||| *There is*

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* Θεῶν κράτιστον. † Τὸν πάντων κύριον.
|| Παντὶ ἄϊστον. ** Δημιουργὸν θεόν.
†† —— Μάλιστα μὲν χρονίδαν
Βαρυόπαν, στερόπης κεραυνώντε πυρὸς ἄνακτα,
Θεῶν σέβεσθαι. Pyth. Od. 6.
|||| Εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαις, εἷς ἐστὶν θεὸς,
Ὃς οὐρανόν τ' ἔτυξε καὶ γαῖαν μακράν,
Πόντου τε χάεσπον ὄιδμα, καὶ ἀνέμων βίας, &c.

in

in truth one only God, who made Heaven and Earth, the Sea, Air and Winds, &c.

Very much to this purpoſe may be ſeen in *Euripedes*, of which I muſt give a Specimen or two. In his *Supplices* we find his acknowledgment of Mens abſolute Dependance upon *Jupiter*, or *one ſupreme Deity:*

* *O* Jupiter, *why are poor wretched Men*
Reputed wiſe? all our Affairs depend
On thy free Will; and what ſeems good to thee,
We do.——

We have alſo an excellent Prayer to the ſupreme Governour of Heaven and Earth cited out of the ſame Tragedian, which runs to this purpoſe: † *That God would infuſe Light into the Souls of Men, whereby they might be enabl'd to know what is the Root, from which all their Evils ſpring, and by what means they may avoid 'em.*

To this I ſhall add one Paſſage more, cited out of the ſame Author, which contains alſo a clear Acknowledgment of *one ſelf-exiſtent* Being, that comprehends and governs the whole World, and which may be thus render'd from the Original:

Thou ſelf-ſprung Being, that doſt all enfold,
And in thine Arms Heav'ns whirling Fabrick hold;

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† Ὦ Ζεῦ τὶ δῆτα τὰς παλαιπόρους βροτῶν
Φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα,
Δρῶμέν τε τοιαῦτ', ἂν σὺ τυγχάνῃς θέλων.

† Σοὶ τῶν πάντων μεδέοντι χρὴν
Πέλανόν τε φέρω, Ζεὺς εἴτ' Ἀΐδης
Ὀνομαζόμενος κέρχνεις,
Σὺ γὰρ ἐν τε θεοῖς τοῖς ἀθανάτοις,
Σκῆπτρον τὸ Διὸς μεταχειρίζων
Χθονίων θ' Ἁιδῆ μετέχεις ἀρχῆς.
Πέμψον μὲν φῶς ψυχαῖς ἀνέρων, &c.

Who

Who art encircl'd with reſplendent Light,
And yet ly'ſt mantl'd o'er in ſhady Night;
About whom the exultant ſtarry Fires
Dance nimbly round in everlaſting Gyres *.

Again, *Ariſtophanes* in the beginning of his *Plutus* diſtinguiſhes between † ζεὺς and θεοὶ, *Jupiter* and the *Gods*. And we have this clear Teſtimony of *Terpander*, cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus*: *Thou* Jupiter, *who art the Original of all things*; *Thou* Jupiter, *who art the Governor of all* ‖. And the following ſenſe is aſcrib'd to *Menander*:

** *Let God alone, the Ruler and Father*
Of all things, the Maker and Beſtower
Of good things; let him be always worſhip'd
With ſtrict Devotion.

But now from the *Greek* we paſs to the *Latin* Poets, among whom we firſt find *Ennius*, deriving the Gods in general, who were all the inferior Deitys, from *Erebus* and *Night*, as ſuppoſing 'em all to have been *made* or *generated* out of *Chaos*; yet nevertheleſs acknowledging *One*, who was *both Father and King of Gods and Men* ††, that is, the Maker or Creator of the whole World; who therefore made thoſe Gods together with the World out of *Chaos*, himſelf being *unmade*.

* Σετὸν Ἀυſοφυῆ τὸν ἐν ἀιθερίῳ
Ῥόμβῳ, πάνſων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ'
Ὃν πέει μὲν φῶς, πέρι δ' ὀρφναία
Νὺξ ἀιολόχρως· ἄκειſος τ' ἀſρων
Ὄχλος ἐνδιλεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει.

† Ὡς ἀργαλέον πρᾶγμ' ἐſὶ ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ θεοὶ.

‖ Ζεῦ πάνſων ἀρχὰ, Ζεῦ παντων ἀγήτωρ.

** Τὸν ὅλα πάνſων κύριον γενικώταſον
Καὶ πατέρα, τοῦτον διατέλει τιμᾶν μόνον
Ἀγαθῶν τοιούτων εὑρέτην καὶ κτίſορα.

†† —— Divûmque Hominumque Pater, Rex.

In like manner, *Plautus* ſometimes diſtinguiſhes betwixt *Jupiter* and the Gods, and plainly acknowledges one omniſcient Deity:

* *Truly there is a God, a Hearer and Spectator of all our Actions.*

And again in his *Rudens* he clearly aſſerts † one ſupreme Monarch and Emperor over all, to whom the inferior Gods are ſubſervient. Alſo he brings in *Hanno* the *Carthaginian*, addreſſing himſelf to *Jupiter*, as to the ‖ *Supreme*, and him in whom Men *live, move, and have their Being.*

In the next place we have a Diſtych of *Valerius Soranus*, an antient and eminent Poet, full to the purpoſe, recorded by *Varro*; the ſenſe whereof is this:

** *Almighty* Jupiter, *the King of Kings*
And Gods, Progenitor and Genitrix,
Father and Mother of the other Gods,
One God and all that is.———

Where by *Jove*'s being call'd the Father and Mother of the Gods, is only meant what we before obſerv'd when ſpeaking of the *Orphick* Theology, that the Gods and all

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* Eſt profecto Deus, qui quæ nos gerimus auditque & videt.
Cap. Act. 2. Sc. 2.

† Qui Gentes omnes Mariaque & Terras movet, &c.
Qui eſt Imperator Divûm atque Hominum Jupiter, &c.

‖ Jupiter, qui genus colis aliſque Hominum, per quem vivimus
Vitale ævum; quem penes ſpes vitæque ſunt Hominum omnium,
Da Diem hunc ſoſpitem quæſo, rebus meis agendis.
Pœn. Act. 5. Sc. 4.

** Jupiter omnipotens, Regum Rex ipſe Deûmque,
Progenitor Genitrixque Deûm, Deus unus & omnes.

other

other things have been produc'd from him alone, and without any *præ-exiſtent Matter*. Next I can't omit two other Paſſages in *Ovid*, beſides thoſe I quoted out of him before, to this purpoſe:

* *That I now ſpeak and breath, and ſee the Light,*
Can I ungrateful be and not confeſs
Who gives me this? Surely 'tis God himſelf.

Again he ſtiles God thus in the third of his *Metam.*

† *Father and Ruler of the Gods, whoſe Hand*
Is arm'd with Thunder, and who with a Nod
Can ſhake the World.———

Next we find *Virgil* acknowledging one God, at leaſt, as a Soul of the Univerſe, to be the Original of all things:

‖ *Know firſt that Heav'n and Earth's compacted Frame,*
And flowing Waters and the ſtarry Flame,
And both the radiant Lights, one common Soul
Inſpires, and feeds and animates the Whole.
This active Mind infus'd thro all the ſpace,
Unites and mingles with the mighty Maſs;

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* Quod loquor & ſpiro, Cœlumque & Lumina Solis
Aſpicio, poſſumne ingratus & immemor eſſe?
Ipſe dedit.———

† Ille Pater Rectorque Deûm, cui Dextra triſulcis
Ignibus armata eſt, qui nutu concutit Orbem.

‖ Principio Cœlum ac Terras Camposque liquentes,
Lucentemque Globum Terræ Titaniaque Aſtra,
Spiritus intus alit: totamque infuſa per Artus
Mens agitat Molem, & magno ſe corpore miſcet.
Inde Hominum Pecudumque genus Vitæque volantum,
Et quæ marmoreo fert Monſtra ſub æquore Pontus.
Virg. Æn. 6.

Hence Men and Beaſts the breath of Life obtain,
The Birds of Air, and Monſters of the Main.

To which agrees what he own'd before in this Prayer of *Venus* to *Jupiter* :

* *O King of Gods and Men, whoſe awful Hand*
Diſperſes Thunder on the Seas and Land,
Diſpoſing all with abſolute Command.

And again, † *O Father, O eternal Pow'r of Men and Gods.*

Upon which we have this Annotation of *Servius*, that *Jupiter* is here call'd the *eternal Power* of the Gods, to diſtinguiſh him from all the other Gods that were not eternal, but made or generated from him.

Next to *Virgil* we may take notice of *Horace* uttering himſelf to the very ſame purpoſe :

‖ *What, ſhall I ſing before the conſtant Praiſe*
Of Father Jove, *who Gods and Mortals ſways ;*
Who Land, Sea, World extended wide
With various Seaſons doth divide?
From whom there nothing ſprings greater than he,
Like nothing lives, nor can a ſecond be ;

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* ——— O qui res Hominumque Deûmque
Æternis regis Imperiis & Fulmine terres. *Æn.* 1.

† O Pater, O Hominum Divûmque æterna Poteſtas. *Æn.* 10.

‖ Quid prius dicam ſolitis Parentis
Laudibus ? Qui res Hominum & Deorum,
Qui Mare & Terras variiſque Mundum
Temperat horis.
Unde nil majus generatur ipſo,
Nec viget quicquam ſimile aut ſecundum ;
Proximos illi tamen occupavit
Pallas Honores. *Hor. Lib.* 1. *Od.* 12.

Yet

Yet ſhall next Honours Pallas *grace,*
Tho ſeated in a lower place.

And again, ſpeaking of *Jove* or the ſovereign God, who deſtroy'd the rebellious Giants, he ſays this concerning him:

* ——*Who Towns and diſmal Ghoſts,*
Immortal Gods, and mortal Hoſts,
The ſtupid Earth and reſtleſs Main,
Does govern with an equal Reign.

From both which Paſſages it is plain, that *Horace*, tho he own'd many other inferior Deitys, yet aſſerted *one Supreme*, whoſe Sovereignty was chiefly ſignify'd by *Jupiter*.

Laſtly, I add that *Manilius*, who liv'd in the ſame *Auguſtean* Age, and was a zealous Oppoſer of the Atheiſtical Hypotheſis of *Epicurus* and *Lucretius*, did alſo plainly aſſert one ſupreme God, the Framer and Governor of the whole World:

† *I'll ſing how God, the World's Almighty Mind,*
Thro All *infus'd, and to that* All *confin'd,*

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* Qui terram inertem, qui Mare temperat
Ventoſum, & Urbes Regnaque triſtia;
Divoſque Mortaleſque turmas,
Imperio regit unus æquo. *Lib.* 3. *Od.* 4.

† Namque canam tacitâ Naturam mente potentem,
Infuſumque Deum Cœlo Terriſque Fretoque,
Ingentem æquali moderantem Fœdere Molem;
Totumque alterno conſenſu vivere Mundum
Et Rationis agi Motu; quum Spiritus unus
Per cunctas habitet Partes, atque irriget Orbem
Omnia pervolitans, &c.—— *Manil. l.* 2.

Directs

Directs the Parts, and with an equal Hand
Supports the Whole, enjoying his Command;
How all agree, and how the Parts have made
Strict Leagues, subsisting by each others Aid;
How all by Reason move, because one Soul
Lives in the Parts, diffusing thro the Whole, &c.

Where, as also in his fourth Book, he says much more to this purpose, some of which is quoted by * Dr. *Cudworth.* Where notwithstanding we confess that the whole animated World, or rather the Soul thereof, is, according to the *Stoical* Doctrine, made by *Manilius* to be the *supreme God.*

We now pass on from the Poets to the Philosophers of the *Pagans:* touching whom, I shall make it unquestionably evident, that the generality of 'em, however they acknowledg'd a multiplicity of Gods, yet asserted *one only self-existent* or *universal Deity,* by whom the World and all the other Gods were made; there being only some few Ditheists to be excepted, such as *Plutarch* and *Atticus,* who out of a certain softness and tenderness of Nature, that they might free the *one good God* from the Imputation of Evils, would needs set up besides him, an evil Soul or *self existent Dæmon* also in the World, to bear all the blame of them. And indeed *Epicurus* is the only Person we can find, amongst the reputed Philosophers, who tho pretending to acknowledg *Gods,* yet professedly oppos'd *Monarchy,* and verbally asserted a multitude of *eternal, unmade, self existent, incorruptible Deitys:* but such as had nothing at all to do with the making or governing of the World. Wherein first it is evident that he was not se-

* *In his* True Intel. Syst. *fol.* 368, &c.

rious

rious and ſincere, becauſe he really admitting no other Principles of things in his Philoſophy beſides *Atoms* and *Vacuum*, agreeably thereunto could acknowledg no other Gods, than ſuch as were compounded out of Atoms, and therefore corruptible. Nevertheleſs had *Epicurus* in good earneſt aſſerted ſuch a Commonwealth of Gods, as were neither made out of Atoms, nor yet corruptible; yet ſo long as he deny'd the World to have been made by any *Mind* or *Wiſdom*, as we have before declar'd, he ought not to be reckon'd among the Theiſts, but Atheiſts. But to proceed to thoſe Philoſophers, who really were Theiſts.

Thales the *Mileſian* was one of the moſt antient *Greek* Philoſophers, who that he admitted a plurality of Gods in ſome ſenſe, is evident from that Saying of his, cited by *Ariſtotle*, That * *all things are full of Gods*. But notwithſtanding, that he aſſerted one ſupreme and *only unmade* or *ſelf-exiſtent Deity*, is alſo manifeſt from that other Apophthegm of his in *Laertius*, † *God is the oldeſt of all things, becauſe he is unmade*. From whence it may be concluded that all *Thales*'s other *Gods* were generated, and the Off-ſpring of *one ſole unmade Deity*.

Pherecydes Syrus was *Thales*'s Cotemporary, of whom *Ariſtotle* in his *Metaphyſicks* has recorded, that he affirm'd that the *firſt Principle*, from which all things were generated, was the *Beſt*, or an ‖ *abſolutely perfect Being*; ſo that in the Scale of *Nature*, things did not aſcend upwards from the moſt *imperfect* to the more *perfect* Beings, but did on the contrary deſcend downwards from the *moſt perfect* to the *leſs perfect*. Again, *Laertius* informs us that this was the beginning of one

† Πλήρη θεῶν πάντα. † Πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεός, ἀγένητον γάρ.
‖ Τὸ γνῶσαν πρῶτον ἄειον.

of

of *Pherecydes*'s Books, * *Jupiter and Time and the Earth always were*; where notwithstanding in the following words he makes the Earth to be dependent upon *Jupiter*.

Pythagoras was the most eminent of all the antient Philosophers, who that he was a *Polytheist* as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from the beginning of the Golden Verses, tho not written by him: Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεὸς, &c. wherein Men are exhorted in the first place to worship the *Immortal Gods*, and that accordingly as they were appointed by Laws; after them the Heroes, as *Laertius* also declares his mind (tho not with an equal Honour) and last of all the *terrestrial Dæmons*. Notwithstanding which, that *Pythagoras* acknowledg'd *one supreme and universal Deity*, which therefore was the Original of all the other *Gods*, may partly appear from that Prayer in the Golden Verses, which, whether written by *Philolaus* or *Lysis*, were undoubtedly antient and agreeable to his Doctrine: Ζεῦ πάτερ, &c. upon which *Hierocles* thus comments; *It was*, says he, *the manner of the* Pythagoreans *to honour the Maker and Father of this whole Universe with the Name of* Dis *or* Zen, *it being just that he, who giveth Being and Life to all, should be denominated from thence.* Moreover, that this *Pythagorick* Prayer was directed to the *supreme Deity and King of Gods*, *Jamblichus* thus declares in his *Protrepticks*: *Here is*, says he, *an excellent Exhortation in these Golden Verses to the pursuit of Divine Felicity, mingl'd together with Prayers and the Invocation of the Gods,* † *but especially of that* Jupiter *who is the King of them.* And the same might further appear from those *Pythagorick* Fragments, which are still ex-

* Ζεὺς μὲν ἡ Χρόνος εἶς ἀεὶ ἡ χθὼν ἦν.
† Καὶ μάλιστα τὸ Βασιλέως αὐτῶν Διὸς.

tant,

tant, as namely thoſe of *Ocellus Lucanus* and others who were Moraliſts; in which as *Gods* are ſometimes ſpoken of plurally, ſo alſo is *God* often ſingularly us'd for that ſupreme Deity, which contains the Whole. But this will be moſt manifeſt from what has been recorded concerning the *Pythagorick* Philoſophy, and its making a *Monad* the firſt Principle: thus *Diogenes Laertius* tells us, that *Alexander*, who wrote the Succeſſions of the Philoſophers, affirm'd he had found in the *Pythagorick* Commentarys, that * *a Monad was the Principle of all things, but that from this Monad was deriv'd infinite Duality, as Matter for the Monad to work upon, as being an active Cauſe.* To which agrees *Hermias*, affirming this to be one of the greateſt of the *Pythagorick* Myſterys, that a *Monad* was *the ſole Principle of all things.* And accordingly *Clemens Alexandrinus* cites this Paſſage out of *Thearidas*, an antient *Pythagorean*, in his Book *concerning Nature*: † *The true Principle of all things was only one, for this was in the Beginning one and alone.* But *Pythagoras*, it ſeems, did not only call the ſupreme Deity a *Monad*, but alſo a *Tetrad* or *Tetractys*, which is term'd in the Golden Verſes, ‖ *the Fountain of the eternal Nature*; an Expreſſion, which can't properly belong to any thing elſe but the *ſupreme Deity*: and thus *Hierocles*, *There is nothing*, ſays he, *in the whole World, which does not depend upon the Tetractys, as its Root and Principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already ſaid, the Maker of all things, the Intelligible God, the Cauſe of the heavenly and ſenſible Gods*, that is, of the animated World or Heaven. This *Tetractys*, as ſome of the Learned among us have thought, was, it is probable, nothing

* Ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν ἁπάντων μονάδα, &c.
† Ἀρχὰ τῶν ὅλων, ἀρχὰ μὲν ὅλως ἁπλῆ μία. ‖ Πηγὴ ἀενάου φύσεως.

elſe but the *Tetragrammaton*, or that proper Name of the ſupreme God amongſt the *Hebrews*, conſiſting of four Letters or Conſonants. Neither ought it to be wonder'd at, that *Pythagoras* ſhould be ſo well acquainted with the *Hebrew Tetragrammaton*, ſince it was not unknown even to the *Hetrurians* and *Latins*, their *Jove* being certainly nothing elſe; much leſs could it be unknown to *Pythagoras*, who beſides that he travel'd into *Egypt*, *Perſia*, and *Chaldea*, and ſojourn'd at *Sidon*, is affirm'd by *Joſephus*, *Porphyrius* and others, to have convers'd with the *Hebrews* alſo. But to make an end with this Philoſopher, I ſum up all concerning him in theſe Words of St. *Cyril*: *Behold*, ſays he, *we clearly ſee, that* Pythagoras *held there was one God of the whole Univerſe, the Principle and Cauſe of all things, the Enlightner, Animater and Quickner of the whole, and the Original of Motion; from whom all things were deriv'd, and brought out of Non-entity into Being* *.

Next to *Pythagoras* in order of time, was *Xenophanes* the *Colophonian*, the Head of the *Eleatick* Sect of Philoſophers, who that he was an Aſſertor both of *many Gods* and *one God*, ſufficiently appears from this Saying of his, cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Sextus* the Philoſopher: † *There is one God, the greateſt both among Gods and Men.* Concerning which *greateſt God*, this other Saying of *Xenophanes* is alſo vouch'd: That *he moveth the whole World without any Labour or Toil, merely by Mind* ‖. Moreover, *Cicero*, *Simplicius* and others tell us, that this *Xenophanes* philoſophizing about the ſupreme Deity, was wont to call it ἓν καὶ πᾶν, *one* and *all*,

* Cyril cont. Jul. l. 1.

† Εἷς θεὸς ἔνλε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιςος.

‖ Καὶ ἀπάνευθε πονοῖο νόῳ, φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει.

as

as being one moſt ſimple Being, which virtually contain'd all things, and which he prov'd to be *one* from hence, becauſe *God is the beſt and moſt powerful of all things; and there being many degrees of Entity, there muſt needs be ſomething ſupreme to rule over all; which beſt and moſt powerful Being can be but one.* Whence it is plain, that he aſſerting *one God*, who was *All* or the Univerſe, could not acknowledg a *multitude* of partial ſelf-exiſtent Deitys.

Next to *Xenophanes* comes *Heraclitus*, who, as he acknowledg'd many Gods, according to that which *Ariſtotle* records of him, that when ſome paſſing by had ſpy'd him ſitting in a ſmoaky Cottage, he beſpoke 'em after this manner, *Come in I pray, for here alſo there are Gods*, he ſuppoſing all Places to be full of *Gods*, *Dæmons*, and *Souls*: ſo was he an undoubted Aſſertor of *one ſupreme Deity*, who governs all things, and who can neither be repreſented by Images, nor confin'd to Temples. For after he had bin accus'd of Impiety by *Euthycles*, he writes to *Hermodorus* in this manner: " O you unwiſe and unlearned! teach us " firſt what God is, that ſo you may be believ'd in accu- " ſing me of Impiety: tell us where God is. Is he " ſhut up within the Walls of Temples? Is this your " Piety, to place God in the dark, or to make him a " ſtony God? O you unskilful! Know ye not that " God is not made with Hands, and has no Baſis or " Prop to ſtand upon, nor can be inclos'd within the " Walls of any Temple; the whole World variegated " with Plants, Animals, and Stars, being his Temple? And again, " Am I impious, O *Enthycles*, who alone " know what God is? Is there no God without Altars? " Or are Stones the only Witneſſes of him? No, his " own Works give Teſtimony of him, and principally

" the Sun; Night and Day bear witneſs of him; the " Earth bringing forth Fruit declares him; the Circle " of the Moon that was made by him, is a heavenly " Teſtimony of him.

In the next place *Anaxagoras* the *Clozomenian* Philoſopher comes to be conſider'd, whoſe Predeceſſors of the *Ionick Order*, after *Thales*, as namely *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, and *Hippo*, were, as I have before obſerv'd, *Materialiſts* and *Atheiſts*; they acknowledging no other Subſtance beſides *Body*, and reſolving all things into the Motions, Paſſions, and Affections of it. But *Anaxagoras* himſelf, as *Themiſtius* and *Plutarch* tell us, was the firſt of theſe *Ionicks*, who went out of that Road: for ſeeing a neceſſity of ſome other Cauſe beſides the Material, *Matter* being not able ſo much as to move it ſelf, and much leſs, if it could, by fortuitous Motion to bring it ſelf into an orderly Syſtem; therefore he introduc'd *Mind* into the *Coſmopœia*, or his Account of the World's Formation, as the principal Cauſe of the Univerſe, which *Mind* is the ſame with God; and being utter'd in the ſingular Number plainly ſhews, that he did not ſuppoſe a multitnde of *unmade Minds* co-exiſtent from Eternity, as ſo many partial Cauſes and Governors of the World, but only *one* infinite *Mind* or God, ruling over all; and which at once was the Cauſe of all, *Matter* only excepted, this being ſuppos'd by him to be eternal, tho *Mind* indeed was the Principle of its Motion, and alſo * *the Regulator of this Motion for Good*, and conſequently the Cauſe of all the Order, Beauty, and Harmony of the World. The Chronology of the old Philoſophers having ſome Uncertainty in it, we ſhall not ſcrupulouſly concern our

* Τῦ εὖ ϗ καλῶς αἴτια.

ſelves

ſelves therein, but ſhall in the next place conſider *Parmenides*, the Auditor of *Xenophanes*, and likewiſe a Philoſophick Poet: but who converſing much with two *Pythagoreans*, *Amenias* and *Diochætes*, was therefore look'd upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the *Pythagorick* Sect. Now it is plain from the Words of this *Parmenides* that he openly acknowledg'd *many Gods*: yet however he likewiſe plainly aſſerted *one Supreme*, making him, as *Simplicius* tells us, the Cauſe of all thoſe other Gods, the firſt of whom is ſaid to have been *Love*; which ſupreme Deity, after his Maſter *Xenophanes*, he calls, * *one that was all*, or the Univerſe: as we find their ſenſe declar'd by *Eudorus*, *Simplicius*, and *Syrianus*; by which Expreſſion they meant, that there was one moſt ſimple, perfect, immutable, and incorporeal Being, which virtually contain'd all things, and from which all things are deriv'd, whoſe Duration was very different from ours, and not in a way of Flux or temporary Succeſſion, but a conſtant Eternity, without either *Paſt* or *Future*. From whence by the way, it may be obſerv'd, that this Opinion of a *ſtanding Eternity*, was not ſo novel a thing as ſome would have us think, nor was firſt of all invented by Chriſtian Writers, Schoolmen or Fathers; it being at leaſt as old as *Parmenides*, from whom it was alſo afterwards receiv'd and entertain'd by the beſt of the other Pagan Philoſophers, however it has been of late ſo mightily decry'd, not only by Atheiſtical Writers, but other precocious and conceited Wits alſo, as mere Non-ſenſe and Impoſſibility.

With *Xenophanes* and his Scholar, agreed *Meliſſus* and *Zeno Eleates*, the Scholar alſo of *Parmenides*, con-

* Ἓν τὸ πᾶν.

ſer[illegible]ing

cerning *one immoveable* or immutable God, which was *All*, or which virtually contain'd in it all things. Also this *Zeno*, as *Aristotle* informs us, endeavour'd to demonstrate that there was but *one God*, from that Idea which all Men have of him, as that which is *the Best*, the *Supreme* and *most Powerful of all*, or as an *absolutely perfect Being*. " If God, says he, be the Best of all things, " then he must needs be one; because this is God, and " the Power of God, to prevail, conquer and rule over " all. Wherefore by how much any thing falls short " of the best, by so much does it fall short of being " God. Now if there be suppos'd more such Beings, " whereof some are better, some worse; those could " not be all of 'em Gods, because it is essential to God " not to be transcended by any: but if they be con- " ceiv'd to be so many equal Gods, then would it not " be the nature of God to be the Best, one Equal being " neither better nor worse than another. Wherefore if " there be a God, and this be the Nature of him, then " can there be but one. And indeed otherwise he " could not be able to do whatsoever he would.

Also *Empedocles* is said to have been an Emulator of *Parmenides*; and that he acknowledg'd *one supreme, universal, incorporeal Deity*, may be concluded from these Words of his:

* *One Mind, that's Holy and Unspeakable,*
Moves by swift Thoughts the System of the World.

And again †:

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* Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ χὴ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον,
Φρεντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσιν.

† Οὐκ ἔστιν πλάσασθ' ὅδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτὸν
Ἠμετέροις, ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν.

Who

Who cannot be approach'd, not ſeen, nor touch'd.

The like is affirm'd concerning him by the Writer *De Mundo*, who tho not *Ariſtotle*, yet was a Pagan of good Antiquity, who tells us, that *Empedocles* deriv'd all things whatſoever from one ſupreme Deity: "All "things, ſays he, that are upon the Earth, and in the "Air and Water, may truly be call'd the Works of "God, who ruleth over the World, out of whom, "according to the Phyſical *Empedocles*, * proceed all "things that were, are, or ſhall be. Indeed he held, as *Ariſtotle* alſo tells us, that Plants, Beaſts, Men, and Gods proceeded all of 'em immediately from *Contention* and *Friendſhip*, without the former of which he imagin'd that all things would be but *One:* but then withal he ſuppos'd that this Contention and Friendſhip depended on *one ſupreme Deity*, who has in him no *Contention* or Diſcord at all, becauſe he is eſſentially τὸ ἕν, or Unity it ſelf and *Friendſhip* †.

Before we come to *Socrates* and *Plato*, we might here take notice of ſome other *Pythagoreans* and eminent Philoſophers, as namely *Philolaus Archytas*, *Ocellus*, *Onatus*, *Ecphantus*, eminently call'd the *Pythagorean*, *Antiſthenes* the Founder of the *Cynick* Sect, *Diogenes Sinopenſis*; to whom might alſo be added *Timæus Locrus*, a *Pythagorean*, ſenior to *Plato*, the Author of a Book concerning *Nature* or the *Soul of the World*, upon which *Plato*'s *Timæus* was but a kind of Commentary; all which Philoſophers, if we believe *Philo*, *Stobæus*, *Jamblichus*, &c. clearly aſſerted *one ſupreme and univerſal*

* Παντ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, ὅσα τ' ἐστὶν ἰδ' ὅσα τε ἔσαι ὀπίσω, &c.
† Ariſt. Met. l. 3. c. 4.

Deity,

Deity, tho undoubtedly they at once acknowledg'd other inferior Gods. What I here aſſert depends on their Authoritys, which if any one diſtruſt whether it be enough ſupported by them or not, I refer him to Dr. *Cudworth*'s *True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, p. 393, *&c.* and ſo I proceed to *Socrates*.

Some are of opinion that *Socrates* died a Martyr for aſſerting one only God: but this is a vulgar Error. For the main Charge againſt him was his free and open condemning thoſe Traditions concerning the Gods, wherein wicked, diſhoneſt and unjuſt Actions were imputed to 'em. But that he acknowledg'd more Gods than *One*, to omit other reaſons, may appear from theſe that follow; that in his laſt dying Words, when one would think he ſhould be moſt ſerious, he requir'd his Friends, after having drunk the fatal Poiſon, to offer a votive Cock for him to *Æſculapius*. Agreeably to this, *Plato* tells us, that he pray'd not to *God*, but to *the Gods*, that is, to the ſupreme and inferior Gods both together; and *Xenophon* in his Memoirs informs us, that *Socrates* did both in his Words and Practice approve of that Doctrine of the *Pythian Apollo*, That *the Rule of Piety and Religion ought to be the Law of every particular City and Country*; he affirming it to be a vanity for any Man to be ſingular herein. Laſtly, in his own Apology, as written by *Plato*, he profeſſes himſelf to acknowledg the Sun, Moon, and Stars for Gods, condemning the contrary Doctrine of *Anaxagoras* for irrational and abſurd. But tho it be thus evident that *Socrates* acknowledg'd more Gods than one, yet is it no leſs plain that he at once acknowledg'd *one ſupreme God*, and ſuch as was above all the reſt, as, to omit other Paſſages, will ſufficiently appear from theſe that follow: When *Ariſtodemus* in *Xenophon*'s firſt Book of Memoirs

Memoirs diſcover'd his Disbelief of Providence, as a thing which ſeem'd to him incredible, if not impoſſible, that one and the ſame Deity ſhould be able to mind all things at once, *Socrates* endeavours to cure his Disbelief in this manner: "Conſider, Friend, ſays he, I "pray you, if that Mind which is in your Body, does "order and diſpoſe it every way, as it pleaſes; why "ſhould not that Wiſdom, which is in the Univerſe, "be able to order all things therein alſo, as ſeemeth "beſt to it? And if your Eye can diſcern things ſeveral "Miles diſtant from it, why ſhould it be thought im-"poſſible for the Eye of God to behold all things at "once? Laſtly, if your Soul can mind things both "here and in *Egypt* and in *Sicily*, why may not the "great Mind or Wiſdom of God be able to take care "of all things in all Places? And then he concludes, that if *Ariſtodemus* would diligently apply himſelf to the Worſhip of God, he would at length be convinc'd, *That God is ſuch and ſo great a Being, that he can at once ſee all things, and hear all things, and be preſent every where, and take care of all Affairs.* Moreover, *Socrates* in his Diſcourſe with *Euthydemus* in *Xenophon*'s fourth Book ſpeaks thus concerning that inviſible Deity which governs the whole World: "The other "Gods giving us good things, do it without viſibly "appearing to us; and that God who fram'd and con-"taineth the whole World, in which are all good and "excellent things, and who continually ſupplieth us "with 'em; he, tho he be ſeen to do the greateſt "things of all, yet notwithſtanding is himſelf inviſible "and unſeen. Which ought the leſs to be wonder'd "at by us, becauſe the Sun, which ſeemeth manifeſt "to all, yet will not ſuffer himſelf to be exactly and "diſtinctly view'd; but if any one impudently and

" boldly gaze upon him, he will deprive him of his ſight:
" as alſo becauſe the Soul of Man, which moſt of all
" things in him partaketh of the Deity, tho it be that
" which manifeſtly rules and reigns in us, yet is
" never ſeen. Which Particulars he that conſiders,
" ought not to deſpiſe inviſible things, but to honour
" the ſupreme Deity, taking notice of his Power from
" his Effects.

Next to *Socrates* comes his Scholar *Plato*, whom many have alſo affirm'd to have held *one only God*, and no more; and that therefore whenſoever he ſpeaks of *Gods plurally*, he muſt be underſtood to have done this not according to his own Judgment, but only in a way of politick Compliance with the *Athenians*, and for fear of being made to drink Poiſon, as *Socrates* was. In confirmation of which Opinion, there is alſo a Paſſage cited out of the thirteenth Epiſtle of *Plato* to *Dionyſius*, wherein he gives this as a mark, whereby his ſerious Epiſtles, and ſuch as were written according to the true ſenſe of his own Mind, might by his Friends be diſtinguiſh'd from thoſe which were otherwiſe: *When I begin my Epiſtles with* God, *then may you conclude that I write ſeriouſly; but not ſo, when I begin with* Gods*. And this place ſeems to be therefore the more Authentick, becauſe it was long ſince produc'd by *Euſebius* to this very purpoſe, namely to prove that *Plato* acknowledg'd *one only God* †. But it is obſervable, that there has been a νοθεύεται, or Brand of Baſtardy prefix'd to this Epiſtle in all the Editions of *Plato*'s Works; and it is otherwiſe very probable, that tho this Paſſage was extant before *Euſebius*'s time, yet it was the Forgery of

* Τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπουδαίας ὁπτέον ἀνδὸς ἄρχει, θεοὶ δ' τῆς ἥττονος.
† Euſ. Præp. Ev. l. 11. c. 13.

ſome

ſome zealous, but ignorant Chriſtian, eſpecially conſidering that it directly oppoſes the Tenour of *Plato*'s Doctrine elſewhere. For firſt in his *Timæus*, as we have already ſhewn, he directly aſſerted a plurality of *Gods*; by which Gods of his are to be underſtood animated or intellectual Beings, ſuperior to Men, and to whom ſome Honour and Worſhip from Men is due. And the ſame might be further evinc'd from all his other Writings, but eſpecially his Book of *Laws*, and his *Epinomis*, which latter is ſaid to have been written by him in his old Age; in which he much inſiſts upon the Godſhips of the Sun, Moon, and Stars; and complains that the young Gentlemen of *Athens* were then infected with that Doctrine of *Anaxagoras*, which made 'em to be nothing but inanimate Stones and Earth: as alſo he approves of that then vulgarly-receiv'd Cuſtom of worſhipping the riſing and ſetting Sun and Moon as Gods, to which in all probability he himſelf conform'd. But however tho *Plato* acknowledg'd and worſhip'd *many Gods*, yet is it undeniably evident, that he was no *Polyarchiſt*, but a *Monarchiſt*, that is, an Aſſertor of *one ſupreme God*, the only ſelf-originated Being, the Maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all the other *Gods*, as may be fully ſeen at the beginning of his *Timæus*. Upon which account *Ariſtotle* quarrels with *Plato*, as contradicting himſelf, in that he affirm'd the Soul to be a Principle, and yet ſuppos'd it not to be eternal, but made together with the Heaven*. For which cauſe ſome *Platoniſts* conclude, that *Plato* aſſerted a double *Pſyche*, one the third *Hypoſtaſis* of his *Trinity* and eternal, the other created in time together with the World, which ſeems to be a probable Opinion. Wherefore

* Ariſt. Met. l. 14. c. 6.

ſince, according to *Plato*, the Soul of the World, which is the chief of all his *inferior Gods*, was not ſelf-exiſtent, but made or produc'd by God in time, all thoſe other *Gods* of his, which were but Parts of the World, as the Sun, Moon, Stars, and Dæmons, muſt needs be ſo too. But leſt any ſhould ſuſpect, that *Plato* might for all that ſuppoſe the World and its *Gods* not to have been made by *one only unmade God*, but by a multitude of co-ordinate ſelf-exiſtent Principles or Deitys conſpiring, we ſhall obſerve that the contrary hereunto is plainly declar'd by him, in way of anſwer to that Query, Whether or no there were many and infinite Worlds, as ſome Philoſophers had maintain'd, or only one? He reſolving it thus about the beginning of the *Timæus*, that there is but one *Archetypal Mind* or Maker of all things that were produc'd; and therefore but one World. And this one God, who according to *Plato* was the Maker of the whole World, is frequently call'd by him *God*, or *the God* by way of eminency; ſometimes, *the Architect or Artificer of the World*; ſometimes, *the Maker and Father of this Univerſe, whom it is hard to find out, but impoſſible to declare to the Vulgar*; again, *the God over all, the Creator of Nature, the ſole Principle of the Univerſe, the Cauſe of all things, and Mind*; *the King of all things, which orders and paſſes thro all things, the Governor of the Whole, that which always is and was never made, the firſt and greateſt God, he that generated or produc'd the Sun*; *he that makes Heaven, Earth, and the Gods, and does all things both in Heaven and Hell and under the Earth*; he, *by whoſe Efficiency the things of the World were afterwards made, when they were not before, or from an antecedent Non-exiſtence were brought forth into Being*: This Philoſopher ſomewhere intimating, That *it was as eaſy*

for

for God to produce those real things, the Sun, Moon, Stars, and Earth, &c. *from himself, as it is for us to produce the Images of our selves, and of whatsoever else we please, by the Interposition of a Looking-glass,* Lastly, he calls him, *him that produceth both all other things and even himself*; whereby he meant, as he elsewhere calls him, that he was * *a self-originated Being, and from no other Cause besides himself, but the Cause of all other things.* And to him agrees not only his Commentator *Plotinus*, but also *Lactantius* and other *Christians*, who have denoted the same by the word αὐτογενὴς, as they have apply'd it to God; whose Scope or Drift in this, as also that of those Philosophers, was partly to set forth the Self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively manner; and partly to confute that odd Conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happen'd by Chance to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of Nature, and had his Being impos'd upon him: whereas he is as much every way, what he would will and chuse to be, as if he had made himself by his own Will and Choice.

Next to *Plato* we may here join *Xenophon*, as being his Equal, and a *Socratick* too, (tho it seems there was no very good Correspondence between 'em) which *Xenophon*, however in sundry places of his Writings he acknowledges a *Plurality* of *Gods*, yet among many others gives this particular Testimony of *one supreme* and *universal Deity*: That † *he both agitates all things, and establishes the Frame of the whole World; who tho he be manifest and visible to be great and powerful, yet is as to his Form hidden and invisible.*

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* Αὐτοφυὴς.

† Ὁ πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τὶς, καὶ δυνατὸς φανερὸς, ὁποῖος δ' ἐστὶ μορφὴν ἀφανὴς.

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In the next place we come to *Ariſtotle*, who that he acknowledg'd more Gods than one, as well as other Pagans, appears from his uſing the Word ſo often *Plurally* *. But withal that he aſſerted one ſupreme and univerſal Deity, is a thing alſo unqueſtionable. For tho it be granted that he us'd the ſingular θεὸς, as likewiſe θεοὶ and τὸ δαιμόνιον, many times indefinitely for a God in general or any Divine Being; and that ſuch places as theſe have been oftentimes miſtaken by Chriſtian Writers, as if *Ariſtotle* had meant the ſupreme God in them; yet is it likewiſe certain, that he often uſes thoſe Words alſo emphatically for one only ſupreme God †. Moreover, *Ariſtotle* in his ‖ *Metaphyſicks*, as I have before obſerv'd, profeſſedly oppoſes that imaginary Opinion of many independent Principles of the Univerſe, that is, of many unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deitys; he confuting the ſame from the *Phænomena*, becauſe all things are plainly co-order'd to *One*, the whole World conſpiring into one agreeing Harmony. Whereas if there were many Principles or independent Deitys, the Syſtem of the World muſt needs have been incoherent and unconſpiring, like an ill-agreeing *Drama*, botch'd up of many impertinent Interſertions. Wherefore he concludes with *Homer*, That *the Government of many is not good*, and that therefore there is ** *one Prince, one Monarch over all.* So that again, tho he not only own'd a multiplicity of Gods in the vulgar ſenſe, but alſo doted on this particular Whimſy of his, that there are as many Intelligibles or eternal immoveable Minds, now commonly call'd Intelli-

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* *See him quoted to this purpoſe in* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 408, &c.

† *Quotations out of his Works to this purpoſe may be ſeen in* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *fol.* 410, &c. ‖ L. 14. c. 10.

** Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, εἷς κοίρανος, &c.

gences,

gences, as there are moveable Spheres of all kinds in the Heavens, which he ſticks not alſo ſometimes to call Principles; yet muſt he of neceſſity be interpreted to have deriv'd all theſe from one ſupreme Univerſal Deity, which, as *Simplicius* expreſſes it, is * *the Principle of Principles*; and which comprehends and contains thoſe other inferior Deitys under it, as the *Primum Mobile*, or higheſt Sphere, contains all the leſſer Spheres within it. Nay this higheſt Principle, as it is an *immoveable Eſſence*, is by *Ariſtotle* ſuppos'd to be the Principle of Motion in the Univerſe, or at leaſt of the chiefeſt Motion of the *Primum Mobile* or higheſt Sphere, which according to the Aſtronomy of thoſe times, ſeems to have been the Sphere of fix'd Stars, by whoſe rapid Circumgyration all the other Spheres or Heavens were imagin'd to be carry'd round from Eaſt to Weſt: agreeably to that of *Boetius*,

—Stabiliſque manens dat cuncta moveri.

Being it ſelf immoveable, it moves
All other things; —

And not only ſo, but he alſo held with *Anaxagoras* that one ſupreme Being, by what Name ſoever call'd, whether *Mind* or *Good*, is the proper efficient Cauſe of all that's *Well* and *Fit*, that is, of all the Order, Beauty, and Harmony in the Univerſe; the whole Mundane Syſtem having been fram'd, and being ſtill mov'd and govern'd according to the beſt Wiſdom and after the beſt manner poſſible †. Again, to diſtinguiſh *God* from

* Ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν.

† *See Quotations to this purpoſe in* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 414.

other

other inferior Gods or any other Creatures whatsoever: he affirms that * *God possesseth all good things, and is self-sufficient.* Again, that there must needs be something *eternal* and *unmade*, as likewise *incorruptible*; *because*, says he, † *if all Substances were corruptible, then all might come to nothing*; which *eternal*, *unmade*, or *self-existent and incorruptible Substance*, according to *Aristotle*, is not *senseless Matter*, *but a perfect Mind.* Again he says, that God is an *incorporeal Substance*, *separate from Sensibles*, and not only so, but also ‖ *indivisible, and devoid of Parts and Magnitude.* And tho he held the Eternity of the World, as well as of God, yet did he partly do it, as he thought, upon this innocent ground, because it cannot be suppos'd, that God, who is an *immoveable Nature* and *whose Essence is Act or Energy*, should have rested or slept from Eternity, doing nothing at all; and then after infinite Ages should have begun to move the Matter, or make the World.

But now, to conclude all concerning *Aristotle*, I shall only add this brief Summary, which he himself gives us of his own Creed and Religion, agreeably to the Tradition of his Pagan Ancestors: *It has been deliver'd down to us*, says he, *from very antient times, that the Stars are Gods also; besides that supreme Deity, which contains the whole Nature. But all the other things were fabulously added hereunto, for the better persuasion of the Multitude, and for the advantage of human Life and Political Ends, to keep Men in obedience to Civil Laws: as for example, that these Gods are of human Form, or*

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* Πάντα ἔχει τ' ἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς ᾗ ἐστιν αὐτάρκης. Mag. Mor. l. 2. c. 15.

† Εἰ πᾶσαι εἰσὶαι φθαρτὰὶ, πάντα φθαρτά. Met. l. 14. c. 6.

‖ Κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀδιαίρετος, ἀμερὴς, ἀμεγέθης. Met. l. 14. c. 7.

like

like to other Animals, with ſuch other things as are conſequent hereupon *. From which Words it appears, that tho *Ariſtotle* acknowledg'd many inferior Gods, and was at once ſenſible how far Policy was concern'd in ordering the Pagan Worſhip, and imbuing the Minds of the Vulgar with ſuperſtitious Notions; yet notwithſtanding he ſeriouſly aſſerted *one ſupreme God*, who contains the *whole Nature and Univerſe.*

To *Ariſtotle* may be ſubjoin'd *Speuſippus* and *Xenocrates*, his Equals and Corrivals, they being *Plato's* Succeſſors, together with *Theophraſtus*, his own Scholar and Succeſſor: of the firſt of whom *Cicero* gives this account, that agreeably to *Plato*, he aſſerted † *one Animal and Intellectual Force, by which all things are govern'd*; of the ſecond, *Stobæus* relates that he held ‖ *a Monad to be God, having the Order of a Father, which he calls* Zen *or Mind, and which is alſo to him the firſt God*; of the third we have this Teſtimony, beſides others, cited out of his *Metaphyſicks*, That ** *there is one Divine Principle of all things, by or from which all things ſubſiſt and remain.*

Next we come to the *Stoicks*, whoſe chiefeſt Doctors *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, and *Chryſippus*, were no better Naturaliſts and Metaphyſicians, than *Heraclitus*, in whoſe Footſteps they trod; they in like manner admitting no other Subſtance beſides *Body*, according to the true and proper Notion thereof, as that which is not only *diſtant* and *extended*, but alſo *reſiſting* and *impenetrable.*

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* Met. l. 14. c. 8.

† Vim quandam, quâ omnia regantur, eamque Animalem. *Cic. de Nat. De. l.* 1.

‖ Τὴν μονάδα, &c. πατέρος ἔχουσαν τάξιν, ἥντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ ζῆνα, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ Νῶν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. l. 1. c. 3.

** Θεία γὰρ πάντων ἀρχή, δι' ἧς τὰ πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ διαμένει.

And again, ſo mightily devoted were they to Polytheiſm, that, as *Plutarch* has noted, they concluded * *all things to be full of Gods and Dæmons*; and accordingly their Religious Worſhip extended to a multiplicity of Gods. To this purpoſe *Epictetus* exhorts, ſaying, † *pray to the Gods.* And the ſame Philoſopher thus deſcribes the Diſpoſition of a Perſon rightly affected: ‖ *I would willingly know what is my Duty, firſt to the Gods, and then to my Parents and other Relations.* And theſe are the Precepts of *Marcus Antoninus:* ** *Revere the Gods*; and, *in every thing implore the Aid and Aſſiſtance of the Gods.* Accordingly in the Cloſe of his firſt Book he thankfully aſcribes many particular Benefits to the Gods in common: *I owe to the* Gods, *that I had good Progenitors and Parents*, &c. where among the reſt he reckons up this for one, that he never was any great Proficient in Poetry or Rhetorick; becauſe theſe, if he had ſucceeded in the purſuit of 'em, would probably have hinder'd him from the Attainment of far better things: and after all his Enumeration he thus concludes, †† *For all theſe things need the Aſſiſtance of the Gods and Fortune, becauſe they are not in our power.*

But after all, neither do we find that the *Stoicks* were ſo much Corporealiſts as to be downright Atheiſts, nor ſo much Polytheiſts as not ſtill to be Monarchiſts. Firſt I ſay, that they were not ſo much Corporealiſts as to be Atheiſts, inaſmuch as they reſolv'd that *Mind* or *Underſtanding*, tho always lodg'd in corporeal Subſtance, yet was not firſt of all begotten out of ſenſleſs Matter, ſo or ſo modify'd, but was an eternal unmade

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* Πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων. † Εὔχου θεοῖς.
‖ Θέλω εἰδέναι τί μοί καθῆκον πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, &c.
** Αἰδοῦ θεούς, καὶ ἐν ἅπασι θεοὺς ἐπικαλοῦ.
†† Πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δέεται.

thing,

thing, and the Maker of the whole Mundane Syſtem. And therefore as to that Controverſy ſo much agitated among the Antients, whether the World were made by Chance or by the *Neceſſity of material Motions*, or by *Mind, Reaſon, and Underſtanding*; they avowedly maintain'd, that it was neither by *Chance*, nor by *material Neceſſity*, but by a *Divine and Eternal Mind every way perfect*. From which *one eternal Mind*, they alſo affirm'd human Souls to have been deriv'd, and not from *ſenſleſs Matter*, ſaying, That * *Wiſdom and Mind deſcended down to Men from the Deity*; and that *Reaſon* is nothing elſe but part of the Divine Spirit immerg'd into a human Body: ſo that theſe human Souls were to them no other than certain † *Parts of God, or Diſcerptions and Avulſions from him.* And as this God of the *Stoicks*, this great Soul, Mind, and Underſtanding, or in *Seneca*'s Language, this *Ratio incorporalis*, was the firſt Author, ſo is he the Ruler of the whole World, and is call'd by 'em not only Mind, but Good, as being in his Government, according to ‖ *Cleanthes*'s Deſcription of him, moſt *Moral* and *Beneficent*.

And again I ſay, that neither were the *Stoicks* ſo much Polytheiſts, but that they were ſtill Monarchiſts and Aſſertors of *one ſupreme God*, who made and rules the Univerſe; foraſmuch as they plainly declare, that all their multiplicity of Gods, one only excepted, was generated and created in time by that *One*, call'd *Zeus* or *Jupiter*, who was not only the *Spermatick Reaſon*,

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* Prudentiam & Mentem a Diis ad Homines perveniſſe.

† Μοῖρα θεῦ ϗ ἀποσπάσματα.

‖ Τ' ἀγαθὸν ἐρωτᾷς μ' ὅτιον ἐστι; ἄκυε δὲ,
Τέλαγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβὲς,
Κρατῆν ἑαυτῦ, χρήσιμον, καλὸν, δέον, &c.
Cleanth. in Clem. Al.

but alſo the *Soul* and Mind of the whole Univerſe; and who from himſelf produc'd the World and thoſe *Gods* out of Non-exiſtence into Being; and not only ſo, but that alſo in the *ſucceſſive Conflagrations*, which the *Stoicks* unanimouſly ſuppoſe to come to paſs, they are all again reſolv'd and ſwallow'd up into that *One*, who afterwards produces the whole Mundane Syſtem, together with all the *Gods*, out of himſelf again. To this purpoſe we have the Teſtimony of *Plutarch* in his *Defect of Oracles*: * *We know*, ſays he, *that the* Stoicks *maintain this Opinion, not only concerning Dæmons, but alſo the Gods themſelves, that they are mortal. For tho they own ſuch a multitude of Gods,* † *yet do they acknowledg only one of 'em to be eternal and incorruptible; affirming of all the reſt, that as they were made in time, ſo will they again be corrupted and deſtroy'd.* Agreeably to this, *Zeno* in *Laertius* ſpeaking about the *Coſmopœia*, ſays, That ‖ *God at firſt being alone and by himſelf, converted the fiery Subſtance of the World by degrees into Water, that is, into a groſſer kind of Chaos; out of which Water he himſelf afterwards, as the Spermatick Reaſon of the World, form'd the Elements and the whole Mundane Syſtem.* And ** *Cicero* himſelf in his *De Legibus*, ſpeaking the ſenſe of the *Stoicks*, attributes the firſt Original of Mankind cautiouſly, not to the Gods in common, but to the ſupreme God only. Thus alſo †† *Epictetus* plainly aſcribes the making of the whole World to God or the *one ſupreme Deity*. Again, he makes a plain diſ-

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* Τὰς Στωικὰς γινώσκομεν, &c. † Ἑνὶ Θεῷ ἀϊδίῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ, τὰς δ' ἄλλας καὶ γεγενέναι καὶ φθαρήσεσθαι νομίζουσας. Plut.

‖ Τὸν θεὸν κατ' ἀρχὰς καθ' αὑτὸν ὄντα, &c.

** Hoc Animal providum, &c. quem vocamus Hominem, præclarâ quâdam Conditione generatum eſſe a ſummo Deo. *Cic.*

†† Ὁ θεὸς πάντα ποιήματα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον.

tinction

tinction of the * *one supreme God*, from the inferior Gods, in saying that *God is the Father of Men and Gods.* Also elsewhere he expressly makes the like distinction: *I have*, says he, *whom I ought to be subject to, whom to obey, God and those who are next after him*, that is, the supreme and inferior Gods †.

Moreover, that the Stoicks, agreeably to their Belief of one supreme God, did accordingly honour and worship him above all other Gods, may appear from sundry Instances: as first from their owning him to be the Sovereign Legislator, and professing Subjection and Obedience to his Laws, accounting this to be their greatest Liberty: thus *Epictetus*, "No man, says he, has "power over me, I am free by God, that is, *by becoming* "*his Subject*; I know his Commandments, and no man "can bring me under Bondage to himself. And again, "These things would I be found employing my self "about, that I may be able to say to God, Have I transgress'd any of thy Commandments? Have I us'd my "Facultys and Anticipations or common Notions "otherwise than thou requirest? Also the same appears from his bespeaking the supreme God after this manner: "Did I ever complain of thy Government? "I was sick when thou wouldst have me, and so are "others; but I vvas so vvillingly. Also I vvas poor "at thy Appointment, but still rejoicing; I never "bore any Magistracy, nor had any Dignity, because "thou wouldst not have me, and I never desir'd it. "Didst thou ever see me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I at any time appear'd before

* Ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ ἐστι τῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν θεῶν.

† *Much more may be seen to this purpose quoted out of* Epictetus *and* Marcus Antoninus *in* Cud. True Intel. Syst. *p.* 427, 428, 429, &c.

"thee

" thee with a diſcontented Countenance? Was I not
" always prepar'd and ready for whatſoever thou re-
" quireſt? Wilt thou now have me to depart out of
" this Feſtival Solemnity? I am ready to go; and I
" render thee all Thanks for that thou haſt honour'd
" me ſo far, as to let me keep the Feaſt with thee and
" behold thy Works, and obſerve thy Oeconomy of the
" World. Let Death ſeize upon me no otherwiſe em-
" ploy'd, than thus thinking and writing of ſuch things.
To the ſame purpoſe does he again make this Exhortation: " Dare to lift up thine Eyes to God and ſay,
" Uſe me hereafter to whatſoever thou pleaſeſt. I
" agree, and am of the ſame mind with thee, in-
" different to all things. I refuſe nothing that ſhall
" ſeem good to thee. Lead me whither thou pleaſeſt.
" Let me act what part thou wilt, either of a publick
" or private Perſon, of a rich Man or a Beggar. I
" will apologize for thee, as to all theſe things, before
" Men; and I will alſo ſhew the Nature of every one
" of them.

Again, the reverent Demeanour of the *Stoicks* towards the *one ſupreme God*, does alſo appear from their pretenſions to look to God, and to refer all to him; expecting Aid and Aſſiſtance from him, and placing their Confidence in him. Thus *Epictetus: My Deſign*, ſays he, *is this, to render you free and undiſturb'd, *always looking at God, as well in every ſmall as greater Matter.* And again he concludes, That *a Man will never be able any otherwiſe to expel Grief, Fear, Deſire, Envy*, &c. *than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him and the Obſervance of his Commandments†.* Thus

* Εἰς τὴν θεὸν ἀφορῶντως, &c.
† Ἐς μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, &c.

alſo

alſo *Marcus Antoninus* affirms, That *no human thing is well done without a reference to God.* And he very well exhorts Men *to be delighted and ſatisfy'd with this one thing; in doing one Action after another, tending to a common Good, or the Advantage of human Society,* * *together with the Remembrance of God.* Accordingly as the *Stoicks* believ'd themſelves to be under the Providence and Care of the *one ſupreme God*, they not only ſubmitted to his Will under whatſoever Evils they ſuffer'd, and refer'd to him all the Goods they enjoy'd: but alſo gratefully thank'd him for the latter, and us'd themſelves to pray to him for future Bleſſings. With relation to the former of theſe, *Epictetus* again thus ſpeaks their ſenſe: " * Had we Underſtanding, ſays he, " what ſhould we do elſe, but both publickly and private- " ly praiſe God, and return Thanks to him? Ought not " they who dig, plow and eat, continually to ſing " ſuch a Hymn to God as this? Great is that God who " gave us theſe Organs to cultivate the Earth withal; " great is that God who gave us Hands, *&c.* who " enabl'd us to grow undiſcernibly, and to breath in our " Sleep. But the greateſt and divineſt Hymn of all is " this, to praiſe God for the Faculty of underſtanding " all theſe things. What then, if for the moſt part " Men be blinded, ought there not to be ſome, who " ſhould perform this Office, and ‖ ſing a Hymn to *God* " for all? If I were a Nightingale, I would perform " the Office of a Nightingale; or if a Swan, then " that of a Swan: ** but now being a reaſonable Crea-

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* Σὺν μνήμῃ τῦ Θεῦ.

† Εἰ νῦν εἴχομεν, ἄλλο τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς ποιῶν, ἢ κοινῇ ἢ ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ εὐτημεῖν, καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χρείας, &c.

‖ Ἄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεὸν; μεγὰς ὁ θεὸς, &c.

** Νῦν δὲ λογικὸς εἰμι, ὑμνεῖν με δεῖ τὸν Θεόν.

" ture,

" ture, I ought to celebrate and ſing aloud the Praiſes " of God, that is, of the ſupreme Deity.

Thus again were they alſo us'd to invoke the ſupreme God as ſuch for future Bleſſings, addreſſing their Devotions to him alone, without the conjunction of any other Gods; and particularly imploring his Aſſiſtance againſt the Aſſaults of Temptations, call'd by them *Phancys*. To this purpoſe is that of *Epictetus*; *This is a great Conflict or Contention, a Divine Enterpriſe, it is for Liberty and for a Kingdom: Now remember the ſupreme God, call upon him as thy Helper and Aſſiſtant, as the Mariners do upon* Caſtor *and* Pollux *in a Tempeſt* *. Alſo he recommends this Form of devotional Addreſs, which was part of † *Cleanthes*'s Litany, to be us'd frequently upon occaſion: *Lead me, O* Jupiter, *and thou* Fate, *whitherſoever I am by you deſtin'd, and I will readily and cheerfully follow; who, tho I were never ſo reluctant, yet muſt needs follow.* Where *Jupiter* and *Fate* are really but one and the ſame ſupreme Deity under two ſeveral Names; and accordingly ‖ *Seneca* in other words very well begins the turning of it thus:

Maker and Ruler of the lofty Pole,
Lead me.——

To this agrees another excellent Hymn of *Cleanthes*, which begins thus, but is too large to be entirely ſet down in this place:

Hail thou moſt glorious of th' immortal Gods,

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* Τῦ Θεῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ὀπικαλῦ Conδὸν καὶ βοηθόν, &c.
† Ἄγε δή με ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σὺ ἡπεπρωμένη, &c. *Cleanth.*
‖ Duc me Parens celſique Dominator Poli, &c. *Sen.*

Who

Who call'd by many Names, haſt always one
Almighty Pow'r, thou Jupiter, *the Prince*
Of Nature, who by certain Law doſt rule
The Univerſe, &c *.

It would be endleſs to cite all the other Pagan Teſtimonys, eſpecially thoſe of latter times, concerning one ſupreme and univerſal Deity. Wherefore I ſhall content my ſelf only to inſtance in ſome of the moſt remarkable, beginning with *M. T. Cicero*, whom tho ſome would ſuſpect to have been a *Sceptick* as to Theiſm, becauſe in his *De Naturâ Deorum* he brings in *Cotta* the *Academick* as well oppoſing *Q. Lucil. Balbus* the *Stoick*, as *C. Velleius* the *Epicurean*; yet from ſundry other places of his Writings it ſufficiently appears, that he was a Dogmatical and hearty Theiſt, as for example, this in his Book *De Divinatione*: " † That there is, " ſays he, ſome moſt excellent and eternal Nature, " which is to be admir'd and honour'd by Mankind, " the Beauty of the World and the Order of the " heavenly Bodys compel us to confeſs. And this in his Oration *de Haruſpicum Reſponſis*: " || Who is ſo " mad or ſtupid, ſays he, as when he looks up to " Heaven, is not preſently convinc'd that there are " Gods? Or can perſuade himſelf, that thoſe things, " which are made with ſo much Mind and Wiſdom, as

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* Κύδιϛ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε παγκρατὲς αἰεὶ
Ζεὺς φύσεως ἀρχηγὲ, νόμε μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν,
Χαῖρε, &c.

The whole very well worth ſeeing, as alſo the Latin *Verſion of it by Dr.* Duport, *in Dr.* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 432, &c.

† Eſſe præſtantem aliquam æternamque Naturam, & eam ſuſpiciendam admirandamque Hominum Generi, &c.

|| Quis eſt tam vecors, qui cum ſuſpexerit in Cœlum, Deos eſſe non ſentiat? &c.

" that no human Skill is able to reach and comprehend " the Artifice and Contrivance of 'em, did all happen " by Chance? Alſo in the Cloſe of the Diſcourſe *De Naturâ Deorum*, *Cicero*, as St. *Auſtin* obſerves, plainly declares himſelf to be more inclinable to the Doctrine of *Balbus*, than either that of *Velleius* or *Cotta*; that is, tho he did not aſſent to the *Stoical* Doctrine or Theology in every point, himſelf being rather a *Platoniſt* than a *Stoick*, yet did he much prefer it, not only before the *Epicureiſm* of *Velleius*, but alſo the *Scepticiſm* of *Cotta*.

However, it muſt be own'd that *Cicero*, tho a *Theiſt*, yet was a *Polytheiſt*; nay, and as ſome have thought, he carry'd this ſo far, as to aſſert a multitude of Gods, the Framers and Rulers of the World, for which he is cenſur'd by *Auguſtinus Stenchus* and other Learned Men. As to which I ſay, that he and other Pagans aſcrib'd the Formation and Government of the World to Gods *plurally* upon no other account, but becauſe they did not ſuppoſe the *ſupreme God* to do all things immediately and by himſelf, but that he aſſign'd ſome certain Parts and Provinces to other inferior Gods, as Miniſters under him, who therefore ſharing in the Formation and Oeconomy of the World, were ſometimes nam'd as Co-creators and Co-governours thereof. Wherefore I ſay, notwithſtanding the Polytheiſm of this Learned Orator and Philoſopher, that he ſtill acknowledg'd the *Monarchy of the World*, or *one ſupreme and univerſal Deity over all*. This appears firſt from his ſo often uſing the word *God* in the ſingular, emphatically and by way of eminency; as when he ſays that *nothing can be leſs grateful to* * *God himſelf, than that there ſhould not be a liberty*

* Ipſi Deo nihil minus gratum, &c. *L.* 2. *de Leg.*

open

open to all, to worſhip and appeaſe him. And again, *Curius* and *Fabricius* had never been ſuch Men as they were, had it not been * *for the Aſſiſtance of God.* And ſays he, † *We muſt needs acknowledg that the Benefits of this Life, the Light which we enjoy, and the Spirit which we breathe, are imparted to us by God.* Alſo in his Verſion of *Plato*'s *Timæus*, ‖ *God*, ſays he, *diſtributing Gods to all the Parts of the World, did as it were ſow ſome Gods in the Earth*, &c. Moreover, this appears from the Deſcriptions he makes of God, which plainly imply his *Oneneſs* or *Singularity*, as when he ſays: " ** There is, there certainly is ſuch a Divine Force " in the World; neither is it reaſonable to think, " that in theſe groſs and frail Bodys of ours, there " ſhould be ſomething, which has Life, Senſe and Un- " derſtanding, and yet no ſuch thing in the whole Uni- " verſe: unleſs Men will therefore conclude that there " is none, becauſe they ſee it not; as if we could ſee " our own Mind (whereby we diſpoſe and order all " things, and whereby we reaſon and ſpeak thus) and " perceive what kind of thing it is, and where it is " lodg'd. Where, as there is a very ſtrong Aſſeveration of the Exiſtence of a God, ſo is his *Singularity* plainly imply'd, in that he ſuppoſes him to be *one Mind or Soul*, acting and governing the whole World, as our Mind does our Body. Again, in his *Tuſculan* Queſtions: " †† Neither, ſays he, can God himſelf be otherwiſe

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* Niſi juvante Deo, &c. *De Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

† Commoda quibus utimur, &c. a Deo nobis dari atque impertiri videmus. *In Orat. pro S. Roſc.*

‖ Deos alios in Terrâ, alios in Luna, alios in reliquas Mundi Partes ſpargens Deus quaſi ſerebat.

** Eſt, eſt profecto illa Vis, &c. *In Orat. pro Milone.*

†† Nec verò Deus ipſe alio modo intelligi poteſt, &c.

" underſtood by us, than as a certain looſe and free " Mind ſegregated from all mortal Concretion, which " both perceives and moves all things. And again, " When we behold theſe and other wonderful Works " of Nature, can we at all doubt but that there preſi- " deth over 'em * either one Maker of all, if they " had a Beginning, as *Plato* conceives; or elſe, if they " always were, as *Ariſtotle* ſuppoſes, † one Moderator " and Governor? Elſewhere ſpeaking of the World, he ſays, that ‖ *this alſo obeyeth God, and the Seas and Earth are ſubject to him, and the Life of Man is diſpos'd of by the Commands of the ſupreme Law.* Alſo he ſpeaks of that ** *God, who rules over all Mankind, and forbids 'em to depart hence without his Leave*; of †† *God, whoſe Divine Power all things obey.* Moreover, we read in *Cicero* of the ‖‖ *ſupreme God*, to whom the firſt making of Man is by him properly imputed; *of the Divine Power of the ſupreme Lord and Governor*; *of the moſt powerful God and* Jupiter, *who has power over all things*; *of that chief or principal God, who governs the whole World, juſt as a human Soul governs that Body which it is ſet over.*

From *Cicero* we paſs on to *M. Terentius Varro* his Equal, a Man famous for his Polymathy or multifarious Knowledg, and reputed unqueſtionably, tho not the moſt eloquent, yet the moſt learned of all the

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* Aliquis vel Effector, ſi hæc nata ſunt ut Platoni videtur; vel, ſi ſemper fuerint, ut Ariſtoteli placet, † Moderator tanti Operis & Muneris.

‖ Nam & hic Deo paret, &c.

** Dominans ille nobis Deus, &c.

†† Deus, cujus Numini parent omnia.

‖‖ Summus aut ſupremus Deus; ſummi Rectoris & Domini Numen; Deus præpotens & rerum omnium præpotens Jupiter; Princeps ille Deus, qui omnem hunc Mundum regit, ſicut Animus humanus id Corpus cui præpoſitus eſt. *Cic. de Leg. de Divin. & de Somn. Scip.*

Romans,

Romans, at leaſt as to Antiquity. Now that he acknowledg'd *many Gods*, which to him were parts of the World animated with Souls ſuperior to Men, appears from this Doctrine of his quoted by * St. *Auſtin*: "That from the higheſt Circuit of the Heavens to the "Sphere of the Moon, there are ethereal Souls or Ani-"mals, the Stars, which are not only underſtood, but "ſeen to be celeſtial Gods: and between the Sphere of "the Moon and the middle Region of the Air, there "are Aereal Souls or Animals, which tho not ſeen by "our Eyes, yet are diſcover'd by our Mind, and call'd "*Heroes*, *Lares* and *Genii*. But ſtill the ſame † St. *Auſtin* informs us, that *Varro* notwithſtanding this Polytheiſm of his, plainly aſſerted *one ſupreme univerſal Numen or God*, he erring only in this, that he call'd him a *Soul*, and not the *Creator of Soul* or a *pure and abſtract Mind*.

From *Varro* we proceed to *L. Annæus Seneca* the Philoſopher, who was Contemporary with our Saviour *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles. Now tho he frequently acknowledg'd a *plurality of Gods*, yet did he notwithſtanding plainly aſſert *one Supreme*; he not only ſpeaking of him *ſingularly* and by way of eminency, but alſo plainly deſcribing him as ſuch: as when he calls him || *the Framer and Former of the Univerſe*; *the Governor, Diſpoſer and Keeper thereof*; *him upon whom all things depend*; *the Mind and Spirit of the World*; *the Artificer and Lord of this whole Mundane Fabrick*; *to whom every Name belongs*; *from whom all things ſpring*; and much

* De Civ. Dei l. 7. c. 6.

† De Civ. Dei l. 4. c. 9.

|| Formatorem Univerſi; Rectorem & Arbitrum & Cuſtodem Mundi; ex quo ſuſpenſa ſunt omnia, &c. *Senec. Nat. Quæſt. l.* 2. c. 45.

more

more to the ſame purpoſe. To which I add what * St. *Auſtin* has obſerv'd, that this *Seneca* in his Book of *Superſtitions*, which is now loſt, did not only highly extol the natural Theology, and according to that the reaſonable Worſhip of *one God*, but did alſo plainly cenſure and condemn the Civil Theology and the unreaſonable Worſhip of *many Gods*, receiv'd among the *Romans*.

To *Seneca*, tho he was no Admirer of him, yet fully agreed in this natural Theology, *M. Fabius Quintilianus*, who ſets down this as the generally receiv'd Notion or Definition of God, † *That he is a Spirit mingl'd with and diffus'd thro all the Parts of the World*; he from thence inferring *Epicurus* to be an Atheiſt, notwithſtanding that he verbally aſſerted *Gods*, becauſe he deny'd *a God* according to this generally receiv'd Notion, he commonly beſtowing upon his *Gods* a circumſcrib'd human Form, and placing 'em between the *Worlds*.

Alſo the *junior Pliny* acknowledg'd *one ſupreme univerſal Deity*, as may ſufficiently appear from his *Panegyrick* Oration to *Trajan*, wherein he is call'd || *That God who is preſent with and inhabits the whole Heaven and Stars; and alſo the Father of the World, and the Father of Men and Gods.*

Next to him I rank *L. Apuleius*, by whoſe pretended Miracles the Pagans endeavour'd to confirm their Religion, as well as by thoſe of *Apollonius*. Now he in ſundry places of his Writings plainly aſſerts *one ſupreme and univerſal Deity*, of which I ſhall only

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* De Civ. Dei l. 6. c. 10.

† Deum eſſe Spiritum omnibus Partibus immiſtum. *L.* 7. *c.* 3.

|| Deus ille, qui manifeſtus ac præſens Cœlum ac Sydera inſidet. Mundi Parens, & Parens Hominum Deorumque.

chuſe

chuſe out this: * *Since the higheſt of the Gods does not only conſider all thoſe things in his Mind, but alſo paſs thro and comprehend within himſelf the Beginning, Middle, and End of all things, and conſtantly govern all by his ſecret Providence.*

To this I add the Teſtimony of *Symmachus*, who tho a zealous Stickler for the Reſtitution of *Paganiſm*, yet declar'd the † *Pagans* to worſhip one and the ſame God with the *Chriſtians*, but in ſeveral ways; he conceiving that there was no neceſſity that God ſhould be worſhip'd by all, after the ſame manner, *&c.*

I ſhall next inſtance in ſome of the latter *Greek Writers*; the firſt of whom I pitch on is the Author *De Mundo*, who, tho not *Ariſtotle*, yet was undoubtedly a Pagan and Polytheiſt. Yet however we find him not only commending this Paſſage of *Heraclitus*, That ‖ *there is one harmonious Syſtem made out of all things, and that all things are deriv'd from one*; but alſo writing very excellently about the *ſupreme God*, whom he ſtiles ** *the Cauſe which contains all things*; *the beſt, and moſt excellent Part of the World* ††; and declaring it *to be an antient Opinion or Tradition, which has been convey'd down to all Men from their Forefathers,* ‖‖ *that all things are from God, and conſiſt by him*; *and that no Nature is ſufficient to preſerve it ſelf, if left alone, and devoid of the Divine Aſſiſtance and Influence.* To which he adds, That (a) *what a Pilot is to a Ship, a Charioteer to a*

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* Cum Summus Deorum, &c.

† Æquum eſt quicquid omnes colunt Unum putari, &c.

‖ Ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα.

** Τὴν τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν. †† Τὸ τοῦ κόσμου κυριώτατον.

‖‖ Ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκε· εὐδαιμὼν δὲ φύσις, αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐταρκὴς ἐρημωθεῖσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας.

(a) Ὅπερ ἐν νηῒ κυβερνήτης, &c. τοῦτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ.

Charioteer,

Chariot, the Coryphæus to a Choir, Law to a City, and a General to an Army; the ſame is God to the World.

Plutarch of *Chæronea*, as I have before declar'd, was unluckily ingag'd in two falſe Opinions: the firſt, that *Matter is ingenerate or uncreated*; the ſecond, that there is a *poſitive ſubſtantial evil Principle*, or an *irrational Soul* and *Dæmon ſelf-exiſtent*; in which reſpect he has been call'd by us a *Ditheiſt*. Withal he was a Worſhipper of the many Pagan Gods, himſelf being a Prieſt of the *Pythian Apollo*. But notwithſtanding all this, he unqueſtionably aſſerted *one ſole Principle of all Good*, and the Cauſe of all things (*Evil* and *Matter* only excepted) who is therefore call'd by him *God* in way of eminency; as when he affirms that * *God does always act the Geometrician*, that is, does all things in Meaſure and Proportion; that † *all things are made by God according to Harmony*. Alſo he gives God theſe Epithets: ‖ *the Great God, the Higheſt God, the Firſt God, the unmade ſelf-exiſtent God*; all the other Pagan Gods, according to him, having been made in time together with the World, *&c.*

Dio Chryſoſtomus, *Plutarch*'s Equal, tho he plainly acknowledg'd many Gods, yet aſſerted that *the World is under a Kingly Power* or *Monarchy*; he calling the *ſupreme God*, ſometime ** *the common King of Gods and Men, the God that rules over all, the firſt and greateſt God*, &c. Alſo he affirms, that there is a *natural Prolepſis* or *innate Idea* of him in the Minds of Men, ſaying, that *concerning the Nature of the Gods in general, but eſpecially of*

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* Ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν τὸν θεόν.

† Πάντα καθ' ἁρμονίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κατασκευάζεσθαι.

‖ Ὁ μέγας θεὸς, ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεὸς, ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς, ὁ ἀγένητος θεὸς.

** Τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν βασιλέα τε καὶ ἄρχοντα; τὸν πάντων κρατοῦντα θεὸν; τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεὸν, &c.

that

that ſupreme Ruler over all, there is an Opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians *as* Greeks, *which is naturally implanted in them as rational Beings, and not deriv'd from any mortal Teacher* *.

That *Galen* was no Atheiſt, and what his Religion was, may plainly appear from this one Paſſage out of his third Book *de Uſu Partium*, to omit many others: " Should I, " ſays he, any longer inſiſt upon ſuch brutiſh Perſons as " thoſe, the Wiſe and Sober might juſtly condemn me, as " defiling this holy Oration, † which I compoſe as a true " Hymn to the praiſe of him that made us; I conceiving " true Piety and Religion towards God to conſiſt in this, " not that I ſhould ſacrifice many Hecatombs or burn " much Incenſe to him, but that I ſhould my ſelf firſt " acknowledg and then declare to others, how great his " Wiſdom is, how great his Power, and how great his " Goodneſs. For that he would adorn the whole " World after this manner, envying to nothing that " Good which it was capable of, I conclude to be a " Demonſtration of moſt abſolute Goodneſs; and thus " let him be prais'd by us as good. And that he was " able to find out how all things might be adorn'd after " the beſt manner, is a ſign of the greateſt Wiſdom in " him. And laſtly, to be able to effect and bring to paſs " all thoſe things, which he had thus decreed, argues " an inſuperable Power.

Maximus Tyrius in the Cloſe of his firſt Diſſertation, declares his Opinion of *one ſupreme God*, where having ſpoken of the Government of the World, he ſhuts up all in theſe words: *Thus you ſee how the Order and Chain*

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* Περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλε φύσεως καὶ μάλιστα τῶν πάντων ἡγεμόνος, &c. ἀναγκαία καὶ ἔμφυτος ἐν παντὶ τῷ λογικῷ γιγνομένη κατὰ φύσιν, &c.

† Λόγον, ὃν ἐγὼ τῷ δημιουργήσαντος ἅπαντας ὕμνον ἀληθινὸν συνῴδημι, &c.

of this Government deſcends down by Steps and Degrees from the ſupreme God *to the Earth and Men**.

Ariſtides, the famous *Adrianean* Sophiſt and Orator, in his firſt Oration or Hymn vow'd to *Jupiter*, after he had eſcap'd a great Tempeſt, is ſo full to the purpoſe, that nothing can be more; he, after his Proem, beginning thus: † Jupiter *made all things, and all things, whatſoever do exiſt, are the Works of* Jupiter, *&c. But he is the firſt and the oldeſt, and the Prince of all things, he being made from himſelf*, &c.

It is certain that all the latter Philoſophers after *Chriſtianity*, whether *Platoniſts* or *Peripateticks*, tho for the moſt part they aſſerted the Eternity of the World, yet univerſally agreed in the acknowledgment of one *ſupreme Deity, the Cauſe of the World and of all the other Gods:* ſuch were *Numenius*, *Plotinus*, *Amelius*, *Porphyrius*, *Proclus Damaſcius*, *Themiſtius*, and others. To which purpoſe I ſhall here only add this full Teſtimony of St. *Cyril*, in his firſt Book againſt *Julian*: "It is manifeſt, ſays he, to all, that amongſt "thoſe who philoſophize in the *Greek* way, it is uni-"verſally acknowledg'd, ‖ that there is one God the "Maker of the Univerſe, and who is by Nature above "all things: but that there have been made by him and "produc'd into Generation certain other Gods, as they "call 'em, both intelligible and ſenſible.

But neither was this the Opinion of *Philoſophers* and *Learned Men* only amongſt the *Pagans*, but even of the *Vulgar* likewiſe. To ſee this, we cannot, I think,

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* Διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχει τῆς γῆς.

† Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησε, καὶ Διὸς ἐστιν ἔργα ὅσα ἐς τὸ πᾶν, &c. ἀλλ' ὅδε ἐστὶ πρῶτος τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων, &c. Ib.

‖ Ἕνα μὲ εδόκει θεὸν εἶναι συνωμολογεῖν, ἢ πᾶν ὅλων δημιουργὸν, &c.

make

make a better Judgment concerning the Generality and Bulk of the antient Pagans, than from the Poets and Mythologiſts, who were the chief Inſtructers of them. Now we have already prov'd from ſundry Teſtimonys of the Poets, that however they were Depravers of the Pagan Religion, yet they kept up this Tradition of *one ſupreme Deity, one King and Father of Gods:* to which Teſtimonys many more might have been added, as of *Seneca* the Tragedian, *Statius*, *Lucan*, *Silius Italicus*, *Perſius*, and *Martial*: but that we declin'd 'em to avoid Tediouſneſs. Moreover, as the Poets taught, ſo in fact may we perceive that the People learnt this Doctrine: To this purpoſe *Ariſtotle* has recorded in his *Politicks*, * *That all Men affirm'd the Gods to be under a Kingly Power, or that there is one ſupreme King and Monarch over the Gods.* And † *Maximus Tyrius*, that as well the Unlearned as the Learned throughout the whole Pagan World, however they differ'd in other Opinions, yet univerſally agreed in this, that *there is one God the King and Father of all.* To which agrees this other Teſtimony of *Dio Chryſoſtomus*, That ‖ *concerning the Nature of the Gods in general, but eſpecially concerning the Prince of all things, there was one agreeing Perſuaſion in the Minds of all Mankind, as well* Barbarians *as* Greeks. Where *Dio* plainly intimates, that there was a more univerſal Conſent of Nations in the belief of *one God*, than of *many Gods*; which one God univerſally fell under the ſame Idea, with the ſupreme and abſolutely perfect, albeit, as we have before obſerv'd,

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* Πάντες λέγουσι θεὸς βασιλεύεσθαι.

† Ὅτι θεὸς εἷς πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατήρ. Diſſ. 1. p. 4, 5.

‖ Περὶ δὲ τῆς τε καθόλου φυσεως καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, &c. Orat. 12. p. 201.

and * might again add, he was in different Countrys call'd by different Names. The Authority of *Dio* is very well confirm'd by this of † *Proclus* upon the *Timæus:* " All Religions and Sects, ſays he, acknowledg " that one higheſt Principle of all; and Men every " where call upon God as their Helper: but that there " are Gods after and below that higheſt Principle, and " that there is a certain Providence deſcending down " from theſe upon the Univerſe, all Sects do not believe, " the reaſon whereof is, becauſe the One or Unity " appears more clearly and plainly to them than the " *Many* or *Multitude.* Accordingly no wonder if the *Vulgar Pagans* in their ordinary Diſcourſe and common Speech us'd the Name of God ſingularly, meaning thereby the ſupreme Deity, as we have it recorded by many of the Antients, and firſt by ſome of the Fathers: *Tertullian* in his Book *de Teſtimonio Animæ*, and his *Apologetick*, produces ſeveral Inſtances of theſe vulgar Forms of Speech among the Pagans, as, ‖ *God ſees, I commend to God, God will reſtore, God will judg between us, what God pleaſes*, &c. Thus alſo ** *Minutius Felix*, " When, ſays he, the Pagans ſtretch out their Hands " towards Heaven, they mention only God; and theſe " Forms of Speech, *He is Great*, and *God is true*, and " *if God grant*, are the natural Language of the Vul- " gar. And again, *Lactantius* gives this other Teſti-

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* *See more of this, as alſo a Confutation of* Lactantius's *Reaſoning, by which he would prove that the* Jupiter Capitolinus *of the* Romans *was not held by them to be* one God over all, *in* Cudw. True Intel. Syſt. f. 449, 450, &c.

† Τὴν πρωτίστην ἀρχὴν πᾶσαι θρησκείαι καὶ αἱρέσεις συγχωρεῖν εἶναι, καὶ θεὸν πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπικαλεῖσθαι βοηθόν, &c.

‖ Deus videt, Deo commendo, Deus reddet, Deus inter nos judicabit, quod Deus vult, &c.

** Cum ad Cœlum manus tendunt, nihil aliud quàm Deum dicunt. Et *Magnus eſt, & Deus Verum eſt*, &c. vulgi iſte naturalis Sermo.

mony

mony: "When, ſays he, they ſwear, and when they "wiſh, and when they give Thanks, they * name not "many Gods, but God only; the Truth by a ſecret "Force of Nature thus breaking forth from them, "whether they will or no. And again, "† They fly "to God, Aid is deſir'd of God, they pray that God "would help them; and when any one is reduc'd to "extreme Neceſſity, ‖ he begs for God's ſake only, "and by the Power of God alone, implores the Mer-"cy of Men. The ſame we may alſo learn from the Atteſtation of Heathens themſelves: We find in *Arianus* his *Epictetus*, that this very Form of Prayer, which has been ſo long in uſe in the *Chriſtian* Church, *Lord have Mercy upon us*, was antiently part of the Pagans Litany to the *ſupreme God*, either amongſt the *Greeks* or the *Latins*, or both: *Invoking God, we pray to him*, ſays *Epictetus*, *after this manner*, *Lord have Mercy upon us* **. And perhaps it may not be amiſs to ſuggeſt in this place, that the *Perſians* themſelves (to omit other ſeeming Inſtances) who of all Pagan Nations have been moſt charg'd with the worſhipping of the Sun as the ſupreme Deity under the name of *Mithras*, did notwithſtanding, if we believe *Eubulus*, who wrote the Hiſtory of *Mithras* at large, acknowledg another inviſible Deity ſuperior to it, and which was the Maker thereof, and of the whole World, as the true and proper *Mithras*. Which Opinion is alſo plain-

* Non Deos multos, ſed Deum nominant, &c.

† Ad Deum confugiunt, a Deo petitur Auxilium, &c.

‖ Deum ſolum obteſtatur, & per ejus Divinum atque Unicum Numen hominum ſibi Miſericordiam quærit.

** Τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλέμενοι δεόμεθα αὐτῷ κύριε ἐλέησον. L. 2. c. 7. *See more to this purpoſe, and a Difficulty or two ſolv'd, in* Cud. True Intel. Syſt. fol. 454, 455, &c.

ly confirm'd not only by *Herodotus*, diſtinguiſhing their *Jupiter* from the Sun, but alſo by *Xenophon* in ſundry places; as particularly where he ſpeaks of *Cyrus*'s being admoniſh'd in a Dream of his approaching Death, and thereupon addreſſing his Devotion * by Sacrifices and Prayers: firſt he ſacrific'd to the *Perſian Jupiter*, and then to the *Sun* and the *other Gods*, praying after this manner: *Thou our Country* Jupiter, that is, *thou* Mithras *or* Oromaſdes, *and thou Sun, and all ye other Gods, accept I pray you theſe my Euchariſtick Sacrifices*, &c. And we alſo find the like Prayer us'd by *Darius* in *Plutarch*, † *Thou our Country* Jupiter, or *ſupreme God of the* Perſians. Moreover, *Herodotus* and *Curtius* record, that in the *Perſian* Pomp and Proceſſion there was wont to be drawn a Chariot ſacred to *Jupiter*, diſtinct from that of the Sun. But *Cyrus*'s Proclamation in the Book of *Eſdras* puts all out of doubt; ſince that *Lord God of Heaven*, who is there ſaid *to have given* Cyrus *all the Kingdoms of the Earth, and commanded him to build him a Houſe at* Jeruſalem, cannot be underſtood of the Sun.

The *Ethiopians* in *Strabo*'s time may well be look'd upon as *Barbarians*, and yet did they not only acknowledg *one ſupreme Deity*, but alſo ſuch as was diſtinct from the World, and therefore inviſible, he writing thus concerning them: ‖ *They believe that there is one immortal God, and this the Cauſe of all things*, &c. And tho *Cæſar* affirms of the antient *Germans*, That ** *they held thoſe only to be Gods whom they ſaw, and by whom they were openly aſſiſted, ſuch as the Sun, Fire, and the Moon*;

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* Ἔθυε Διΐ τε παλρῴῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, &c. Cyr. Inſt. l. 8.

† Ζεῦ παλρῷε Περσῶν. De Fort. Alex. l. 2.

‖ Θεὸν νομίζουσι τὸν μὲν ἀθάνατον, τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν ἄϊδιον τῶν πάντων, &c. l. 17.

** Deorum numero eos ſolos ducunt, quos cernunt & quorum opibus aperte juvantur, Solem & Vulcanum & Lunam.

yet

yet is he contradicted by * *Tacitus*, who coming after him had better Information; and others have recorded that they acknowledg one ſupreme God under the name of *Thau* firſt, and then of *Thautes* and *Theutates*.

Laſtly, the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the *Indians*, *Chineſes*, *Siamenſes*, and *Guineans*; the Inhabitants of *Peru*, *Mexico*, *Virginia*, and *New England*, ſome of whom are ſufficiently barbarous, do acknowledg *one ſupreme* or *greateſt God*, they having their ſeveral proper Names for him, as *Parmiſcer*, *Fetiſſo*, *Wiracocha*, *Pachachamac*, *Vitziliputzti*, &c. tho worſhipping withal other Gods and Idols; all which is confirm'd by this Teſtimony of *Joſephus Acoſta*, † That *this is common almoſt to all the* Barbarians, *to confeſs one ſupreme God, who is perfectly good*. It has been already mention'd that, according to *Themiſtius* and *Symmachus* two zealous Pagans, one and the ſame ſupreme God was worſhip'd in all the ſeveral Pagan Religions throughout the whole World, tho after different manners. Which Diverſity of Religions, as in their Opinion it was no way inconvenient in it ſelf, ſo neither was it ‖ ungrateful or unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his Honour, State and Grandeur, to be worſhip'd with this Variety, than after one manner only. Now moreover, that this alſo was the Sentiment of other more antient Pagans, may appear from this remarkable Teſtimony of *Plutarch* in his Book *de Iſide*, where defending the *Egyptian* Worſhip, which was indeed the main Deſign of that whole Book, he

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* *See* Sched. de Diis Germ.

† Hoc commune apud omnes pæne Barbaros eſt, ut Deum quidem omnium rerum ſupremum & ſummè bonum fateantur.

‖ Ταύτῃ νόμιζε χάιννσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸ τὸ παντὸς ἀρχηγέτην.

plainly

plainly affirms that the ſeveral Religions of the Pagan Nations, whether *Greeks* or *Barbarians*, and among theſe the *Egyptians* alſo as well as others, conſiſted in nothing elſe, but the worſhipping of * *one* and the ſame *ſupreme Mind, Reaſon*, and *Providence* which orders all things in the World; and of its *ſubſervient Powers* or *Miniſters*, appointed by it over all the ſeveral Parts of the World, tho under different Names, Rites and Ceremonys, and with different Symbols, *conſecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on mens Underſtandings to Divine things*; *tho*, ſays he, *this has not been without ſome danger of caſting Men upon one or other of theſe two Inconveniences, either Superſtition or Atheiſm.*

That *Titus Livius* was alſo of the ſame Opinion, may be concluded from this Paſſage of his concerning *Hannibal*: "I know not, ſays he, whether *Hannibal* were "more admirable in his Adverſity or Proſperity, who "having a mixt Colluvies of all Nations under him, "which had different Rites, different Ceremonys, "and almoſt different Gods from one another, did not-"withſtanding ſo unite them together in one common "Bond, that there happen'd no Sedition at all amongſt "them. Where *Livy* plainly intimates, that tho there was a great diverſity of Religious Rites and Ceremonys among the Pagans, as if they had worſhip'd ſeveral Gods, yet the Gods of them all were really the ſame, namely one ſupreme God and his Miniſters under him. And the ſame *Livy* elſewhere declares this to have been the general Opinion of the *Romans* and *Italians* likewiſe at that time.

The *Egyptians* were doubtleſs the moſt ſingular of all the Pagans, and the moſt oddly diſcrepant from others in

* Ἑνὸς λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν ἅπαν κοσμοῦντος καὶ μιᾶς προνοίας διοικούσης, &c.

their

their manner of Worſhip; yet nevertheleſs that theſe alſo agreed with the reſt in thoſe Fundamentals, of worſhipping *one ſupreme* and *univerſal God* together with his inferior Miniſters, as *Plutarch* ſets himſelf induſtriouſly to maintain it in that foremention'd Book *de Iſide*, ſo was it further clear'd and made out, as *Damaſcius* informs us, by two famous *Egyptian* Philoſophers, *Aſclepiades* and *Heraiſcus*, in certain Writings of theirs, which have been ſince loſt; wherein they affirm that, according to the true *Egyptian* Theology, * *There is one Principle of all things, celebrated under the Name of the* Unknown Darkneſs, *&c.* and aſſign this reaſon of the *Egyptians* Polytheiſm, † that *they were wont to divide and multiply things that are one and the ſame; and accordingly have they divided and multiply'd the firſt Intelligible, or the one ſupreme Deity, into the Propertys of many Gods.* The ſame alſo appears to have been the Doctrine not only of the *Egyptians*, but of others, from a Treatiſe, which, according to *Suidas* upon the word *Heraiſcus*, was begun by *Aſclepiades*, but left unfiniſh'd, concerning the *Symphony of all Theologys*: for in this do we find a general Agreement touching thoſe two Fundamentals expreſt by *Plutarch*, namely the worſhipping *of one ſupreme and univerſal Deity, Reaſon* and *Providence*, governing all things; and then, of his ſubſervient Miniſters, the Inſtruments of Providence, created and appointed by him over all the Parts of the World: which being honour'd under ſeveral Titles, and with different Rites and Ceremonys, according to the Laws of the reſpective Countrys,

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* Ὡς εἷη κατ' αὐτὸς ἡ μὲν μία πᾶσι ὅλων ἀρχὴ, σκότος ἄγνωστον, &c.

† Ὅτι διαιρετικοὶ εἰσι πολλαχῶς, πᾶσι κατ' ἕνωσιν ὑφεστώτων; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον διηρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, &c. Damaſc. de Princ. M. S.

caus'd all that diverſity of Religions, which was among them *.

The *Hebrews* were the only Nation, who before *Chriſtianity* for ſeveral Ages profeſſedly oppos'd the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of the Pagan World. Whence it may be probably concluded, that they had the right Notion of this Pagan Polytheiſm, and underſtood wherein it conſiſted. Now again from the generality of *them* we learn, that the Pagan Nations antiently, at leaſt the Intelligent amongſt them, acknowledg'd *one ſupreme God* of the whole World; and confeſs'd that all their other Gods were not unmade, ſelf-originated, *&c.* but *Creatures* and *inferior Miniſters*; which were worſhip'd by them upon theſe two accounts: either as thinking that the Honour done to them redounded to the ſupreme God, or elſe that they might be their *Mediators* and *Interceſſors*, their *Orators* and *Negotiators* with him; and theſe were of two kinds, Angels and Stars. All this we find atteſted by *Philo* in his Comment on the Decalogue, by *Flavius Joſephus* in his *Jewiſh* Antiquities, by *Maimonides* in *Halacoth* עכו"ם, in his *More Nevochim*, and in his Gloſs upon *Jeremy* 10. 7. alſo by *Moſes Abelda* in his † *Gnolath Tamid*; by *Joſeph Albo* in his *Ikkarim*, by *R. David Kimchi* upon 2 *Kings* 17, &c; by the Author of the Book *Nitzachon*; by *Rabbi Solomon* in his Gloſs upon *Malachi* 1. 11. and upon *Pſalm* 65. 6, *&c* ‖.

Laſtly, the ſame is plainly confirm'd from the Scriptures of the New Teſtament alſo; that the Gentiles

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* *More to this purpoſe may be ſeen in* Cud. True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 462, 463, &c.

† חמיר עולח

‖ *Quotations at large to this purpoſe may be ſeen in* Cud. True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 465, 466, 467, &c.

and

and Pagans, however Polytheiſts and Idolaters, yet were not unacquainted with the Knowledg of the true God, that is, of the one only ſelf-exiſtent and omnipotent Being, who comprehendeth all things under him: from whence it muſt needs follow, that their other many Gods were all of 'em ſuppos'd to have been deriv'd from this *one*, and to be dependent on him. For firſt * St. *Paul* in his Epiſtle to the *Romans* tells us, that theſe Gentiles or Pagans did † *hold the Truth in Unrighteouſneſs*, or unjuſtly detain and impriſon the ſame. Which is chiefly to be underſtood of the Truth concerning *God*, as appears from what follows, and therefore implies the Pagans not to have been unfurniſh'd with ſuch a Knowledg of God, as might and ought to have kept 'em from all kinds of Idolatry; however by their Default it prov'd ineffectual to that end, as is afterwards declar'd: ‖ *They lik'd not to retain God in the Agnition or Practical Knowledg of him.* Where there is a diſtinction to be obſerv'd betwixt the ** *Knowledg* and the *Agnition* of God; the former of which in this Chapter is plainly granted to the Pagans, tho the latter be here deny'd them; becauſe they laps'd into Polytheiſm and Idolatry, which is the meaning of theſe words, †† *They chang'd the Truth of God into a Lie.* Again the ſame Apoſtle there affirms, That ‖‖ *that which may be known of God was manifeſt within them*, God himſelf having ſhew'd it unto them. There is ſomething of God unknowable and incomprehenſible by

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* Ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὀργὴ Θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων.

† Τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων, Rom. 1. 18.

‖ Οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει. Ib. v. 28.

** Γνῶσις & ἐπίγνωσις.

†† Μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει. Ib. v. 25.

‖‖ Τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Ib. v. 19.

all Mortals; but that of God which is knowable, his *eternal Power and Godhead*, with the Attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifeſt to all Mankind by his Works: *The inviſible things of him from the Creation of the World, being clearly ſeen and underſtood by the things that are made* *. Moreover, this Apoſtle expreſly declares, the Pagans to have known God, in that Cenſure which he gives of 'em, that † *when they knew God, they glorify'd him not as God*, becauſe they fell into Polytheiſm and Idolatry; tho the Apoſtle here inſtances only in the latter of theſe two, ‖ *their changing the Glory of the incorruptible God into an Image made like to corruptible Man, and to Birds and Beaſts and creeping things*. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe this Idolatry of the Pagans properly ſo call'd, that is, their worſhipping of Stocks and Stones form'd into the likeneſs of Man or Beaſt, was generally taken amongſt the *Jews*, as *Philo* alſo obſerves, for the groſſeſt of all their religious Miſcarriages; and from hence it came to paſs, that the Polytheiſm of the Pagans, their worſhipping of inferior Gods, as namely Stars and Dæmons, was vulgarly call'd alſo by the *Jews* and *Chriſtians Idolatry*, it being ſo denominated by them *a famoſiore ſpecie*. Again, the Apoſtle plainly declares that the Error of the Pagan Superſtition univerſally conſiſted, not in worſhipping *many independent Gods and Creators*, but in joining Creature-Worſhip as ſuch, ſome way or other, with the Worſhip of the Creator; while *they* religiouſly *worſhip'd and ſerv'd the Creature* beſides or *more than the Creator* **. To this may be added an Oration made by Sr. *Paul* at *Athens* in the Areopagitick Court,

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* Ib. v. 20. † V. 21. ‖ V. 23.

** Ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα. V. 25.

beginning

beginning after this manner: *Ye Men of* Athens, *I perceive that in all things* or every way *ye are*, as 'tis commonly render'd, *too ſuperſtitious*, but ſhould be rather turn'd, Ye are more than ordinarily religious; it being not only more likely that St. *Paul* would in the beginning of his Oration thus conciliate their Benevolence with ſome Commendation of them, but alſo very unlikely that he would call the worſhipping of the true God by the name of *Superſtition*, becauſe it follows, *For as I paſs'd by and beheld your Devotions*, or rather your Sacred things or Monuments, *I found an Altar with this Inſcription, to the* * *unknown God*, mention'd alſo by *Lucian* in his *Philopatris*, and that as being erected to the *ſupreme* Governour of the World, inaſmuch as *Triephon* there utters what agrees to the ſubſequent Words of St. *Paul*: *Whom therefore you ignorantly worſhip*, under the name of the *Unknown God*, *him declare I unto you*, *God that made the World and all things therein*, *the Lord of Heaven and Earth*. From which place we may upon firm Scripture-Authority conclude two things: Firſt, that by the *Unknown God* of the *Athenians* was meant the only true God, he *who made the World and all things in it*, who in all probability was therefore ſtil'd by them *the Unknown God*, becauſe he is not only *inviſible*, but alſo *incomprehenſible* by Mortals; agreeably to what *Joſephus* writing againſt *Appion* tells us, that † *He is knowable to us only by the Effects of his Power, but as to his own Eſſence is unknowable or incomprehenſible.* But when in *Dion Caſſius* the God of the *Jews* is ſaid to be not only ‖ *inviſible*, but alſo *ineffable*; and when he is

* Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ. Acts 17. 23.

† Δυνάμει μόνον ἡμῖν γνώριμος, ὁποῖος δὲ κατὰ ὐσίαν ἄγνωστος.

‖ Ἄῤῥητός καὶ ἀειδής.

call'd

call'd in *Lucan* an * *uncertain God*; the reaſon hereof ſeems to have been, not only becauſe there was no Image of him, but alſo becauſe he was not vulgarly then known by any proper Name, the *Tetragrammaton* being religiouſly forborn amongſt the *Jews* in common uſe, that it might not be profan'd. And what ſome Learned Men have mention'd upon this occaſion, of the Pagans ſometimes ſacrificing to † *the proper and convenient God*, without ſignifying any Name, ſeems to be nothing to this purpoſe; that proceeding only from a ſuperſtitious Fear of thoſe Pagans, ſuppoſing ſeveral Gods to preſide over ſeveral things, leſt they ſhould be miſtaken, in not applying themſelves to the right and proper God in ſuch certain caſes, and ſo their Devotion ſhould prove unſucceſsful and ineffectual. But that this *unknown God* is here ſaid to be ignorantly worſhip'd by the *Athenians*, is to be underſtood chiefly in regard to their *Polytheiſm* and *Idolatry*. The ſecond thing that may be concluded hence is this, that theſe *Athenian* Pagans did religiouſly worſhip the true God, the Lord of Heaven and Earth: And this again we find to be confirm'd by St. *Paul* in that he cites this Paſſage out of *Aratus*, a Heathen Poet, ‖ *For we are alſo his Off-ſpring*; and interprets the ſame of the true God, *in whom we live, move, and have our Being*. And indeed that *Aratus*'s Ζεὺς was not a Man born in *Crete* or *Arcadia*, but the Maker and ſupreme Governor of the whole World, is evident from this which immediately goes before, and much more to the purpoſe which follows; he beginning his *Phænomena* thus:

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* Incertus Deus.

† Προσήκοντι Θεῷ.

‖ — Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

Let

* *Let us begin our Work with* Jove, *of whom*
We Men are never ſilent, and of whom
All things are full, he paſſing thro and b'ing
In ev'ry place, whoſe kind and bounteous Hand
We all make uſe of and enjoy, for we
His Off-ſpring alſo are.——

Whereupon the *Scholiaſt* writeth thus: Aratus *being about to declare the Poſition of the Stars, does in the firſt place very decorouſly and becomingly invoke* ζεὺς, † *the Father and Maker of them.* Neither is it reaſonable to think that *Aratus* was ſingular in this, but that he ſpake according to the receiv'd Theology of the *Greeks*, and that not only amongſt Philoſophers and Learned Men, but even the vulgar alſo. Nor do we think that that Prayer of the antient *Athenians*, commended by *M. Antoninus* for its ſimplicity, is to be underſtood otherwiſe: *Rain, rain, O good or gracious* Jupiter, *upon the Fields and Paſtures of the* Athenians‖. And ſince the *Latins* had the very ſame Notion of *Jupiter* that the *Greeks* had of ζεὺς, it cannot be deny'd, but that they commonly alſo by their *Jupiter* underſtood the *one ſupreme God, the Lord of Heaven and Earth.* We know nothing that can be objected againſt this from the Scripture, unleſs it ſhould be that Paſſage of St. *Paul, In the Wiſdom of God the World by Wiſdom knew not God.* But the

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* Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν ἀθέσποτ' ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν
Ἄρρητον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲ ἀγυιαὶ,
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγορηὶ μεσὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
Καὶ λιμένες. πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες.
Τοῦ γὸ καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν.—

† Τὸν πατέρα τούτων καὶ δημιουργόν.

‖ Ὕσον, ὕσον ὦ φιλε Ζεῦ κατὰ τῆς ἀρόσεως τῶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶ πεδίων.

meaning

meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the World before Chriſtianity, by their natural Light and Contemplation of the Works of God, did not attain to ſuch a *Practical Knowledg* of him, as might both free them from Idolatry, and effectually bring them to a *holy Life*.

CHAP. V.

A Continuation of the former Argument; That the Generality of the Pagans maintain'd the Oneneſs or Singularity of the Godhead. This is made appear from a yet fuller Account of the Pagan Theology, of the ſeveral Names and Kinds of the Gods of the Heathens; notwithſtanding which it is prov'd, that they ſtill aſſerted one Deity over all. Alſo under this Head comes in a large Account of the Parmenidean, Pythagorean *or* Platonick Triad.

IN order to a fuller Explication of the Pagan Theology, and giving a yet more ſatisfactory Account of it, there are two Heads requiſite to be inſiſted on: Firſt, that the intelligent Pagans worſhip'd the *one ſupreme God*, under many ſeveral Names; Secondly, that beſides this *one God* they worſhip'd alſo many Gods, whom they ſuppos'd to be indeed inferior Deitys and ſubordinate to him. We begin with the firſt; that the ſupreme God amongſt the Pagans was *Polyonymous*, and worſhip'd

worſhip'd under ſeveral perſonal Names, according to ſeveral Notions and Conſiderations of him, from his ſeveral Attributes and Powers, Manifeſtations and Effects in the World.

Not only the *Egyptians*, as *Origen* has obſerv'd, but alſo the *Syrians*, *Perſians*, *Indians*, and other *Barbarian* Pagans had, beſides their vulgar Theology, another more arcane and recondite one, amongſt their Prieſts and Learned Men: and that the ſame was true concerning the *Greeks* and *Latins* alſo, is unqueſtionably evident. Now by the *Vulgar Theology* of the Pagans we underſtand not only their *Myſtical* or *Fabulous*, but alſo their *Political* or *Civil Theology*, it being truly affirm'd by St. *Auſtin*, that * *both the Fabulous Theology of the Pagans was in part their Civil, and their Civil was Fabulous.* And by their more arcane or recondite Theology, is doubtleſs meant that which they conceiv'd to be the *natural and true Theology*. Which diſtinction of the *Natural* and *True Theology* from the *Civil* and *Political*, as it was acknowledg'd by all the antient *Greek* Philoſophers, but moſt expreſly by *Antiſthenes*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle* and the *Stoicks*: ſo was it own'd and much inſiſted on both by *Scævola*, that famous *Roman Pontifex*, and by *Varro*, that moſt Learned Antiquary; they both agreeing, that the *Civil Theology* then eſtabliſh'd by the *Roman* Laws, was only the Theology of the Vulgar, but not the *True*; and that there was another Theology beſides it, call'd by them *Natural*, which was the *Theology of wiſe Men and of Truth*: nevertheleſs granting a neceſſity, that in Citys and Communitys, beſides this *Natural* and *True Theology*, which the generality of the Vulgar were unca-

* Et civilis & fabuloſa, ambæ fabuloſæ ſunt, ambæque civiles. *De Civ. Dei l.* 4. *c.* 8.

pable of, there ſhould be another *Civil* or *Political Theology*, accommodate to their Apprehenſions; which *Civil Theology* differ'd from the *Natural*, only by a certain mixture of Fabuloſity in it, and was therefore look'd upon by them as a middle betwixt the *Natural* and the *Fabulous* or *Poetical Theology*.

Wherefore it was acknowledg'd that the *Vulgar Theology* of the Pagans, that is, not only their *Fabulous*, but even their *Civil* alſo, was oftentimes diſcrepant from the *Natural* and *True Theology*; tho the wiſe Men amongſt 'em in all Ages endeavour'd, as much as they could, to diſſemble and diſguiſe this difference, and by allegorizing the *Poetick Fables* of the Gods, to bring that Theology into ſome ſeeming Conformity with the *Natural* and *Philoſophick*; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by them excus'd upon the neceſſity of the Vulgar.

The Fabulous Theology both of the *Greeks* and *Romans* did not only *generate* all the other Gods, but even *Jupiter* himſelf alſo, their *ſupreme Deity*, in aſſigning him both a Father and a Mother, a Grandfather and a Grandmother. And tho the *Romans* did not plainly adopt this into their *Civil Theology*, yet are they tax'd by St. *Auſtin* for ſuffering the Statue of *Jupiter*'s Nurſe to be kept in the *Capitol* for a Religious Monument. And however this differ'd nothing at all from that Atheiſtick Doctrine of *Evemerus*, That *all the Gods were really no other than mortal Men*; yet was it tolerated and conniv'd at by the Politicians, in way of neceſſary compliance with the Vulgar, it being ſo extremely difficult for *them* to conceive any ſuch living Being or *Animal*, as was never made and without beginning. Inſomuch that *Callimachus*, who would by no means admit of *Jupiter*'s Sepulcher, either in *Crete* or *Arcadia*, but

but look'd upon it as a foul Reproach to him for this reaſon, becauſe he * *was Immortal and could never die*; did notwithſtanding himſelf attribute a temporary *Generation* or Nativity to him, as *Origen* and others have obſerv'd. However, the generality of the more civiliz'd and intelligent Pagans, and even of the Poets themſelves, did all this while conſtantly retain thus much of the *natural* and *true Theology* amongſt 'em, that *Jupiter* was the *Father both of Gods and Men*, that is, the *Maker of the whole World*, and conſequently himſelf *without Father*, *eternal* and *unmade*, according to that *Peleadean* Oracle in *Pauſanias*: † Jove *was*, Jove *is*, Jove *will be*.———

Again, the *Civil Theology* of the Pagans, as well as the *Poetick*, had not only many phantaſtick Gods in it, but alſo an appearance of a plurality of *Independent Deitys*, it making ſeveral to be *ſupreme*, in their ſeveral Territorys and Functions: as one to be the chief Ruler over the Heavens, another over the Air and Winds, another over the Sea, and another over the Earth and Hell; one to be the Giver of Corn, another of Wine; one the God of Learning, another the God of Pleaſure, and another the God of War; and ſo for all other things. But the *Natural Theology* of the Pagans, tho it did admit of a *Plurality* of Gods too, in a certain ſenſe, that is, of *inferior Deitys ſubordinate to one Supreme*; yet did it neither allow of more independent Deitys than *one*, nor own any Gods at all, but ſuch as were *natural*, that is, ſuch as had a real Exiſtence in Nature and the World without, and not in Mens Opinions only. And theſe were concluded by *Varro* to be no other than firſt

* — Σὺ δ' ὦ θάλες, ἐσσὶ γὸ ἀιεί.
† Ζεὺς ἦν, Ζεὺς ἐστι, Ζεὺς ἔσεται. ———

the Soul of the World; then the animated Parts thereof, ſuperior to men, that is, *one ſupreme univerſal Deity unmade*, and other particular *generated Gods*, ſuch as Stars, Dæmons, and Heroes. Wherefore all the other Gods beſides theſe are frequently exploded by *Cicero* and other Pagan Writers, under the name of *Dii Poetici*, that is, not Philoſophical but Poetical Gods; and *Dii Commentitii & Fictitii*, that is, not natural and real, but feign'd and fictitious Gods: they in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing elſe but ſo many ſeveral Names and Notions of *one ſupreme God*, according to his ſeveral Powers and various Manifeſtations and Effects in the world; it being thought fit, as we have before obſerv'd, by the Wiſdom of the antient Pagan Theologers, that all thoſe manifold Glorys and Perfections of the Deity ſhould not be huddl'd up, and as it were crowded and crumpl'd together in one general acknowledgment of an *inviſible Being the Maker of the World*, but that they ſhould be diſtinctly and ſeverally diſplay'd, and each of 'em ador'd ſingly and apart; and this too, for the greater Pomp and Solemnity, under ſo many *perſonal Names*. Which perhaps the unskilful and fottiſh Vulgar might ſometimes miſtake, not only for ſo many real and ſubſtantial, but alſo *independent and ſelf-exiſtent Deitys*.

We have before obſerv'd that one and the ſame ſupreme God in the *Egyptian Theology* had ſeveral proper and perſonal Names given him, according to ſeveral Notions of him, and his ſeveral Powers and Effects: as namely of *Ammon*, *Phtha*, *Oſiris*, *Neith*, *Serapis*, *Cneph*, *Emeph*, *Eicton*, *Iſis*, &c. and the ſame is fully * atteſted

* *See* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *fol.* 479, 480.

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by *Jamblichus* and *Damaſcius* the Philoſopher. Now the *Egyptian Theology* was in a manner the Pattern of all the reſt, but eſpecially of thoſe *European Theologys* of the *Greeks* and *Romans*; who likewiſe that they often made *many Gods* of *one*, is evident from their beſtowing ſo many proper and perſonal Names upon each of thoſe *inferior Gods* of theirs, the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth; the firſt whereof had therefore this Epithet of πολυώνυμος, commonly given him, that is, *the God with many Names*. And the Moon was not only ſo call'd, but alſo *Diana* and *Lucina* and *Hecate*, &c. inſomuch that this Goddeſs alſo, as well as her Brother, has been ſtil'd *Polyonymous*. And laſtly the Earth, beſides thoſe honorary Titles of *Bona Dea*, *Magna Dea*, *& Mater Deorum*, *the good Goddeſs and the great Goddeſs, and the Mother of the Gods*, was multiply'd by them into thoſe many Goddeſſes of *Veſta*, *Rhea*, *Cybele*, *Ceres*, *Proſerpina*, *Ops*, &c. Now if theſe *inferior Gods* of the Pagans had each of 'em ſo many perſonal Names beſtow'd upon 'em, much more might the ſupreme God be Polyonymous amongſt them; and accordingly that he was ſo, is witneſs'd by that Learned Grammarian *Heſychius* upon the word πολυώνυμον: the ſame alſo appears from the * Compellation of *Cleanthes* in the Hymn before cited; from his Maſter *Zeno*, who tells us in *Laertius*, That *God is call'd by many ſeveral Names according to his ſeveral Powers and Vertues* †; from *Maximus Madaurenſis*, ſpeaking to the very ſame purpoſe in St. *Auſtin*; and particularly from the Writer *De Mundo*, who largely inſtanceth in the ſeveral Names of God, as ‖ *the Thun-*

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* Κυδας' ἀθανάτων πολυώνυμε, &c.

† Ὁ θεὸς πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις ἀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις.

‖ Βεβυλαῖος, Ασσυριακὸς, Τέρπος, Ἐπικάρπιος, Πολιεὺς, Σωσὴς, Ἐλευθέριος, &c.

derer

derer and Lightner, the Giver of Rain, the Beſtower of Fruits, the Keeper of Citys, the Savior and Aſſertor, &c. Likewiſe he adds another ſort of Names, by which God was call'd, as Ἀνάγκη *Neceſſity*, either becauſe he is an *immoveable Eſſence*, or as *Cicero* will have it, *becauſe nothing can be otherwiſe than as it is by him appointed*; alſo Εἱμαρμένη, becauſe all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him uncontrolably; Πεπρωμένη, becauſe all things in the world are determin'd by him; Μοῖρα, becauſe he makes an apt Diviſion and Diſtribution of all things; Ἀνάγκεια, becauſe his Power is ſuch, as that none can poſſibly avoid or eſcape him: laſtly, that ingenious Fable, as he calls it, of the three fatal Siſters, denoted according to him, nothing elſe but God; as he tells us, that *the noble and generous* Plato *likewiſe intimates, when he affirms God to contain the Beginning, and Middle, and End of all things.* Alſo both *Cicero* and *Seneca* tell us, that amongſt the *Latins* God was not only term'd *Fatum*, but alſo *Fortuna* and *Natura*: *They ſometimes call God alſo by the name of Fortune*, ſays *Cicero, becauſe he ſurprizeth us in many Events, and bringeth to paſs ſuch things as are unexpected by us.* And ſays *Seneca, What is Nature elſe but God and the Divine Reaſon, inſerted into the whole World and all its ſeveral Parts?* He adding, *that God and Nature were no more two different things, than* Annæus *and* Seneca; and concluding of theſe and other the like Names, that *theſe are all Names of one and the ſame God, variouſly manifeſting his Power.*

But moreover, there are other Names of God us'd amongſt the Pagans, which have a greater ſhew and appearance of ſo many diſtinct Deitys, not only becauſe they are proper Names, but alſo becauſe each of 'em had their peculiar Temples appropriated to them, and their different

different Rites of Worſhip. Now theſe are of two ſorts: Firſt, ſuch as ſignify the Deity, according to its *univerſal* and *all-comprehending* Nature; and ſecondly, ſuch as denote the ſame, according to certain particular Powers, Manifeſtations, and Effects of it in the world. Of the former kind there are not a few: for firſt of all *Pan*, as the very word implies, was held to be an univerſal Deity, and ſuppos'd to be the *Harmoſtes* of the Univerſe, or to play upon the World as a Muſical Inſtrument; thus the *Arcadians* and *Greeks* meant by him not the corporeal World inanimate, nor yet as endu'd with a ſenſleſs Nature only, but as proceeding from an *intellectual Principle* or *Divine Spirit*, which fram'd it harmoniouſly, which ſtill acts and governs, and as it were keeps it in tune. Accordingly *Socrates* in his *Phædrus* invokes this *Pan* as the ſupreme Deity, and the only God, inaſmuch as there could be no more than *one Pan*, no more than *one All* or *Univerſe*, which contain'd *All* within it ſelf, diſplay'd *All* from it ſelf, framing the World harmoniouſly, and which is in a manner *all things*.

Again *Janus*, whom the *Romans* firſt invok'd in all their Sacrifices and Prayers, and who was never omitted, whatſoever God they ſacrific'd to, was unqueſtionably many times taken for an univerſal Deity, as in this of *Martial*:

* *Faireſt Creator of the beauteous World.*

And in this of *Ovid*:

Whate'er thou ſeeſt, Heav'n, Sea, Clouds, Earth,

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Are

Are all ſhut up and open'd in my Hand,
I alone rule and keep the ſpacious World *.

From which Paſſages it alſo appears that *Janus* was not the mere ſenſleſs and inanimate Matter of the World, but a Principle preſiding over it. And undoubtedly all the beginnings of things were therefore refer'd to this *Janus*, becauſe he was accounted the moſt *antient God, and the Beginning of all things.* As to † St. *Auſtin*'s Quarrel with the Pagans for making *Janus* and *Jupiter* two diſtinct Gods, this is grounded only with reſpect to the *Civil Theology* of the Pagans; in which tho this diſtinction was made, yet in their arcane or natural Theology there was no ſuch thing, but they were plainly held to be but one God: however for certain Political Reaſons they were worſhip'd under ſeveral Names, and with different Rites. Wherefore *Janus* and *Jupiter* being really but different Names for one and the ſame *ſupreme God*, the Conjecture of *Salmaſius* ſeems very probable, that the *Romans* deriv'd their *Janus* from ζανὸς, the *Ætolian Jupiter.*

Genius was alſo another of the twenty ſelect *Roman Gods*; and that this likewiſe was an univerſal Deity, containing the whole Nature of things, appears from this of *Feſtus*: That *they call'd that God, who has the power of producing or begetting all things*, Genius ‖. And to him again agrees ** St. *Auſtin*, who ſays, That

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* Quicquid ubique vides, Cœlum, Mare, Nubila, Terras,
Omnia ſunt noſtrâ clauſa patentque manu:
Me penes eſt unum vaſti cuſtodia Mundi. *Faſt.* 1.

† De Civ. Dei l. 7. c. 10.

‖ Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obtineret rerum omnium generandarum.

** Reſtat ut eum ſingulariter & excellenter dicant Deum Genium, quem dicunt mundi Animum; ac per hoc Jovem. *De Civ. Dei l.* 7. *c.* 13.

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tho Genius *be ſometimes us'd for the Mind of every Man, yet the God* Genius *ſpoken of by way of Excellency can be no other than the Mind of the whole World or* Jupiter, that is, *the ſupreme God.*

Again, that *Chronos* or *Saturn* was no particular Deity, but the univerſal God of the whole World, is plainly affirm'd by *Dionyſius* of *Halicarnaſſus*, where commending the Fertility of *Italy* he writeth thus: *Wherefore it is no wonder that the Antients thought this Country to be ſacred to* Saturn; *they ſuppoſing this God to be the* * *Perfecter and Giver of all Happineſs to Men; whether we ought to call him* Chronos, *as the* Greeks *will have it, or* Cronos, *as the* Romans; *he being either way ſuch a God* † *as comprehends the whole Nature of the World.* But the word *Saturn* was *Hetrurian*, which Language was originally Oriental; and being deriv'd from סתר, which ſignifies *hidden*, accordingly by *Saturn* was meant, that *hidden Principle of the Univerſe, which containeth all things*; and he was therefore call'd by the Romans *Deus Latius, the hidden God:* as the Wife of *Saturn* in the Pontifical Books is *Latia Saturni*, and the Land it ſelf, which in the *Hetrurian* Language was *Saturnia*, is in the *Roman*, *Latium*; from whence the Inhabitants were call'd *Latins*, which is as much as to ſay, *the Worſhippers of the hidden God.* Moreover, that *Saturn* could not be inferior to *Jupiter*, according to the fabulous Theology, is plain from hence, becauſe he is therein ſaid to have been his Father: but then the Queſtion will be, how *Saturn* and *Jupiter* could be both of 'em one and the ſame univerſal God? As to which it

* Πᾶσης εὐδαιμονίας δοτῆρα καὶ πληρωτὴν ἀνθρώποις. † Πᾶσαν περιειληφότα τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν, ὁπότερον ἂν τις ὀνομάσοι. Rom. Ant. l. 1. p. 24. Steph.

may either be ſaid, according to the plainer and ſimpler ſenſe of *Heſiod*'s Theogonia, that *Jupiter* together with *Neptune* and *Pluto*, when ſaid to be the Son of *Saturn*, was not ſuppos'd to be the ſupreme Deity, nor as *Plato* in his *Cratylus* thought, *the Soul of the World*; but only the Æther, as *Neptune* was the Sea, and *Pluto* the Earth. Or as the Writer *De Mundo* thinks, *Jupiter* might be ſaid to be the Son of *Chronos* or *Saturn*, as *Chronos* ſignifies Immenſity of Duration or Eternity, and Jupiter *continues from one Eternity to another.* Or laſtly perhaps the beſt Anſwer to this difficulty is this: that there is no coherent ſenſe to be made of all things in the *fabulous Theology.* Agreeably to the former, St. *Auſtin* from *Varro* gives us this account of *Saturn*, that it is he who produces from himſelf continually the *hidden Seeds* and *Forms* of things, and reduces or receives 'em again into himſelf: which ſome think to have been the true meaning of that Fable, concerning *Saturn*'s devouring his Male Children; becauſe the *Forms* of theſe corporeal things are perpetually deſtroy'd, whilſt the *material Parts* ſignify'd by the Females ſtill remain. However it is plain that this was but another Pagan Adumbration of the Deity, that being alſo ſometimes defin'd by * St. *Auſtin, a certain Boſom or deep Hollow and inward Receſs of Nature, which contains within it ſelf all things*; and therefore we may † with him conclude that the Pagans *Jupiter* and *Saturn* were really but *one* and *the ſame Deity*; and the ſame may be ſaid of *Uranus* and *Cælus*.

In the next place, tho it be true that *Minerva* be ſometimes taken for a *particular God*, or for *God* accor-

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* Sinus quidam Naturæ in ſeipſo continens omnia. *De Civ. Dei l.4. c.12.*

† De Civ. Dei l. 7. c. 13.

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ding to a particular manifeſtation of him in the *Æther*, as ſhall be ſhew'd hereafter; yet was it often alſo taken for the *ſupreme God*, according to his moſt general Notion, or as an univerſal Deity diffuſing it ſelf thro all things. It is unqueſtionable, that *Neith* or *Neithas* was the ſame amongſt the *Egyptians*, that *Athena* was amongſt the *Greeks*, and *Minerva* amongſt the *Latins*; which that it was an univerſal Deity, appears from that *Egyptian* Inſcription in the Temple of this God: *I am all that is, was, and ſhall be.* And accordingly *Athenagoras* tells us, that the *Athena* of the *Greeks* was *Wiſdom paſſing and diffuſing it ſelf thro all things*, as it is alſo ſaid in the Book of Wiſdom, and that * it is the Artifex of all things. Wherefore this *Athena* or *Minerva* of the Pagans was either the *firſt ſupreme Deity*, a perfect and infinite Mind, the Original of all things; or, as *Ariſtides* ſpeaks in his Oration upon *Minerva*, † *the only immediate Off-ſpring of the only Maker and King of all things*, or the ſecond Divine Hypoſtaſis. Wherefore that conceit of the learned and induſtrious *Voſſius*, that the Pagans univerſal Deity was no other than a ſenſleſs Nature or ſpermatick Reaſon of the whole World, undirected by any higher intellectual Principle, which is indeed no better than downright Atheiſm, is plainly confuted from hence, in that they make Wiſdom and Underſtanding under theſe Names of *Neith*, *Athena*, and *Minerva*, to be either the abſolutely *ſupreme Deity*, or *the firſt begotten Off-ſpring of it.*

To *Minerva* may be added *Apollo*, who tho often taken for the ſenſible Sun animated, and ſo an inferior Deity, yet was not always underſtood in this ſenſe;

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* Ἡ πάντων τεχνίτις.

† Τῶ πάντων δημιουργῶ καὶ βασιλέως παῖς ἐστι μόνη δι' μόνου.

nor indeed then, when he was reckon'd among the twelve *Conſentes*; becauſe the Sun was afterwards added to them, in the number of the *eight ſelect Gods*. And that he was ſometimes taken for the ſupreme univerſal Deity, the Maker of the World, I think we may depend on this Teſtimony of *Plutarch*, who was his Prieſt: * *Whether*, ſays he, Apollo *be the Sun, or whether he be the Lord and Father of the Sun, plac'd far above all ſenſible and corporeal Nature, it is not likely that he ſhould now deny his Oracles to them, to whom himſelf is the Cauſe of Generation and Nouriſhment, of Life and Underſtanding.*

Moreover, *Urania Aphrodite*, the heavenly *Venus* or Love, was an univerſal Deity alſo, or another Name of God, according to his more general Notion, as comprehending the whole World, it being the ſame with that Ἔρως or *Love*, which *Orpheus* and others in *Ariſtotle* made to be the firſt Original of all things; for it is certain that the Antients diſtinguiſh'd concerning a double *Venus* or *Love*. Thus *Pauſanias* in *Plato*'s *Sympoſium*: *There are*, ſays he, *two* Venuſſes, *and therefore two Loves, the one the older and without a Mother, the Daughter of* Uranus *or Heaven, which we call the heavenly* Venus; *another younger, begotten from* Jupiter *and* Dione, *which we call the vulgar* Venus; *and accordingly are there of neceſſity two Loves, anſwering to theſe two* Venuſſes, *the one vulgar and the other heavenly.* The elder of theſe two *Venuſſes* is in *Plato* ſaid to be ſenior to *Japhet* and *Saturn*, and by *Orpheus the oldeſt of all things*, and *the firſt Begetter of all.* Upon which account perhaps ſhe was call'd by the Oriental Nations, *Mylitta* or *Genetrix*, as being the *fruitful Mother of all.* This was alſo the

* Εἷς ἥλιος ἐστιν εἴτε κύριος ἡλίου καὶ πατὴρ, &c.

ſame

ſame with *Plato*'s * *firſt Fair*; the Cauſe of all Beauty, Order, and Harmony in the World. And *Pauſanias* the Writer tells us, that there were Temples ſeverally erected to each of theſe *Venuſſes* or *Loves*, the *Heavenly* and the *Vulgar*; and that *Urania* or *the heavenly Venus* was ſo call'd, *becauſe the Love belonging to it was pure and free from all corporeal Affection*; which as it is in Men is but a Participation of that firſt *Urania* or *heavenly Venus* and Love, God himſelf. And thus is *Venus* deſcrib'd by *Euripedes* in *Stobæus*, as the *ſepreme Deity*:

† *Do you not ſee how great and high a God*
This Venus *is*? *But yet you can't declare*
Her Greatneſs, nor compute its vaſt Extent.
'Tis ſhe that nouriſhes both thee and me
And all Mankind.——

And the ſame is confirm'd by ‖ *Æſchylus*, ** *Ovid*, and †† *Boethius* a Chriſtian Philoſopher and Poet; they all declaring *Venus* to be the *one ſupreme Deity*, and to have created all the Gods. To this *Urania* or heavenly *Venus* was near of kin alſo that third *Venus* in *Pauſanias*, call'd Ἀποστροφία, and by the *Latins Venus verticordia, pure and chaſt Love*, expulſive of all unclean Luſts, to which the *Romans* conſecrated a Statue, as ‖‖ *Valerius Maximus* tells

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* Τὸ πρῶτον καλὸν.

† Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἂν ὁρᾷς ὅση Θεὸς;
Αλλ' ἂν ἄν εἴποις, οὐδὲ μεληίσειας ἄν,
Ὅση πέφυκε καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον διήκεται.
Αὕτη τρέφει σε καὶ μὲ καὶ πάντας βροτούς.

‖ Grot. Excerp. *p.* 45. ** Faſt. l. 4. †† In Conſol. l. 2. Met. 8. *See* Cudworth's Intel. Syſt. *fol.* 488.

‖‖ L. 8. c. 15.

us

us, *to the end that the Minds of the Female Sex might then the better be converted from Lust and Wantonness to Chastity.* Wherefore we conclude, that *Urania* or the *heavenly Venus* was sometimes amongst the Pagans a Name for the supreme Deity, as that which is the most amiable Being and *first Beauty*, the *most benign and fruitful Begetter of all things, and the constant Harmonizer of the World.*

Again, tho *Vulcan*, according to the most common and vulgar Notion of him, be to be reckon'd amongst the *particular Gods*, yet had he also another more universal Consideration. For *Zeno* in *Laertius* tells us, that the supreme God was call'd Ἥφαιστος or *Vulcan*, as *his Hegemonick or ruling Faculty* acted in the artificial Fire. Nay *Plutarch* and *Stobæus* testify, that the *Stoicks* did not only call *Nature*, but also the *supreme Deity* it self, and the Architect of the whole World, an * *artificial Fire*, they conceiving him to be corporeal. And *Jamblichus* making *Phtha* to be the same *supreme God* amongst the *Egyptians* with *Osiris* and *Hammon*, or rather more properly the *Soul of the World*, tells us that *Hephæstus* in the *Greekish* Theology was the same with this *Egyptian Phtha*; and by consequence was taken for the *supreme God*, or at least the *Soul of the World*, as *artificially framing all things.*

Furthermore, *Seneca* gives us yet other Names of the supreme Deity according to the sense of the *Stoicks*: "Our Philosophers, says he, take this Auctor of all "things to be *Liber Pater*, *Hercules*, and *Mercury*; the "first, because he is the Parent of all things, *&c.* the "second, because his Force and Power is unconquerable, "*&c.* and the third, because there is in and from him

* Τεχνικὸν πῦρ.

"Reason,

" Reaſon, Number, Order, and Knowledg.

Bnt beſides theſe there were many other Pagan Gods, call'd by *Servius Dii ſpeciales*, ſpecial or particular Gods; which cannot be thought neither to have been ſo many really diſtinct and ſubſtantial Beings, that is, *natural Gods*, much leſs *ſelf-exiſtent* and *independent*, but only ſo many ſeveral Names or Notions of one and the ſame *ſupreme Deity*, according to certain particular *Powers* and *Manifeſtations* of it. It is true that ſome late Chriſtian Writers againſt the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of the Pagans, have charg'd them at leaſt with a *Trinity* of *independent Gods*, namely *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, as ſeeming to ſhare the Government of the World amongſt theſe three, and conſequently acknowledging no *one univerſal Deity*. Notwithſtanding which, it is certain, that according to the more *arcane Doctrine* and *Cabala* of the Pagans, concerning the *natural true Theology*, theſe three conſider'd as diſtinct and independent Gods, were accounted but *Dii Poetici & Commentitii*, *Poetical and Fictitious Gods*; and they were really eſteem'd no other than ſo many ſeveral Names and Notions of one and the ſame *ſupreme Deity*, as acting variouſly in thoſe ſeveral Parts of the World, the Heaven, the Sea, the Earth and Hell. For firſt as to *Pluto* and *Hades*, call'd alſo by the *Latins Orcus* and *Dis*, (which latter ſeems to have been a Contraction from *Dives* to anſwer the *Greek* πλέτων) as *Balbus* in *Cicero* attributes to him * all earthly Power, ſo others commonly aſſign to him the Regimen of ſeparate Souls after Death. Now it is certain, that according to this latter Notion, it was by *Plato*, and alſo by *Ficinus* writing upon the *Cratylus*, underſtood no otherwiſe than as a Name for that part

* Omnem vim terrenam.

of

of the Divine Providence, which exerciſeth it ſelf upon the Souls of men after Death; and *this*, ſays the latter, *is that, which according to* Plato, *binds and detains pure Souls in that ſeparate State, with the beſt* Vinculum *of all, which is not Neceſſity, but Love and Deſire, they being raviſh'd and charm'd as it were with thoſe pure Delights, which they there enjoy.* Upon this account was *Pluto* ſtil'd by *Virgil* the *Stygian Jupiter*; but by others, particularly by the Writer *De Mundo*, *Pluto* together with *Ceres* is taken in a larger ſenſe, for the manifeſtation of the Deity in the whole Terreſtrial Globe; alſo as he manifeſts himſelf in the Heavens, he is the *Heavenly Jupiter:* accordingly *Zeus* and *Hades*, *Jupiter* and *Pluto* are made to be one and the ſame thing by * *Julian*, *Euripedes*, and *Hermeſianax* the *Colophonian* Poet.

That *Neptune* was alſo another Name for the *ſupreme God*, taken from another particular Conſideration of him, namely as acting in the Seas, is plainly declar'd by divers of the Antients. Thus *Xenocrates* in *Stobæus*, and *Zeno* in *Laertius* affirm, *That God, as acting in the Water, is call'd* Poſidone *or* Neptune; and to the ſame purpoſe *Balbus* in *Cicero* declares, That † *the Poetick Fables concerning the Gods, being deſpis'd and rejected, it is eaſy for us to underſtand how God paſſing thro the Nature of every thing, may be call'd by ſeveral Names; as thro the Earth,* Ceres *and* Pluto; *thro the Seas,* Neptune; *and thro other Parts of the World by other Names:* ſo that all theſe Titular Gods were but ſo many ſeveral Denominations of *one ſupreme Deity.* And to him agrees *Cotta*, when he ſays, *Your meaning is,* Neptune

* Εἷς Ζεὺς, εἷς Ἀΐδης. Ζεὺς εἷς Ἀΐδης, ονομαζόμενος σέργεις. Πλάτων, Περσεφόνη, Δημήτηρ, &c. εἷς Θεός ἐστί.

† De Nat. Deor. l. 2.

is

is a Mind, with which Underſtanding paſſes thro the Sea, and the like of Ceres *thro the Earth* *. And to paſs by much more to this purpoſe, particularly the Confeſſion of *Maximus Tyrius* and others, I ſhall only hereunto ſubjoin the Declaration of *Pauſanias* in his *Corinthiacks*, where he expounds the meaning of a certain Statue of *Jupiter* with three Eyes, call'd the Country *Jupiter* of the *Trojans*, ſaying, That † *the Statuary made* Jupiter *with three Eyes, to ſignify that it is one and the ſame God, which ruleth in thoſe three ſeveral Parts of the World, the Heaven, the Sea, and the Earth.*

Moreover, as *Neptune* was a Name for God as manifeſting himſelf in the Sea and ruling over it, ſo was *Juno* another Name of God, as acting in the Air. This is particularly affirm'd by *Xenocrates* in *Stobæus*, and *Zeno* in *Laertius*. And St. *Auſtin* propounding this Query, why *Juno* was join'd to *Jupiter* as his Wife and Siſter, makes the Pagans anſwer thus to it: *Becauſe we call God in the Æther*, Jupiter; *and in the Air*, Juno. But the reaſon why *Juno* was a Feminine and a Goddeſs, is thus given by *Cicero*: ‖ *They effeminated the Air*, ſays he, *and attributed it to* Juno *a Goddeſs, becauſe nothing is ſofter than that.* Alſo *Minerva* was ſometimes taken for a ſpecial or particular God; and then was it nothing elſe, as *Zeno* informs us, but a Name for the ſupreme God, as paſſing thro the higher *Æther*. And again, as the ſupreme God was call'd *Neptune* in the Sea and *Juno* in the Air, ſo by the ſame reaſon may we conclude, that he was call'd *Vulcan* in the Fire.

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* Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

† Τειὼν ἓν ὁρῶνλα εποίησεν Οφθαλμοῖς ὅσις ἦν ἓν ὁποιήσας, ἅτε ἓν ταῖς τειὶ ταῖς λεγομέναις λήξεσιν ἄρχοντα ὕ ἀύλου τοῦτου Θεὸν.

‖ Effæminârunt autem eum, Junonique tribuerunt, quod nihil eſt Aere molliùs.

Laſtly, as the Sun and Moon were themſelves ſometimes worſhip'd by the Pagans for inferior Deitys, they being ſuppos'd to be animated with particular Souls of their own; ſo was the ſupreme God alſo worſhip'd in them both, as well as in the other Parts of the World, and that under thoſe ſeveral Names of *Apollo* and *Diana*. Thus the Pagans appointing a God to preſide over every Part of the World, did thereby but make the ſupreme God Polyonymous, all thoſe Gods of theirs being indeed nothing but ſeveral Names of him. Which Theology of the antient Pagans *Maximus Tyrius* has thus declar'd, in his *Account of *Homer*'s Philoſophy: "You may find, "ſays he, in *Homer* other Principles, and the Originals "of ſeveral Names, which the ignorant hear as Fables, "but a Philoſopher will underſtand as Things and "Realitys. For he aſſigns a Principle of Vertue and "Wiſdom, which he calls *Minerva*; another of Love "and Deſire, which he calls *Venus*; another of Arti-"ficialneſs, and that is *Vulcan*, who rules over the "Fire; and *Apollo* alſo with him preſides over Dan-"cings, the Muſes over Songs, *Æolus* over Winds, "and *Ceres* over Fruits. And then does he thus conclude: "So that no part either of Nature or the World "is to *Homer* Godleſs, or void of a God; none deſtitute "of a Ruler, or a ſuperior Government: but all things "are full of Divine Names, and of Divine Reaſon, and "of Divine Art. That the more Philoſophick Pagans did thus really interpret the Fables of the Gods, and make their many Poetical and Political Gods to be all of them but *one and the ſame ſupreme natural God*, is alſo evident from the Teſtimonys of *Antiſthenes*, *Plato*, *Xenocrates*, *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, and *Chryſippus*, (who alle-

* Diſſert. 16.

goriz'd

goriz'd all the Fables of the Gods accordingly) and of *Scævola* the *Roman Pontifex*, of *Cicero*, *Varro*, *Seneca*, and many others. Nay moreover, that even their Poets alſo did ſometimes venture to broach this *Arcane Theology*, is manifeſt from the Teſtimonys of *Hermeſianax* among the *Greeks*, partly cited in the Margent a little before; and of *Valerius Soranus* among the *Latins*, he univerſally pronouncing that *Jupiter Omnipotens* is *—Deus unus & omnes, one God and all Gods.* Moreover, St. *Auſtin* making a more full and particular Enumeration of the Pagan Gods, and mentioning amongſt them many others beſides the *Select Roman Gods*, (which are not now commonly taken notice of) does pronounce univerſally of them all, according to the ſenſe of the more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the ſame *Jupiter*: *Let all theſe Gods and Goddeſſes*, ſays he, *and many more which I have not mention'd, be one and the ſame* Jupiter; *whether as Parts of him, which is agreeable to their Opinion, who hold him to be the Soul of the World*; *or elſe as his Vertues only, which is the ſenſe of many and great Pagan Doctors**. Whatever the Learned J. G. *Voſſius* in his *De Theologiâ Gentili* has infer'd from *Apuleius* in his Book *De Deo Socratis*, concerning the *Civil* and *Poetical* Pagan Gods, as if he there meant that the *Conſentes* and *Selecti*, and the other Civil and Poetical Gods of the Pagans were ſo many *ſubſtantial and eternal Minds* or underſtanding Beings *ſuperceleſtial* and *independent*, their *Jupiter* being put only in an equality with *Apollo*, *Juno*, *Venus*, and the reſt; with a due reſpect to that learned and induſtrious

* De Civ. Dei l. 4. c. 11. *See a free, but candid Cenſure of the Learned* J. G. Voſſius, *for ſeeming to aſſert the contrary, in* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *fol.* 497, &c.

Perſon, I affirm quite the contrary, and that no ſuch thing can be juſtly infer'd even from his *Apuleius*, whoſe ſeeming Authority alone he depends on. Foraſmuch as the deſign of *Apuleius* in that Writing was not in the leaſt to aſſert a *multitude* of *ſubſtantial and eternal Deitys*, or independent *Minds*: but only to reduce the vulgar Theology of the Pagans, both their *Civil* and *Poetical*, into ſome Conformity with the *Natural*, *Real*, and *Philoſophick Theology*; and this according to *Platonick* Principles: wherein many other of the Pagan *Platoniſts* both before and after Chriſtianity agreed with him; they making the many Pagan inviſible Gods to be really nothing elſe but the *eternal Ideas* of the Divine Intellect, call'd by them the Parts of the Intelligible and Archetypal World; which they ſuppos'd to have been the Paradigms and Patterns, according to which this ſenſible World and all particular things therein were made, and upon which they depended, they being only Participations of them. Wherefore tho this may well be look'd on as a monſtrous Extravagance in theſe *Platonick* Philoſophers, thus to talk of the Divine Ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal Paradigms of things, not only as *ſubſtantial*, but alſo as ſo many ſeveral *Animals*, *Perſons*, and *Gods*, it being their humour thus upon all ſlight occaſions to multiply Gods; yet nevertheleſs muſt it be acknowledg'd, that they did at the very ſame time declare, that all theſe were deriv'd from one ſupreme Deity; and not only ſo, but that they alſo exiſted in it: as they did likewiſe at other times, when unconcern'd in this buſineſs of their *Pagan Polytheiſm*, freely acknowledg all thoſe *intelligible Ideas*, to be really nothing elſe but νοήματα, that is, *Conceptions in the Mind of God*, or the firſt Intellect, tho not ſuch ſlight accidental and evanid ones, as the Conceptions and Modifications of

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our human Souls are; and conſequently not to be ſo many diſtinct *Subſtances*, *Perſons*, and *Gods*, much leſs *independent* ones, but only ſo many *partial Conſiderations of the Deity* *.

In ſhort, amongſt the Pagans there was nothing at all without a God †, they having a ſtrong Perſuaſion, that Divine Providence extended it ſelf to all things, and expreſſing it after this manner, by aſſigning to every thing in Nature and every Part of the World, and whatſoever was done by Men, ſome particular God or Goddeſs by name, to preſide and rule over it. Now moreover, that the intelligent Pagans ſhould believe in good earneſt, that all theſe inviſible Gods and Goddeſſes of theirs were ſo many ſeveral *ſubſtantial Minds*, or *underſtanding Beings eternal and unmade*, really exiſting in the world, is a thing in it ſelf utterly incredible. For how could any poſſibly perſuade themſelves that there was one eternal unmade *Mind* or *Spirit*, which, for example, eſſentially preſided over the *Rockings of Infants Cradles*, and nothing elſe? another over *the ſweeping of Houſes*? another over *Ears of Corn*? another over *the Husks of Grain*? and another over the *Knots of Straw and Graſs*, and the like? And the caſe is the very ſame touching thoſe other noble Gods of theirs, as they term 'em, the *Conſentes* and *Selecti*; ſince there can be no reaſon given, why thoſe ſhould all of 'em be ſo many *ſubſtantial and eternal Spirits* ſelf-exiſtent or unmade, if none of the other were ſuch. Wherefore if theſe be not all, ſo many ſeveral ſubſtantial and eternal *Minds*, ſo many ſelf-exiſting and independent *Deitys*; then

* *See this Point more fully clear'd by Citations out of* Apuleius, *and the Authoritys of* Plato, Julian, *&c.* in Cud. True Intel. Syſt. *ib. &c.*

† Μηδὲν ἄθεον.

muſt

must they of necessity be either several partial Considerations of the Deity, namely the several Manifestations of the Divine Power and Providence personated, or else inferior Ministers of the same. Accordingly the more high flown and *Platonick* Pagans understood what was before mention'd, that these *Consentes* and *Select Gods*, and all the other invisible ones, were really nothing else but the *Ideas* of the *Intelligible* and *Archetypal World*, which is the Divine Intellect; that is indeed, but partial Considerations of the Deity, as *virtually* and *exemplarily* containing all things: whilst others of 'em going in a more plain and easy way, concluded these Gods of theirs to be all of 'em but several Names and Notions of the *one supreme Deity*, according to the various Manifestations of its Power in the World, agreeably to that Apology of the Heathens in *Eusebius*: * *That they Deify'd nothing but the invisible Powers of that God which is over all.* Nevertheless, beeause these several Powers of the *supreme God* were not suppos'd to be all of 'em executed immediately by himself, but by certain other † *subservient Ministers* under him, appointed to preside over the several things of Nature, the Parts of the World and the Affairs of Mankind, commonly call'd *Dæmons*; therefore were those Gods sometimes also taken for such *subservient Spirits* or *Dæmons* collectively.

But for the yet fuller clearing of the whole Pagan Theology, and especially this one Point of it, that their *Polytheism* or multiplicity of Gods was in great part nothing else but the *Polyonymy* of *one God*, or his being call'd by *many personal Proper Names*, two things are

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* Θεοποιεῖν τὰς ἀοράτους δυνάμεις αὐτῷ τῷ ὄντι πᾶσι. Præp. Ev. l. 3. c. 13.
† Ὑπηρετικὰ δυνάμεις.

here

here requiſite to be further taken notice of: Firſt, that according to the Pagan Theology God was conceiv'd to *be diffus'd thro the whole World, to permeate and pervade all things, and intimately to act all things.* That the *Egyptians* were of this opinion, may be concluded from the words of *Horus Apollo*, affirming * *God to be a Spirit that pervaded the whole World, and that nothing at all conſiſted without God.* And to them agreed the other Antients whether *Greeks* or *Latins*, &c. That the *Greeks* did ſo, does particularly appear from the Confeſſion of † *Diogenes* the Cynick in *Laertius*, of *Ariſtotle* or the Writer *De Plantis* ||, ſpeaking to the ſame purpoſe: and the ſame is repreſented by *Sextus Empiricus*, as the ſenſe of *Pythagoras*, *Empedocles*, and all the *Italick Philoſophers* **; by †† *Clemens Alexandrinus* and |||| *Tertullian*, as the ſenſe of the *Stoicks*. Nay even *Anaxagoras* and *Plato*, who neither of 'em confounded God with the World, but kept 'em both diſtinct, and affirm'd God to be (*a*) *unmingl'd with any thing*, nevertheleſs concluded that (*b*) *he did order and govern all things, paſſing thro and pervading all things*; which is the very ſame with the Doctrine of (*c*) Chriſtian Theologers, *That God permeates and paſſes thro all things unmixedly.* And the ſame is again declar'd by *Plato* to have been the Opinion of *Heraclitus*, who etymologizes the word δίκαιον, being apply'd to God, from διὰ ἰὸν, *paſſing thro*, the Letter *Cappa*

* Τῦ παντὸς κόσμυ τὸ διῆκον πνεῦμα· διὸ καὶ θεῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι.

† Αὐτῦ πάντα πλήρη. || L. 1. c. 1.

** Ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς κόσμυ διῆκον, ψυχῆς τρόπον, &c. Adv. Mathem. p. 331.

†† Διὰ πάσης ὕλης καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγυσι. Protr. p. 44.

|||| Stoici volunt Deum ſic per Materiam decucurriſſe, quomodo Mel per Favos. *Tertul.* (*a*) Οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον.

(*b*) Αὐτὸν πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα.

(*c*) Τὸν θεὸν διὰ πάντων ἀμιγῶς διήκειν.

being

being put between for the better Pronunciation: however indeed *Plato* derides the *Heracliticks* for confounding God with *Matter*, and fancying this *univerſal Spirit* to be either *Fire* or *Heat*. Again, that the *Latins* alſo fully agreed in this, appears from the Teſtimonys of * *Seneca*, † *Quintilian*, ‖ *Apuleius*, ** *Servius*, &c. to this purpoſe. Nay that this was aſſerted alſo by the Poets, is evident from this and the like Paſſages of theirs: †† *That all the things of Nature and Parts of the World are full of Gods.* Laſtly, to name no more, the ſame is witneſs'd by *Strabo* concerning the *Indian Brachmans*, as ſaying, |||| *That the Maker and Governour of the World pervades the whole of it.* Wherefore this being the univerſally receiv'd Doctrine of the Pagans, that God is a Spirit or Subſtance diffus'd thro the Whole, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if, as *Paulus Oroſius* ſpeaks, (*a*) *while they believe God to be in many things, they have therefore out of an indiſcreet fear feign'd many Gods*; in which words he intimates, that the Pagans *many Gods* were really but ſeveral Names of *one God*, as exiſting in many things, or in the ſeveral Parts of the World, as the Ocean is call'd by ſeveral Names from the ſeveral Shores it beats upon.

A ſecond thing to be taken notice of is this: that the Theology of the Pagans went ſometimes yet a ſtrain

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* Deum eſſe Divinum Spiritum per omnia maxima ac minima, æquali intentione diffuſum. † Ille fuſus per omnes rerum Naturæ partes ſpiritus, &c. ‖ Deum omnia permeare, &c. ** Nulla pars Elementi ſine Deo eſt, &c.

†† Jovis omnia plena. Μεσαὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαὶ, &c. ——

——Deum namque ire per omnes
Terraſque Tractuſque Maris Cœlumque profundum.

|||| Ὅτε διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν θεὸς, διὰ ὅλε διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτε.

(*a*) Quidam dum in multis Deum credunt, multos Deos indiſcreto timore finxerunt.

higher,

higher, they not only thus ſuppoſing *God to pervade the whole World*, which Opinion thus far keeps up ſome difference and diſtinction betwixt *God* and the *World*; but alſo himſelf to be in a manner *all things*. That the *Egyptian* Theology, from whence the Theologys of other Nations were deriv'd, ran ſo high, is evident from that excellent Monument of *Egyptian* Antiquity, the *Saitick* Inſcription before mention'd, *I am all that was, is, and ſhall be*; and from the Triſmegiſtick Sayings to the very ſame purpoſe. And from *Egypt* in all probability was this Doctrine deriv'd by *Orpheus* into *Greece*, the Orphick Verſes running much upon this ſtrain, and being thus abridg'd by *Timotheus* the *Chronographer*, that *all things were made by God, and that himſelf is all things*. The ſame is confirm'd by * *Æſchylus* amongſt the *Greeks*, by † *Lucan* and *Seneca* amongſt the *Latins*; which latter has this remarkable Paſſage: ‖ *What*, ſays he, *is God? He is all that you ſee, and all that you do not ſee; and he alone is all things, he containing his own work, not only without, but alſo within.* Neither was this the Doctrine of thoſe Pagans only, who held God to be the *Soul of the World*, and conſequently the whole *animated World* to be the ſupreme Deity; but of thoſe others alſo, who conceiv'd of God, as an *abſtract Mind*, ſuperior to the *Mundane Soul*; or rather as a *ſimple Monad*, ſuperior alſo to *Mind*: as namely of

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* Ζεὺς ἐστιν αἰθὴρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανὸς,
Ζεὺς τοι τὰ πάντα, κἀμέ τι τῶν, δ' ἐπ' ὑπέρτερος ἐστιν.
i. e. Jove is the Earth, the Æther, and the Heav'n;
He alone is all things, and above all.

† ——— Superos quid quærimus ultra?
Jupiter eſt quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris.

‖ Quid eſt Deus? Quod vides totum, & quod non vides totum: ſic ſolus eſt omnia; opus ſuum & extra & intra tenet.

Xenophanes, *Parmenides*, and *Meliſſus*, who deſcrib'd God to be *one and all things*, they ſuppoſing that becauſe all things were from him, they muſt needs have been firſt in a manner *in him, and himſelf all things, both which are and which are not.* To whom agrees the Author of the *Aſclepian* Dialogue; as alſo the other * Triſmegiſtick Books, and the † Orphick Verſes. Now this was not only a further ground of that ſeeming Polytheiſm amongſt the Pagans, which was really nothing elſe but the *Polyonymy* of *one God*, and their *perſonating his ſeveral Powers*; but alſo of another more ſtrange and puzling Phænomenon in their Theology, namely their perſonating likewiſe the *inanimate Parts of the World*, and *things of Nature*, and beſtowing the Names of Gods and Goddeſſes upon them: thus, for example, they did not only call the God, which preſideth over thoſe Arts that operate by Fire, *Hephæſtus* or *Vulcan*, but alſo *Fire* it ſelf; and *Demeter* or *Ceres* was not only taken by them for that God, who was ſuppos'd to give *Corn* and *Fruits*, but alſo for *Corn* it ſelf: and the ſame was the caſe as to all the reſt. Now I will not deny that this was ſometimes done Metonymically, the *Efficient Cauſe*, and the *ruling* or *governing Principle*, being put for the *Effect*, or that which was rul'd or govern'd by it: and thus was *Mars* frequently ſtil'd War, *Bacchus* Wine, and the like; and at firſt, as *Plutarch* informs us, there was no more in that Language than this: *As we*, ſays he, *when a Man buys the Books of* Plato, *commonly ſay that he buys* Plato; *and when one acts the Plays of* Menander, *that he acts* Menander: *ſo did the Antients not ſpare to call the Gifts and Effects of the Gods, by the*

* Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα ἐφανέρωσε, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ.

† ——Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέι σύμπα πφύκε.

Names

Names of thoſe Gods reſpectively, thereby honouring them for their Advantage. Nevertheleſs the *inanimate Parts* of the World, and the *things of Nature* were frequently deify'd by the Pagans, not only thus Metonymically, but alſo in a further ſenſe, as *Cicero* tells us; *Both that,* ſays he, *which proceeds from God is call'd by the Name of a God, as Corn is ſometimes thus call'd* Ceres, *and Wine* Liber: *and* * *alſo whatſoever has any greater Force in it, that thing it ſelf is often call'd a God too.* Thus, as *Philo* alſo tells us, *ſome have deify'd the four Elements, the Earth, the Water, the Air, and Fire. Some the Sun and the Moon, and the Planets and fix'd Stars,* &c. Indeed I don't deny but that the four Elements as well as the Stars were ſuppos'd by ſome of the Pagans to be animated with particular Souls of their own (which *Ammianus Marcellinus* ſeems principally to call *Spiritus Elementorum,* the *Spirits of the Elements,* worſhip'd by *Julian*) and upon that account to be ſo many *inferior Gods* themſelves. Notwithſtanding which, that even the inanimate Parts of theſe were alſo deify'd by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence, becauſe *Plato,* who in his *Cratylus* etymologizes Διόνυσος from *giving of Wine,* and elſewhere calls the Fruits of the Earth † *the Gifts of* Ceres, does himſelf nevertheleſs, in compliance with this vulgar Speech, call *Wine* and *Water,* as mingl'd together in a Glaſs or Cup to be drunk, *Gods:* where he affirms, That *a City ought to be ſo temper'd, as in a Cup, where the furious Wine being pour'd out, bubbles and ſparkles; but being corrected by another ſober God,*

* Tum illud quod erat a Deo natum nomine ipſius Dei nuncupabant, &c. Tum autem res ipſa, in quâ Vis ineſt major, ſic appellatur ut ea ipſa res nominetur Deus. *De Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

† Τὰ Δημήτερος δῶρα.

that is, Water, *both together do make a good and moderate Potion* *. To which purpoſe *Cicero* alſo tells us, that the *Roman* Admirals, before they went to Sea, were wont to offer up a Sacrifice to the *Waves*. To this I add, that not only *Subſtances*, but alſo mere *Accidents* and *Affections* of things in *Nature* were by the antient Pagans commonly *perſonated* and *deify'd*, as namely *Time*, *Love*, and the like. All which, I ſay, we may conceive to have been done at firſt upon no other ground but only this: becauſe God was ſuppos'd by them not only to permeate and pervade *all things*, to be diffus'd thro *all*, and to act in and upon *all*; but alſo to be himſelf in a manner *all things*, which they expreſt after this way, by perſonating the things of Nature ſeverally, and beſtowing the Names of Gods and Goddeſſes upon them; and eſpecially beſides the greater Parts of the World, to two ſorts of things: Firſt to ſuch things, in which human Advantage was moſt of all concern'd; *becauſe*, ſays *Cicero*, *they thought that whatſoever brought any great Profit to Mankind, this was not without the Divine Goodneſs* †. Secondly to ſuch as were moſt wonderful, extraordinary, or ſurprizing; to which purpoſe, ſays *Seneca*, ‖ *We adore the riſing Heads and Springs of great Rivers; every ſudden and plentiful Eruption of Waters out of the hidden Caverns of the Earth, hath its Altars erected to it*, &c. And this is that, which is properly call'd the Phyſiological Theology of the Pagans, their perſonating and deifying, in a certain ſenſe, the *things of Nature*, whether *inanimate Subſtances*, or the

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* Κολαζόμενος ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου Θεοῦ. De Leg. l. 6.

† Quia quicquid magnam utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non ſine divinâ bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur. *De Nat. Deor. l.* 2.

‖ Magnorum Fluminum Capita veneramur; ſubdita & ex abdito vaſti Amnis eruptio Aras habet, &c. *Ep.* 41.

Affections

Affections of Substances; a great part of which Physiological Theology was * allegorically contain'd in the *Poetick Fables of the Gods*, these being only the *things of Nature personated*.

But however these *personated* and *deify'd things of Nature* were not themselves properly and directly worship'd by the intelligent Pagans, who acknowledg'd no † *inanimate* thing for a God, so as to terminate their Worship ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the *supreme God*, or else at most in way of Complication with him, whose Effects and Images they are, so that they were not so much themselves worship'd, as God was worship'd in them. For these Pagans profess'd, as we have it in the words of *Julian*, That ‖ *they did not contemplate and view the Heaven and World with the same Eyes that Oxen and Horses do, but so as from that which is visible to their outward Senses, to discern and discover another invisible Nature under it*. That is, they profess'd to behold all things with religious Eyes, and to see *God in every Thing*; not only as pervading all things, and diffusing through *all Things*, but also as being in a manner *all things*. Wherefore they look'd upon the whole World as a *sacred thing*, and as having a kind of Divinity in it, it being, according to their Theology, nothing but God himself *visibly display'd*. And thus was God worship'd by the Pagans in the whole corporeal World, taken all together, or in the Universe, by the Name of *Pan*. As they also commonly conceiv'd of *Zeus* and *Jupiter* after the same manner, that is, not

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* *See more of this in* Cudw. Intel. Syst. *fol.* 510, 511, &c.

† *See* Cudw. Intel. Syst. *fol.* 513, 514, &c.

‖ Τὸν ἀέρα νῦν ἀκοῦσαι ἵππους καὶ βόας ὁρᾶν ἔτι τοῦ ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων ζώων. ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν φανερῶν τὴν ἀφανῆ πολυπραγμονεῖν φύσιν. Julian. Orat. 4.

abstractly

abſtractly only, as we now uſe to conceive of God; but *concretely*, together with all that which proceeds and flows from him, that is, the whole World. Thus do the Pagans in *Plato* confound * the greateſt God and the whole World together, as being but one and the ſame thing. And this Notion was ſo familiar with theſe Pagans, that *Strabo* himſelf writing of *Moſes*, could not conceive of his God and of the God of the *Jews* any otherwiſe than thus, namely, *That which containeth us all, and the Earth and the Sea, which we call the Heaven and the World, and the Nature of the Whole.* By which notwithſtanding *Strabo* did not mean the Heaven or *World inanimate*, and a *ſenſleſs Nature*, but an underſtanding Being, framing the whole World, and containing the ſame, which was conceiv'd together with it: of which therefore he tells us, that according to *Moſes*, no wiſeman would go about to make any Image or Picture, reſembling any thing here amongſt us. From whence we conclude, that when the ſame *Strabo* writing of the *Perſians* affirms of 'em, † that they did *take the Heaven for* Jupiter; and alſo ‖ *Herodotus* before him, that they did *call the whole Circle of the Heaven* Jupiter; the meaning of neither of 'em was, that the Body of the *Heaven inanimate* was to them the *higheſt God*, but that tho he were an *underſtanding Nature*, yet framing the whole Heaven or World, and containing the ſame, he was at once conceiv'd together with it.

But beſides this, the Pagans ſeem'd to apprehend a kind of neceſſity of worſhipping God thus in his Works, and in the viſible things of this World; becauſe the

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* Τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμιον. De Leg. l. 7.
† Τὸν ἡγεμόνα νομίζειν Δία. Strab.
‖ Κύκλον πᾶν τὸ οὐρανὸν Δία καλεῖν. Herodot.

gene-

generality of the Vulgar were then unable to frame any Notion or Conception at all of an *inviſible Deity*; and therefore unleſs they were detain'd in a way of Religion by ſuch a Worſhip of God, as was accommodate and ſutable to the Lowneſs of their Apprehenſions, they would unavoidably run into *Atheiſm:* nay the moſt philoſophical Wits amongſt 'em, confeſſing God to be incomprehenſible to 'em, ſeem'd therefore themſelves alſo to ſtand in need of ſome *ſenſible Props* to lean upon. To this purpoſe *Maximus Tyrius* does indeed exhort Men to aſcend up, in the Contemplation of God, above all corporeal things, ſaying, "The end of your Journy is not "the Heaven, nor thoſe ſhining Bodys in the Heaven; "for albeit thoſe be beautiful and divine, and the genuine "Off-ſpring of that ſupreme Deity, fram'd after the beſt "manner, yet ought theſe all to be tranſcended by you, "and your Head lifted up far above the Starry Hea-"vens, *&c.* Nevertheleſs he thus cloſes his Diſcourſe: "But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate "that Father and Maker of all things, it will be ſuffi-"cient for you at the preſent to behold his Works, and "to worſhip his Progeny or Off-ſpring, which is va-"rious and manifold. For there are, according to the "*Bæotian* Poet, not only thirty thouſand Gods, all the "Sons and Friends of the ſupreme God, but innume-"rable. And ſuch in the Heaven are Stars, in the "Æther Dæmons, *&c* *. Much the ſame account of the Pagan Practice is given by † *Euſebius*, agreeably to the Mind of ‖ *Socrates*, ** *Plato*, &c. *That God being incorporeally and inviſibly preſent in all things, and pervading or paſſing thro all things, it was reaſonable that*

* Max. Tyr. Diſſ. 1. † Præp. Ev. l. 3. c. 13.
‖ Xenoph. Mem. l. 4. ** De Leg. l. 7.

Men

Men ſhould worſhip him by and thro thoſe things that are viſible and manifeſt. Moreover, that theſe *Phyſiological Gods*, that is, the things of Nature perſonated and deify'd, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper Gods, much leſs independent and ſelf-exiſtent ones, may further appear from hence; becauſe they did not only perſonate and deify things *ſubſtantial* and *inanimate Bodys*, but alſo mere * *Accidents* and *Affections* of Subſtances; a large Catalogue of which is collected by *Voſſius* in his eighth Book *de Theologiâ Gentili.* And certainly thoſe things, which were ſo far from having any *Life* or *Senſe* in them, that they had not ſo much as any *real Subſiſtence* or *ſubſtantial Eſſence* of their own, could by no means be acknowledg'd for *true* and *proper Gods.* Accordingly we find that *Cotta* in *Cicero* does juſtly explode and baniſh theſe Gods out of the *Philoſophick* and *true Theology*: "Is there, ſays he, any need, "think you, of any great Subtlety to confute theſe "things? For tho we ſee indeed that Mind, Faith, "Hope, Vertue, Honour, Victory, Health, Concord, "and the like, have the Force of things, yet have they "not the Force of Gods; becauſe they exiſt either in "us, as Mind, Hope, Vertue, Concord, or elſe are "deſir'd to happen to us, as Honour, Health, Victory, that is, they are nothing but mere *Accidents* or *Affections* of things; "and therefore how they can have the "Force of Gods in them, cannot poſſibly be under-"ſtood †. And again after that he affirms, that thoſe who in the Allegorical Mythology of the Pagans are ‖ call'd *Gods, are really but the Natures of things, and not*

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* *See more of this in* Cudw. True Intel. Syſt. *fol.* 518, 519, &c.

† Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

‖ Eos, qui Dii appellantur, rerum Naturas eſſe, non Figuras Deorum.

the

the true Figures or Forms of Gods. Wherefore since the Pagans could not but acknowledg, that those *personated and deify'd things of Nature* were not true and proper Gods, the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were so many *several Names* and *partial Considerations* of *one supreme God*, as manifesting himself in all the *things of Nature.* For that *Vis* or *Force*, which *Cicero* tells us, was that in all these things, which was call'd God or deify'd, is really no other, than something of God in every thing that is good. To this purpose besides *Cicero*, *Pliny* also, tho no very divine, yet an ingenious Person, declares himself: * *Frail and toilsom Mortality*, says he, *has thus broken and crumbl'd the Deity into parts, mindful of its own Infirmity; that so every one by parcels and pieces might worship that in God, which himself most stands in need of.* Agreeably to this it is observable in *Plutarch*, that the *Egyptian* Fable of *Osiris*, being mangled and cut in pieces by *Typhon*, did, as we have before noted, allegorically signify the same thing, that is, one simple Deity's being as it were divided, in the *Fabulous and Civil Theologys* of the Pagans, into many partial Considerations of him, and so many nominal and titular Gods; which notwithstanding, by *Isis*, that is, true Knowledg and Wisdom, according to the natural or Philosophick Theology, is united all together into *one.* In short, we have an Epitome of the natural Theology of the Pagans, in the words of *Prudentius* to this effect: * *It acknowledg'd one supreme Omnipotent God, ruling over all, who displayeth and exerciseth his manifold Vertues*

* Fragilis & laboriosa Mortalitas in partes ista digessit, Infirmitatis suæ memor, ut portionibus quisque coleret, quo maximè indigeret. *Nat. Hist. l.* 2. *c.* 7.

and Powers in the world, all ſeverally perſonated and deify'd in the Poetick and Civil Theologys, together with the ſubſervient Miniſtry of other inferior Minds, underſtanding Beings or Dæmons call'd alſo by them Gods *, and diſtinguiſh'd by many particular Names, ſometimes by thoſe even of Accidents or Affections. Agreeably to which the Pagans declare in *Euſebius*, † That *they did not deify thoſe viſible Bodys of the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, nor the other ſenſible Parts of the world themſelves, but thoſe inviſible Powers of the God over all, which were diſplay'd in them. For they affirm that that God, who is but one, yet filleth all things with his various Powers, and paſſes thro all things, foraſmuch as he is inviſibly and incorporeally preſent in all, is reaſonably to be worſhip'd in and by thoſe viſible things.*

This I further add, was the caſe, with reference to our purpoſe, not only of thoſe Pagans who held God to be elevated above the World, and unmingl'd with it; but alſo of thoſe too, who had no higher Notion of him, than as a *Soul of the World*, that is, an univerſal Spirit or *common Nature*, immingl'd with the ſeveral Parts of it, ſuppos'd by ſome to be incorporeal, by others corporeal, and that either *Fire*, as *Heraclitus* and *Hippaſus* thought, or, as *Diogenes Apolloniates*, *Air*: and ſo he being the far better part of the World was, as ‖ *Varro*

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* ——— In uno
Conſtituit Jus omne Deo, cui ſerviat ingens
Virtutum Ratio, variis inſtructa Miniſtris.
See more of this in Voſſ. de Theolog. Gent. *l.* 8. *c.* 1. *in* D. Auguſt. de Civ. Dei l. 4. c. 24. *and in* Cudw. Int. Syſt. *fol.* 524, 525, &c.

† Præp. Ev. l. 3. c. 13.

‖ Dicit Varro, adhuc de Theologiâ naturali præloquens, Deum ſe arbitrari eſſe Animam mundi, quem Græci vocant κόσμον, & hunc ipſum mundum eſſe Deum. Sed ſicut hominem ſapientem, cum ſit ex Corpore & Animo, tamen ab Animo dici ſapientem, ita mundum Deum dici ab Animo, cum ſit ex Animo & Corpore. *De Civ. Dei l.* 7. *c.* 6.

with

with the reſt of the *Stoicks* declares in St. *Auſtin*, confounded and made to be the ſame thing with it. Now if the whole animated World be the ſupreme God, it plainly follows from thence, as *Seneca* owns, that the ſeveral parts and members thereof muſt be the parts and Members of God *: accordingly the *Soul of the World* or the whole *Mundane Animal*, was frequently worſhip'd by the Pagans in theſe its ſeveral Members, the chief Parts of the World and the moſt important things of Nature, as it were by piece-meal. But however, tho it be indeed true that the Pagans did many times perſonate and deify the *chief Parts of the World* and the *things of Nature*, as well as they did the ſeveral *Powers* and *Vertues* of the *Mundane Soul*, diffus'd thro the whole World; yet did not the Intelligent amongſt them therefore look upon theſe, as ſo many true and proper Gods, but only worſhip 'em as Parts and Members of one great *Mundane Animal*, or rather worſhip the *Soul* of the whole World, their ſupreme Deity in them all, as its various Manifeſtations. To this purpoſe do the Pagans in *Athanaſius* declare, that they did not worſhip the ſeveral *Parts of the World*, as really ſo many true and proper Gods, but only as Parts and Members of their *one ſupreme God*, that † great *Mundane Animal* or *whole animated World*, taken altogether as one thing. Thus we ſee that the Pagans were indeed univerſally World-worſhippers, in one ſenſe or other; yet did they not worſhip the World, as a *dead inanimate* thing, but either as the Body of God, as *they* did, who held him to be a great *Mundane Soul*; or at leaſt as the *Temple* or *Image* of him, as they did, who, as we ſaid before, ſuppoſing

* Totum hoc Deus eſt, ſocii ejus & membra ſumus.

† Ὡς ἓν ἀποτελοῦντες μέγα σῶμα, τὸ ὅλον Θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσι.

him to have been the Cauſe of all things, and ſo at firſt to have contain'd all things within himſelf; as likewiſe that the World, after it was made, was not cut off from him, nor ſubſiſted alone by it ſelf as a dead thing, but was cloſely united to him, and livingly dependent on him. But neither of 'em terminated their Worſhip in that which was *ſenſible* and *viſible* only, but in that great *Mind*, which fram'd and governs the whole World underſtandingly.

Hitherto have we declar'd the ſenſe of the Pagans in general, that they agreed in theſe two things: firſt, the breaking and crumbling as it were of the *ſimple Deity*, and parcelling out of the ſame into many particular Notions and partial Conſiderations, according to the various Manifeſtations of its Power and Providence in the World; by the *perſonating* and *deifying* of which ſeverally, they made as it were ſo *many Gods* of *one*. The chief ground whereof was this, becauſe they conſider'd not God according to his *ſimple Nature* and *abſtractly* only, but *concretely* alſo with the World as he diſplayeth himſelf therein, pervadeth *All*, and diffuſeth his Vertues thro *All*. For as the Sun reflected by groſſer Vapours, is ſometimes multiply'd; and the ſame Object beheld thro a Polyedrous Glaſs, by reaſon of thoſe many Superficies being repreſented in ſeveral places at once, is thereby render'd manifold to the Spectator; ſo one and the ſame ſupreme God, conſider'd *concretely* with the World, as manifeſting his ſeveral Powers and Vertues in it, was multiply'd into ſeveral Names, not without the appearance of *ſo many ſeveral Gods*. Whereas πολυώνυμον with thoſe antient Pagans was the ſame with πολυδύναμον, that which hath *many Names*, all one with that which hath *many Powers*. Accordingly the many Pagan Gods are in *Plato's Cra-*

tylus

tylus interpreted as the many *Powers* of *one* God diffus'd thro the World. And the Pagan Theologers ſeem'd to conceive this to be more ſutable to the Pomp, State, and Grandeur of the *ſupreme God*, for him to be conſider'd *diffuſively*, and call'd by *many Names*, ſignifying his many ſeveral Vertues and Powers (*Polyonymy* being by them accounted an Honour) rather than to be contracted and ſhrunk up all at once, into one general Notion of a perfect *Mind*, the Maker or Creator of the whole World. Secondly, the Pagans alſo agreed in their perſonating and deifying the Parts of the World and things of Nature themſelves, and thereby making 'em ſo many Gods and Goddeſſes too; their meaning therein being declar'd to be really no other than this, that God who does not only pervade all things, but alſo is the Cauſe of all things or a *Soul of the whole World*, ought to be worſhip'd in all the *things of Nature* and *Parts of the World*: as alſo that the *Force* of every thing was *Divine*; and that in all things that were beneficial to Mankind, the Divine Goodneſs ought to be acknowledg'd.

Thus I have now diſpatch'd the firſt of thoſe three Heads propos'd to be inſiſted on, namely, that the Pagans worſhip'd *one* and the ſame *ſupreme God* under many *perſonal Names*. So that much of their Polytheiſm was but ſeeming and fantaſtical, and indeed nothing but the Polyonymy of *one ſupreme God*, they making many *Poetical* and *Political Gods* of that *one natural God*; and thus worſhipping God by parts and piece-meal, according to that clear Acknowledgment of *Maximus Madaurenſis*: "The Vertues, ſays he, of "the one ſupreme God, diffus'd throughout the whole "World, we *Pagans* invoke under many ſeveral "Names, and ſo proſecuting with our Supplications

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" his as it were divided Members, must needs be " thought to worship him whole, we leaving out no- " thing of him *. The wise men amongst the Pagans, as *Josephus* particularly owns of the † *Greeks, held the same thing concerning God, which the* Jews *did*; but, as he also tells us, *they were afraid to declare the Truth of this their Doctrine to the Vulgar prepossess'd with other Opinions.* And *Plato* himself intimates as much in these words: *That as it was hard to find out the Maker of this Universe, so* ‖ *neither being found out, could he be declar'd to the Vulgar.* Wherefore since God was so hard to be understood, they conceiv'd it necessary, that the Vulgar should be permitted to worship him in his works by parts and piece-meal, according to the various Manifestations of himself; that is, should have a *Civil* Theology at least, distinct from the *Natural* and *Philosophical*, if not another *Fabulous* one too **.

I now proceed to the second Head propos'd, that besides this Polyonymy of *one supreme God* in the *Poetical* and *Civil* Theology of the Pagans, which was their seeming and fantastick *Polytheism*, they had another real Polytheism also, they acknowledging in their *Natural* and *Philosophick* Theology likewise, a multiplicity of Gods, that is, of *substantial understanding Beings*, superior to Men, really existing in the World. Which kind of Gods are stil'd by *Ammianus Marcellinus*

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* Unius summi Dei Virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas nos multis vocabulis invocamus; & dum ejus quasi quædam Membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere videmur.

† Ταῦτα περὶ Θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι δοκοῦσι καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι. εἰς πλῆθος δόξας περικαλυμμένον τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενέγκειν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν. Cont. Ap. l. 2.

‖ Τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.

** *All these Matters are more fully confirm'd by Authoritys, &c. in* Cudw. True Intel. Syst. *from* fol. 528. *to* 542.

Sub-

Subſtantiales Poteſtates, *Subſtantial Powers*, probably in way of diſtinction from thoſe other Pagan Gods, that were not *ſubſtantial*, but ſo many Names and Notions of *one ſupreme God* or his Powers ſeverally *perſonated* and *deify'd*. And theſe ſubſtantial Powers are ſaid by the ſame Writer to be ſubject to that one ſovereign Deity call'd *Themis*, as ruling the whole World with Juſtice or Righteouſneſs. And however they were indeed term'd *Gods*, yet were they not therefore ſuppos'd to be *unmade* and *ſelf-exiſtent* or *independent* Beings, but all of 'em, one only excepted, *generated Gods*, according to the larger Notion of that word before declar'd, that is, tho not as * *made in time*, yet at leaſt as *produc'd from a ſuperior Cauſe*; that is, deriv'd by way of Emanation from that *one God*, who is every way † under-riv'd and independent upon any other Cauſe, tho they were at once, as *Plato* ſtiles 'em, ‖ *Eternal* too: accordingly *Proclus* univerſally pronounces, that ** *all the Gods owe their being Gods to the firſt God*; adding that he is therefore call'd †† *the Fountain of the Godhead*; as likewiſe he was call'd θεὸς or *God* by way of eminency, in oppoſition to θεοὶ or thoſe other *Gods*, which, as *Plutarch* ſomewhere ſtiles 'em, were ὑπερχοὶ δυνάμεις, the *ſubſervient Powers* or *Miniſters* of the *one ſupreme unmade Deity*. So that we find the Pagans held both *one God* and *many Gods* in different ſenſes, *one unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deity* and *many generated or created Gods*. To this purpoſe *Onatus* the *Pythagorean* declares, that they who aſſerted *one only God* and not *many*, *underſtood not*

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* Tho not κατὰ χρόνον, yet ἀπ' αἰτίας γενητοὶ.

† Ἀγένητος. ‖ Ἀΐδιοι.

** Τὸ εἶναι Θεοὶ, πάντες οἱ Θεοὶ; διὰ τ πρῶτον ἔχουσι Θεόν. Theol. P. l. 3. c. 7.

†† Πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος.

what

what the Dignity and Majeſty of the Divine Tranſcendency conſiſted in, namely in ruling over Gods. Agreeably to whom *Plotinus* conceiv'd, that the *ſupreme God* was moſt of all glorify'd, not by *being contracted into one, but by having multitudes of Gods deriv'd from him and dependent on him, and that the Honour done to them, redounded unto him.* Where there are two things to be diſtinguiſh'd: Firſt, that according to the Pagan Theiſts, God was no *ſolitary Being*, but that there were multitudes of Gods or *ſubſtantial Powers*, and *living underſtanding* Natures, ſuperior to men, which were neither ſelf-exiſtent nor *generated out of Matter*, but yet all *generated* in ſome ſenſe, or created from *one Supreme.* Secondly, that foraſmuch as all theſe were ſuppos'd to have ſome influence more or leſs upon the Government of the World and the Affairs of Mankind, they were therefore all of them conceiv'd to be the due Objects of mens Religious Worſhip, Adoration and Invocation, and accordingly was the Pagan Devotion ſcatter'd amongſt them all. Nor were the Gods of the Oriental Pagans neither mere *dead Statues* and *Images*, according to that Reply of the *Chaldeans* in *Daniel* to *Nebuchadnezzar*, when he requir'd 'em to tell his Dream: *There is none other that can ſhew this thing before the King, except thoſe Gods whoſe Dwelling is not with Fleſh*, that is, the immortal Gods, or who are exalted above the Condition of human Frailty. Tho ſome conceive that theſe words are to be underſtood of a peculiar ſort of *Gods*; namely that this was ſuch a thing as could not be done by thoſe *Dæmons* and lower *Aereal Gods*, which frequently converſe with Men, but was reſerv'd to a higher Rank of Gods, who are above human Converſe. Now as to the former of theſe two things, that God is no *ſolitary Being*, but that there are multitudes of under-

underſtanding Beings ſuperior to men, the Creatures and Miniſters of *one ſupreme God*, the Scriptures both of the Old and New Teſtament do fully agree with the Pagans herein: * *Thouſand Thouſands miniſter'd unto him, and ten thouſand times ten Thouſand ſtood before him*; and, † *Ye are come to an innumerable Company of Saints.* But the latter of them, that Religious Worſhip and Invocation does of right belong to theſe created Spirits, is conſtantly deny'd and condemn'd in theſe Writings, that being a thing peculiarly reſerv'd to that one God, who was the Creator of Heaven and Earth. And thus is that Prophecy of *Jeremy* to be underſtood, expreſt in the *Chaldee* Tongue, that ſo the *Jews* might have it in readineſs for the *Chaldean* Idolaters, when they came to *Babylon*: *Thus ſhall ye ſay unto them, the Gods that have not made the Heavens and the Earth, ſhall periſh from the Earth, and from under theſe Heavens* ‖; that is, there ſhall come a time, when none ſhall be religiouſly worſhip'd any where upon the face of the whole Earth, ſave only that God, who made the Heavens and the Earth; and he, without Images too. Which Prophecy, but in part yet fulfil'd, ſhall then have its perfect Accompliſhment, when the Kingdoms of this World ſhall become the Kingdoms of our Lord and of his Chriſt. Agreeably to this, we are told by *Lactantius*, that the main Controverſy between the Chriſtians and Pagans was then only this: whether or no the created *Miniſters* of the *ſupreme God might be call'd Gods and religiouſly worſhip'd.* From whence it may be infer'd, that the Pagans univerſally held *one ſovereign uncreated God*; however they did indeed worſhip other *created Gods.*

* Dan. 7. 10. † Heb. 12. 22. ‖ Jerem. 10. 11.

But whereas the Pagans, besides their *mundane, sensible* and *generated Gods*, had also their * *supermundane, eternal and intelligible Gods*, touching these there may rise a suspicion, whether or no this latter Polytheism does not shock our main drift, and be not inconsistent with Monotheism and Monarchy, as seeming to suppose a plurality of *co-ordinate, unmade*, and *independent* Gods? Now not to repeat what was before said, that these Gods might be in some sense *produc'd, inferior* and *dependent*, tho allow'd to be *eternal*, I think it will be needful in this place to insist upon a further Account and Examination of them. Now the *supermundane, eternal* and *intelligible* Gods of the Heathens were principally those † *three Divine Hypostases*, as *Plotinus* stiles 'em, which have the nature of *Principles* in the Universe, namely, ‖ *Good* or *Monad*, *Mind* and *Soul*. This *Trinity*, according to *Amelius* and *Proclus*, was part of the *Orphick* as well as the *Pythagorick Cabala*; *Orpheus*, and after him *Pythagoras*, having travel'd into *Egypt*, and there very probably learn'd it, as being also a part of the *Hermaick Doctrine*. Moreover, there being no other account to be given whence the *Egyptians* had this Trinity, and it being hardly conceivable how it should be discover'd by the mere Light of Nature, we may reasonably conclude what *Proclus* asserts of it, as it was contain'd in the *Chaldaick Oracles*, to be true; that since there are in the antient Writings of the Old Testament certain significations of a *Plurality* in the Deity, or of more than *one Hypostasis*, it was at first a *Theology of Divine Tradition* or *Revelation*, or a *Divine Cabala*, namely, amongst the *Hebrews* first, and from them after-

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* Ὑπερκόσμιοι, ἀΐδιοι καὶ νοητοὶ θεοί.

† Τρεῖς ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις. ‖ Τ' ἀγαθὸν or ἕν, νοῦς and ψυχή.

wards

wards communicated to the *Egyptians* and other Nations. Neither ought it to be thought any conſiderable Objection to the contrary, that the *Pythagoreans*, *Platoniſts*, and other Pagan Theologers did not expreſs this their *Trinity* in the very words of the *Athanaſian Creed*, nor according to the Form of the *Nicene* Council; foraſmuch as this Myſtery was gradually imparted to the World, aud that firſt but ſparingly to the *Hebrews* themſelves, either in their *Written* or *Oral Cabala*; but afterwards more fully under *Chriſtianity*, the whole Frame whereof was built thereupon. It is not at all to be wonder'd at, that in ſuch a difficult and myſterious Point as this, there ſhould be ſome diverſity of Apprehenſions amongſt the reputed Orthodox Chriſtians themſelves; and much leſs therefore amongſt Pagan Philoſophers. However I freely own, that as this *Divine Cabala* was but little underſtood by many of thoſe, who entertain'd it among the Heathens, ſo was it by divers of them much deprav'd and adulterated alſo. But this Imputation is chiefly to be laid upon ſome modern *Platoniſts*, between whom and *Plato* himſelf, together with his moſt antient and genuine Followers, we ſhall do well to diſtinguiſh, but ſtill to reconcile both to the purpoſe we drive at, that is, to ſhew that notwithſtanding either the real or ſeeming Tritheiſm of one and t'other, they were however *Monotheiſts*, or Aſſerters of *one ſupreme God*. Firſt, I ſay, notwithſtanding the *real Tritheiſm* of the one; becauſe it muſt be own'd that the modern *Platoniſts* have generally ſtil'd this their *Trinity*, *a Trinity of Gods*, * *the Firſt*, *the Second*, *and the Third God*; as the more Philoſophical among them call'd it alſo a *Trinity of Cauſes*, and a

* Τὸν πρῶτον, ἢ δευτέρον, καὶ ἢ τρίτον θεὸν.

Trinity of Principles, and ſometimes a *Trinity of Opificers*. Thus is this *Cabala* of the Trinity ſtil'd in *Proclus*, * *the Tradition of the three Gods*. And accordingly he ſays of *Numenius*, That † *having prais'd the three Gods, he tragically or affectedly call'd them the Grandfather, the Son, and the Nephew*; *Numenius* thereby intimating, that as the *Second* of theſe Gods was the Off-ſpring of the *Firſt*, ſo the *Third* call'd the *Nephew* of the *Firſt* was deriv'd both from him and from the *Second*; from the *Firſt* as the *Grandfather*, and from the *Second* as the *Father* of him. Likewiſe *Harpocration*, *Atticus* and *Amelius* are ſaid by *Proclus* to have entertain'd this ſame *Cabala* or *Tradition* of the *three Gods*, the latter of theſe ſtiling 'em ‖ *three Kings and three Opificers*, or Makers of the whole World.

But whereas it no where appears that they held a multitude, or even a Triplicity of independent Gods, it may be concluded that the *Second* and *Third* God were held to be inferior to the *Firſt*; accordingly I add, that their πρῶτος θεὸς or *Firſt God*, was us'd in different ſenſes by theſe Pagans, ſometimes in a larger ſenſe, and in way of oppoſition to all the *generated or created Gods*, or the *Gods* that were made in time together with the World; and ſometimes again more particularly, in way of diſtinction from thoſe other two *eternal Divine Hypoſtaſes*, call'd by them the *Second* and *Third* God: which *Firſt* of the three Gods is alſo frequently call'd by them θεὸς, *God* emphatically and by way of excellency, they ſuppoſing a gradual Subordination in theſe Principles; I ſay a gradual Subordination, and that not

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* Ἡ τῶν τριῶν θεῶν παράδοσις.

† Τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεὺς, he did τετραγωδῶν καλεῖν, πάππον, ἔκγονον, ἀπόγονον. ‖ Βασιλέας τρεῖς καὶ τεττίγων δημιουργούς.

only

only of Order, but of Eſſence and Perfection: which is again another Argument that they held one ſupreme God, the firſt in their Triad above the other two Now this appears as to the ſecond Hypoſtaſis from this Repreſentation of the *Pythagorick* or *Platonick* Hypotheſis in the *Zoroaſtrian Oracles*: * *The Father or firſt Deity perfected all things, and deliver'd them to the ſecond Mind, who is that whom the Nations of Men do commonly take for the firſt*; that is, as *Pſellus* gloſſes on the words, *the whole Generation of Mankind, being ignorant of the Paternal Tranſcendency, do commonly call this ſecond Mind the firſt God, they looking up no higher than to the immediate Architect of the World* †. Alſo as to the third Hypoſtaſis, which they call'd Ψυχὴ or Soul, this they muſt needs look on as really inferior not only to the firſt but alſo to the ſecond, inaſmuch as they ſuppos'd it to be either an ‖ *immediate Soul of the corporeal World*; or, according to *Numenius*, it was the World it ſelf: and the ſame is confirm'd by this Citation of *Proclus*, out of the *Chaldaick* or *Magick* Oracles: ** *After or next below the Paternal Mind*, that is, *the ſecond Hypoſtaſis*, *I* Pſyche *dwell.* And accordingly the ſame *Proclus* and ſome others of the *Platoniſts* plainly underſtood this Trinity no otherwiſe, than as a certain Scale or Ladder of Beings in the Univerſe, or a gradual Deſcent of things from the firſt or higheſt by ſteps downward lower and lower, ſo far as to the Souls of all

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* Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε πατὴρ καὶ νῷ παρέδωκε
Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον καλέεσθαι ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν.

† Ὁπλινὰ νῦν τὸ ξύμπαν γένος ἀνδρῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν παλαικὴν ὑπεροχήν. Θεὸν πρῶτον καλοῦσι, &c.

‖ Ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος.

** ——— Μετὰ δὲ παλαικὰς διανοίας
Ψυχὴ ἐγὼ ναίω. ———

Animals:

Animals: the direct tendency of which Notion, 'tis obſervable by the way, was to lay a foundation for infinite Polytheiſm and Creature-worſhip; and accordingly theſe *Pſeudo-Platonick* Pagans were the greateſt, if not the only publick and profeſs'd Champions, that dar'd to hold up the Bucklers againſt Chriſtianity; one of whoſe chief Deſigns was to oppoſe and bear down the Pagan Idolatry.

But ſecondly we may obſerve a *ſeeming Tritheiſm* in the Triad of *Plato* himſelf, and of his moſt antient and genuine Followers; I call it only a *ſeeming Tritheiſm*, becauſe tho it carry an appearance, according to their manner of deſcribing it, of *three co-ordinate Gods*, yet ſhall we find it to be eaſily reconcilable with their belief of *one ſupreme God*: inaſmuch as tho, agreeably to the antient Cabala and Chriſtian Doctrine of the Trinity, they did indeed diſtinguiſh three Hypoſtaſes in the *Godhead*, yet did they not, with the ſpurious *Platoniſts* aforeſaid, in earneſt aſſert *three Gods*, however ſometimes they did indeed unwarily uſe the word *Gods*; which is the leſs to be wonder'd at in Heathens, ſince *Chalcidius*, tho a Chriſtian and undoubtedly a Monotheiſt, has likewiſe done the ſame, he calling the *three Divine Hypoſtaſes*, * *a Chief, a Second, and a Third God.* But to make it plain that *Plato* and his genuine Followers were no *Tritheiſts*, I ſhall firſt ſet down their Doctrine of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes, and after that ſhew how they held notwithſtanding a *Trinity* in *Unity*.

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* Ipſius rei diſpoſitio talis mente concipienda eſt, originem quidem rerum eſſe ſummum & ineffabilem Deum; poſt providentiam ejus ſecundum Deum, Latorem Legis utriuſque vitæ tam æternæ quam temporariæ: Tertium eſſe porro ſubſtantiam, quæ ſecunda Mens Intellectuſque dicitur, &c. *P.* 277.

As to the former then, we find *Plato* in his *Timæus* ſtiling the * *World a made or created Image of the eternal Gods*; by which *eternal Gods* he there doubtleſs meant that τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ τὸ τρίτον, that *firſt*, *ſecond* and *third*, which in his ſecond Epiſtle to *Dionyſius*, he makes to be the Principles of all things; that is, his *Trinity* of *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, by whoſe concurrent Efficiency, and according to whoſe Image and Likeneſs the whole World was made; for, ſays † *Euſebius*, theſe things do the Interpreters of *Plato* refer to the firſt God, and to the ſecond Cauſe, and to the third, the Soul of the World. Accordingly *Theodoret* alſo tells us in his Book *de Principio*, that Plotinus *and* Numenius *explaining* Plato's *ſenſe, declare him to have aſſerted three Supertemporals or Eternals*; *Good, Mind or Intellect, and the Soul of the Univerſe: he calling that* τ' ἀγαθὸν, *or* Good, *which to us is Father*; *that Mind or Intellect, which to us is Son or Word*; *and that* Pſyche *or a Power animating and enlivening all things, which our Scriptures call the Holy Ghoſt. And theſe things*, ſays he, as ‖ *Euſebius* alſo intimates, *were by* Plato *purloin'd from the Philoſophy and Theology of the* Hebrews. To make good which Teſtimonys we find *Plotinus* himſelf declaring, ** *That this World is an Image always iconiz'd and perpetually renew'd, as the Image in a Glaſs, of that firſt, ſecond and third Principle, which are always ſtanding*, that is, fix'd in Eternity and never made. To which may be added what he concludes elſewhere, that

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* Τῶν ἀϊδίων Θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα.

† Præp. Ev. l. 11. c. 20.

‖ Τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις λογίων μετὰ τὸ πεὶ παλῆος καὶ ὑῆ λόγον ἐν τρίτῃ τάξῃ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καλαλεγόνλων, &c. *Ibid.*

** Οὗτος μὲν ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν, ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος ἐσηκότων μὲν τῶ πρώτυ καὶ τῦ δευτέρυ καὶ τῦ τείτυ. In En.

there

there can be neither more nor fewer Divine *Hypoſtaſes* or *Principles* than three: "We ought not, ſays he, to "entertain any other Principles, nor yet fewer than "theſe three; for he that will contract the number and "make fewer of them, muſt of neceſſity either ſup-"poſe Soul and Mind to be the ſame, or elſe Mind and "the firſt Good: but that all theſe three are diverſe "from one another, has been often demonſtrated by us. Thus far we have a Specimen of the true and genuine *Platonick* Doctrine about the Divine Triad; from which it appears that the *Platoniſts* were us'd to ſpeak of the *eternal Nature, which always is and was never made, but was it ſelf the Principle of all other things*, not only *ſingularly*, as we Chriſtians do, but often in the Paganick way, *plurally* alſo; I ſay in the Paganick way, or according to the cuſtom of the Heathens, who were likewiſe wont to call many inferior Beings by the name of Gods, tho in earneſt they held but *one ſupreme God*. And thus ſhall I make it evident that *Plato*'s *three Gods*, which Term he unwarily us'd inſtead of Hypoſtaſes, were really underſtod by him to be but *one*. But before I proceed to do this directly, I ſhall firſt conſider a ſeeming difficulty, which lies in the way; an examination whereof will give us a yet further inſight into the Doctrine of the *Platonick Triad*. Now this ſeeming difficulty is, that *Plato* and his Followers aſſerted an eſſential Dependance of the *ſecond Hypoſtaſis* upon the *firſt*, as alſo of the *third* both upon the *firſt* and *ſecond*, together with a gradual Subordination in them; the chief ground of which Doctrine is that fundamental Principle of their Theology, that there is but one Original of all things, and only **one Fountain of the Godhead*; from

* Μία πηγὴ τῆς Θεότητος.

whence

whence all other things, whether temporal or eternal, created or uncreated, were deriv'd. And therefore, ſay they, the *ſecond Hypoſtaſis* of the *Trinity*, ſince it muſt accordingly derive its whole Being from the *firſt*, as the ἀπαύγασμα from the φῶς, the *Splendor* from the original *Light*, muſt alſo have an eſſential Dependence upon the ſame, and conſequently a gradual Subordination in it. And the ſame, to uſe the words of *Plotinus*, is alſo to be ſaid of the *Third*: *Perfect Intellect*, ſays he, *generates Soul*; *and it being perfect muſt needs generate, for ſo great a Power could not remain barren*: * *But that which is here begotten alſo cannot be greater than its Begetter, but muſt needs be inferiour to it, as being the Image thereof.* To this may be added a Paſſage of *Amelius* cited by *Proclus*, wherein he ſtiles the *firſt* of the *three Hypoſtaſes* τὸν ὄντα, *him that is*; the ſecond, τὸν ἔχοντα, *him that hath*; the third, τὸν ὁρῶντα, *him that ſees*: in which Expreſſions, tho peculiar to himſelf, he denotes an eſſential Dependence and Subordination in them. But tho the *Platoniſts* do commonly affirm their *ſecond Hypoſtaſis* to have been begotten from their *firſt*, and the *third* from the *firſt* and *ſecond*; yet do they by no means underſtand thereby any ſuch Generation as that of Men, where the Father, Son and Grandſon, when adult at leaſt, have no eſſential Dependence upon one another, or any *gradual Subordination* in their Nature, but are all perfectly co-equal and alike abſolute: becauſe this is but an imperfect Generation, where that which is *begotten* does not receive its whole Being originally from that which did *beget*, but from *God* and *Nature*; the *Begetter* being

* Κρεῖττον δὲ ἂν οἷόν τε ἦν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τὸ γενώμενον, ἀλλ' ἔλαττον ἂν εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

but a Channel or Inſtrument, and having been himſelf before *begotten* or produc'd by ſome other. Whereas the *firſt Divine* Hypoſtaſis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the ſole Principle and Original of all things; and therefore muſt the *ſecond* needs derive its Eſſence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely in a way of *natural Emanation*, as Light is from the Sun; and conſequently, tho co-eternal, muſt have an eſſential Dependence on him, and gradual Subordination to him. And this is the Point, which I am now to clear: the *Platoniſts* thus making a Dependence and Subordination in their *Divine Hypoſtaſes*, ſurely (ſome will object) they could not acknowledg 'em to be *one* and the *ſame God*. But on the contrary, the *Platoniſts* themſelves do upon this very account, and no other, declare all theſe *three* to be but *one Divinity*; even becauſe they have an eſſential Dependence and Subordination in them; the *ſecond* being but the Image of the *firſt*, and the *third* the Image both of the *firſt* and *ſecond*. Whereas were theſe three ſuppos'd to be perfectly coequal, and to have no eſſential Dependence one upon another, they could not by theſe *Platoniſts* be concluded to be any other than *three co-ordinate Gods*, having only a *Generical* or *Specifical Identity*, and ſo no more *one* than *three* Men are *one* Man: a thing, which the Pagan Theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconſiſtent with the perfect Monarchy of the Univerſe, and highly derogatory from the Honour of the ſupreme God and firſt Cauſe. For example, ſhould three Suns appear in the Heaven all at once with coequal Splendor, and not only ſo, but alſo be concluded, that tho at firſt deriv'd and kindl'd from *one*, yet they were now all alike abſolute and independent; theſe three

three could not ſo well be thought to be one Sun, as three that ſhould appear gradually differing in their Splendor; two of 'em being but Particles of the other, and eſſentially dependent on it: foraſmuch as the *ſecond* would be but the reflected Image of the *firſt*, and the *third* but the *ſecond* refracted. At leaſt thoſe *three* co-equal Suns could not ſo well be thought to be *one* thing, as the Sun and its firſt and ſecondary Splendor (which can neither be beheld without the Sun, nor the Sun without them) might be accounted one and the ſame thing. So that methinks the *Platoniſts* ſeem to have meant no more by the Subordination and Dependence of the *ſecond* and *third* Hypoſtaſes (however their Similitude, tho one of the beſt they could think of among created things, and accordingly made uſe of by * *Athanaſius* himſelf, does not come up to their full meaning) than that the *firſt* is greater than the *ſecond*, and the *ſecond* than the *third*; tho not by Nature or any eſſential Perfection, but, as a † Learned Chriſtian writes (in reference to the Subordination of the Son) *Auctoritate ſolâ*, with reſpect to the Original of one and t'other; in that the *ſecond* is from the *firſt*, the *third* from the *firſt* and *ſecond*, and not, *vice verſâ*, the *firſt* from the *ſecond*, or the *ſecond* from the *third*. Thus is their Doctrine ſet down by *Plotinus*: ‖ *That*, ſays he, *which is always perfect, generates what is eternal; and that which it generates, is always leſs than it ſelf. What ſhall we then ſay of the moſt abſolutely perfect*

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*Οὐδὲ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσάγομεν ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑποδέομεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα, &c. Cont. Ar. Or. 4. p. 467.

† *Dr.* Bull *in* Def. Fid. Nicæn. §. 4. c. 2. Ed. Grab.

‖ Τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀΐδιον γεννᾷ, καὶ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ, &c. En. 5. l. 1. c. 6.

Being of all? Does that produce nothing from it ſelf? Or rather does it not produce the greateſt of all things after it? Now the greateſt of all things, after the moſt abſolutely perfect Being, is Mind or Intellect, and this is ſecond to it. For Mind beholdeth this as its Father, and ſtandeth in need of nothing elſe beſides it: whereas that firſt Principle ſtandeth in need of no Mind or Intellect; and this is ſecond to it. For Mind beholdeth this as its Father, and ſtandeth in need of nothing elſe beſides it: whereas that firſt Principle ſtandeth in need of no Mind or Intellect. What is generated from that which is better than Mind, muſt needs be Mind or Intellect; becauſe Mind is better than all other things, they being all in order of Nature after it and junior to it, as Pſyche *it ſelf or the firſt Soul; for this is alſo the Word or Energy of Mind, as that is the Word and Energy of the firſt Good.* From which account it appears that the *Platoniſts* deny'd nothing to the *ſecond* and *third* Hypoſtaſes, which they aſcrib'd to the *firſt*, but only *Self-exiſtence* or *Unorigination*, which notwithſtanding they granted to 'em as they were *abſolutely God*, tho not as they were *relatively Hypoſtaſes*: and indeed a Denial of it to 'em in this latter ſenſe, eſpecially conſidering withal their ſuppos'd manner of Generation and Proceſſion, does by no means infer a Tritheiſm; but even in the Judgment of Chriſtians, thoſe great Aſſertors of a Divine Monarchy, is very well reconcilable with the Unity of the Godhead. Accordingly *Athanaſius* himſelf, St. *Baſil*, St. *Gregory Nazianzen*, and St. *Chryſoſtom*, with ſeveral others of the *Latins*, do interpret this Saying of our Saviour, *My Father is greater than I*, to be ſpoken not of his *Humanity*, but even his *Divinity*. To this purpoſe likewiſe St. *Hilary* is very expreſs; *We*

do

do not, ſays he, *equalize or conform the Son, but underſtand him to be ſubject or inferior to the Father* *. And to name no more particulars, we have this general Teſtimony of *Petavius* concerning the Antients, That † *the Father is in a right Catholick manner affirm'd by moſt of the Antients to be greater than the Son, and he is commonly ſaid alſo to be before him in reſpect of Original.* And our Learned Dr. *Bull* lays down and makes good this Theſis in the place before cited: That ‖ *as well the Ante as Poſt-Nicene Fathers unanimouſly held that God the Father was greater than God the Son, even as to his Divinity.* But notwithſtanding this *Gradation* of the *ſecond*, and for the ſame reaſon of the *third Hypoſtaſis*, no one can deny but that theſe Fathers both did and might very well at once aſſert the *Unity* of the Godhead: nor do we find juſt ground to deny the ſame of *Plato* and his Orthodox Followers, who, like the Chriſtians, diſtinguiſh betwixt οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, the *Eſſence* of the Godhead and the different *Hypoſtaſes* or *Perſonalitys* thereof; they making *Eſſence* or *Subſtance* to differ from *Hypoſtaſis*, as τὸ κοινὸν from τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, that which is *common* and *general* from that which is *proper* and *particular*: and thus their three Hypoſtaſes might be Homo-ouſian, Coeſſential, and Coequal as to the ſame *common Nature* of the Godhead, and be indeed *one God*, tho they were diſtinct and

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* Non exæquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri, ſed ſubjectum intelligimus. *In Lib. de Synod.*

† Pater major Filio ritè & catholicè pronunciatus eſt a pleriſque Veterum, & Origine prior ſine reprehenſione dici ſolet. *De Trin.* p. 863.

‖ Catholici Doctores tum qui Synodo Nicænâ anteriores fuêre, tum qui poſtmodum vixerunt, unanimi conſenſu Deum Patrem etiam ſecundum Divinitatem Filio majorem eſſe ſtatuerunt, &c.

greater

greater or leſs than one another, as to their Perſonalitys and manner of ſubſiſting. Which latter, as we have before obſerv'd, might well be ſuppos'd by 'em; becauſe that which is originally of it ſelf and underiv'd from any other, muſt needs have ſome Pre-eminence and Superiority over that, which derives its whole Being and Godſhip from it; as the *ſecond* Hypoſtaſis does from the *firſt*, and the *third* from the *firſt* with the *ſecond*. And in this ſenſe *Plotinus* ſays particularly of the *firſt Hypoſtaſis*, * *That it muſt needs be the moſt powerful of all Beings*; and *Macrobius*, that it is *Omnipotentiſſimus Deus, the moſt Omnipotent God*; by which he did not mean to deny that the *ſecond* and *third* Hypoſtaſes were omnipotent too, but only imply'd that they were not ſo in a perfect Equality *ad intra*, or as within the Deity, compar'd with each other; they being not able to produce the *firſt*, as the *firſt* did the *ſecond*, and that, together with the *ſecond*, the *third*: however notwithſtanding *ad extra*, and outwardly or abſolutely, they were equally omnipotent, as being but *one* and the *ſame God*. The genuine *Platoniſts* held no further *Subordination* of their Hypoſtaſes, than what was unavoidable in regard to the *Original* of the *ſecond* and the *third*, and what was abſolutely needful to keep up ſome Diſtinction, yet ſo as not to infer *three co-ordinate Gods*, but ſtill to maintain the *Unity* of the Godhead; they ſuppoſing the Divine *Eſſence to proceed to the three* Hypoſtaſes: which Eſſence, like all others, being notwithſtanding indiviſible, the Hypoſtaſes ſubſiſting in it muſt needs be one and the ſame God. Which that the genuine *Platoniſts* did hold, having, as

* Δεῖ πάντων ἥκιστα δυνατώτατον εἶναι.

I think, taken off a ſeeming difficulty touching the Subordination of the ſecond and third Hypoſtaſes, I come now more directly to ſhew; and that as far as in a caſe of this nature, they could by words expreſs their meaning, they ſuppos'd a Trinity in the Unity of the Godhead; I ſay as far as they could by words expreſs their meaning, while being cautious that the Hypoſtaſes as ſuch might not be confounded, ſtill they aſſerted ſuch a cloſe Conjunction between 'em as is no where elſe to be found, and as muſt needs infer 'em to have meant that they were but *one God*. To this purpoſe let us hear *Plotinus*: *Intellect*, ſays he, *is ſaid to behold the firſt Good, not as if it were ſeparated from it, but only becauſe it is after it, but ſo as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there between Intellect and Soul. Every thing which is begotten, deſires and loves that which begat it; eſpecially when theſe two, that which begat and that which is begotten, are alone, and nothing beſides them.* * *Moreover, when that which begat is abſolutely the beſt thing, that which is immediately begotten from it, muſt needs cohere intimately with it, and ſo as to be ſeparated from it only by Alterity.* Which is all one as if he ſhould have ſaid, that theſe three Divine Hypoſtaſes are ſo intimately conjoin'd together and united with one another, as that they are *tantum non*, *only not the very ſelf-ſame*: and therefore tho their Triad of Hypoſtaſes in this ſenſe will not very well admit of the Epithet *Tauto-ouſian* or *Mono-ouſian*, which Terms would ſeem too much to ſtraiten the Diſtinction of them, and to confound 'em all in *one Hypoſtaſis*, and were therefore diſown'd and diſclaim'd by the antient

* Ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἢ τὸ γεννῆσαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῷ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι. En. 5. l. 1. c. 6.

Fathers

Fathers of the Chriſtian Church; yet methinks it will admit of the Term *Homo-ouſian*, which implies indeed a *Community of Nature* in the Divine Eſſence, ſo as that the Hypoſtaſes ſubſiſting in it are co-eſſential or co-equal, and agree all in *one*; tho at once by their particular Modes of ſubſiſting in it and mutual Relations they are diſtinguiſh'd between themſelves: for thus is the word *Homo-ouſian* underſtood by * *Plotinus*, he making τὸ ὁμοούσιον and συγγένεια to be ſynonymous; as when ſpeaking of the Soul he ſays, that it is θείων μεστὴ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον, *that it is full of Divine things by reaſon of its being cognate or congenerous and Homo ouſian with them.* Nor was *Athanaſius* himſelf a ſtranger to this ſignification of the Word, he affirming in like manner † τὰ κλήματα εἶναι ὁμοούσια καὶ συγγενῆ τῆς ἀμπέλου, *that the Branches are Homo ouſian*, that is, co-eſſential or conſubſtantial, *and congenerous with the Vine or with the Root thereof*; and agreeably to this he uſes the words ὁμογενὴς, ὁμοειδὴς and ὁμοφυὴς, indifferently for ὁμοούσιος in ſundry places.

But this Co-eſſentiality or Unity of the three Hypoſtaſes will yet more plainly appear, if we conſider further, that the *Platoniſts* declar'd 'em to be ἀδιαίρετοι, abſolutely *indiviſible* and *inſeparable*, as the *Splendor* is indiviſibly join'd with the *Light* or *Sun*; which Similitude alſo *Athanaſius* himſelf frequently uſes to the ſame purpoſe. Again, the *Platoniſts* ſeem likewiſe to attribute to their three Divine Hypoſtaſes juſt ſuch an ἐμπεριχώρησις, *Circuminſeſſion* or *mutual In-being*, as Chriſtians do: for as their *ſecond* and *third* Hypoſtaſes muſt needs be in the *firſt*, as being therein virtually

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* En. 4. l. 7. c. 10.

† Epiſt. de Sent. Dion. p. 556.

contain'd;

contain'd; ſo muſt the *firſt* likewiſe be in the *ſecond* and *third*, they being as it were but two other Editions of it, or it ſelf gradually diſplay'd and expanded. But to ſpeak of this more particularly, the firſt muſt needs be in the ſecond, the τ' αγαθὸν in the νῶς, the *Good* in the *Mind*, and ſo both of 'em really one and the ſame God; becauſe the common Notions of all Mankind do attribute Underſtanding and Wiſdom to the Deity; but according to the Principles of *Plato*, *Plotinus*, and others, the Deity does not properly underſtand any where, but in the ſecond Hypoſtaſis, which is the *Mind* and *Wiſdom* of it. And the *Emperichoreſis* or *Circuminſeſſion* of the *ſecond* and *third* Hypoſtaſes was thus alſo intimated by *Plato*, when having ſpoken of that Divine *Wiſdom* and *Mind*, which orders all things in the world, he adds: * *But Wiſdom and Mind can never be without Soul*, that is, cannot act without it; *wherefore in the Nature of* Jupiter *is at once contain'd both a Kingly Mind and a Kingly Soul.* Here he makes *Jupiter* to be both the *ſecond* and *third* Hypoſtaſes of his *Trinity*, νῶς and ψυχὴ *Mind* and *Soul*; and conſequently thoſe *two* to be but *one God*: which νῶς or Mind is alſo ſaid to be γενόσης, that is, *of the ſame kind* and coeſſential with the firſt Cauſe of all things. To which I add, that as the *firſt Platonick Hypoſtaſis*, which is it ſelf ſaid to be above *Mind* and *Wiſdom*, is properly wiſe and underſtanding in the *ſecond*; ſo do both the *firſt* and the *ſecond* move and act in the *third*: ſo that the Entireneſs of the whole Divinity is made up of theſe three together, which have all μίαν ἐνέργειαν, one and the ſame Energy or Action *ad extra*, tho in point of re-

* Σοφία μὲν ϗ νῶς ἄνευ ψυχῆς ἐκ ἂν πόϛε γενοίϖην· ἐκεῖν ἐν ϕ τῇ τῦ Διὸς ἐρᾷς φύσῃ βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νῦν ἐγγίγνεϖαι.

lation *ad intra* they differ among themſelves. Again, theſe three Divine Hypoſtaſes, *Good*, *Mind*, and *Soul*, are ſaid by the *Platoniſts* to be one θεὸν or Divinity, juſt in the ſame manner as the *Centre*, *immovable Diſtance*, and *movable Circumference* of a Sphere or Globe are all eſſentially one Sphere or Globe. Thus *Plotinus* expreſly writing of the *third* Hypoſtaſis or *Pſyche*, " This " *Pſyche* or * third Hypoſtaſis, ſays he, is a venerable " and adorable thing alſo, it being the Circle fitted to " the Centre, an indiſtant Diſtance, foraſmuch as it is " no corporeal thing; for theſe things are juſt ſo as if " one ſhould make the τ' αγαθὸν or firſt Good to be the " Centre of the Univerſe; in the next place Mind or " Intellect to be the immovable Circle or Diſtance; " and laſtly Soul to be that which turns round, or the " whole movable Circumference, acted by Love or " Deſire. Wherefore theſe three *Platonick* Hypoſtaſes ſeem to be really nothing elſe, but *infinite Goodneſs*, *infinite Wiſdom*, and *infinite active Love* and *Power*, not as mere Qualitys or Accidents, but as ſubſtantial things that have ſome kind of Subordination one to another, all concurring together to make up *one Divinity*, juſt as the Centre, immovable Diſtance, and movable Circumference concurrently make up *one Sphere*, and are co-eſſential to it; or, as they ſometimes make the Compariſon, juſt as the Root, Stock, Boughs or Branches are co-eſſential with an entire Tree: by which Similitude, as I have before noted, *Athanaſius* himſelf does alſo illuſtrate the Trinity in Unity.

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* Σεμνὸν γὰρ τὸ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος περιαγμότων κέντρῳ, &c.

But

But again it may be yet further preſum'd that the *Platoniſts* held their *three* Hypoſtaſes to be but *one God*, from their applying ſuch Attributes to each of them, as are incommunicable to any other, but the *one ſupreme God*; ſuch are *Eternity* (which is *Plato*'s diſtinctive Character of *God* and the *Creature*) *neceſſary Exiſtence, and Univerſality or Infinity.* As to the former of which Attributes, I need not repeat what has been often mention'd, that *Plato* acknowledg'd *one eternal Being*, it being, as *Proclus* expounds his mind on the beginning of the *Timæus*, * *either one of our common Notions, or a thing Mathematically demonſtrable, that there muſt be ſomething eternal or which was never made, but always was, and had no beginning*; and what elſe is this but God, the τὸ ὄν by way of eminency, the † *Fountain of the Godhead*, the Monad or firſt Hypoſtaſis in the *Platonick Triad*, which agreeably to this is ſtil'd in the *Septuagint* Tranſlation of the *Moſaick* Writings ὁ ὤν, he *that truly is*, as being *uncreated* and *never made*. But it being unqueſtionable that *Plato* held the Eternity of his *firſt* Hypoſtaſis, I paſs on to his *ſecond*. Now that this, tho ſaid to have been generated, that is, to have proceeded by way of Emanation from the firſt call'd τ' ἀγαθὸν, *the Good*, yet was acknowledg'd to have been eternal or without beginning, might be prov'd by many expreſs Teſtimonys of the moſt genuine *Platoniſts*; *Plotinus* writes thus concerning it: ‖ *Let all temporal Generation be quite baniſh'd from our Thoughts* (ſpeaking of Mind) *whilſt we treat of things eternal or ſuch as always are, we attributing Generation to them only in reſpect of Cauſality and*

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* Ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἡμῶν ἐννοίαις ἀπόκεισθαι τὸ εἶναί τι ἀεὶ ὄν.

† Ἡ πηγὴ τῆς θειότητος.

‖ En. 5. l. 1. c. 6.

Order, but not of Time. To which may be added this Testimony of *Porphyrius* in St. *Cyril*: Plato, says he, *thus declares concerning the first Good, that from it was generated a certain Mind incomprehensible to Mortals; in which, subsisting by it self, are contain'd the things that truly are, and the Essences of all Beings. This is the first Fair and Pulchritude it self, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all Eternity as its Cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten and as its own Parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way mov'd towards its Generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begottenly: And that not from any temporal Beginning, there being as yet no such thing as Time. Nor when Time was afterwards made, did it any way affect him; * for Mind is always timeless and alone eternal.* To this purpose *Socrates* the Ecclesiastick Historian tells us, *that* † Plato *no where affirms his first and second Cause (as he was wont to call 'em) to have had any Beginning of their Existence*; *and* Origen, a strict *Platonist*, as well as *Christian*, *every where confesseth the Son to be co-eternal with the Father.* To which may be fitly added this famous Passage of *Amelius*, contemporary with *Plotinus*, recorded by *Eusebius*, St. *Cyril*, and *Theodoret*; where speaking of the second Hypostasis, he says, That ‖ *this was the* Logos *or Word, by whom existing from Eternity, according to* Heraclitus, *all things were made*; *and whom that* Barbarian *also placeth in the Rank and Dignity of a Principle, affirming him to*

* Ἀχρονος γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νοῦς. S. Cyril cont. Jul. l. 1. *out of* Porphyry's *fourth Book of Philosophick History.*

† Οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ δεύτερον καὶ τὸ τρίτον αἴτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζειν εἰώθειν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως εἰληφέναι φησὶ, &c. L. 7. c. 6.

‖ Καὶ ὅτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ λογος, καθ' ὃν ἀεὶ ὄντα, τὰ γινομενα ἐγίνετο, &c. See Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 11. c. 9.

have

have been with God, and to be God, &c. Which *Platonick* Doctrine amounts to this Acknowledgment of *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria*, approv'd of by *Athanaſius*, That *God is an eternal Light, which never began, and ſhall never ceaſe to be*; * *wherefore there is an ethereal Splendor co exiſtent alſo with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, ſhining out before him.*

But touching the third Hypoſtaſis call'd *Soul*, it may be queſtion'd by ſome, whether *Plato* held the *Eternity* of it or no; becauſe in his *Timæus*, tho he acknowledg'd it to be ſenior to the World, yet does he ſeem to attribute a *temporary Generation* or Nativity to it. Nevertheleſs it is no way probable, that *Plato*'s *third* Principle of all things, in his Epiſtle to *Dionyſius*; and that *Pſyche* or *Soul* of his, which is the only God, and which in his Tenth *de Legibus* he goes about to prove againſt Atheiſts, ſhould ever not have been; and therefore it is moſt reaſonable to compound this buſineſs thus, by ſuppoſing with *Plotinus* and others, that *Plato* held a double *Soul*, one ἐγκόσμιον or *mundane*, which is as it were the concrete Form of this corporeal World, and whereby this World is properly made an Animal and a *ſecond* or *created God*; another ὑπερκόσμιον, *ſupra mundane* or ſeparate, and which is not ſo much the Form, as the Artificer of the World. The firſt of which two is term'd by *Plotinus* the *Heavenly* Venus, † *a certain ſeparate Subſtance which does not at all partake of Matter, as the Fable intimated, when it call'd it Motherleſs*; and again he ſays of it, That *this Soul can never fall, it being much more cloſely united and connected with that*

* Οὐκοῦν ἀϊδίως προσκεῖσθαι καὶ σύνεσιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, &c.

† Χωρισὴν ὅσαν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν, ὅθεν αὐτὴν τέλεον ἀϊδιότητος τοῦ ἀμήτορα εἶναι. En. 3. l. 5. c. 2.

immovable

immovable Mind or Intellect, from which it was begotten, *than that Light which is circumfus'd about the Sun, is connected with the Sun* *. But the second he terms a *lower Venus*, or that which in the Fable is said to have been begotten from *Jupiter* himself, the *superior Soul* of the World, and *Dione* a wateriſh Nymph. Wherefore we conclude that tho this *lower mundane Soul* might, according to *Plato*, have a temporary Production together with the World or before it; yet that other *superior and most divine Soul*, which *Plotinus* calls the Heavenly *Venus* and Love, the *Son of Chronos or Mind, without a Mother*, and which was truly the third Hypoſtaſis of *Plato*'s Trinity, was eternal and without beginning. But to conclude this Head, touching the *Eternity* of the *three Hypoſtaſes*, I ſhall only add two more general Teſtimonys concerning it: the firſt is of *Plato* himſelf, in his ſecond Epiſtle to *Dionyſius*; where after he had mention'd his *Firſt*, *Second*, and *Third*, that is, his *Trinity of Divine Hypoſtaſes*, immediately ſubjoins theſe Words: "The Mind of Man, as par-
"turient, has always a great deſire to know what theſe
"things are, and to that end does it look upon things
"cognate to it, which are all inſufficient, imperfect
"and heterogeneous. † But in that King of all things,
"and in the other ſecond and third, which I ſpake of,
"there is nothing of this kind; that is, nothing like to theſe created things. The other Teſtimony is this of *Athanaſius*, who affirms concerning the *Platonicks*, that tho they deriv'd the *ſecond* Hypoſtaſis of their Trinity from the *firſt*, and the *third* from the

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* Οὐσί' ἂν ἐκπέσοι, νῦ ἐξηρ]ημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ αὐτῦ, ὅταν αὐ]ὸν περιλάμπει φῶς, εἰς αὐ]ὸν ϑυνηρ]ημένον. Ib.

† Τῦ ὃ Βασιλέως πέρι, κὴ ὧν εἶπον, ϑέμις τοιῦ]ο.

ſecond,

ſecond, yet they ſuppos'd both their *ſecond* and *third Hypoſtaſes* to be *uncreated*; and therefore does he ſend the *Arians* to School thither, who becauſe there is but one Ἀγέννητος, *one ſelf-originated Being*, would unskilfully conclude, that the *Word* or *Son* of God muſt therefore needs be a *Creature*. Thus in his Book concerning the Decrees of the *Nicene Conncil*, "The "*Arians*, ſays he, borrowing the word Ἀγέννητος from "the Pagans, who acknowledg only one ſuch, make "that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, "who is the Creator of all, amongſt Creatures or "Things made. Whereas they ought to have learn'd "the right ſignification of that word Ἀγέννητος, from "thoſe very *Platoniſts*, who gave it them, and "who, tho acknowledging their ſecond Hypoſtaſis of "Mind or Intellect to be deriv'd from the firſt call'd "τ' αγαθὸν, or the Good, and their third Hypoſtaſis "call'd Soul from the ſecond, nevertheleſs doubt not to "affirm them both to be *Ἀγέννητα or uncreated, know-"ing well that hereby they detract nothing from the "Majeſty of the firſt, from whom theſe two are de-"riv'd. Wherefore the *Arians* ought ſo to ſpeak as "the *Platoniſts* do, or elſe to ſay nothing at all con-"cerning theſe things, of which they are ignorant.

The ſecond incommunicable Attribute apply'd to the three Hypoſtaſes, and which therefore proves 'em to be but *one God*, is *neceſſary Exiſtence*. Now to this purpoſe the *Platoniſts* aſſert that the *firſt* Hypoſtaſis can no more exiſt without the *ſecond*, nor the *firſt* and *ſecond* without the *third*, than original *Light* can exiſt without

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* *Obſerve the Difference between* ἀγεννητος *and* ἀγενητος, *the former ſignifying* unbegotten, *and only applicable to the* firſt Divine Hypoſtaſis; *the latter ſignifying* uncreated, *and applicable to all of 'em.*

its

its *Splendor*, *Coruscation*, and *Effulgency*: accordingly by this Comparison do they most frequently illustrate this Doctrine; the first Hypostasis being like the *Sun*, the Fountain of *Light*; the second being like to that *radious Effulgency*, which immediately encompassing them is beheld together with them, and, as the Astronomers tell us, augments their apparent Diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, as they are beheld thro Telescopes, cutting off their luxuriant and circumambient Rays; the third being resembl'd to the remoter and more distant *Splendor*, which circling, still gradually decreases. Thus *Plotinus* concerning the *first* and *second Hypostasis*: * *How*, says he, *should we consider this second Hypostasis otherwise, than as a confus'd Splendor, which encompasseth the Body of the Sun, and from that always remaining, is perpetually generated anew?* and of the third he says, that it is that † *which moveth about Mind or Intellect, the Light or Effulgency thereof, and its Print or Signature, which always depends upon it and acts according to it.* Which kind of Similitudes, as *sensibly* making for the Belief of a Trinity in Unity, were frequently us'd by the antient Fathers of the Christian Church.

But thirdly I say, that as the *three Divine Hypostases* were held by the *Platonists* to be eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly suppos'd by 'em to be *universal*, which is such an Epithet, as can agree to none but the *one supreme God*: inasmuch as I here understand by it, that they being both *infinite* and *omnipotent*, did both make and do still rule over all things, and contain or comprehend the whole World under 'em.

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* Πῶς ἂν καὶ τι δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μόνον; περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν, &c.

† Τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον καὶ νοῦ φῶς καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου.

For

For thus are they expreſly ſtil'd in general, * *Principles, Cauſes,* and *Opificers* of the World; they being, according to the genuine and moſt antient *Platonick* Doctrine, the Joint-Creators of all things beſides themſelves, as † *Ficinus* more than once declares the Tenor thereof; and before him *Proclus,* ‖ *All things,* ſays he, *depend upon the firſt One by Mind and Soul.* Again in particular, that the *Platoniſts* held their *firſt* Hypoſtaſis to be a Principle and Governour of all things, is unqueſtionable; and as to the *ſecond,* this they ſometimes term, as our Goſpel does, λόγον, *Reaſon* or *Word,* as well as νῶν or *Mind,* and likewiſe the *Son* of the *firſt,* and affirm'd it to be the *Artificer and Cauſe of the whole World*; this, as *Proclus* tells us, was commonly meant by *Plato,* that ** *the Opificer was Intellect:* and we find him himſelf declaring in his *Philebus,* that †† *Mind always rules over the whole Univerſe.* Again, it is affirm'd by *Amelius* in the place before-mention'd, that this ‖‖ *was the* λόγος *or Word, by whom all things were made; and that whatſoever was made, was Life and Being in him.* Agreeably to this St. *Auſtin* writes concerning a *Platoniſt* in his time, who, as *Simplicianus,* afterwards Biſhop of *Milan,* had told him, affirm'd (*a*) *that the Beginning of St.* John's *Goſpel deſerv'd to be writ in Letters of Gold, and ſet*

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* Ἀρχαὶ, εἴλια, καὶ δημιουργοὶ.

† Hi tres uno quodam conſenſu omnia producunt. *In Plotin. En.* 1. *l.* 2.

‖ Πάντα ἀν ἤρτηται τῷ ἑνὶ διὰ νῶ καὶ καὶ ψυχῆς.

** Δημιουργὸς ὁ νῶς Πλάτωνι. †† Ὡς ἀεὶ τῶ παντὸς νῶς ἄρχει.

‖‖ Καὶ ἔστος ἦν ὁ λόγος, &c. ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἀπλῶς γεγένηται.

(*a*) Initium ſancti Evangelii, cui nomen eſt ſecundum Johannem, quidam Platonicus, ſicut a ſancto ſene Simpliciano, qui poſtea Mediolanenſi Eccleſiæ præſedit Epiſcopus, audire ſolebamus, aureis Literis conſcribendum, & per omnes Eccleſias in locis eminentiſſimis proponendum eſſe dicebat. *De Civ. Dei l.* 10. *c.* 29.

up in all the moſt eminent places throughout the Chriſtian Churches. Likewiſe *Origen* tells us that the ſecond Hypoſtaſis or *Son of God* was plainly ſpoken of by *Plato* in his Epiſtle to *Hermias* and *Coriſcus*, and there call'd by him * *the God of the whole Univerſe, and the Prince of all things both preſent and future.*

Moreover, as to the *third Platonick Hypoſtaſis*, this alſo is often call'd by *Amelius*, *Plotinus*, and other *Platoniſts*, the † *Artificer* or *Opificer* of the whole World: likewiſe *Plato* himſelf ſpeaking of it in his *Cratylus*, beſtows the name of ζεὺς, that is, of the *ſupreme God* upon it, and etymologizes the ſame from ζῆν, and adds theſe Words concerning it, that *there is nothing, which is more the Cauſe of Life to us and all other Animals, than this Prince and King of all things; and that therefore God was call'd by the* Greeks ζεὺς, *becauſe it is by him that all Animals live.* And that all this was meant properly by him of the *third Hypoſtaſis* of his Trinity call'd *Soul*, is manifeſt from thoſe words of his that follow, where he expounding the Poetick Mythology, makes ζεὺς to be the Son of χρόνος: ‖ *It is agreeable*, ſays he, *to Reaſon that* ζεὺς *ſhould be the Progeny or Off-ſpring of a certain great Mind*, that is, of the *ſecond Hypoſtaſis*; and again he expreſly calls it the Inſpirer of all Life, and Creator of all Souls.

Thus we find ſuch Characters apply'd to the three *Platonick Hypoſtaſes*, as being incommunicable, do plainly prove 'em to be but *one God*. To which it may be further added, that when God is ſo often ſpoken of in *Plato* ſingularly, the word is not always to be underſtood of the *firſt Hypoſtaſis* only, but many

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* Cont. Celſ. l. 6. † Δημίουργος.

‖ Εὔλογον ᾧ μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία.

times

times of the *firſt*, *ſecond*, and *third* altogether, or that whole θεῖον or Divinity, which conſiſts or is made up of theſe three Hypoſtaſes. Which will more plainly appear from hence, that when the *whole World* is ſaid in *Plato* to be *the Image of the eternal Gods*, as alſo by *Plotinus*, of a *firſt*, *ſecond*, and *third*, *by whom it is always produc'd a-new*, *as the Image in a Glaſs*; this is not to be underſtood, as if the World being tripartite, each third part thereof was ſeverally produc'd or created by one of thoſe three; nor can it be conceiv'd how there ſhou'd be three really diſtinct Creations of one and the ſame thing. Wherefore the World having but one Creation, and yet being created by thoſe three Divine Hypoſtaſes, it follows that they are all three really but *one Creator* and *one God*. Thus when both in *Plato* and *Plotinus* the Lives and Souls of all Animals, as Stars, Dæmons, and Men, are attributed to the *third Hypoſtaſis*, the *higher and great Soul*, as their Fountain and Cauſe, after a ſpecial manner, according as in the *Nicene* Creed the *Holy Ghoſt* is ſtil'd *the Lord and Giver of Life*; this is not ſo to be underſtood as if therefore the firſt and ſecond Hypoſtaſes were to be excluded from having any Cauſality therein. For the firſt is ſtil'd by *Plato* alſo * *the Cauſe of all good things*, and therefore doubtleſs chiefly of *Souls*; and the ſecond is call'd by him and others too, as we have before obſerv'd, the † *Cauſe and Artificer* of the whole World. Whence we conclude that *Souls* being created by the joint Concurrence and Influence of theſe *three Hypoſtaſes ſubordinate*, they are all really but one and the ſame God: and thus it is expreſly affirm'd

* Αἴτιον ἀπάντων τῶν καλῶν.
† Αἴτιον καὶ δημιουργός.

by *Porphyrius* in St. *Cyril*, that *the Eſſence of the Divinity proceeds or propagates it ſelf, by way of Deſcent downwards, unto three Hypoſtaſes or Subſiſtences. The higheſt God is* τ'αγαθὸν, *or the ſupreme Good; the ſecond next after him is the Architect or Maker of the World; and the Soul of the World is the third: for the Divinity extendeth ſo far as to this Soul.* And thus St. *Cyril* himſelf owns that the Platoniſts * *ſuppoſing three Hypoſtaſes, which have the nature of Principles in the Univerſe, do extend the Eſſence of the Godhead to 'em*; and by conſequence conceive 'em to be but *one God.*

But after all perhaps 'twill be demanded what kind of Unity of the three Hypoſtaſes the *Platoniſts* meant, whether a ſpecifical or numerical? As to which I anſwer, that the true *Platonick* Philoſophers have not expreſly declar'd their Minds touching either of theſe Unitys, but however they may be very probably concluded to have underſtood a *numerical Unity:* becauſe this alone would ſute with their main Hypotheſis of a *firſt Principle* of all other things, and their ſteady Belief of *one God.* And accordingly I add, that if, as ſome think, they meant a *ſpecifical Unity* of the Divine Hypoſtaſes, then all I have been ſaying is in vain and to no purpoſe; it having been my principal drift to prove that the *Trinity* of Hypoſtaſes, according to the *Platoniſts*, does not imply a *Tritheiſm:* Whereas if the *Unity* of 'em be but only *ſpecifical*, it plainly infers a *Tritheiſm* or three Gods; which Inference, and therefore, I may ſay, the Premiſe to it, Dr. *Cudworth* very truly, tho not conſiſtently with himſelf, affirms that the *Platoniſts* were abhorrent from. Firſt, I ſay, that he affirms

* Τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ὑπολαμβάνοντες καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ τεταμκέναι ἰσχυρισάμενοι.

this

this very truly, * where having mention'd that the *Platoniſts* held a Dependence and Subordination of the ſecond and third Hypoſtaſes, he intimates that otherwiſe they would have concluded 'em to be *three co-ordinate Gods*, " having, ſays he, only a generical or ſpe-
" cifical Identity, and ſo no more one than three
" Men are one Man; a thing which the *Platonick*
" Theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which
" is inconſiſtent with the perfect Monarchy of the
" Univerſe, and highly derogatory from the Honour of
" the ſupreme God and firſt Cauſe. In which words it is moſt plain that the *Platoniſts*, according to him, in no wiſe admitting of *three co-ordinate Gods*, both muſt and do therefore deny a ſpecifical Unity of their three Divine Hypoſtaſes. Wherefore this, I ſay, he affirms very truly, tho as it appears afterwards, not conſiſtently with himſelf; becauſe elſewhere he plainly affirms, † That " the *Platoniſts* dream'd of no ſuch
" thing at all as one and the ſame numerical Eſſence or
" Subſtance of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes. Here he unſays what was juſt before ſaid, and declaring the *Platoniſts* to deny a numerical, muſt needs ſuppoſe 'em to have held a ſpecifical Unity of the Godhead. But this he does in a way not uſual to him, without citing one Authority; the reaſon of which is, becauſe I think there is none for it, the *Platoniſts* having not, as I before hinted, expreſly declar'd their minds touching either Unity: wherefore it muſt be only from their Silence that the Doctor concludes 'em to have never dream'd of the ſame numerical Eſſence of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes; while notwithſtanding upon bet-

* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 590.
† True Intel. Syſt. *p.* 592.

ter

ter grounds he might much rather have concluded the contrary. The *Platoniſts* might have dream'd or thought of this Unity, tho they never expreſly declar'd their Thoughts; and I make no queſtion but that if the ſenſe of the Terms be rightly ſtated, they much leſs dream'd of a ſpecifical Unity of the Godhead, and that the Doctor himſelf would not in earneſt deny that they did ſo. Accordingly again we find him compounding the matter * elſewhere; in that he admits, "That the genuine *Platoniſts* ſuppoſing the "three Hypoſtaſes of their Trinity to be all of them "not only *God*, but alſo *one God* or one entire Divinity, "upon this latter account the whole may be ſaid, that "is, *truly* ſaid alſo by them to have one ſingular or "numerical Eſſence. But then he preſently flies off again, and adds this other Self-inconſiſtency, "† That "the *Platoniſts* no where ſuppoſe each of theſe three "Hypoſtaſes to be *numerically* the very ſame, or to "have no diſtinct ſingular Eſſences of their own, "this being in their Apprehenſions, directly contra-"dictory to their very Hypotheſis it ſelf, and all one "as if they ſhould affirm them indeed not to be "three Hypoſtaſes but only one. According to which Words, if the three Hypoſtaſes do numerically differ, the Unity of 'em in the Godhead can be but ſpecifical; and this is that which he afterwards contends for. By conſequence herein he again in truth infers 'em, according to his own ſenſe of the Term before-mention'd, to hold three Gods; which yet in the Sequel of the ſame || Paſſage he abſolutely denies in words that they ever did. Now what ſhall we ſay to all this? Were either the thoughtful *Platoniſts*, or the Learned Doctor

* Intel. Syſt. p. 601. † Ibid. || P. 590.

in

in giving an account of 'em, guilty of a downright Contradiction, in ſaying that the three Divine Hypoſtaſes had one and the ſame numerical Eſſence, and that they had not; but only the ſame ſpecifical one? Or that they had only the ſame ſpecifical Eſſence, and that they had not; but alſo the ſame numerical one? Theſe Extremes are plainly contradictory, and cannot at once be truly affirm'd of the *ſame thing*, *in the ſame reſpect*, *and after the ſame manner*. How then ſhall we bring off the *Platoniſts* and the Doctor (ſuppoſing that *they* really fluctuated in this Point, as *he* does in his Account of 'em) from the Imputation of this ſeeming Abſurdity and appearance of Falſhood?

Now this, I think, cannot otherwiſe be attempted, than by clearing the Ambiguity of the Terms, *Specifical* and *Numerical*; which being made uſe of ſometimes in one ſenſe, ſometimes in another, have occaſion'd theſe ſeeming Contradictions and Self-inconſiſtencys. Touching the former, namely the word *Specifical*, the Doctor in the Paſſage firſt cited, where he aſſerts, that according to the *Platoniſts*, the Admiſſion of a *Generical* or *Specifical* Unity only of the *three Hypoſtaſes*, *would infer three co-ordinate Gods*; *a thing*, ſays he, *which the* Platonick *Theology is utterly abhorrent from*: The Doctor, I ſay, in this Paſſage, underſtands the Term *Specifical* in a true Logical Senſe, as ſignifying that which is *predicable of more that are under it*, *numerically differing from each other*, *that is*, *of more Individuals*: according to which Senſe of the word, were the Unity of the Divine Hypoſtaſes only *Specifical*, then would God himſelf be a *Subſtantia ſecunda*, like *Homo* or *Man* in reference to the Individuals of Human kind; and the *three Divine Hypoſtaſes*, *three Individual Gods*, ſubjected to an univerſal Godhead, as the *Species*

of

of them: but this he very well ſays that the *Platoniſts were abhorrent from.*

Again I add as touching the word *Numerical*; when he ſays * that *the genuine* Platoniſts *holding the three Hypoſtaſes of their Trinity to be all of 'em not only* God, *but alſo* one God *or an entire Divinity*; *upon this account the whole may be ſaid alſo by them to have one ſingular or numerical Eſſence.* Here he alſo takes the word *Numerical* in a true Logical Senſe, as denoting the Godhead to be a *Subſtantia prima*, which is *not affirm'd of a Subject*, or is not predicable of any Inferiors, differing *Eſſentiâ*, that is, of whom it can be ſaid that the Eſſence of one is not alſo that of another: and in this ſenſe, according to him, the *Platoniſts* might ſay, that the three Divine Hypoſtaſes (tho otherwiſe diſtinguiſh'd amongſt themſelves) have one and the ſame numerical Eſſence. But whereas he again ſeems to contradict this in ſaying elſewhere, that *the* Platoniſts *never dream'd of any ſuch thing as one and the ſame numerical Eſſence or Subſtance of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes*; *and that they no where ſuppoſe the three Divine Hypoſtaſes to have no diſtinct ſingular Eſſences of their own*, &c †. *becauſe this would be in effect to affirm 'em to be not three Hypoſtaſes but only one*; and therefore would needs have it, that they muſt have held only a *ſpecifical Identity* of the Hypoſtaſes. Here I perceive him to be under a Miſtake, at leaſt of Terms, in firſt making no diſtinction between *Divine Hypoſtaſes* and *Individuals*; the latter of which do differ *numero*, that is, have their diſtinct ſingular Eſſences, and are ſubjected to the ſame Species; but the former as ſubſiſting in the Divine Eſſence neither can be nor were ſuppos'd even by the *Platoniſts* to differ *numero*, or to have their

* P. 601. † P. 592, 601.

diſtinct

diſtinct ſingular Eſſences, but only their diſtinct Perſonalitys, that is ſome certain Notes or Propertys, and as it were individuating Circumſtances, by which they reſpectively differ amongſt themſelves, ſo as not *to be one and the ſame Hypoſtaſis*, tho, abſolutely ſpeaking, they have one and the ſame numerical Eſſence, and are indeed *one God*. But this Divine Eſſence, becauſe it is common to and predicable of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes (not three Individuals) the Doctor agreeably to the former Miſtake does again illogically confound with ſpecifical; I ſay illogically, becauſe tho the word *Common* be indeed very applicable in this caſe, yet the word *Specifical*, if apply'd by the Doctor to the Godhead, in reference to the three Hypoſtaſes, according to the true logical or metaphyſical Senſe of it, would at once argue him to contradict what he had before ſaid *, and, as I have already noted, would infer the *Platoniſts* to be Tritheiſts; neither of which can I believe that he did in good earneſt, he being undoubtedly a Perſon of too much Judgment to be guilty of the former, and it being his main drift to diſprove the latter. Wherefore granting his inward Meaning to have been uniform and right, I muſt needs beg leave to ſay that he was too looſe and unwary in the Uſage of Terms; and that had he but ſtuck, in his Account of the *Platoniſts*, to the former Diſtinction, which he † ſaid was made by them, that οὐσία, *Eſſence* or *Subſtance*, differs from ὑπόστασις, as τὸ κοινὸν from τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, *that which is common and general, from that which is proper and ſingular*; he might have ſet all at rights in few words, and talk'd more conſiſtently, without incurring the Suſpicion of being a Tritheiſt himſelf, or of repreſenting the *Pla-*

* P. 590. † P. 596.

toniſts as ſuch; and withal might have ſav'd himſelf the great pains he has taken from *p.* 601. to almoſt the end of his fourth Chapter, to prove that the antient Fathers of the Chriſtian Church were generally of the ſame Perſuaſion, in that they alſo aſſerted no other than a ſpecifical Unity of three Divine Hypoſtaſes. For tho it be granted, which is all that his Quotations and Reaſonings amount to, that they did *in words* aſſert only a ſpecifical Unity of the Divine Hypoſtaſes; yet while they meant no more by ſpecifical, as is very fully ſhewn in the Introduction, than common or general, and held that the three Divine Hypoſtaſes, tho having a kind of Individuation and Marks of a real Diſtinction between themſelves, yet were not abſolutely three Individuals, as they muſt be, were they ſubject or inferior to the Godhead as a *Species*, I cannot but look upon the whole of this Debate to be a mere Logomachy, or Contention about Words: becauſe I ſay, it being plain, that the Fathers underſtood no more by ſpecifical than general or common, in applying it to the Unity of the three Divine Hypoſtaſes, or the Identity of the Godhead as predicable of them, it does in no wiſe follow, that they hereby meant to exclude it from being what the Schoolmen and the preſent Church do generally hold, that the Divine Eſſence, tho ſomewhat looſly term'd *Specifical* in that ſenſe, yet is at once in a true and proper ſenſe the ſame *numerical* and *ſingular* Eſſence: ſeeing it may very well be ſuch in it ſelf, tho it be withal *common*, and ſo as it were *ſpecifical*, in reference to the three Hypoſtaſes which ſubſiſt in it, and of which it is predicable. And thus alſo accordingly may the *three Hypoſtaſes* be *as it were* three *Individuals*, in that they are *ſubjected* to the Godhead, and have ſome ſpecial Notes of Diſtinction between themſelves,

ſelves, tho, abſolutely ſpeaking, they do not differ *numero*, ſo as not to have one and the ſame *real Eſſence*. They come as near to it indeed as is poſſible, in that their different Perſonalitys may be number'd, and ſo they may be ſaid (which is all that the Fathers meant) to differ ſomewhat like *Individuals*, tho not in exactly the very ſame manner.

And no more than this can, I think, be juſtly charg'd either upon the *Platoniſts* or Fathers, without inferring 'em to have been Tritheiſts; which even Dr. *Cudworth* will not explicitly admit touching either of 'em; at leaſt (which makes for my preſent purpoſe) tho in the firſt place he affirms 'em both alike to have held no other than only a ſpecifical Unity of the Godhead, and after that attempts to vindicate the former, if in the wrong, by the unanimous Conſent of the latter; yet again having drawn in ſome more eſpecially of the antient Fathers, as verbally aſſerting this in a plainer manner than the reſt, he then ſomewhat unfairly infers the Concluſion, as if the Premiſe had been underſtood by 'em in a ſtrict and proper ſenſe, and as when apply'd to created things, ſaying that this Trinity of theirs * *plainly ſeems to be no other than a kind of Tritheiſm, and that of Gods independent and co-ordinate too.* But ſtill, I ſay (which makes for my purpoſe) he does not thus rigidly interpret the Meaning of the *Platoniſts*, tho he had before introduc'd 'em, as uttering the ſame in words, namely, † that *they no where ſuppoſe each of the three Hypoſtaſes to be numerically the very ſame* Eſſence, *or to have no diſtinct ſingular Eſſences of their own*, and by conſequence that they held the nature of the Godhead in reference to its Predicability of them to be only ſpecifical. However he now leaves the Fathers in the mire, and as guilty of downright Tritheiſm; but

* P. 604. † P. 601.

looks on the *Platoniſts* as exempted from this Charge, and upon this very occaſion ſays, " * That ſome would " therefore think that the antient and genuine *Plato-* " *nick* Trinity taken with all its Faults, is to be prefer'd " before the Trinity of St. *Cyril* and St. *Gregory Nyſſen*, " and ſeveral other reputed Orthodox Fathers; and to " be more agreeable to the Principles both of *Chriſti-* " *anity* and *Reaſon*. And again, ſeeming to recal what he had before in effect imputed to the *Platoniſts*, namely, that they aſſerted the Divine Hypoſtaſes to differ numerically, and conſequently not to agree in one and the ſame numerical, but only ſpecifical Eſſence of the Godhead (without which Imputation however, all his Apology for 'em from the Fathers would be an unpardonable Digreſſion, and not at all to the purpoſe) he ſays of them in another place; " Whether this were " a Fault or no in 'em, that they did not ſuppoſe their " Hypoſtaſes to be three Individuals under the ſame " ultimate Species, we leave others to judg †; where-by he implies it to have been a fault in the Fathers that they did ſo. But in what ſenſe the Fathers were chargeable with this I have more ſeaſonably and fully ſtated in the Introduction; and at preſent laying hold of the latter Conceſſions of the Doctor touching the *Platoniſts*, as making for my purpoſe, tho ſeemingly partial and inconſiſtent with what he ſaid of 'em before, I do from his own mouth, beſides the reaſons I urg'd for it before, conclude that the *Platoniſts*, however they Paganically or according to Cuſtom, or for want of a better word, ſometimes call'd the three Divine Hypo-ſtaſes three Gods, and thereby imply'd 'em to be as it were three Individuals, yet in earneſt underſtood 'em,

* Intel. Syſt. p. 604. † P. 624.

tho reſpectively diſtinguiſh'd among themſelves, to be but one and the ſame *numerical Eſſence*, that is, *one uncreated God.*

Thus upon the whole I have made it appear, that the Pagans univerſally aſſerted *one unmade ſupreme Deity*; and that, as *Irenæus* ſpeaks, * *they ſo ſerv'd the Creature and thoſe who are not Gods, rather than the Creator, that notwithſtanding they attributed the firſt place of the Deity to one certain ſupreme God, the Maker of this Univerſe:* and in particular I have ſhewn that the Triad neither of the ſpurious nor the genuine *Platoniſts* does in any wiſe imply a Tritheiſm, or *three eternal, uncreated Gods.* In making out which, as I have been oblig'd to ſtate the reſpective Accounts of this Triad, ſo herein by the way have I given the Reader to underſtand, that however ſome Perſons, even under the Sunſhine of Chriſtianity, do queſtion this great Article of a Trinity in Unity, as if implying a Contradiction and Repugnancy to Reaſon; yet here we have a Set of Men, eſpecially the true and genuine *Platoniſts*, who making indeed the utmoſt uſe of natural Reaſon, yet having no other Guide but that, even in this dark and difficult Point, excepting only a faint Tradition from the *Hebrews*, have aſſerted, if not orthodoxly, yet very near the matter ſo, this grand Myſtery of three eternal Hypoſtaſes as *the one Principle and Original of the whole World.* If they did not always ſpeak exactly of ſo abſtruſe a Subject, I do not much wonder, but do much rather wonder that they ſhould think ſo well, and apprehend ſo much of this incomprehenſibe Article,

* Ita Creaturæ potiùs quàm Creatori ſerviebant, & his qui non ſunt Dii, utprimum Deitatis locum attribuerent uni alicui & ſummo Fabricatori hujus Univerſitatis, Deo. *L.* 2. *c.* 9.

without

without a ſpecial Revelation from above; and that, as St. *Cyril* ſpeaks, * *Plato* (and by conſequence his genuine Followers) *was not altogether ignorant of the Truth, but that he had the knowledg of the only begotten Son of God, as likewiſe of the Holy Ghoſt, call'd by him* Pſyche.

Whereupon I cannot but here take notice of the wonderful Providence of Almighty God on two accounts: Firſt, that this Doctrine of a Trinity of Divine Hypoſtaſes ſhould find ſuch Admittance and Entertainment in the Pagan World, and be receiv'd by the wiſeſt of all their Philoſophers, before the times of *Chriſtianity*; thereby to prepare a more eaſy way for the Reception of *Chriſtianity* amongſt the Learned Pagans: which, that it prov'd ſucceſsful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the Monuments of Antiquity. And ſecondly, that beſides this Advantage from the antient Pagan *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*, as admitting a Trinity into their Theology, in like manner as *Chriſtianity* does, there is another Advantage of the ſame extending even to this preſent time, probably not unintended alſo by the Divine Wiſdom; that whereas bold and conceited Wits, raſhly condemning the Doctrine of the Trinity for Nonſenſe, abſolute Repugnancy to human Facultys, and utter Impoſſibility, have thereupon ſome of 'em quite ſhaken off *Chriſtianity* and all reveal'd Religion, profeſſing only Theiſm or Deiſm: others have fruſtrated the Deſign thereof by Paganizing it into Creature-Worſhip or Idolatry: This ignorant and conceited Confidence of both may be retunded and confuted from hence, becauſe the moſt

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* Πλὴν ἐκ ἠγνόηκεν ὁλοσρόπως τὸ ἀληθὲς, &c.

ingenious

ingenious and acute of all the Pagan Philoſophers, the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*, who had no Byaſs at all upon them, nor any Scripture Revelation, that might ſeem to impoſe upon their Facultys, but follow'd the free Sentiments and Dictates of their own Minds, did notwithſtanding not only entertain this Trinity of Divine Hypoſtaſes, eternal and uncreated, but were alſo fond of the Hypotheſis, and made it a main Fundamental of their Theology. But of this only by the way.

Thus far I have declar'd in the fourth and this fifth Chapter what the *Idea* of God is, namely *a perfect underſtanding Nature, neceſſarily ſelf-exiſtent, and the Cauſe of all other things.* And as there is nothing unconceivable or contradictious in this Idea, ſo have I ſhew'd that theſe confounded Atheiſts do not only at the ſame time, when they verbally deny an Idea of God, implicitly acknowledg and confeſs it; foraſmuch as otherwiſe, denying his Exiſtence, they would deny the Exiſtence of they know not what: but alſo that they agree with Theiſts in this very Idea, it being the only thing which Atheiſts contend for, that the firſt Original and Head of all things is no perfect underſtanding Nature, but that all ſprung from *Thohou* and *Bohou*, or *dark and ſenſleſs Matter fortuitouſly mov'd.* Moreover, I have not only thus declar'd the Idea of God, but alſo largely prov'd and made it clearly evident that the generality of Mankind in all Ages have had a Prolepſis or Anticipation in their Minds concerning the real and actual Exiſtence of ſuch a Being. The Pagans themſelves, beſides their many other Gods, which were underſtanding Beings ſuperiour to Men, acknowledging one *chief* and *ſovereign Deity*, the Maker of them all,

all, and of the whole World. From whence it plainly appears, that thoſe few Atheiſts, who formerly have been, and ſtill are here and there up and down in the World, are no other than the Anomalys and Monſters of Human kind: and this alone might be ſufficient to repel the firſt Atheiſtick Aſſault made againſt the Idea of God. But becauſe it may be, that after this firſt Blow, the Atheiſts will pretend to reinforce themſelves, and then to attack us again in this Quarter, I ſhall in the next Chapter particularly declare all their other moſt colourable Pretences againſt the Idea of God, and then ſhew the Folly and Invalidity of them *.

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* *A much larger, tho ſomewhat confus'd Account, firſt of the* Pſeudo-Platonick, *ſecondly of the true* Platonick *Trinity; together with a long Digreſſion touching the Agreement or Diſagreement of the latter with the Chriſtian Trinity, and particularly its Conformity to the Belief of the antient Fathers of the Church, may be ſeen in Dr.* Cudworth's True Intel. Syſt. *from* p. 546. *to* p. 632.

The End of the Firſt Volume.